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ABSTRACT 
The research reported in this doctoral thesis aims to contribute to the corporate finance 
literature by focusing on the interdependence of corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions of UK-listed companies, within the period 1999–2008. The thesis consists of six 
chapters. After the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 critically reviews the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on corporate investment, financing and payout policies, from which 
several promising research ideas are identified. Chapter 3 investigates the interactions among 
the three corporate decisions. One of the key findings is that the three corporate decisions are 
likely to be jointly determined in the presence of financial constraints. The results also suggest 
that the effect of uncertainty on corporate investment is significantly positive, but the effect 
on dividend payout is significantly negative. Chapter 4 explores the influence of managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment on the set of jointly determined corporate decisions. An 
important finding is that the state of confidence at aggregate levels has significantly positive 
effects on both real investment and debt financing decisions. Chapter 5 discriminates 
conceptually and evaluates empirically twenty alternative measures of corporate investment 
used in the existing literature. It is found that conclusions drawn from empirical analyses are 
likely to be sensitive to the choice of corporate investment measures, indicating that the 
measurement of corporate investment behaviour matters. The key findings of the thesis are 
summarised in the conclusion chapter, alongside some promising ideas for further research.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Corporate investment, financing and payout choices are known as the trilogy of corporate 
decisions (see Wang, 2010), and are believed to have significant influence on corporate 
performance. They have attracted great attention in the existing literature (see, for example, 
Denis and Osobov, 2008; Almeida and Campello, 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Baker et al., 
2002; among many others). Companies use internal and external funds to finance their 
investment projects, in an attempt to maximise their company value and thus shareholders’ 
wealth. Internal funds are chiefly represented by retained earnings and non-cash expenses; 
and external funds mainly refer to the proceeds from issuing new debt and new equity. 
Managers, therefore, have to make both real (i.e. non-financial) and financial decisions. The 
real decisions are concerned with the optimal level of capital investment; while financial 
decisions are concerned with how to finance the desired investment, which involves the 
appraisal of two financial choices. One is dividend payout choice, i.e. how much internally 
generated funds should be paid out to shareholders as dividends which otherwise could be 
re-invested in the business. The other is external financing choice, i.e. how much external 
funds does a company need to raise from outside capital markets for its investment.  
Although much effort has been devoted to investigating the corporate behaviour of 
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companies, the three corporate decisions are typically discussed separately and routinely 
examined in isolation rather than altogether. Indeed, the seminal works by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) posit separately the investment separation 
principle, capital structure irrelevance theorem and dividend irrelevance theorem (hereafter 
the Modigliani-Miller theorems). The Modigliani-Miller theorems demonstrate that internal 
and external funds for a company are perfect substitutes in a perfect market environment, and 
hence the company’s optimal level of investment should be determined solely by its real 
considerations and totally independent of its financial decisions. Both capital structure and 
dividend payout choices, thus, should have no impact on company value, and be irrelevant to 
shareholders’ wealth, suggesting no interdependencies among the set of corporate decisions 
within a perfect market environment. As a result, each of the three corporate decisions has 
been widely and intensively scrutinised in the existing corporate finance literature, but we 
know little about the interactions that may exist among them. 
Prior research, however, has provided reasons and evidence that financial constraints 
in the real world, such as insufficient availability of internal funds and limited access to new 
external funds, may hamper companies’ ability to invest efficiently (see, for example, Fazzari 
et al., 1988; and Guariglia, 2008). It is true that in practice the corporate decisions are related 
through the accounting identity, in that sources of funds must equal uses of funds. So when a 
company adjusts any one policy, the other policies may also be affected. Therefore, 
companies should consider their investment decisions alongside their fund-raising choices. 
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Although no consensus has been reached, an important implication is that corporate 
investment, financing and payout decisions are likely to be interdependent upon one another 
and jointly determined by management. The single equation frameworks used by prior 
research without explicitly accounting for the interdependence among corporate decisions 
may be misspecified, which potentially leads to incomplete and biased results. A simultaneous 
equations framework, therefore, is likely to provide greater insight into the inter-relationships 
that may exist among the set of corporate decisions, improving our knowledge of corporate 
decision-making processes in the real world. It is worth highlighting that, by referring to the 
simultaneous determination of corporate decisions throughout the thesis, we are by no means 
arguing that corporate decisions are necessarily made at the same time, but rather that they are 
likely to be executed on simultaneously so that the outcomes can be observed via a 
simultaneous approach. 
Recent literature that seeks to explore the determinants of corporate investment 
behaviour has highlighted the importance of uncertainty associated with companies’ future 
prospects, even though the investment-uncertainty relationship remains theoretically 
ambiguous and empirically inconclusive (see, for example, Carruth et al., 2000; Lensink and 
Murinde, 2006; and Baum et al., 2008). However, the potential effects of uncertainty on 
corporate financing and payout decisions have received little attention. Given the fact that all 
corporate decisions are made on the basis of incomplete information and a company’s future 
cash flows are likely to be uncertain, it is reasonable to argue that the degree of uncertainty 
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matters in both corporate financing and payout decisions as well. If this is true, uncertainty 
may influence investment, not only on its own, but also through its effects on financing and 
payout choices. Prior research on corporate investment under uncertainty that ignore the roles 
played by financing and payout choices should be critically reviewed, since they may 
generate misleading results and lead to inappropriate inferences. It is, therefore, more 
plausible to model corporate investment, financing and payout decisions simultaneously, and 
to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the set of corporate decisions systematically.  
Moreover, recent developments suggest that behavioural finance plays an important 
role in explaining aspects of finance that traditional finance literature has failed to explain. 
Behavioural finance literature replaces the traditional assumption of broad rationality with a 
potentially more realistic assumption that agents’ behaviours are less than fully rational. The 
assumption of less than full rationality finds strong support from a large body of 
psychological literature (see, for example, Gilovich et al., 2002). The behavioural finance 
approach is now commonly used in asset pricing literature, in which investors are assumed to 
be less than fully rational. Corporate finance literature, however, rarely relaxes the assumption 
that managers are fully rational. Although the theoretical framework in this emerging area has 
not been firmly established and the empirical evidence is still relatively rare (see Baker et al., 
2006), it is plausible to hypothesise that the less than fully rational manager approach to 
behavioural corporate finance has the potential to explain a wide range of patterns in 
companies’ investment, financing and payout choices. This thesis, therefore, also extends the 
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existing corporate finance literature by incorporating the state of managerial confidence and 
economic sentiment into corporate behavioural models in an attempt to provide new insights 
into the influence of managers’ psychological bias on aspects of corporate behaviour.  
1.2 Data and methodology 
The research methodology adopted by this study is described in Figure 1.1, using a simple 
flowchart. It starts with a comprehensive and critical review of the existing literature, which is 
not only helpful in understanding the relevant context of this study, but also useful for 
identifying the potential gaps in the previous studies from which a number of research ideas 
are proposed. The promising research ideas are used to develop testable hypotheses and to 
formulate empirical models.  
The data used in this study are collected from different sources, which are mainly 
secondary and thus available electronically through financial and economic information 
providers. Specifically, accounting and financial data for the companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) within the period from 1999 to 2008 are retrieved from the 
Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. Stock price data for the same batch 
of companies over the same period of time are collected from the DataStream database. The 
indicators for managerial confidence and economic sentiment are publicly available from the 
European Commission Economic Database. Worldscope is chosen as the principal data source 
since it is the most comprehensive web-based database covering accounting and financial 
information for companies from 130 exchanges, including the LSE listed companies.   
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Figure 1.1: Flowchart for the research methodology of this study  
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At the data collection stage, as many companies, years and items as possible are 
collected to form our dataset in order to prevent the need for extra data collection at later 
stages. The initial dataset has more than 30,000,000 data entries. There are, however, some 
variations among the sample sizes used in different empirical works presented in this thesis, 
depending on the objectives of the studies, the specifications of the models as well as the 
estimation techniques adopted. A detailed description of the sampling procedures employed to 
construct the final samples is given in each of the empirical chapters. 
UK-listed companies are chosen as the sample for this thesis because it is argued that 
financial constraints on corporate investment are relatively more severe in the more 
market-oriented UK financial system than in the continental European financial system (see, 
for example, Bond et al., 2003; and Seitfert and Gonenc, 2008). Bond et al. (2003) indicate 
that, compared with the continental European financial market, the market-oriented financial 
system in the UK perform less well in channelling investment funds to companies with 
profitable investment opportunities because of the arm’s-length relation between companies 
and suppliers of finance. The market-oriented financial system in the UK thus may give rise 
to financial constraints for the UK-listed companies. Moreover, Seifert and Gonenc (2008) 
point out that the ownership of the UK-listed companies is considerably dispersed as 
compared to companies in other markets. Because of the relatively widespread ownership of 
stock, investors in the UK face more severe problems of information asymmetry, which may 
also give rise to financial constraints. Therefore, the interactions among corporate investment, 
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financing and payout decisions are likely to be more pronounced for the UK-listed companies 
which tend to be characterised by severe financial constraints. Besides, this study focus on the 
corporate decisions made by the UK-listed companies over the period 1999–2008 which 
allow us to sidestep the data breaks that characterise the period 2009–2012. 
The dataset is organised as a panel which has both cross-company and time-series 
dimensions. The pooling of company-year observations provides a more informative dataset 
which enables us to tackle the complexity of corporate decision-making procedures by 
relaxing the assumptions that are implicitly made in pure cross-sectional or pure time-series 
analysis (see, for example, Baltagi, 2008; and Brooks, 2008). Therefore, the rich structure 
makes the panel dataset intuitively more preferable than pure cross-sectional and pure 
time-series data in the context of empirical corporate finance research. 
The empirical models formulated in this thesis are estimated using a number of 
estimation techniques for panel data, including fixed effect, random effect, first-difference 
generalised method of moments (difference-GMM), system generalised method of moments 
(system-GMM), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimations. The choice of estimation methods largely depends on the model specification, the 
sampling procedure and the results from statistical tests. Diagnostic tests and robustness 
checks are also carried out to statistically evaluate the estimation results. If a model is not 
statistically adequate, either the model will be reformulated or a different estimation technique 
will be used. The process of building a statistically adequate and robust model, therefore, is an 
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iterative one, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The empirical results obtained from estimating 
statistically adequate models are interpreted with reference to theoretical predictions.  
Overall, the main research methodology adopted by this thesis is empirical. The thesis 
as a whole is structured following the steps described in Figure 1.1. Besides this, the empirical 
papers presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are also structured in such a way as to ensure a good 
understanding of the existing literature, promising research ideas, solid theoretical 
frameworks, a sufficiently large dataset, appropriate econometric techniques, testing for 
robustness of empirical results, credible interpretations, and thus reliable findings and 
conclusions. A detailed methodology is provided in each of the empirical chapters.  
1.3 Structure and scope of the thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters, including an introduction, a literature review chapter, three 
stand-alone empirical chapters and a conclusion. The remainder of the thesis is structured as 
follows. 
Chapter 2 critically reviews the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, on 
corporate investment, financing and payout policies. Corporate finance theories about the 
three key corporate decisions are briefly reviewed respectively, together with recent empirical 
evidence, in order to explore the current state of knowledge on aspects of corporate behaviour. 
More importantly, some prior studies attempt to examine how various frictions in the real 
world may drive linkages among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions. The 
mechanisms through which the set of corporate decisions may affect one another are explored 
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in detail. Furthermore, since uncertainty has been identified as a key determinant of corporate 
investment, Chapter 2 comprehensively reviews literature on the effect of uncertainty on 
corporate investment decisions as well as its potential effects on corporate financing and 
payout decisions. In addition, following the recent argument that managers’ psychological 
bias may explain a wide range of patterns in corporate behaviour that traditional corporate 
finance literature has failed to explain, Chapter 2 also reviews the small but growing strand of 
literature on behavioural corporate finance. Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, 
several promising research ideas are proposed, aiming to fill the critical lacunae identified in 
the existing corporate finance literature. 
Chapter 3 presents the first empirical work. It investigates the interactions among 
corporate investment, financing and payout decisions under financial constraints and 
uncertainty, using a large panel of UK-listed companies. We model these corporate decisions 
within a simultaneous equations system which explicitly allows for contemporaneous 
interdependence among them, as implied by the information asymmetry-based flow-of-funds 
framework for corporate behaviour. It is found that capital investment and dividend payout, as 
competing uses of funds, are negatively interrelated, but both are positively related to the net 
amount of new debt issued, which may imply joint determination of corporate decisions under 
financial constraints. We also offer the first attempt to examine simultaneously the effects of 
uncertainty on the three corporate decisions. The results show that the effect of uncertainty on 
corporate investment is significant and positive, while the effect on dividend payouts is 
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significant and negative. Furthermore, the results suggest that financial constraints may 
intensify simultaneity among corporate decisions, and reduce managerial flexibility to 
respond to uncertainty.  
Chapter 4 presents the second empirical work. It extends the work presented in 
Chapter 3 by taking into account the role of the state of confidence in the determination of 
corporate decisions. The relations between corporate decisions and the state of confidence are 
examined within the simultaneous equations system formulated in Chapter 3. It is found that 
the state of confidence at aggregate level, as proxied by UK or EU sector-specific managerial 
confidence indicators or overall economic sentiment indicators, has significantly positive 
effects on companies’ real investment and debt financing decisions. The significant effects of 
the state of confidence on investment and financing decisions persist even after controlling for 
company idiosyncratic uncertainty and other company-specific fundamental characteristics. 
However, corporate payout decisions are mainly affected by company idiosyncratic 
uncertainty rather than confidence at sector level or sentiment at economy level. Besides, the 
results also show that, compared with the companies in the other sectors, UK-listed 
companies in the services sector behave more aggressively when the managerial confidence 
or economic sentiment is high. Specifically, they invest in capital stock more intensively, use 
debt financing more heavily, and cut dividends more decisively when their managers are 
confident. Chapter 4 contributes to the small but growing literature on behavioural corporate 
finance, providing evidence that managers’ psychological bias plays an important role in the 
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determination of corporate decisions. 
Chapter 5 presents the third empirical work. The survey of corporate finance literature 
shows that use of corporate investment to capital stock ratio as a measure of corporate 
investment behaviour has been common practice in empirical analyses. Although the 
corporate investment measures used in the literature seem, at first sight, to be very similarly 
specified, they in fact vary in terms of the numerator and the denominator, i.e. how 
investment spending and capital stock are empirically measured. However, there is no 
literature that provides a comparison among the various versions of the corporate investment 
ratios, and thus we know little about how differently these corporate investment measures 
perform in empirical analyses. As a result, a claim has been implicitly made that the different 
measures of corporate investment can always yield equivalent results in corporate investment 
research. The purpose of Chapter 5, therefore, is to conceptually discriminate and statistically 
evaluate twenty alternative measures of corporate investment ratios which have been 
identified in the existing literature. Simple statistical and econometric procedures are utilised 
to test the sensitivity of the conclusions drawn from empirical analyses to choice of corporate 
investment measures. It is found that corporate investment measures with different 
specifications are not uniformly positively correlated with one another. Significantly negative 
correlations are also observed among the alternative measures, which appear surprising, since 
they are supposed to measure the investment behaviour of the same batch of companies over 
the same period of time. A simple regression of the Tobin’s Q model clearly shows that the 
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choice of corporate investment measures, to a considerable extent, influences the conclusions 
drawn from empirical analyses. Furthermore, the relative performances of the alternative 
corporate investment measures, in terms of volatility and information content, are empirically 
evaluated. Empirical results suggest that gross investment measures are less volatile around 
their respective trends and thus are more predictable compared with net investment measures, 
while cash based investment measures contain greater value relevant information than their 
accrual based counterparts. Accordingly, cash based gross investment measures, which 
contain relatively less noise and greater value relevant information, are recommended to 
researchers for future studies, if they have to make a mutually exclusive choice among the 
alternatives without any particular preference. 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by recapping the research questions, summarising the 
key findings, highlighting the main contributions, discussing the broad implications and 
acknowledging the limitations. A number of promising ideas for future research are also 
proposed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Investment, financing and payout choices are the three important corporate decisions that 
have attracted much attention in the literature for more than half century (see, for example, 
Denis and Osobov, 2008; Almeida and Campello, 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2003; and Baker et 
al., 2002). The seminal works by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), i.e. the Modigliani-Miller theorems, show that, in a perfect market environment, 
internal and external funds are perfect substitutes for companies to finance their investment, 
and hence the optimal level of investment should be solely determined by the real 
considerations and totally independent of the financial decisions.1 
Since the seminal works by Modigliani and Miller, researchers have tried to explain 
how real world complications alter perfect and efficient capital market conditions, and how 
market imperfections make corporate financing and payout choices relevant to investment 
decisions and company value. By relaxing Modigliani-Miller’s assumptions and introducing 
                                                 
1 The Modigliani-Miller theorems are generally considered as a cornerstone of modern corporate finance, so we shall not go 
into the details of the seminal works. Suffice it to say here that Modigliani-Miller’s assumptions include the existence of risk 
class (i.e. each company belongs to a risk class), neutral taxes (i.e. all types of tax payer and all sources of income are taxed 
at the same rate), no capital market frictions (i.e. no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, no flotation costs and no asset 
trade restrictions), symmetrical access to credit markets (i.e. the same borrowing and lending rate for companies and 
investors); corporate financial policy contains no information (i.e. financial choices cannot be used to convey any signal 
about a company’s value to investors), etc. 
 
            Chapter 2: Literature Review  
– 15 – 
market imperfections, corporate finance research has intensively scrutinised each of the three 
corporate decisions. Although much effort has been devoted to investigating the corporate 
behaviour of companies, these three corporate decisions are typically discussed separately and 
routinely examined in isolation. For example, empirical investigations of corporate 
investment decisions commonly utilise a single equation framework in which a corporate 
investment measure is regressed on a set of exogenous explanatory variables, without 
explicitly accounting for the interdependence of various other policies, such as financing and 
payout choices. Similar approaches are also used to investigate corporate financing and 
payout decisions. In practice, however, corporate decision-making is a complex process, in 
which the decisions made by one department are likely to be affected by those made by others 
(Mueller, 1967). As argued by Fazzari et al. (1988), financial constraints, such as insufficient 
availability of internal finance and limited access to external finance, may hamper companies’ 
ability to invest efficiently. Under such conditions, companies have to consider their 
fund-raising choices alongside investment decisions; that is, if any one policy is adjusted, 
other polices must also be adjusted accordingly (Gatchev et al., 2010). However, our 
knowledge about the potential interactions among the corporate decisions is limited by the 
single equation framework currently used in the literature, which is unable to capture the 
simultaneous determination of corporate decisions and fails to provide a complete view of 
corporate behaviour. It should be borne in mind that the simultaneous determination corporate 
decision refers to the execution, or outcome, of the set of corporate decisions rather than the 
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actual decision-making process. 
Conventional literature on corporate finance has also been criticised for overlooking 
the effects of uncertainty on companies’ real and financial behaviours. Recent studies that 
seek to explore the determinants of corporate investment have highlighted the importance of 
uncertainty associated with companies’ prospects (see, for example, Baum et al., 2008; 
Lensink and Murinde, 2006; and Carruth et al., 2000). Several channels through which 
uncertainty may influence investment have been identified and examined. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between investment and uncertainty remains theoretically ambiguous and 
empirically inconclusive. Compared with corporate investment decisions, the importance of 
uncertainty in financing and payout decisions has received little attention, and consequently 
the influence of uncertainty on investment through its effects on financing and payout choices 
has also been largely ignored. The omission of relevant information in examining the effect of 
uncertainty on corporate investment is likely to generate misleading results and lead to 
inappropriate inferences, casting doubt on the conclusions drawn from the exiting literature on 
the investment-uncertainty relationship. 
More recently, behaviour finance has begun to play an important role in explaining 
aspects of finance that traditional finance literature has failed to explain. Behavioural finance 
literature replaces the traditional assumption of broad rationality with a potentially more 
realistic behavioural assumption that agents’ behaviours are less than fully rational, i.e. they 
may have behavioural biases (Baker et al., 2006). Prior research in this area has mainly 
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focused on the influence of investors’ psychological bias, by adopting the less than fully 
rational investor approach to behavioural corporate finance. However, it is argued that 
managers’ psychological bias may also have a substantial impact on corporate decisions (see, 
for example, Malmendier et al., 2011; Oliver and Mefteh, 2010; Hackbarth, 2008; and Heaton, 
2002). In particular, managers’ upward bias towards future company performance may 
generate overinvestment, underinvestment and pecking order financing behaviours through 
different mechanisms. Although the theoretical framework in this emerging area has not been 
firmly established and the empirical evidence is still relatively rare, the existing literature 
shows that the less than fully rational manager approach has the potential to explain a wide 
range of patterns in companies’ investment, financing and payout choices which conventional 
corporate finance literature has failed to explain. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews 
mainstream corporate finance theories on investment, financing and payout decisions 
respectively, alongside their empirical evidence. Section 2.3 explores the possible channels 
through which the three corporate decisions may be interdependent upon one another and thus 
jointly determined by management. Section 2.4 surveys both theoretical and empirical studies 
on the effects of uncertainty on investment decisions as well as on the financial decisions of 
companies. Section 2.5 focuses on the behavioural corporate finance literature and the 
relationships between managerial confidence and corporate decisions. Concluding remarks as 
well as promising research ideas are offered in Section 2.6. 
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2.2 Corporate decision theories 
2.2.1 Corporate investment theories 
Corporate investment decision is one of the fundamental decisions made by individual 
companies to risk their funds, in the hope of producing streams of revenue in the future. The 
best-known method of determining whether an investment should be undertaken is the 
standard net present value (NPV) rule. Its principle is fairly simple, that is, discount both 
expected future cash inflow and outflow of a project back to their present value at a specific 
discount rate, and then sum them up to obtain the NPV of the project. All projects with 
positive NPV would add value to shareholders’ wealth and should be accepted, while all 
projects with negative NPV would damage company value and should be rejected.  
The NPV rule, on the one hand, has been widely used throughout the business world. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 74.9% of the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) 
surveyed rely heavily on this technique for evaluating investment projects. One the other hand, 
it has long been acknowledged that the application of the NPV rule in capital investment 
practices is not without critique. As noted in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), discount rates set by 
companies to evaluate investment opportunities are typically three or four times the cost of 
capital. More recently, Ow-Yong and Murinde (2009) survey a sample of 159 UK 
non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. They find that a 
theory-practice gap still exists in terms of the non-usage of discounted cash flow techniques. 
Arnold and Hatzopoulos (2000) argue that the theory-practice gap in capital budgeting is 
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partly due to the impractical assumptions underlying the NPV rule. As a result, the NPV rule 
provides little explanatory power for the observed corporate investment behaviour in practice. 
Given the importance of corporate investment decision in maximising shareholders’ wealth, a 
number of more sophisticated investment theories, such as Tobin’s Q theory, accelerator 
theory, financial constraints theory and real options theory, have been developed, aiming to 
fill the theory-practice gap. 
2.2.1.1 Tobin’s Q model 
Tobin’s Q is developed by Tobin (1969) as a ratio of the market value of reproducible real 
capital assets to the current replacement cost of those assets. Companies with Tobin’s Q ratios 
greater than one should have an incentive to invest, since the market value of the asset being 
reproduced is greater than the current replacement cost of the asset. Conversely, companies 
with Tobin’s Q ratios less than one should curtail investment. Accordingly, the standard 
Tobin’s Q theory states that the marginal Q, which can be measured as the ratio of the 
capitalised value to the replacement cost of the marginal investment, summarises the effects 
of all the factors relevant to a company’s investment decisions, and thus the company’s 
corporate investment should be an increasing function of its marginal Q (see, for example, 
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). In other words, Tobin’s Q theory implies that all the 
information relevant to the expected future profitability affect corporate investment decisions 
through their effects on the marginal Q. High marginal Q values (if the marginal Q exceeds 
one) encourage companies to undertake new investments or expand current operations, while 
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low marginal Q values (if the marginal Q falls below one) suggest companies reject 
investment opportunities and reduce existing investments. The optimal investment level is 
reached when the market value of the incremental unit of capital is equal to its replacement 
cost, i.e. when the marginal Q is equal to one.  
Although some empirical studies find that Tobin’s Q and investment rates are 
positively correlated (see, for example, Ascioglu et al., 2008; Aggarwal and Zong, 2006; and 
Erickson and Whited, 2000), the empirical performance of Tobin’s Q model of investment is 
far from satisfactory. This is largely attributable to a number of reasons. First, in the absence 
of a secondary market where the ownership of an investment can be traded, the capitalised 
value of investment is very difficult to observe, and thus the marginal Q is in fact 
unobservable. As a result, average Q, which is defined as the ratio of market value to the 
replacement value of capital stock, is typically used as a proxy for marginal Q in empirical 
studies (Erickson and Whited, 2000). As noted in Lensink and Murinde (2006), the measure 
of marginal Q is problematic, and different proxies for the marginal Q have been used in 
empirical literature. Thus, the disappointing empirical performance of Tobin’s Q theory is 
primarily attributable to severe measurement errors. Second, it is argued that Tobin’s Q does 
not carry all the information relevant to investment decisions, and some factors, such as 
capital market constraints, adjustment costs and uncertainty, may affect investment apart from 
Tobin’s Q. For example, Ferderer (1993) finds that uncertainty has a larger impact on 
investment than does average Q, and that extending a standard Tobin’s Q model of investment 
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by including uncertainty measures improves the performance of the model significantly. In 
addition, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) point out that, in order to determine the value of Tobin’s Q, 
the capitalised value of an investment has to be calculated as the expected present value of the 
stream of profit it would yield, and therefore the underlying principle of Tobin’s Q theory is 
still the basic NPV model. 
2.2.1.2 Accelerator model 
The accelerator principle states that the stock of capital goods is supposed to be proportional 
to the level of production, and companies engage in capital investment in an attempt to close 
the gap between the desired stock of capital good and existing stock of capital goods left over 
from the past (see, for example, Lucas, 1967; and Chenery, 1952). According to this view, if 
the capital to output ratio is constant, a change in a company’s output or sales requires a 
corresponding amount of investment to adjust its capital stock towards the desired level. The 
economic logic underlying the accelerator effect is that increased sales indicate that a 
company is likely to make more profits and greater use of existing capacity in the future, 
which would encourage companies to spend more funds on capital stock. The increased 
capital expenditure may lead to further growth of sales and profits, causing a multiplier effect. 
On the contrary, falling sales hurts a company’s profit and use of capacity, which in turn 
discourages capital investment and worsens the company’s prospects via the multiplier effect. 
The relevance of the accelerator effect has been verified by a large number of 
empirical studies. For example, Lensink and Sterken (2000) find that corporate investment is 
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highly sensitive to increase in sales for both small and large companies, which is consistent 
with the central prediction of the accelerator theory. Bo and Lensink (2005) investigate the 
investment-uncertainty relationship for a panel of Dutch non-financial companies based on a 
standard accelerator model. They find that, as expected, the estimated coefficient for the 
change in sales is highly significant with a positive sign. Furthermore, Lensink (2002) finds 
that, at an aggregate level, the accelerator type of effect, which is measured by the growth rate 
of real gross domestic product (GDP), also has important power in explaining the variation in 
the investment to GDP ratio for a group of 17 developed countries. 
The dynamic relationship between capital stock and output has also been utilised to 
derive an error correction model (ECM), which is able to provide a flexible distinction 
between short-run and long-run influences of changes in a company’s output on its investment 
behaviour (see, for example, Bloom et al., 2007; and Bond et al., 2003). The error correction 
behaviour is taken into account because the presence of adjustment costs makes it impossible 
for a company to adjust its capital stock to the desired level, which is considered as a function 
of output, immediately (see Guariglia, 2008). The error correction specification is widely used 
in empirical works on corporate investment. By examining the dynamic relationship between 
capital stock and real sales of a panel of manufacturing companies, Bond et al. (2003) find 
that capital stock and real sales series are indeed cointegrated, which shows empirical 
relevance of the long-run proportionality imposed in the error correction model. More 
importantly, they find that the error correction terms are correctly signed and statistically 
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significant in all regressions being estimated, suggesting that a capital stock above its desired 
level is normally associated with lower future investment, and vice versa. Besides this, 
Guariglia (2008) and Bloom et al. (2007) also report qualitatively similar findings that, in the 
long run, UK companies adjust their capital stock towards the target level, which is 
proportional to real sales. 
However, both the standard accelerator model and error correction model of 
investment have been criticised for overlooking the importance of financial variables and 
other factors related to investment decisions. Guariglia (2008) and Bond et al. (2003) 
investigate the role of financial variables play in corporate investment decisions using an error 
correction model of investment. They both provide robust findings that cash flow and profits 
terms appear to be highly significant in their investment models, indicating that the standard 
error correction model is potentially misspecified. Moreover, Bo and Lensink (2005), Lensink 
(2002) and Lensink and Sterken (2000) examine the effect of uncertainty on corporate 
investment behaviour based on an augmented accelerator model of investment. They all 
conclude that the standard accelerator model of investment is neither economically complete 
nor statistically adequate in the sense that it fails to capture the important roles played by 
other factors, such as financial constraints and uncertainty, in the determination of investment 
decisions. 
2.2.1.3 Financial constraint model 
Under the Modigliani-Miller theorems, a company’s financial choices are irrelevant to its 
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investment decisions and its value, since external funds provide a perfect substitute for 
internal funds within perfect capital markets. However, the irrelevance hypotheses fail to take 
account of the capital market imperfections, such as information asymmetry problems and the 
resulting financial constraints. To fill this gap, Myers and Majluf (1984) link corporate 
investment and capital market imperfections by offering an insight into the underinvestment 
problem in the presence of asymmetric information. They demonstrate that, when managers 
have superior information about a company’s value, their efforts to raise external funds, 
especially new equity, to finance desired investment projects tend to be interpreted by outside 
investors as a signal that the company is overvalued. Consequently, outside investors will 
rationally lower their estimation of the company’s value by raising their required rates of 
return. The increased cost of external financing in turn lowers projects’ NPVs, which may 
force a company with insufficient internal funds to forgo some valuable investment 
opportunities, resulting in underinvestment. Similarly, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that 
asymmetric information may also cause credit rationing in the loans market. Therefore, the 
costs of raising both new debt and new equity from external capital markets may differ 
substantially from the opportunity cost of internally generated funds, and corporate 
investment is likely to be financially constrained by the availability of internal finance and 
access to new external finance (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
Recognising the shortcomings of previous empirical models developed mainly under 
the assumption of perfect capital markets, an explosion of studies have focused on the role 
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played by financial constraints in investment decisions (see, for example, Guariglia, 2008; 
Almeida and Campello, 2007; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; and Fazzari et al., 1988; among 
many others). Fazzari et al.’s (1988) pioneering paper investigates the effect of financial 
constraints on corporate investment using a wide range of empirical specifications, including 
the Tobin’s Q and accelerator models. In each case, they find that the investment behaviour of 
low-dividend companies, which are more likely to be financially constrained, is more 
sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow, while the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is 
relatively low for high-dividend companies, which are less likely to face financial constraints. 
Their results, therefore, suggest that capital market imperfections lead to binding financial 
constraints on investment. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find evidence that 
financially less constrained companies exhibit greater sensitivities than financially more 
constrained companies. They argue that higher sensitivities cannot be interpreted as evidence 
that companies are more financially constrained. Recently, Guariglia (2008) distinguishes the 
difference between internal and external financial constraints, and examines their effects on 
corporate investment, both separately and jointly. She finds that the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow increases monotonically with the degree of external financial constraint, while 
the investment-cash flow relationship mimics a U-shaped curve if the sample is split on the 
basis of the degree of internal financial constraints faced by companies. Although the question 
of whether the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be considered as an indicator of 
financial constraints has not been fully addressed, the broad consensus is that financial 
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constraints affect investment decisions (Almeida and Campello, 2007). 
Besides, Bond et al. (2003) empirically investigate the role of financial factors in 
investment decisions in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. The cross-country 
comparison shows that cash flow and profits terms appear to be statistically more significant 
and economically more meaningful in the UK than in the three continental European countries. 
This finding is in line with the prediction that financial constraints on corporate investment 
are relatively more severe in market-oriented financial systems, such as the UK and the US, 
than in bank-based systems, such as Germany and Japan. Bond et al. (2003) indicate that the 
arm’s-length relation between companies and supplier of finance in the market-oriented 
systems may exacerbate the problems of information asymmetry, and hamper efficiency in 
channelling investment funds to companies with valuable investment opportunities. Thus, the 
corporate investment of UK companies is likely to face more severe effects of financial 
constraints caused by a higher cost premium for the use of external finance. In addition, 
Seifert and Gonenc (2008) point out that the relatively widespread ownership of the UK-listed 
companies is also likely to cause more severe problems of information asymmetry and give 
rise to financial constraints.  
2.2.1.4 Real options model 
Conventional literature on corporate finance has also been criticised for overlooking the 
effects of uncertainty on corporate investment behaviour. To explain the failures and address 
the shortcomings of earlier models, recent studies that seek to explore the determinants of 
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corporate investment have highlighted the importance of uncertainty associated with 
companies’ prospects (see, for example, Baum et al., 2008; Lensink and Murinde, 2006; and 
Carruth et al., 2000). Among the several competing theoretical models (described in detail in 
Section 2.4.1), the real options approach to irreversible investments is generally accepted as 
the most promising direction to address the question regarding the investment-uncertainty 
relationship. It recognises on the option value to delay an investment decision in order to 
await the arrival of new information about market conditions, therefore provides a much 
richer dynamic framework for investigating corporate investment behaviour under uncertain 
circumstances (see Carruth et al., 2000). 
By exploiting an analogy with the theory of options in financial markets, Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) derive a real options theory of investment. They demonstrate that, with 
irreversibility or partial irreversibility, an investment opportunity could be considered as a call 
option which can be exercised at any time before the option expires. The financial options 
literature indicates that the higher volatility of an underlying financial asset increases the 
option value, leading to a higher critical value for option exercise. Similarly, greater 
uncertainty associated with the outlook of an irreversible investment is likely to increase the 
value of the real option to invest, creating a larger wedge between the overall investment cost 
of a project and the standard present value of future cash flows. In order to make an optimal 
investment decision, the real option value should be accounted for as part of the full costs of 
the project. Given that an increase in uncertainty raises the trigger value of investment and 
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hence discourages immediate investment, the real options theory, therefore, predicts a 
negative effect of uncertainty on corporate investment. 
The prediction of the real options theory of investment is supported by a large body of 
empirical literature on the investment-uncertainty relationship. Guiso and Parigi (1999) 
investigate the effect of demand uncertainty on corporate investment decisions of a sample of 
Italian manufacturing companies. Their results show that uncertainty weakens the response of 
investment to demand, and slows down capital accumulation. Using a sample of US 
companies, Bond and Cummins (2004) find a significantly negative effect of uncertainty on 
capital accumulation, not only in the short run but also in the longer term. Furthermore, Bulan 
(2005) decomposes the total uncertainty faced by a company into its market, industry and 
company-specific components. She finds that empirical evidence from US companies lends 
strong support to the real options theory. Both company-specific and industry uncertainty 
components appear to increase the value of the option to delay, and depress investment. 
Although a number of studies also find a positive relationship between uncertainty and 
investment (see, for examples, Abdul-Haque and Wang, 2008; and Lensink and Sterken, 
2000), the negative effect of uncertainty on investment still overwhelmingly dominates the 
empirical evidence. 
Although the real options theory of investment seems to be a very promising direction 
for research on the investment-uncertainty relationship, it is criticised for overlooking the 
strategic interactions between peers under a competitive business environment. Mason and 
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Weeds (2010) highlight the effect of pre-emption and show that, when there is a strong and 
persistent advantage to be the first to invest, companies may forfeit the option value of delay 
to pre-empt their rivals in spite of the uncertain outcomes. Once strategic considerations are 
taken into account, the threat of being pre-empted will offset the value of the real option, and 
greater uncertainty can lead companies to take advantage of pre-emption by investing earlier. 
Mason and Weeds (2010), therefore, predict that an increase in uncertainty may increase 
corporate investment even if the projects are irreversible. The net effect of uncertainty on 
corporate investment behaviour must be determined empirically. 
2.2.2 Corporate financing theories 
The explanation of corporate financing behaviour is intensely debated in corporate finance. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) provide the foundations for modern corporate financing theories. 
They prove that, in an efficient market with no taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs and 
information asymmetry, the value of a company is not related to how the company is financed. 
In other words, internal funds and external funds are perfect substitutes for a company to 
finance its investment, and thus financing decisions are irrelevant to the company’s value. 
Modigliani-Miller’s irrelevance proposition has been generally accepted as correct. The focus 
of research on corporate financing decisions has shifted to questions about how real world 
complications alter the perfect capital market conditions, and whether market imperfections 
make a company’s value depend on its corporate financing choices. The main competing 
theories of corporate financing decision-making include trade-off, pecking order, market 
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timing and agency theories.  
2.2.2.1 Trade-off model 
By relaxing Modigliani-Miller’s assumptions regarding the absence of tax and bankruptcy 
costs, the trade-off theory states that a company would seek an optimal debt-to-equity ratio to 
maximise its value by weighing the benefits and costs of taking on additional debts (see, for 
example, Myers, 1984). More precisely, a company’s optimal debt ratio should be determined 
by a trade-off between benefits of interest tax shields and costs of financial distress or 
bankruptcy associated with additional debts. On the one hand, in the presence of corporate tax, 
interest on debt is typically a tax-deductible expense for tax-paying companies, which can be 
deducted from taxable income. Taking on debt can thus create a tax shield, giving rise to 
company value. However, on the other hand, taking on debt also increases the costs of 
financial distress and bankruptcy. At moderate debt levels, the probability of financial distress 
and bankruptcy is trivial, and hence the tax benefit of debt dominates. But, as debt level 
increases, the marginal benefit of further increases in debt declines, while the marginal cost 
associated with debt increases. Therefore, the theoretical optimal debt to equity ratio is 
achieved when the marginal benefit of future borrowing is exactly offset by its marginal cost.  
The trade-off theory successfully explains industry differences in capital structure 
choice, and justifies moderate debt ratios observed in reality. Survey evidence offered by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) shows that 81% of the companies in their sample make their 
financing decisions by considering a target debt ratio or range. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
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examine the relative importance of a long list of factors which, according to the different 
theories, are the determinants of capital structure decisions. Their empirical evidence obtained 
from publicly traded US companies over the period 1950–2003 seems reasonably consistent 
with the predictions of trade-off theory. Flannery and Rangan (2006) explicitly examine 
whether companies have long-run target debt ratios and, if so, how quickly they adjust 
towards the targets. By using a partial-adjustment model, Flannery and Rangan (2006) find 
that companies indeed have a target capital structure. Companies which are under-leveraged 
or over-leveraged adjust their debt ratios to offset about one third of the observed gap between 
the actual and target debt ratios each year. This targeting behaviour to some extent explains 
the observed corporate financing behaviour and lends empirical support to the prediction of 
trade-off theory.  
However, as highlighted by Fama and French (2005), trade-off theory also has serious 
problems. There are many observed patterns in corporate financing decisions that cannot be 
explained by trade-off theory. In particular, the well-documented negative relation between 
leverage and profitability in reality is a contradictory to the central prediction of the trade-off 
theory (see, for example, Fama and French, 2002). In addition, the trade-off theory fails to 
explain the fact that companies with the same level of operating risk may have different 
capital structures. 
2.2.2.2 Pecking order model 
The pecking order theory of capital structure is developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
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Myers (1984) by relaxing the assumption of no information asymmetry made by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). It tries to explain corporate financing behaviour from a completely 
different prospective. The pecking order theory states that asymmetric information and 
signalling problems associated with external finance create a hierarchy of corporate financing 
choices, i.e. using up internal funds and safe debt first, then using up risky debt, and finally 
resorting to external equity. The driving force behind the pecking order theory of corporate 
financing decision, as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984), is that managers know more about 
the prospects, risks and value of their company than do outside investors. In the presence of 
information asymmetry, managers’ efforts to issue risky securities tend to be interpreted by 
outside investors as a signal that the company is overvalued. Consequently, outside investors 
rationally discount the company’s security price, leading to negative market reactions. In 
order to avoid adverse selection, managers prefer to finance all of the uses of funds with 
internally generated funds, which have a cost advantage and no information asymmetry 
problem. If internal funds are exhausted and external finance is required, managers raise 
external funds with debt, which is less likely to be affected by revelations of managers’ 
superior information. Equity financing is only considered as a last resort and is rarely used. 
The strict pecking order theory, therefore, implies that debt issuance is chiefly driven by 
financing deficits. 
By introducing the costs of financial distress into the adverse selection framework, 
Myers (1984) modifies the strict pecking order theory, and argues that companies may issue 
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equity before it is absolutely necessary in order to build up financial slack which enables them 
to undertake investment opportunities in the future. Unlike trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory predicts that there is no optimal debt ratio. As noted by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), a significant merit of pecking order theory is that it successfully explains the negative 
effect of profitability on financial leverage, which trade-off theory fails to explain. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) empirically test the predictions of the pecking order 
theory using a sample of US companies observed from 1971 to 1989. They refine the 
prediction of pecking order theory into a testable hypothesis that financing deficit should 
normally be matched dollar-by-dollar by a change in corporate debt. Their empirical evidence 
shows that the pecking order model provides stronger explanatory power for the observed 
time-series variation in debt ratios than does the trade-off model, especially for the mature 
companies in their sample. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that pecking order 
theory is an excellent descriptor of corporate financing behaviour. Using a similar 
methodology, Frank and Goyal (2003) find that, although large companies exhibit some 
aspects of pecking order behaviour in the 1970s, the overall empirical evidence is not robust, 
lending little support to the prediction of the pecking order hypothesis. More surprisingly, 
Frank and Goyal (2003) find that net equity issues track the financing deficit even better than 
do net debt issues, which is contradictory to the predictions of pecking order theory. Frank 
and Goyal (2003) conclude that, over time, financing deficit becomes less important in 
explaining net debt issues, while equity becomes more important. 
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More recently, Leary and Roberts (2010) quantify the empirical relevance of the 
pecking order hypothesis using a large panel of companies over the period 1980 to 2005. 
Their simulation experiment results show that the pecking order can only accurately classify 
less than half of the observed debt and equity issuance decisions. However, by incorporating 
some factors suggested by trade-off theory, the classification ability of the model increases 
significantly. The expanded model is able to accurately classify more than 80% of the 
observed corporate financing decisions. This finding empirically supports the conjecture of 
Fama and French (2005) that both the take-off and pecking order theories have elements of 
truth, and therefore should be treated as complementary explanations of corporate financing 
decisions.  
2.2.2.3 Market timing model 
By relaxing the assumption of an efficient capital market made by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), the market timing theory asserts that capital structure evolves as the cumulative 
outcome of managers’ attempts to time the equity market (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) offer two explanations for equity market timing behaviour. The first 
explanation is based on a dynamic version of Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection 
problem. It is documented that the degree of information asymmetry and the resulting adverse 
selection costs vary across companies and over time, and are inversely related to the 
market-to-book ratio. Under this interpretation, market timing opportunities arise because of 
the changes in the degree of information asymmetry between rational managers and investors. 
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The second explanation is based on managers’ perception of time-varying mispricing. 
Managers issue equity when they believe their shares are irrationally overvalued, and 
repurchase equity when they believe their shares are irrationally undervalued. Under this 
interpretation, market timing opportunities arise as long as managers believe that their 
company is irrationally mispriced. Both of the two explanations lead to the same conclusion 
that capital structure is the outcome of the accumulation of managers’ attempts to time the 
equity market.  
Survey evidence reported by Graham and Harvey (2001) shows that market timing 
appears to be an important consideration in making corporate financing decisions in practice. 
Two thirds of CFOs admit that they consider the amount by which their securities are 
mispriced as an important factor in making their decisions to issue new debt and equity. Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) also provide empirical investigation into the relationship between current 
capital structure and the historical path of the market-to-book ratio. Consistent with the 
prediction of the market timing theory, managers’ perception of market timing opportunities, 
which is measured by the market-to-book ratio, have persistent effect that helps to explain the 
cross section of capital structure.  
Alti (2006) examines the capital structure implication of market timing by focusing on 
initial public offerings (IPOs). It is found that market timing indeed plays an important role in 
making corporate financing decisions. Hot-market IPO companies issue substantially more 
equity, and thus lower their leverage ratios by more, than do their cold-market counterparts. 
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However, Alti (2006) further finds that market timing appears to have only a short-term 
impact on capital structure. The short-term deviations from the leverage target quickly reverse 
after going public, which is more consistent with the prediction of trade-off theory of capital 
structure. Alti (2006) cast doubt on the market timing theory by arguing that the commonly 
used measures of market timing, such as market-to-book ratio, are likely to be correlated with 
other determinants of financing decisions, and generate a spurious link between market timing 
and capital structure dynamics.  
2.2.2.4 Agency cost model 
By relaxing the assumption of no conflicts between principals and agents, agency theory 
suggests that debt serving obligations help to prevent overinvestment of free cash flow by 
self-serving managers, creating value in companies with agency problems (see, for example, 
Harvey et al., 2004; and Jensen, 1986). Principal-agent problems mainly exist between 
outside shareholders and management, owning to the separation of ownership and control. In 
this agency setting, managers have an incentive to cause their companies to grow beyond the 
optimal size, so as to increase their compensation as well as the resources under their control. 
Jensen (1986) develops a “control hypothesis” for debt creation which predicts that debt 
reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at 
the discretion of managers.2 The control effect of debt, thus, is a potential determinant of 
                                                 
2 Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as the cash flow left over after a company has exhausted its positive NPV projects. 
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corporate financing decisions.  
Harvey et al. (2004) test whether debt capital is able to reduce the impact of agency 
problems using a sample of emerging market companies which have potentially extreme 
managerial agency problems. They find evidence that debt mitigates the reduction in company 
value caused by the separation between management and ownership, and creates shareholder 
values for companies that face potentially high managerial agency costs. The incremental 
benefit of debt is particular meaningful for companies which are likely to have 
overinvestment problems; that is, have either high level of assets in place or limited growth 
opportunities in the future. 
The agency perspective of debt is often embedded in the trade-off framework, in 
which the monitoring effect is considered alongside other benefits and costs of taking on 
additional debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). In addition, Stulz (1990) points out that the use of 
debt, which requires management to pay out funds, reduces the overinvestment cost, but also 
exacerbates the underinvestment cost when cash flow is truly low. Meanwhile, an equity issue, 
which increases resources under management’s control, can reduce the underinvestment cost, 
although it may worsen the overinvestment cost. Since the uses of debt and equity decrease 
one cost of agency problem and increase the other, there should be an optimal mix of debt and 
equity that minimises the overall costs of over- and underinvestment.  
2.2.3 Dividend payout theories 
Dividend policy is another important topic that remains unsolved in corporate finance, both 
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theoretically and empirically. Theories on dividend policy differ in their assumptions and 
approaches, providing many reasons for paying and not paying dividends to shareholders. The 
debate which is often referred to as the dividend puzzle can be traced back to the dividend 
irrelevance theorem proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961). Before the dividend 
irrelevance theorem, it is widely believed that increased dividends make shareholders better 
off because they reduce the uncertainty associated with future cash flows. The basic argument 
is that, in the presence of uncertainty and imperfect information, investors prefer the bird in 
the hand or current cash dividends, rather than the two in the bush or future capital gains (see, 
for example, Gordon, 1959). The bird in the hand theory argues that high dividend payout 
ratios reduce uncertainty associated with future cash flows and thus increase company value. 
However, Miller and Modigliani (1961) criticise the bird in the hand view by arguing that the 
risk of a company is determined by its real investment decisions, regardless of how the 
company distributes its earnings. Empirical evidence is also not in favour of the bird in the 
hand argument. Baker et al. (2002) survey managers of a sample of NASDAQ companies that 
consistently pay cash dividends to assess their views about dividend policy. As expected, most 
of the financial managers disagree with the bird in the hand explanation for paying dividends.  
Based on their assumptions of perfect capital markets, Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
demonstrate that dividends and capital gains are perfect substitutes. Investors should be 
indifferent to dividend policies because they can always create homemade dividends by 
adjusting their portfolios in accordance with their preferences. Therefore, dividend policies 
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should be irrelevant and unimportant in a perfect market environment. Again, by relaxing the 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, later studies focus on whether and how the real world 
complications and the resulting market imperfections make corporate payout decisions 
relevant to company value. A range of theoretical explanations as to the cause of the relevancy 
of corporate payout decisions have been developed and examined in the literature, including 
tax clienteles, signalling, catering, free cash flow and life cycle theories. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that no dividend model, either separately or jointly with other models, is 
supported invariably (see Frankfurter and Wood, 2002). 
2.2.3.1 Tax clienteles model 
Tax clientele theory explains corporate payout behaviour by focusing on the market 
imperfection caused by the differentials in tax treatment between dividend income and capital 
gains. First, dividends are typically taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. Second, dividends 
are taxed immediately, whereas capital gains are not taxed until they are actually realised from 
the sale of stocks. Given the tax advantages of capital gains over dividends, tax-paying 
investors are expected to prefer low dividend payout ratios which are associated with lower 
future tax liabilities. As a result, tax-paying investors are likely to pay a premium for 
low-payout companies, lowering low-payout companies’ cost of equity. The tax effect 
hypothesis, therefore, suggests lower dividend payout ratios which lower the cost of capital 
and increase stock price (see, for example, Fankfurter and Wood, 2002).  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) also admit that the imposition of a tax liability on 
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dividends plays a role in making corporate payout decisions. But they argue that investors are 
likely to be attracted by different mixes of dividend income and capital gains, depending on 
their particular situations. For example, tax-exempt institutional investors and individual 
investors with low marginal tax rates may prefer dividend income, and tend to be attracted by 
high-payout companies, while investors with high marginal tax rates generally dislike 
dividend income, thus are likely to be attracted by low-payout companies. Meanwhile, 
companies also tend to attract certain types of investor by using their dividend choices. If the 
distribution of the company’s payout ratios perfectly matches the distribution of the investors’ 
preferences, no company can increase its value by changing its dividend strategy. Therefore, 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) claim that, owing to such a dividend clientele effect, a 
company’s value should not be affected by its payout choice, and dividend policy remains 
irrelevant even in the presence of taxes.  
The clientele effect has been supported by a number of empirical studies. Using actual 
portfolios and demographic data, Pettit (1977) finds significant empirical evidence for the 
existence of a dividend clientele effect, that is, portfolios’ dividend yields are positively 
correlated with their investors’ ages and negatively correlated with their investors’ incomes. 
Similarly, a survey conducted by Lewellen et al. (1978) shows that stockholders in high 
marginal tax brackets buy securities with low-dividend yields and vice versa. Recently, 
Graham and Kumar (2006) provide direct evidence of dividend clienteles by studying the 
stock holdings and trading behaviour of more than 60,000 households. Their results show that, 
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consistent with previous findings and the dividend clientele hypothesis, older and low-income 
individual investors prefer dividend-paying stocks and tend to buy stocks on the 
cum-dividends day or earlier in order to obtain the dividends. Lee et al. (2006) extend the 
examination of the existence of the dividend clientele effect to the Taiwan Stock Exchange, 
where capital gains tax is zero. They find that wealthy individuals who are subject to high 
rates of taxation on dividends tend to hold stocks with lower dividends by selling stocks that 
raise dividends and buying stocks that lower dividends, while institutions and less wealthy 
individuals who are in lower tax brackets behave in the opposite manner. All of these patterns 
are completely consistent with the tax-induced clientele effect.  
2.2.3.2 Signalling model 
The signalling model of dividends is characterised by information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders. It states that managers signal their private knowledge about the 
company’s current and future prospects to the capital markets through their payout choices in 
an attempt to close the information gap (see, for example, Miller and Rock, 1985). According 
to the signalling hypothesis, managers have an incentive to use payout policy as a vehicle to 
communicate their private information to the outside investors about the real value of their 
company. Meanwhile, outside investors perceive dividend payouts as a reflection of managers’ 
anticipations of the company’s prospects. Under such conditions, outside investors tend to 
interpret increases in dividend payout as good news that the company has good future 
profitability, and thus react to the announcements positively. On the contrary, dividend cuts 
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are likely to be considered as bad news that the company has poor future prospects, causing 
unfavourable market reactions. Therefore, mangers are reluctant to cut dividends in order to 
avoid the anticipated negative market reactions. They are also reluctant to increase dividends 
unless they are confident that they will be able to produce sufficient future cash flow to 
support their payouts at higher levels in the foreseeable future. 
In the presence of information asymmetry, dividends are regarded as a credible 
signalling device because they are costly to companies in various ways. Miller and Rock 
(1985) argue that signalling costs may distort a company’s investment behaviour. Therefore, 
only good quality companies can afford to signal their information through dividend payment, 
which cannot be mimicked by poor quality companies. The signalling hypothesis of dividends 
is also consistent with the early survey study by Lintner (1956), which shows that managers 
usually have a reasonably definitive target payout ratio in the long run, and slowly adjust the 
actual payout ratio towards the target over years.  
The dividend signalling hypothesis has been extensively addressed by empirical 
studies by focusing on two main issues: the market reactions to dividend change 
announcements; and the predictive power of dividend changes for the future earnings. Bali 
(2003) documents significant drifts in stock returns following announcements of changes in 
cash dividends, which are consistent with the dividend signalling hypothesis. He reports that, 
on average, the positive abnormal return following dividend increases is 1.17 percent, which 
is smaller in magnitude than the negative abnormal return of –5.87 percent following dividend 
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cuts. This shows that share prices follow the same direction as the dividend change 
announcements. Nissim and Ziv (2001) investigate the relation between dividend changes and 
future profitability, in an attempt to assess the information content of dividends. They find 
that dividend changes provide incremental information about the level of profitability in 
subsequent years beyond that provided by market and accounting data. However, Benartzi et 
al. (1997) find only limited support for the hypothesis that changes in dividends have 
information content about future earnings of the company. Their empirical results show that 
companies that increase dividends in year t have experienced significant earnings increases in 
years t and t–1, but show no subsequent unexpected earnings growth. Similarly, companies 
that cut dividends in year t have experienced a significant earnings drop in years t and t–1, 
and their earnings are likely to be improved significantly in the subsequent years. Although 
the predictive power of changes in dividends seems weak, it seems that there is a strong past 
and current link between earnings and dividend changes. Benartzi et al. (1997) conclude that 
Lintner’s (1956) model of dividends remains the best description of corporate payout 
behaviour. Koch and Sun (2004) also find that changes in dividends cause investors to revise 
their expectations about the persistence of past earnings changes. Therefore, the market 
interprets changes in dividends as a signal about the persistence of past earnings changes. 
2.2.3.3 Free cash flow model 
Unlike the signalling model, in which managers have the incentive to signal their private 
information to the market by paying dividends, the free cash flow model of dividends is 
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developed on the basis that managers may have an incentive not to pay dividends, and thus 
need to be forced to pay out free cash flow (see, for example, Easterbrook, 1984; and Jensen, 
1986). By relaxing Modigliani-Miller’s assumption of no conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders, the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend policy argues that 
managers as imperfect agents of shareholders may use free cash flow funds in a way that 
benefits themselves, at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Under such an agency setting, 
paying more dividends may serve to align the interests of managers and shareholders, and 
mitigate the agency problems by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers and 
the resultant overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986). The free cash flow model, therefore, 
also implies that corporate investment and payout decisions are likely to be interrelated, such 
that an increase in dividend payments may reduce investment in negative NPV or poor 
projects, especially when a company has a substantial surplus of cash.  
In addition, Easterbrook (1984) offers another agency cost explanation of dividends. 
He hypothesises that dividend payments oblige managers to raise external funds, which in 
turn forces the companies to undergo management scrutiny by third parties including market 
regulators, financial intermediaries and potential investors. Capital market monitoring is 
expected to reduce the chances for managers to act in their own self-interest, as well as the 
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. Therefore, dividend 
payments allow shareholders to monitor managers at lower cost, and simultaneously minimise 
collective action problems. However, Easterbrook (1984) also note that increasing dividend 
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payments may force managers to take undesired actions such as taking on too much debt, 
leading to a potential conflict between shareholders and debtholders. 
Rozeff (1982) addresses the free cash flow hypothesis of dividends empirically by 
focusing on two proxies for agency costs, namely, the percentage of common stock held by 
insiders and the number of shareholders. Using a large sample of US companies, he finds that 
companies tend to establish higher dividend payouts when insiders hold a lower fraction of 
common stock and when the ownership is more widespread, which is entirely consistent with 
the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis. It is also found that the benefits of dividends 
in reducing agency cost are more pronounced for companies with lower insider ownership and 
higher dispersion of ownership. Khan (2006) investigates the relationship between dividend 
payout and ownership structure for a panel of publicly traded UK companies. Consistent with 
previous findings, dividend payout is found to be negatively related with ownership 
concentration, indicating that dividend payments substitute for poor monitoring by a 
company’s shareholders. In addition, La Porta et al. (2000) provide international evidence that 
dividends play a useful role in the agency context. Specifically, they find that, on average, 
companies operating in countries where minority shareholders have better legal protection pay 
higher dividends. In these countries, companies with good investment opportunities pay lower 
dividends than their counterparts with poor investment opportunities, indicating that 
well-protected shareholders are willing to wait for dividends when investment opportunities 
are attractive, and are able to force managers to disgorge cash when investment opportunities 
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are unwanted. However, shareholders in countries where legal protection is poor tend to take 
whatever dividends they can get, regardless of investment opportunities.  
2.2.3.4 Catering model 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) propose a catering theory of dividends in an attempt to explain the 
payout puzzle from a new perspective. By relaxing Modigliani-Miller’s assumption of market 
efficiency, Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that the decisions to pay dividends are driven by 
prevailing investor demand for dividend payers. Essentially, they hypothesise that managers 
tend to rationally cater to investors’ demand by initiating dividends when the investors put a 
premium on dividend payers, and by omitting dividends when the investors prefer nonpayers. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) assert that the catering model of dividends is the most natural 
explanation of the discrete decision of whether to pay dividends. Li and Lie (2006) extend 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2004) discrete decision model by including increases and decreases in 
existing dividends. The extended catering model predicts that both the probability and the 
magnitude of dividend changes are related to the dividend premium.  
To test the dividend catering hypothesis, Baker and Wurgler (2004) relate dividend 
payment choices to several stock market-based proxies for dividend premiums. It is found that 
all four proxies for dividend premiums are significantly and positively related to the aggregate 
rate of dividend initiation, and two of them are significantly and negatively related to the rate 
of dividend omission. These results strongly suggest that dividends are highly related to share 
price and company value but in different directions at different times, and that managers cater 
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to investors’ demands by shifting their payout choices. Li and Lie (2006) also verify the 
empirical relevance of the extended dividend catering model. They find that the probability 
and the magnitude of dividend decreases are greater when the dividend premium is low, and 
the probability and magnitude of dividend increases are greater when the dividend premium is 
high. However, Denis and Osobov (2008) cast doubt on the catering hypothesis as a 
first-order explanation for dividend payment patterns around the world. They find little 
evidence of a systematic positive relation between dividend premium and the propensity to 
pay dividends outside the US market.  
2.2.3.5 Life cycle model 
More recently, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) provide an alternative explanation for 
corporate payout behaviour by proposing a life cycle theory. The life cycle theory of 
dividends states that the dividend payout choices rely on the trade-off between retention and 
distribution which evolves over the life cycle stages of a company as profits accumulate and 
investment opportunities decline (see also DeAngelo et al., 2006; and Denis and Osobov, 
2008). This theory predicts that companies optimally shift their payout choices over their life 
cycle stages in response to the evolution of the trade-off between retention and distribution. 
That is, companies in their early years face relatively abundant investment opportunities but 
have limited funds, so they pay fewer dividends and retain more profits to avoid the flotation 
and information costs of raising external funds. Companies in their later years tend to have 
sufficient funds but fewer attractive investment opportunities, so they have a stronger 
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incentive to pay dividends to reduce agency costs associated with free cash flow. Therefore, as 
a company matures, the benefits of paying dividends overweight their costs, leading to a 
higher propensity to pay dividends. 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) test the life cycle model by assessing the relation between a 
company’s probability of paying dividends and its life cycle stage, which is proxied by the 
company’s mix of earned and contributed capital. The idea is that companies with relatively 
low retained earnings as a proportion of total capital are likely to be in their capital infusion 
stage, whereas companies that cumulate relatively more retained earnings in their capital tend 
to be more mature. DeAngelo et al. (2006) find that a company’s probability of paying 
dividends uniformly and significantly increases with the relative amount of earned equity in 
its capital. Their results provide direct evidence in favour of the life cycle model of dividends. 
The life cycle theory of dividends is further confirmed by Brockman and Unlu (2011) in an 
international setting. In addition, Denis and Osobov (2008) examine cross-sectional and 
time-series evidence on the propensity to pay dividends in a number of developed financial 
markets. Their international evidence on the determinants of dividend policy casts doubt on 
the signalling, clientele and catering explanations for dividends, but largely supports the 
agency cost-based life cycle theory.  
2.3 Simultaneity of corporate decisions 
As noted above, the Modigliani-Miller theorems provide the fundamental framework for 
modern corporate finance theories. The central lesson commonly drawn from the 
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Modigliani-Miller theorems is that, in a perfect market environment, a company’s investment 
decision is solely determined by its real considerations, and is completely unaffected by how 
the projects are financed. As a consequence, corporate financing and payout choices have 
been automatically considered as by-products of investment decisions, and each of the three 
aspects of corporate behaviour has been studied intensively but separately. The interactions 
among the three corporate decisions, to a large extent, have been overlooked in the literature. 
Nonetheless, some studies have attempted to investigate how various market frictions in the 
real world may drive linkages among the three corporate decisions. Several mechanisms 
through which the set of corporate decisions may be interdependent upon one another have 
been identified. Arguably, the simultaneity of corporate decisions can be derived from five 
main sources, namely, institutional underpinnings of modern companies, flow-of-funds 
approach, tax approach, agency approach and information approach. It is worth noting that 
these hypothesised mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but they may have very different 
implications for the interactions among the set of corporate decisions.  
2.3.1 Institutional approach 
The institutional underpinnings of modern companies suggest that a corporation is a complex 
organisation with a considerable degree of decentralisation (see, for example, Dhrymes and 
Kurz, 1967). Corporate decisions made by one department may have impacts on those made 
by the others, and vice versa. Given this institutional fact, corporate decisions depend not only 
on factors which are exogenous to the company, such as the economic environment, but also 
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on factors which are endogenous to the company, such as decisions made by other 
departments. Thus, if any one of the decisions is adjusted, other decisions must also be 
adjusted accordingly. In such a context, the role of the top executives of a company, e.g. the 
board of directors or the president, are not making decisions in the first instance, but receiving 
proposals, examining priorities and making sure that the departmental decisions are executed 
consistently with one another by weighing the effects of one choice versus those of the others. 
Mueller (1967) emphasises that, in making corporate decisions, one must be aware of the 
inherent interactions among many of the company’s decisions, not only in order to avoid 
undesirable side effects which may stem from a given decision, but also to be certain that 
these interactions do not actually result in the negation of a decision’s primary goal. Therefore, 
given the institutional underpinnings of modern companies, it is reasonable to expect that the 
corporate decisions are likely to be executed on simultaneously so that the outcome can be 
observed via a simultaneous approach. It should be kept in mind that the simultaneity among 
the key corporate decisions does not require them to be actually made at the same time. 
Mueller (1967) also points out that, due to the complexity of corporate behaviour, 
empirical models of corresponding complexity should be formulated in order to carry out 
valid empirical investigation. However, existing literature on corporate finance 
overwhelmingly employs single equation techniques, which permit no analysis of interactions 
among corporate decisions and fail to capture the complexity of corporate-making processes. 
To gain deeper and more comprehensive insight into the complex interdependence of 
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corporate behaviour, in particular the inherent simultaneity among the key corporate decisions, 
more sophisticated and more statistically correct techniques which explicitly allow for the 
simultaneity should be more plausible.  
2.3.2 Flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour3 
The flow-of-funds approach is based on the argument that corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions are interconnected within a flow-of-funds framework for corporate 
behaviour. This literature goes back to Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). It takes the view that a 
company faces an outflow of funds represented mainly by its variable and fixed costs, taxes 
and dividend payments, as well as investment outlays. Meanwhile, the company relies on an 
inflow of funds, represented chiefly by its sales and the proceeds of various forms of external 
finance such as debt or stock issuance. Accordingly, Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) define that the 
major problems of a company are raising funds from profits, new debt and equity, and 
spending it on investment and dividends, where the overriding constraint is the flow-of-funds 
identity, i.e. sources of funds must equal uses of funds. If the capital markets are sufficiently 
imperfect, companies are likely to have a marked reliance on internal funds and a strong 
aversion to resort to external capital markets. Under such circumstances, companies have to 
consider their fund-raising choices alongside their fund-spending decisions, and trade-off 
                                                 
3 The flow-of-funds approach in this thesis refers to the framework set up by Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) to investigate the 
interactions between corporate investment and financial decisions. It is worth noting that there is another strand of 
flow-of-funds literature which studies issues concerning the financial sector and its relationships with the real economy (see, 
for example, Green and Murinde, 1998). Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis, we do not discuss it here. 
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between outlays for capital investment and dividend payouts. Therefore, in a world where the 
capital markets are sufficiently imperfect, corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions are likely to be determined jointly, and must be investigated in the context of a 
simultaneous equations system (see also McCabe, 1979). If the flow-of-funds conjectures 
about the interactions are empirically relevant, the jointly determined corporate decisions, 
which are endogenous to a company, should be significantly interdependent upon one another 
(see Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967). 
To empirically verify the predictions of the flow-of-funds approach, Dhrymes and 
Kurz (1967) set up a three-equation simultaneous system in which investment spending, new 
debt financing and dividend payouts are treated as endogenous variables, and each equation 
contains the other two endogenous variables as explanatory variables. They find that when the 
single equation methodology is adopted, the endogenous variables are generally significant in 
the equations where they serve as explanatory variables, but do not have the sign implied by 
the flow-of-funds approach. However, when the three corporate behavioural equations are put 
into a system and estimated simultaneously, the signs on the endogenous variables become 
consistent with the predictions of the flow-of-funds approach, and significant in most 
instances. Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), therefore, conclude that ignoring the interdependence of 
corporate decisions is likely to result in an incomplete and potentially misleading view of the 
complex corporate decision-making processes. Following up the flow-of-funds framework, 
McCabe (1979) modifies Dhrymes and Kurz’s (1967) three-equation model by carefully 
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specifying the exogenous variables and the lag structures. Using evidence obtained from US 
companies, he finds that corporate investment decision does not appear to be determined 
independently of financial choices. As implied by the flow-of-funds framework, investment 
outlays and dividend payouts are found to be significantly and negatively interrelated, while 
both are positively interrelated with the main sources of funds, i.e. current new debt and 
profits. In a similar vein, Peterson and Benesh (1983) re-examine the empirical relationships 
among the same set of corporate decisions. The results obtained using alternative estimation 
techniques provide additional evidence on the joint determination of corporate decisions. 
They conclude that the imperfections in capital markets are sufficient to invalidate the 
Modigliani-Miller’s theorems, leading to a joint determination of corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions as implied by the flow-of-funds approach. In contrast to the 
findings on US data, McDonald et al. (1975) find that empirical evidence from a sample of 
French companies in favour of Modigliani-Miller’s independence proposition, that is, the 
dividend and investment decisions of individual companies are completely independent of 
each other. They reject Dhrymes and Kurz’s (1967) flow-of-funds conjectures based on 
French data, and argue that the interactions among corporate decisions are likely to depend on 
the size of the capital markets. 
Although the simple idea of the flow-of-funds approach seems to be intuitively 
appealing, Dhrymes and Kurz’s (1967) three-equation model is criticised for its lack of 
coherent theoretical background, and it hence falls short of resolving the issue regarding the 
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directions of the interactions (see, for example, Ravid, 1988). Later studies armed with further 
theoretical arguments, such as information asymmetry and agency problems, address the issue 
in more depth.  
2.3.3 Information approach 
The theoretical contributions in information economics provide another promising direction to 
justify the interdependencies among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions. 
The intuitive idea is that the asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders may 
constrain corporate investment by reducing the elastic supply of internal funds as well as 
limiting the access to external funds, thus evoking simultaneity among corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions.  
Information asymmetry creates an imperfectly elastic supply of internal finance for 
capital expenditure by limiting the access to retained earnings. In the presence of information 
asymmetry, managers have an incentive to use dividends as a signal to reveal some of their 
private information about the company’s current and future earnings to the outside investors 
(Miller and Rock, 1985). Given the information content of dividends, managers are reluctant 
to cut dividends in order to avoid the anticipated negative market reactions. Meanwhile, they 
are also reluctant to raise dividends unless they are confident that sufficient future cash will 
flow in to support their payouts at higher levels. The stickiness of dividends under 
information asymmetry, therefore, reduces the flexibility in raising funds for capital 
investment from internally generated cash flow. Since the variation in capital expenditures 
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cannot be soaked up freely by retained earnings, corporate investment is likely to be internally 
financially constrained. As a result, companies may be forced either to forego relatively low 
net present value investment projects or to raise more funds from outsiders to maintain their 
dividend payouts at the desired levels. Gugler (2003) finds empirical evidence of the 
competition for funds between dividends and investment in capital stock, and concludes that 
dividend payout choice should be regarded as a decision that significantly affects other 
corporate decisions, rather than as a mere residual, in the light of capital market failures. 
The imperfect information not only impedes the ability of companies to raise funds 
from internal finance, but also limits their access to external finance. In the real world, the 
alternative sources of funds are no longer perfect substitutes, owing to the costs created by 
managers’ superior information (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In the presence of information 
asymmetry, managers’ efforts to issue risky securities tend to be rationally interpreted as a 
signal that the company is overvalued. Information asymmetry, therefore, justifies the pecking 
order behaviour of corporate financing. Specifically, managers prefer to finance all the uses of 
funds with internally generated cash flow if possible, which is not subject to the information 
problem and hence has a cost advantage. When the internal cash flow is exhausted and 
external finance is required, managers raise external funds with debt financing, which is less 
affected by revelations of managers’ superior information. External equity financing is only 
considered as a last resort and is rarely used. If companies are not able to obtain as much 
internally generated cash flow and safe debt as they desire at a given cost in this context, their 
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investment spending is likely to be externally financially constrained, resulting in high 
investment-cash flow sensitivities. A large body of literature finds support for this theoretical 
prediction (see, for example, Almeida and Campello, 2007). 
Taken together, information asymmetry constrains companies’ ability to raise internal 
finance via its effect on dividends, and limits their access to external finance via its effect on 
issuance of securities. Therefore, corporate decisions are likely to be made systematically and 
simultaneously by managers, with full recognition of competing needs for funds and 
alternative sources of funds. Mougoué and Mukherjee (1994) provide empirical justification 
of the interrelations among the three decisions of a company by applying the vector 
autoregressive modelling technique to US industrial companies. Their causality test results 
strongly support the prediction of information approach that the causality flow between a 
company’s investment decisions and dividend decisions is bidirectional and negative, while 
the causality flow is bidirectional and positive between investment and borrowing decisions 
and between dividends and borrowing decisions. They conclude that capital market 
imperfections caused by information asymmetry lead to the causality relations among a 
company’s investment, financing and dividend decisions. More recently, Wang (2010) adopts 
more advanced techniques, including path analysis and directed acyclic graphs analysis, to 
explore the causal structure of the same set of corporate decisions. The empirical results 
obtained from high-tech companies listed in Taiwan and China further confirm that the 
investment, financing and dividend decisions made by companies can be effectively explained 
            Chapter 2: Literature Review  
– 57 – 
by the causal relationship among them in the presence of information asymmetry. 
2.3.4 Tax approach 
Modigliani-Miller’s assumptions of a perfect market environment are criticised for failing to 
incorporate tax in their theory. Modigliani and Miller (1963) revise their original proposition 
by taking tax into consideration. The revised proposition states that, because interest 
payments are treated differently from dividends and capital gains for tax purposes, managers 
could be able to increase company value by using debt financing. More specifically, since 
interest expenses are tax deductible, debt financing creates a tax shield which leads to an 
increase in existing shareholders’ wealth. 
Tax deductibility, however, is not unique to debt financing. Depreciation allowances 
resulting from investments made by a company also provide an annual non-debt tax shield 
which is equal to the product of the depreciation and the marginal tax rate. Myers (1974) 
argues that in valuing a project one must take into account its contribution to the tax shield 
value of the company. From this point of view, taxes might offer a link between corporate 
investment and financing decisions. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) demonstrate that both 
investment and debt financing decisions give rise to tax shields. If a company’s income does 
not always exceed all tax shields, some tax shields may not be deductible, and thus plentiful 
non-debt tax shields may reduce the need for debt financing. In other words, debt financing 
may be considerably more expensive if the investment which it finances creates enough 
depreciation-related tax shields to render the interest-related tax shields useless. Similarly, 
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investment projects may be considerably less profitable if depreciation tax shelters cannot be 
used to their full advantage as a result of large deductions for interest payments (see Ravid, 
1988). Given the substitutability of depreciation-related and interest-related tax shields, the 
innovative tax planning model reaches the conclusion that corporate investment and debt 
financing decisions should be determined simultaneously, thus higher level of investment 
should be financed by less debt, and vice versa.  
A recent study by Graham and Tucker (2006) lends strong empirical support to the 
prediction of DeAngelo and Masulis’s (1980) model by showing that companies are 
significantly less likely to issue debt when their non-debt tax shields are large. They also 
acknowledge that it is difficult to unambiguously prove the direction of causality or order of 
sequential choice, because a company might use less debt after having first established 
non-debt tax shields or it might resort to sheltering after discovering that it is unable to issue 
much debt for whatever reason. Cooper and Franks (1983) further take the issue of 
carry-forwards and carry-backs into consideration. They argue that tax losses resulting from 
the company’s choice of investment projects may affect the company’s effective tax rate in 
future periods, which in turn affect the tax shield value of investment and debt. Therefore 
current investment decisions are also likely to interact with future investment and debt 
financing decisions. 
Tax considerations also have implications for dividend decisions. Since dividend 
income is taxed more heavily than capital gains, paying higher dividends may create a large 
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burden of personal taxation to shareholders. For example, the dividend income in the UK is 
taxed at a basic rate of 32.5%, while capital gains are taxed at a much lower flat rate of 18%.4 
In order to reduce tax burden, low dividend payouts should be welcomed by any taxpaying 
investor, especially investors in high tax brackets. Moreover, taxes on dividends have to be 
paid immediately, while capital gains are not taxed until they are realised from the sale of 
shares. Under a tax code that favours capital gains, it is rational for companies to try to 
minimise dividend payouts, and hence taxes, by holding and reinvesting their profits. 
Nevertheless, it is well documented in dividend policy literature that taxes have been only a 
secondary consideration, which itself alone can neither justify the existence of dividends nor 
explain corporate payout behaviour (see, for example, Frankfurter and Wood, 2002). Besides, 
the tax approach does not have any implication on the interactions between dividends and 
investment decisions, and between dividends and financing decisions.  
In a nutshell, the tax approach may imply that a company’s tax planners should 
minimise dividend payout to avoid a large burden of personal taxation, and make investment 
and debt financing decisions simultaneously to take full advantages of both 
depreciation-related and interest-related tax shields. However, it must be emphasised that 
corporate decisions are, of course, not solely determined by tax considerations, and therefore 
the tax approach can only provide a framework to analyse the relationships among the 
                                                 
4 Dividend income at or below the £37,400 basic rate tax limit is taxed at 10%; dividend income above the £150,000 higher 
rate tax limit is taxed at 42.5% (Source: HM Revenue and Customs website via http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxon/uk.htm). 
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decisions in such a particular way. Besides, Adedeji (1998) points out that, since the 
imputation tax system in the UK does not encourage companies to use debt as much as the 
classical tax system does in the US, it may weaken the interaction between investment and 
financing decisions, and strengthen the interaction between investment and payout decisions 
in the UK.5 
2.3.5 Agency approach 
Alternatively, the set of corporate decisions may make sense in connection with one another 
through an agency approach. In the context of modern corporations, managers, who perform 
as the agents of shareholders, have the duty to maximise shareholders’ wealth. However, they 
may be tempted to maximise their personal wealth using their power, serving as imperfect 
agents. The conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders are likely to cause 
agency problems and distort corporate behaviour. Jensen (1986) claims that managers have an 
incentive to make their companies to grow beyond the optimal size so as to increase the 
resources under their control. The managers’ incentive to build a larger empire rather than pay 
out its free cash flow may distort corporate investment behaviour, leading to a problem of 
overinvestment. The overinvestment problem is likely to be more severe in companies with 
substantial free cash flow. Thus, the internal control system and the market for corporate 
                                                 
5 Adedeji (1998) argues that the imputation tax system in the UK encourages companies to pay dividends rather than reinvest 
their profits. From 1973 to 1999, the UK operated an imputation system, with shareholders able to claim a tax credit 
reflecting advance corporate tax (ACT) paid by a company when distribution was made. A company could set off ACT 
against the company’s annual corporate tax liability, subject to limitations. In 1999 ACT was abolished. Shareholders 
receiving a dividend are still entitled to a tax credit which offsets their tax liability, but the tax credit no longer necessarily 
represents tax paid by the company, and cannot be refunded to the shareholder. 
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control are particularly important for those companies to ensure that managers are pursuing 
the shareholders’ interests (see Jensen, 1986). To control the agency problem of 
overinvestment, it is desirable to set up agency-cost control mechanisms that give managers 
an incentive to act as better agents. Literature on agency theory suggests that both debt 
financing and dividend payouts can be used as agency-cost control devices to motivate 
managers to disgorge free cash flow to shareholders rather than invest it in negative NPV 
projects (see, for example, Jensen, 1986).  
Easterbrook (1984) offers an agency-cost explanation of dividends. That is, paying 
dividends compel companies to distribute more free cash flow in the hands of managers, and 
force companies to raise new funds in capital market more frequently. Companies that payout 
dividends and raise external funds simultaneously subject themselves to the scrutiny of third 
parties to attract the needed capital. From this point of view, dividend payout provides an 
incentive for managers to reduce the costs associated with the agency problems. Furthermore, 
Easterbrook (1984) indicates that, in the presence of alternative agency-cost control devices, 
such as when a non-dividend monitoring mechanism is in place, the use of costly dividend 
payout mechanisms to induce capital market monitoring is less likely. In this spirit, Jensen 
(1986) proposes a control hypothesis of debt by highlighting the benefits of taking on debt in 
monitoring managers and their companies. He argues that the use of debt can diminish the 
agency problem of overinvestment by committing a company to fixed interest payments in a 
way that cannot be accomplished by simple dividend increases. Therefore, debt can be used as 
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an effective substitute for dividends in reducing the agency costs of free cash flows. The 
control hypothesis of debt is further confirmed by Stulz (1990), who proves that debt can 
indeed reduce the probability of overinvestment.  
The agency approach is successful in explaining why some companies raise new funds, 
often in the form of bank loans, simultaneously with paying dividends. Although both floating 
new securities and issuing dividends incur costs, they reduce the shareholders’ losses resulting 
from agency problems by setting up monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, because both of the 
agency-cost control devices are themselves costly, one would expect to see substitution 
between them (see Easterbrook, 1984). The substitution among debt, dividends and other 
agency-cost control devices is empirically verified by Jensen et al. (1992). More recently, 
Noronha et al. (1996) and Ding and Murinde (2010) also observe the simultaneity between 
capital structure and dividend decisions in an agency-cost framework, the latter obtaining 
evidence from a panel of UK companies. 
One implication of the literature surveyed above is that the interactions among 
corporate investment, financing and payout decisions might be driven by agency-cost 
considerations, especially in large public companies where the ownership is considerably 
dispersed and the free cash flow is typically substantial. Companies with high levels of capital 
expenditures are more likely to face severe agency problems of overinvestment, thus should 
be more closely monitored by using either more debt financing or higher dividend payout as 
monitoring mechanisms. In such an agency setting, investors demand high levels of debt 
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financing or dividend payouts not because these are valuable in themselves, but because they 
promote more careful and value-oriented investment decisions. In other words, investors are 
willing to bear certain relevant costs, such as tax burden and issuance costs, in order to realise 
the benefits of reduction in the costs associated with the agency problem of overinvestment. 
However, it should be noted that the monitoring rationale for debt and dividends is only a 
partial explanation of corporate financing and payout policies, and not all companies base 
their financial decisions on agency-cost considerations (Noronha et al., 1996). In particular, 
the effect of agency-cost considerations on corporate behaviours may not be as important for 
rapidly growing companies with large and profitable investment projects but insufficient free 
cash flow. 
2.4 Corporate decisions under uncertainty 
Conventional literature on corporate finance has long been criticised for overlooking the 
importance of uncertainty in determining aspects of corporate behaviour (see Knight, 1921). 
Along with the theoretical development relating to corporate investment behaviour and 
advances in econometric techniques, recent studies that seek to explore the determinants of 
corporate investment have highlighted the role of uncertainty associated with companies’ 
prospects plays in determining corporate investment behaviour. However, the importance of 
uncertainty in financing and dividend decision-making processes has received little attention. 
Therefore, we know little about how uncertainty affects corporate financial choices, and 
whether uncertainty influences corporate investment decisions through its effects on financial 
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choices. 
2.4.1 Corporate investment decision and uncertainty 
Conventional corporate finance literature has long been criticised for overlooking the effects 
of uncertainty on companies’ real and financial behaviours. One stream of research in the 
literature that seeks to explore the determinants of corporate investment has recognised the 
importance of uncertainty associated with companies’ prospects (see, for example, Baum et 
al., 2008; Bloom et al., 2007; Lensink and Murinde, 2006; and Carruth et al., 2000). The 
relationship between investment and uncertainty has been addressed in various ways in the 
literature, including the Hartman-Abel approach, financial constraints approach, real options 
approach, pre-emption approach, etc. However, the investment-uncertainty relationship 
remains theoretically ambiguous and empirically inconsistent.  
2.4.1.1 Hartman-Abel approach 
The Hartman-Abel framework of investment lays strong emphasis on the convexity of the 
marginal product of capital (see Hartman, 1972; and Abel, 1983). Under the assumption of 
competitive product markets and symmetric adjustment costs for capital, it suggests that 
uncertainty has a positive effect on corporate investment via Jensen’s inequality. Specifically, 
Hartman’s (1972) discrete-time model shows that, if the future input and output prices of a 
project are mean-preserving stochastic processes, greater uncertainty about the distributions of 
these variables increases the expected present value of future profits associated with the 
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project. Since the higher marginal product of capital makes the projects more attractive, the 
quantity of current investment undertaken by a company is an increasing function of 
uncertainty. 
Abel (1983) generalises Hartman’s (1972) discrete-time model to a continuous–time 
model, and he proves that Hartman’s results continue to hold. His analysis confirms that a 
company’s marginal product of capital is a convex function of future price for its output, 
which implies that higher than expected output prices raise profits by more than lower than 
expected output prices reduce them. A wider range of the mean-preserving future output price, 
therefore, raises the expected level of future profits via Jensen’s inequality. Accordingly, the 
convexity of profit function to the mean-preserving stochastic variables rationalises a positive 
effect of uncertainty on investment. 
The intuitive idea in the Hartman-Abel framework is that uncertainty associated to an 
investment project contains both downside and upside risks, inducing not only dangers but 
also opportunities. If a company can take appropriate strategies to deal with various possible 
situations after a commitment has taken place, they can reasonably put more weight on the 
favourable outcomes, leading the company to undertake additional investment. However, it is 
also argued that the convex function relies heavily on the assumptions of perfect competition 
and constant return-to-scale production technology. If these assumptions are violated, the 
convexity of the relationship between profits and output prices may be weakened, or even 
reversed (see, for example, Caballero, 1991). In addition, the prediction of the Hartman-Abel 
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framework is not favoured by empirical evidence. Using a panel of US companies, Leahy and 
Whited (1996) find no evidence that corporate investment increases with uncertainty through 
the convexity of the marginal product of capital. 
2.4.1.2 Financial Constraints approach 
Another strand of literature claims that the financial constraints caused by asymmetric 
information may induce a negative effect of uncertainty on investment. By taking bankruptcy 
cost into consideration, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) point out that the optimal level of a 
company’s investment depends not only on the expected return to investment, but also on the 
level of uncertainty about future profitability. Higher levels of uncertainty about future 
profitability increase both the absolute and the incremental risk of bankruptcy. If a company 
cannot absorb the increased risk of bankruptcy by issuing new equity, the company may be 
forced to lower its investment spending. Therefore, profit uncertainty may force companies to 
rely on their internal finance, and impose a negative effect on corporate investment especially 
for financially distressed companies. 
Based on Greenwald and Stiglitz’s (1990) argument, Ghosal and Loungani (2000) use 
company size as a proxy for capital market access and examine the differential impact of 
profit uncertainty on investment in small and large businesses. Using US industry-level data, 
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) show that greater uncertainty significantly depresses investment 
in the full sample of industries, and the negative impact of uncertainty on investment is 
substantially larger in those industries which are dominated by small companies. They 
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conclude that greater uncertainty may exacerbate the problem of information asymmetry 
between companies and the capital markets, and impose an adverse impact on investment by 
increasing the premium charged on external funds. Minton and Schrand (1999) also find 
evidence that cash flow volatility is positively associated with costs of external financing, 
which may force companies to forgo valuable investment opportunities and lower capital 
expenditures. Bo et al. (2003) empirically explore the relationships among uncertainty, capital 
market imperfections and corporate investment using a panel of Dutch company. They find 
evidence that companies that are confronted with higher levels of uncertainty suffer from 
more severe capital market constraints. Greater uncertainty, therefore, has an indirect negative 
effect on investment via its effect on financial constraints. 
2.4.1.3 Real options approach 
As briefly introduced in Section 2.2.1, the real options approach to investment emphasises the 
importance of the option value to delay an investment decision in order to await the arrival of 
new information about market conditions (see Carruth et al., 2000). The value of waiting to 
invest is initially introduced by McDonald and Siegel (1986). They argue that, in reality, most 
investments can be delayed but cannot easily be reversed. Companies with investment 
opportunities have the right to choose to invest now or in the future. But once a company 
decides to commit an investment, the decision is irreversible, even if the market climate 
changes adversely. However, both the ability to delay investment and the irreversibility of 
capital investment are overlooked by the simple NPV model as well as the other investment 
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models based on the NPV principle. These overlooked characteristics may have profound 
effects on corporate investment behaviour. According to the theoretical work by McDonald 
and Siegel (1986), if the outlook of an irreversible investment project is unclear, companies 
can choose to delay undertaking the project, waiting for the arrival of new information until 
the uncertainty decreases or until the expected payoff from the project increases enough to 
offset the uncertainty. To incorporate these dynamic considerations, an optimal real decision, 
therefore, should be made by comparing the value of immediate investment and the present 
values of delayed investment at all possible times in the future, and choosing the investment 
time point that yields the highest expected payoff (McDonald and Siegel, 1986).  
By exploiting an analogy with theory of options in financial markets, Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) extend the investment timing model, and derive a real options theory of 
investment. They show that, with irreversibility or partial irreversibility, an investment 
opportunity could be considered as a call option which can be exercised at any time before the 
option expires. Financial options literature, e.g. the Black-Scholes framework, indicates that 
higher volatility of underlying financial assets increases the option value, leading to a higher 
critical value for option exercise. Consistent with this intuition, greater uncertainty associated 
with the outlook of an irreversible investment is likely to increase the value of the real option 
to invest, creating a larger wedge between the standard present value of future cash flows and 
the overall investment cost of a project. Thus, in order to make an optimal investment 
decision, the real option value should account for part of the full costs of the project. Given 
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that an increase in uncertainty raises the threshold for a project to be undertaken, the real 
options theory, therefore, clearly predicts a negative relationship between investment and 
uncertainty. 
This theoretical development stimulates a growing empirical literature which 
examines uncertainty and threshold effects on corporate investment behaviour. For example, 
using a panel of US manufacturing industries, Ghosal and Loungani (1996) show that the 
impact of uncertainty on investment is significantly negative for highly competitive industries, 
whist that for less competitive industries is small and insignificant. Their finding is broadly 
consistent with the prediction of the real option model. Guiso and Parigi (1999) find that 
uncertainty weakens the response of investment to demand and slows down the capital 
accumulation of a sample of Italian manufacturing companies. Bond and Cummins (2004) 
report a significantly negative effect of uncertainty on the capital accumulation of a sample of 
US companies, both in the short run and in the longer term. Bulan (2005) shows that 
uncertainty, both company-specific and industry-wide, appears to increase the value of real 
options and depress investment in the US. Leahy and Whited (1996) also find evidence for a 
negative effect of uncertainty on the investment of a panel of US manufacturing companies. 
However, their results indicate that uncertainty influences corporate investment primarily 
through its effect on Tobin’s Q. 
Based on the standard real options model of investment, Abel et al. (1996) develop a 
more general model by allowing companies to disinvest, so that the irreversibility of 
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investment is not complete, but limited. In this model, the ability to delay and abandon an 
investment yields two options. More specifically, when a company obtains an investment 
opportunity, the valuable real call option gives the company the right to invest within certain 
period of time. Likewise, once the company commits the investment, it automatically acquires 
a valuable real put option which enables it to resell the installed capital in the future. Since 
both the values of the call option and the put option depend on the volatility of future returns, 
greater uncertainty not only increases the value of the call option which encourages 
companies to wait to keep the call option alive, but also increases the value of the put option 
which encourages companies to invest to acquire the put option. Given that the effects of the 
two options act in opposite directions, Abel et al. (1996) conclude that the net effect of 
uncertainty on the incentive to invest remains ambiguous. 
2.4.1.4 Pre-emption approach 
Recent theoretical innovations, however, tend to cast doubt on the assertion of the standard 
real options theory of investment (see, for example, Grenadier, 2002; and Mason and Weeds, 
2010). It is argued that the real options approach only analyses corporate investment decisions 
in a single-agent context, but overlooks the strategic interactions between peers under a 
competitive business environment (Mason and Weeds, 2010). In the real world, investment 
usually takes place in a very competitive business environment, so the strategic considerations 
should be taken into account when investigating the investment-uncertainty relationship in a 
multi-player context. Caballero (1991) demonstrates that if a company is operating in a 
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perfectly competitive product market with constant return-to-scale production technology, the 
value of the option to delay irreversible investment is insufficient to deter the company’s 
investment. Caballero (1991) therefore concludes that company-specific uncertainty may still 
have a positive effect on investment, as argued by Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983), even in 
the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs. 
In addition, Grenadier (2002) points out that, in the real world, real option exercise 
strategies cannot be determined in isolation, but must be formulated as part of a strategic 
equilibrium, because the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic. By 
including competitive interactions, Grenadier (2002) shows that a company is likely to choose 
its optimal investment strategy based on its belief about the analogous strategies of its 
competitors in the market. Competitive access to the investment opportunities, therefore, 
drastically erodes the value of the option to wait.  
More recently, Mason and Weeds (2010) highlight that two types of strategic 
interaction between investing agents need to be considered, namely, pre-emption and 
externality. First, when there is a strong and persistent advantage to be the first to invest, 
companies may forfeit the option value of delay to pre-empt their rivals in spite of the 
uncertain outcomes.6 Once the strategic considerations are taken into account, the threat of 
                                                 
6 Mason and Weeds (2010) list several relevant situations. For example, patent races are characterised by lasting first-mover 
advantage. The first to invent (or first to file) gains an exclusive right over the technology, which other companies must not 
infringe. System wars between incompatible technologies (e.g. Windows vs. Apple Mac, VHS vs. Betamax) are also 
instances where a first-mover advantage tends to persist. Entry into industries with substantial economies of scale also tends 
to confer long-lasting benefits. Incumbents are difficult to displace and typically earn high returns. In these situations, one 
might expect to observe pre-emptive investment, and relatively little sensitivity to uncertainty. 
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being pre-empted will offset the value of real option. Second, the value of an investment may 
also depend on the number of companies which have also invested. Externality may affect the 
value of an investment negatively through a competitive effect, or positively through a 
complementary effect.7 In both cases, the value and timing of a company’s investment are 
likely to be influenced by the investment decisions of its peers. Mason and Weeds (2010) 
argue that, under a very competitive condition, greater uncertainty can lead companies to take 
the advantage of pre-emption by investing earlier. Therefore, by extending the real option 
analysis to include strategic interactions among peers, Mason and Weeds (2010) conclude that 
an increase in uncertainty may increase corporate investment, even if the projects are 
irreversible.  
2.4.1.5 Nonlinear hypothesis 
Although almost all the literature assumes that the relationship between investment and 
uncertainty is linear, a number of theoretical studies suggest that the relationship might not be 
monotonic, adding to the complexity of the problem.  
Abel and Eberly (1999) distinguish between the short and long-run effects of 
uncertainty, and examine their effects on capital accumulation separately. In the short run, 
greater uncertainty raises the trigger value of irreversible investment, causing a “user-cost 
effect”. In the long run, if a company encounters unfavourable conditions but fails to disinvest 
                                                 
7 Mason and Weeds (2010) argue that the interaction may have a positive effect, if there are complementarities between the 
agents’ actions such as network externalities or demand expansion. 
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the irreversible investments undertaken, the capital stock is likely to be higher than the 
optimal level, leading to a “hangover effect”. Because these two effects have opposing 
implications for the expected long-run capital stock, Abel and Eberly (1999) conduct a 
numerical analysis to determine the overall effect of uncertainty on capital stock. The 
numerical results show that at low levels of uncertainty the hangover effect is relatively 
stronger, whereas the user-cost effect outweighs at high levels of uncertainty. Therefore the 
relationship between uncertainty and expected capital stock is represented by a proximately 
inverted-U shaped curve. 
Instead of focusing on the level of expected long-run capital stock, Sarkar (2000) 
hypothesises a similar non-linear relationship between investment and uncertainty by 
emphasising the effect of increased volatility on the probability that an investment will take 
place within a specific time period. Again, two opposing effects of uncertainty on investment 
are identified. Apart from the negative effect of uncertainty on investment, which is in line 
with the standard real options theory, Sarkar (2000) also finds that increased volatility may 
raise the probability that a particular investment trigger will be hit, and in turn the likelihood 
of investment to be undertaken. The so called “hitting effect” may offset the effect of 
irreversibility and speed up investment. Again, the numerical results show that the net effect 
of uncertainty on the probability of investing mimics an inverted U-shaped curve. More 
precisely, the overall effect of uncertainty on investment is positive up to a certain threshold 
level of uncertainty, and turns out to be negative thereafter. 
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The empirical relevance of the inverted U-shaped relationship between investment and 
uncertainty has also been verified. Lensink and Murinde (2006) empirically verify an inverted 
U hypothesis of investment under uncertainty, using a panel of UK non-financial companies. 
The UK evidence suggests that the effect of uncertainty on investment is positive at low levels 
of uncertainty, but becomes negative at high levels of uncertainty. The inverted U effect of 
uncertainty on investment is similarly established for a panel of Dutch non-financial 
companies by Bo and Lensink (2005). Additionally, Lensink (2002) also provides evidence on 
the empirical relevance of the non-linear effect of uncertainty on investment at aggregate level 
for a set of developed economies.  
2.4.2 Corporate financing decision and uncertainty 
Although in the literature there is a plenty of evidence suggesting the effect of uncertainty on 
investment, the importance of uncertainty in companies’ financial decision-making processes 
has received little attention. Given the fact that all corporate decisions are made on the basis 
of uncertain information, the degree of uncertainty should be carefully considered in each of 
the decision-making processes for corporate policies. Several recent studies have indicated the 
potential role that uncertainty plays in companies’ financial decision-making processes.  
Minton and Schrand (1999) hypothesise positive associations between cash flow 
uncertainty and costs of accessing external debt and equity finance. They argue that, all other 
things being equal, cash flow volatility increases the probability that a company’s cash flow 
realisation in any given payment period will not be sufficient to cover its debt service 
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requirements. Since the increased probability of default must be compensated by a higher risk 
premium, Minton and Schrand (1999) predict a negative effect of uncertainty on external debt 
financing. Turning to access to equity capital, Minton and Schrand (1999) claim that analysts 
are less likely to follow companies with volatile cash flow, and thus companies with higher 
levels of uncertainty are subject to greater information asymmetry. Greater information 
asymmetry in turn implies a higher cost of accessing equity capital. Taken together, Minton 
and Schrand’s (1999) predictions imply a negative impact of uncertainty on companies’ 
access to external finance through its effects on the costs of debt and equity capital. Minton 
and Schrand (1999) further show that their predictions with respect to the association between 
cash flow uncertainty and the cost of accessing debt and equity capital find strong empirical 
support from a panel of US companies. 
Bo et al. (2003) argue that greater uncertainty leads to more risky projects. If debt 
holders are risk averse, greater uncertainty is likely to cause an increase of the risk premium, 
resulting in financial constraints. In addition, Bo et al. (2003) argue that uncertainty and 
financial constraints are interlinked, even if the debt holders are risk neutral. Due to the 
limited liability, shareholders of a company have an incentive to finance or partly finance 
projects with higher levels of risk using debt. Rational debt holders who anticipate such 
behaviour would charge a premium that reflects the expected costs they have to bear in the 
event of default (Bo et al., 2003). Therefore, uncertainty increases the wedge between the 
costs of internal funds and external funds, leading to capital market constraints. Using a panel 
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of Dutch companies, Bo et al. (2003) find empirical evidence that uncertainty and financial 
constraints are interlinked such that companies that are confronted with greater uncertainty 
suffer more from financial constraints. 
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) also indicate that greater uncertainty exacerbates the 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and thus increases the premium 
charged on external funds, creating financing constraints for certain types of borrowing 
companies in the capital market. Therefore, they hypothesise that uncertainty may limit 
companies’ access to capital markets and force companies to rely on their internally generated 
funds. A recent study by Baum et al. (2009) offers empirical evidence in support of this 
hypothesis maintaining that greater overall uncertainty associated with a company’s prospects 
has a negative effect on its ability to borrow. In addition, Frank and Goyal (2009) examine the 
relative importance of many factors in capital structure decisions, and they provide empirical 
evidence that uncertainty can to some extent explain companies’ leverage. They argue that 
companies with greater uncertainty face higher expected costs of financial distress, and thus 
should use less debt.  
2.4.3 Corporate payout decision and uncertainty 
Turning to the corporate payout choice, Minton and Schrand (1999) predict a negative 
association between dividend payout ratio and cash flow volatility. They argue that because 
negative market reactions to dividend cuts are normally larger in magnitude than positive 
reactions to dividend increases, companies with higher cash flow uncertainty may be forced to 
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maintain lower dividends in order to avoid the cost associated with cutting dividends. The 
prediction of a negative association between dividend payout ratio and cash flow volatility is 
strongly supported by their empirical evidence from a panel of US companies. Furthermore, 
by including control for earnings volatility, Minton and Schrand (1999) find that both cash 
flow volatility and earnings volatility are negatively associated with dividend payout ratios. 
Brav et al. (2005) report the results of an international survey on payout policy. 
Feedback from financial executives indicates that perceived uncertainty of future 
performances is an important factor affecting dividend decisions. Uncertainty may have an 
impact on the probability of paying dividends as well as the amount of dividend. These survey 
results on dividend policy and uncertainty are to some extent supported empirically by Chay 
and Suh (2009), who report a significant and negative impact of cash flow uncertainty on 
corporate payout policy using worldwide data. Chay and Suh (2009) argue that companies 
facing high cash flow uncertainty tend to avoid paying high dividends because they are not 
confident of their ability to maintain high dividends. Therefore, managers’ incentive to 
prevent financial trouble and adverse market reaction may lead to a negative effect of 
uncertainty on corporate payout policy.  
2.5 Corporate decisions and managerial confidence 
2.5.1 Modern corporate finance versus behavioural corporate finance 
As noted above, corporate investment, financing and payout choices are the main corporate 
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decisions facing management and the controversial issues in modern corporate finance. A 
large body of literature has been devoted to investigating the primary determinants of this key 
set of corporate decisions. Under the traditional assumption of broad rationality, the prior 
research typically relies on company fundamental characteristics, such as cash flow, 
investment opportunity, company size, asset tangibility, ownership structure, life cycle stage, 
industry characteristics, etc., in explaining aspects of corporate behaviour, largely ignoring the 
importance of the state of managerial confidence and economic sentiment in corporate 
decision-making processes. 
Recently, behaviour finance has begun to play an important role in attempting to 
explain aspects of finance that traditional finance literature has failed to explain. Behavioural 
finance literature replaces the traditional assumption of broad rationality with a potentially 
more realistic behavioural assumption that agents’ behaviours are less than fully rational, i.e. 
they may have behavioural biases (see a survey by Baker et al., 2006). The assumption of less 
than full rationality finds strong support from a large body of psychological literature (see, for 
example, Gilovich et al., 2002). Behavioural approaches are now commonly used in asset 
pricing literature in which investors are assumed to be less than fully rational. However, 
corporate finance literature has rarely relaxed the assumption that managers are fully rational. 
A review of the existing literature in behavioural corporate finance offered by Baker et al. 
(2006) shows that two distinct approaches have been developed in this area, namely, the less 
than fully rational investor approach and less than fully rational manager approach.  
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The less than fully rational investor approach views investor behaviour as less than 
fully rational, which causes securities market mispricing, while managerial behaviour as 
rational response to market mispricing. In the less than fully rational investor framework, 
market mispricing influences corporate real and financial decisions through a catering channel, 
that is, if the market misprices a company’s value according to the corporate decisions made 
by the company, managers may try to boost the short-run share prices of the company by 
catering to the current investor sentiment. In this spirit, Polk and Sapienza (2009) find 
evidence that corporate investment and market mispricing are positively correlated. 
Specifically, it is found that managers rationally cater to investor sentiment by investing in 
projects that are overpriced and by avoiding projects that are underpriced, in order to 
maximise the short-term stock prices of their companies. The catering idea has also been 
applied to corporate payout decisions by Baker and Wurgler (2004). They find that managers 
cater to investors by initiating dividends when the shares of payers are trading at a premium to 
those of nonpayers, and by omitting dividends when payers are at a discount or a negative 
dividend premium. Regarding corporate financing decisions, Graham and Harvey (2001) find 
that two thirds of CFOs in their survey consider the amount by which their securities is 
mispriced as an important factor in the decision to issue new debt and common stock. The 
market timing effect on capital structure is further developed and tested by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002). They find that current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. 
They conclude that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of managers’ attempts to time 
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the equity market based on their perceptions of mispricing. 
The less than fully rational manager approach to behavioural corporate finance 
assumes that managers have behavioural biases, while investor behaviour is fully rational. 
The less than fully rational manager assumption is supported by a large body of psychology 
literature demonstrating that individuals tend to systematically overestimate their intelligence 
quotient and skills relative to the average, i.e. the “better-than-average effect”, and to 
consistently underestimate inherent risk, i.e. the “narrow confidence intervals” (see, for 
example, Gilovich et al., 2002; Alicke et al., 1995). Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that 
top decision makers are more likely to exhibit overconfidence, both in terms of the 
“better-than-average effect” and in terms of the “narrow confidence intervals”, for a number 
of reasons. First, top executives typically believe they have a great deal of control over their 
companies’ performance (March and Shapira, 1987). Second, they are highly committed to 
their companies’ good performance, which is closely related to their personal wealth, 
professional reputation and employability (Weinstein, 1980). Third, it is difficult to assess top 
executives’ managerial skills relative to the average of others due to the abstract reference 
points involved (Alicke et al., 1995).8 It is well documented that all three factors, namely, the 
illusion of control, a high degree of commitment to good outcomes and abstract reference 
points, trigger managers’ upward bias towards future company performance and downward 
                                                 
8 Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that assessing relative managerial skill is difficult due to other factors that influence 
overall company performance. 
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bias towards the associated risks (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Therefore, thus far, the less 
than fully rational manger approach to behaviour corporate finance has mainly focused on the 
positive management illusions of optimism and overconfidence, and their resulting distortions 
of corporate decisions (see, for example, Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Lin et al., 
2005).9 
It is worth noting that the less than fully rational manager approach to behavioural 
corporate finance may share some predictions with the more established non-behavioural 
theories. However, Baker et al. (2006) highlight that the distortions in corporate decisions 
caused by less than fully rational managers’ behavioural biases should be distinguished from 
those caused by rational managers’ moral hazard behaviour. The less than fully rational 
manager approach to behavioural corporate finance is concerned with situations where the 
managers believe that they are loyal to shareholders and maximising company value, but are 
in fact deviating from their goal. Although the theoretical framework in this emerging area has 
not been firmly established and empirical evidence is still relatively rare, the existing 
literature indicates that the less than fully rational manager approach has the potential to 
explain a wide range of patterns in companies’ investment, financing and payout choices. The 
remainder of this section, therefore, focuses on behavioural corporate finance literature that 
                                                 
9 It is documented that managerial upward bias towards future company performance may be due to overconfidence or 
optimism (see, for example, Oliver and Mefteh, 2010; and Malmendier and Tate, 2005). According to psychology literature, 
overconfidence typically results from an overestimation of one’s own abilities, such as intelligence quotient and managerial 
skills, while optimism typically results from an overestimation of exogenous events related to the probability of success, for 
example economic growth. Besides this, sentiment is also a term often used to describe confidence and optimism (Oliver and 
Mefteh, 2010). Therefore, the words sentiment, confidence and optimism have been used interchangeably in the literature, 
and we do not discriminate among them hereinafter in this thesis. 
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adopts the less than fully rational manager approach. 
2.5.2 Corporate investment decision and managerial confidence 
In his General Theory, Keynes (1936) links the notion of “sentiment” to the “state of 
long-term expectation” and the “state of confidence”. He points out that the level of 
confidence one has in the future of the economy, or a sector of it, plays an important role in 
the formation of one’s expectations of future profit levels, and hence in the determination of 
investment decisions. Accordingly, an intuitive and compelling channel through which 
sentiment and confidence could influence companies’ real investment decisions is that where 
the state of managerial sentiment and economic confidence is one of the major factors 
determining expected rates of return, upon which corporate investment decisions are made. 
Corporate investment, therefore, should be increase with managerial confidence or economic 
sentiment. However, as criticised by Keynes (1936), the state of confidence or sentiment, 
which receives the closest and most anxious attention in practice, has not been discussed 
carefully and analysed thoroughly by researchers in economics and finance. 
The importance of confidence and sentiment, especially those of managers, in making 
corporate investment decisions has received little attention until recent years. The emerging 
literature in behavioural corporate finance recognises that managers’ psychological bias, 
particularly their positive illusions of optimism and overconfidence, may result in distortions 
in corporate investment decisions. More specifically, managerial optimism may result in 
overestimation of the expected returns to the investment projects, while managerial 
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overconfidence may result in underestimation of the risk associated with projects. Thus, 
managerial upward bias towards future company performance leads naturally to unintended 
overinvestment and risk-taking behaviour which distorts corporate investment decisions (see 
Heaton, 2002). By adopting the behavioural approach in a simple corporate finance model, 
Heaton (2002) demonstrates that optimistic managers who systematically overvalue the 
company’s investment opportunities may invest in projects whose net present values are in 
fact negative even if they are loyal to shareholders. Malmendier and Tate (2005) further 
confirm that managerial overconfidence indeed leads to distortions in corporate investment 
decisions made by a sample of large publicly traded UK companies. They argue that 
overconfident managers are likely to systematically overestimate the future returns to their 
investment projects, and thus overinvest relative to the optimal level. It is important to note 
that managerial overconfidence induced investment distortions are completely different from 
those caused by rational moral hazard behaviour under the agency view, such as overinvesting 
to build a large empire. To be more precise, unlike the traditional agency problems in which 
managers pursue their private benefits when there is a misalignment of interest between 
managers and shareholders (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers who are less than 
fully rational under the behavioural approach still believe that they are actually maximising 
shareholders’ wealth, even though they in fact overestimate the NPVs of investment projects 
and invest in negative NPV projects, deviating from their initial objectives (see Baker et al., 
2006). 
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Apart from its direct effect on investment, the state of confidence and sentiment may 
also influence investment decisions via its effects on corporate financing choices. It is 
documented that managerial overconfidence is also likely to cause managers to overvalue 
their companies, which in turn causes them to believe that the efficient capital market is 
undervaluing their company’s risky securities (Heaton, 2002). As a result, overconfident 
managers view external funds, especially external equity, as unduly costly, leading to a 
preference for internal funds and risk-free debt. They may decline valuable investment 
opportunities that must be financed externally. From this point of view, managerial 
overconfidence may result in underinvestment, if companies do not have sufficient internal 
funds and risk-free debt for their desired investment projects. Therefore, Heaton (2002) 
establishes a framework which allows for managerial optimism induced trade-off between 
underinvestment and overinvestment, without invoking traditional theories of agency cost and 
information asymmetry.  
Moreover, it is equally plausible to hypothesise that investor sentiment is heavily 
influenced by managerial confidence, and thus security prices might be inflated with 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment, allowing managers to infer lower required 
rates of return or cheaper external funds, which would prompt both external finance and 
investment. In this light, both investment and external financing should increase with 
sentiment. Ben-David et al. (2007) present empirical evidence that companies with 
overconfident CFOs invest in capital stock more intensively and use debt more aggressively.  
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2.5.3 Corporate financing decision and managerial confidence 
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), which proves the irrelevance of 
corporate financing decisions conditional on the assumptions of perfect capital market, a large 
number of theoretical and empirical analyses have been developed to investigate the 
determinants of corporate financing decisions caused by various market imperfections in the 
real world. The prior research in this area generally follows two competing theories, i.e. the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, both of which assume a broad rationality. 
Recently, Baker and Wurgler (2002) propose a market timing theory of capital structure which 
drops the assumption of investor rationality, and allows for time-varying market mispricing. 
Rational managers, who incorporate mispricing caused by investor sentiment into their 
financing decisions, tend to issue equity when they believe its cost is irrationally low, and 
repurchase equity when they believe its cost is irrationally high. Therefore, capital structure 
can be considered as the cumulative outcome of managers’ attempts to time the equity market 
based on their perceptions of mispricing. A recent study by Frank and Goyal (2009) reviews 
the existing literature on capital structure, and concludes that there is no universal theory 
which is able to fully explain corporate financing decisions, and there is no reason to expect 
one.  
Traditional explanations for capital structure heavily rely on the rigorous assumption 
of managerial rationality, and none of them consider managers’ psychological bias as an 
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important determinant in corporate financing choice.10 However, Heaton (2002) contends that 
managers tend to overvalue not only their investment opportunities, but also their company 
value. Because overconfident managers consistently overestimate the probability of good 
company performance versus the efficient capital market’s outlook, they always perceive that 
the capital market is undervaluing their company. Therefore, it is possible to integrate 
managers’ psychological bias into existing capital structure theories, and hypothesise 
managerial confidence and sentiment as an important determinant of corporate financing 
decisions alongside other company fundamental characteristics.  
In the trade-off model of capital structure, managers seek an optimal level of financial 
leverage to maximise their company value by weighing the tax advantages of debt and the 
bankruptcy costs of debt. Hackbarth (2008) extends the traditional trade-off model by taking 
managerial traits into account. Under the assumption of the coexistence of fully rational 
investors and less than fully rational managers, the extended trade-off model suggests that 
managers with an upward bias towards future company performance tend to choose higher 
debt levels and issue new debt more often, resulting in actual choices of debt levels differing 
from the optimal ones. The distortions of debt levels are attributed to managers’ less than fully 
rational perception of their company’s growth and risk. On the one hand, optimistic managers 
tend to overestimate their company’s growth rate of earnings, and thus believe their company 
                                                 
10 To some extent, Baker and Wurgler (2002) can be considered an exception. They argue that market timing theory does not 
require that the market actually be inefficient, i.e. investors actually be less than fully rational. The marker timing explanation 
remains valid as long as managers believe that they can time the market if even they themselves are less than fully rational. 
Specifically, managers may be less than fully rational and they are not required to predict stock return successfully and 
perceive market mispricing correctly. 
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is more profitable than it actually is. On the other hand, overconfident managers tend to 
underestimate their company’s riskiness of earnings, and thus believe their company is less 
risky than it actually is. Both the growth perception bias and the risk perception bias naturally 
lead managers to believe their company is less likely to experience financial distress, and in 
turn to choose higher than optimal debt levels. Hackbarth (2008) therefore predicts that 
overconfidence is associated with aggressive debt financing policies. On the empirical side, 
Oliver and Mefteh (2010) integrate managerial confidence into the trade-off model, and 
hypothesise that the more confident the managers are, the less likely they will be to expect the 
company to go into bankruptcy and the greater the extent to which they will use debt finance. 
Their prediction is strongly supported by the empirical evidence obtained from a sample of 
French companies, showing that managers act according to their expected psychological bias 
and prefer debt financing when they are confident. 
According to the pecking order model, asymmetric information problems generate a 
hierarchy of financing policies with a preference for internal over external funds and for debt 
over equity. As a result, companies finance the use of funds first with internally generated 
cash flow, then with debt, and equity finance is only used under duress. Heaton (2002) models 
the financing decisions of less than fully rational managers, and shows that managerial 
overconfidence induces a misperception of the cost of risky external capital, leading to a 
hierarchy of financing similar to that predicted by conventional pecking order theory. It is 
argued that optimistic managers are prone to attach higher probabilities to good outcomes 
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than an efficient capital market, thus they are likely to believe that the efficient capital market 
is undervaluing their company’s risky securities.11 For this reason, optimistic managers in an 
efficient market always perceive issuing a risky security, such as new equity, to be a negative 
net present value event which damages the interests of existing shareholders. Consequently, 
they believe there is never a good time to issue equity, and they never sell equity unless they 
have to. Likewise, optimistic managers believe that safer securities are less sensitive to 
probabilistic beliefs, and thus are less mispriced by the capital market.12 Since internal funds 
and risk-free debt are insensitive to probabilistic beliefs, they are not subject to the problem of 
undervaluation from the optimistic manager’s point of view. This induces a pecking order 
financing preference, in which optimistic managers attempt to minimise their overall cost of 
capital, without invoking asymmetric information. Heaton (2002) posits that optimistic 
managers strictly prefer internal funds and risk-free debt to any risky securities, and prefer 
risky debt to all equity financing. This pecking order of financing preference, therefore, is a 
testable prediction of the managerial optimism model.  
Malmendier et al. (2011) hypothesise that overconfident managers raise risky external 
finance only if the overestimated investment returns are larger than the misperceived 
financing costs. If the misperceived cost of external finance exceeds the overestimated 
investment returns, overconfident managers are reluctant to access external capital market, 
                                                 
11 The prices of risky securities reflect the capital market’s probabilities of good versus bad states of the world (Heaton, 
2002). 
12 Malmendier et al. (2011) assert that, in the case of equity financing, the difference in opinions between managers and 
investors about future cash flows matters for all states of the world. However, the difference in opinions matters only for 
default states in the case of risky debt financing.   
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and are likely to invest up to the limit of risk-free debt finance. The financing decisions of 
companies with less than full rational managers therefore depend, not only on their 
misperception of financing cost, but also on their overestimation of future returns.  
Overall, the predictions about how the state of confidence and sentiment affect 
corporate debt financing decisions are unclear. A high level of managerial confidence may, on 
the one hand, lead to greater use of debt financing if the managers systematically overestimate 
future profitability and underestimate the probability of financial distress. On the other hand, a 
high level of managerial confidence may discourage the use of external finance if the 
overconfident managers believe that their risky securities are undervalued by the markets. The 
influence of managerial confidence and sentiment on corporate debt financing decision 
therefore needs to be addressed empirically. Ben-David et al. (2007) find empirical evidence 
from US data that companies with overconfident managers use debt more aggressively and 
maintain longer debt maturity. Malmendier et al. (2011) find that overconfident managers 
prefer to use internal funds and risk-free debt. Conditional on having to raise risky external 
capital, overconfident managers prefer debt to equity financing. Malmendier et al. (2011) also 
indicate that both the trade-off and pecking order theories are complementary to the 
managerial effect on capital structure, and hence it is not necessary to take a stand on their 
relative merits.  
2.5.4 Corporate payout decision and managerial confidence 
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the models used to test dividend policy theories differ in their 
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assumptions and approaches. Lintner’s (1956) early study shows that managers usually have a 
reasonably definitive target payout ratio in the long run, and adjust the actual payout ratio 
slowly towards the target over years. Signalling model of dividends is characterised by 
information asymmetry and states that managers signal their private knowledge about the 
company’s prospects to the capital markets through dividend policy. Tax clientele theory 
focuses on the market imperfection resulting from the differential taxation of dividends and 
capital gains to explain corporate payout behaviour. The catering theory posits that dividend 
payouts respond to investors’ demand for dividends. Agency theory states that dividends are 
used by shareholders as a device to reduce free cash flow and the resultant overinvestment 
made by managers. More recently, a strand of literature highlights the importance of the 
company’s financial life cycle stage in its dividend policy. However, the conventional wisdom 
on dividend policy, under the assumption of broad rationality, fails to capture the potential 
effect of managerial confidence on corporate payout behaviour.  
Relaxing the assumption of broad rationality, it is plausible to argue that less than fully 
rational managers’ upwards psychological bias may also have profound implications for 
corporate payout decisions. On the one hand, managerial optimism implies that managers are 
prone to overinvest since they misperceive projects as more profitable than they really are, 
resulting in higher financing needs. On the other hand, managerial overconfidence implies 
that managers also tend to overvalue their companies, and hence misperceive the cost of 
external financing as unduly costly, limiting their access to external sources of funds. To 
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finance investment projects whose net present values are possibly overestimated, and at the 
same time to avoid external finance whose perceived costs are too high, managers are likely 
to retain internally generated cash flows that otherwise would have been paid out to 
shareholders as dividends, in an attempting to prevent losses from underinvestment (see 
Ben-David et al., 2007). Since internal funds are perceived as more valuable due to managers’ 
upward psychological bias, managerial confidence may lower the amount of dividends paid 
out as well as the propensity to pay out dividends. Ben-David et al. (2007) obtain empirical 
evidence from a panel of US companies showing that companies with overconfident CFOs 
pay out fewer dividends. The negative effect on payout policy is more significant for the 
long-term overconfidence measure compared with the short-term one, which is potentially 
due to the stickiness of dividend payments.  
However, it is equally plausible to argue that, if managers are more optimistic and 
confident about future cash flow, they may view dividend payment as more sustainable, 
leading to high levels of dividend payouts (Baker et al., 2006). In addition, DeAngelo et al. 
(1996) argue that because managers tend to be overly optimistic about company growth, they 
tend to send signals which are overly optimistic about future earnings. From this point of view, 
managerial overconfidence may cause a company’s dividend to go up. Given that the 
conflicting arguments provide equally good reasons for both positive and negative effects of 
managerial confidence on dividend payouts, the related research questions are subjected to 
empirical testing. 
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2.6 Conclusion and promising research ideas 
2.6.1 Conclusion 
This chapter offers a comprehensive and critical review of the main theoretical and empirical 
literature on corporate investment, financing and payout decisions, starting from the 
Modigliani-Miller theorems. Specifically, the main theories surveyed in this chapter include 
Tobin’s Q, accelerator, financial constraint and real options theories on corporate investment 
decisions; trade-off, pecking order, market timing and agency theories on corporate financing 
decisions; and bird in the hand, tax clienteles, signalling, catering, free cash flow and financial 
life cycle theories on corporate payout decisions. The conventional wisdom on the three 
aspects of corporate behaviour alongside selected recent empirical evidence are summarised 
in Appendices 2.A, 2.B and 2.C, respectively. Although these corporate finance puzzles which 
have captured the interest of researchers over the last six decades remain theoretically 
ambiguous and empirically inclusive, a number of conclusions can be drawn from the existing 
corporate finance literature reviewed in this chapter. 
First, the literature review shows that, although much effort has been devoted to 
investigating this key set of corporate decisions in literature, corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions have been typically treated separately, and hence there has been little 
analysis of the simultaneity among them. Previous studies, however, provide both reasons and 
evidence that corporate investment, financing and payout decisions are likely to be 
interdependent upon one another and jointly determined by management. Several mechanisms 
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through which the set of corporate decisions may affect one another have been explored, such 
as the institutional approach, flow-of-funds approach, tax approach, agency approach, 
information approach, etc. One important implication is that corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions are potentially linked in several important ways, thus should be better 
analysed within a simultaneous model framework. A summary of selected previous studies on 
the simultaneity of corporate decisions is presented in Appendix2.D. These studies provide us 
guidance in modelling corporate behaviours to avoid the danger of drawing spurious 
conclusions. However, none of the early studies are sufficiently comprehensive in the sense 
that they do not provide enough insight into the theoretical mechanism through which the set 
of corporate decisions may be bonded together and determined simultaneously. Besides, most 
of the significant empirical studies that investigate the joint determination of the corporate 
decisions are based on data from US companies, and the body of evidence on other markets 
outside the US is still rather small. McDonald et al. (1975) point out that the interactions 
among the corporate decisions are likely to depend on the size of the capital market. Thus, it 
still remains to be further investigated whether solid empirical evidence can be found to verify 
the possible interactions suggested by the theoretical arguments.  
Second, the literature review also shows that uncertainty associated with a company’s 
future prospects seems to be a critical factor in determining corporate investment behaviour, 
as highlighted by the real options theory of investment. However, the competing theories 
provide equally good reasons for both positive and negative relationships between investment 
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and uncertainty, leaving the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship remains unclear 
from a theoretical point of view. On the empirical side, a broad consensus in the existing 
literature is that the effect of uncertainty on investment is negative, although a number of 
studies also show that the investment-uncertainty relationship might be positive or non-linear. 
Prior research, however, has largely ignored the importance of uncertainty in financing and 
payout decisions as well as the potential influence of uncertainty on investment through its 
effects on the financial choices. Given the fact that all corporate decisions are jointly 
determined on the basis of uncertain information, the omission of relevant information in 
examining the effect of uncertainty on corporate investment may generate misleading results 
and lead to inappropriate inferences, which may bias our understanding of corporate 
behaviour under uncertain circumstances. Therefore, it is more plausible to model corporate, 
financing and payout decisions simultaneously, and to investigate the effect of uncertainty on 
aspects of corporate behaviour within a simultaneous equations system. 
Third, an emerging body of literature on behavioural corporate finance reveals that 
managers’ psychological bias may have a substantial impact on corporate decisions. In 
particular, managers’ upward bias towards future company performance may generate 
overinvestment, underinvestment and pecking order financing behaviours through different 
mechanisms. Prior research in this area mainly focuses either on the influences of investor 
sentiment (see, for example, Polk and Sapienza, 2009), or on the impacts of managers’ 
personality traits on corporate behaviour (see, for example, Malmendier et al., 2011; 
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Hackbarth, 2008; and Malmendier and Tate, 2005). However, little has been done on the 
influences of the state of managerial confidence or economic sentiment at aggregate levels on 
aspects of corporate behaviour, despite it is often being argued this has some bearing on 
corporate decision-making. Although the theoretical framework in this emerging area has not 
been firmly established and the empirical evidence is still relatively rare, it is plausible to 
hypothesise that the less than fully rational manager approach to behavioural corporate 
finance has the potential to explain a wide range of patterns in corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions. 
2.6.2 Promising research ideas 
One of the main objectives of the review of existing corporate finance literature is to identify 
some promising research ideas. In this section, we summarise four promising research ideas 
which are derived directly from the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in this 
chapter.  
The first promising research idea relates to the potential interactions that may exist 
among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions, as indicated in Gatchev et al. 
(2010), Wang (2010) and Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). Typically, corporate decisions are 
examined in isolation using a single equation framework, which fails to account for the 
interdependence among various policy choices. Such a methodology may produce coefficient 
estimates that suffer from omitted variables bias, and therefore provide incomplete view of 
corporate behaviour. To overcome the shortcomings of single equation techniques that are 
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currently adopted in the existing literature, the proposed research idea is to empirically 
investigate the joint determinations of the three corporate decisions by modelling them within 
a simultaneous equations system which explicitly allows for the interactions among them. The 
simultaneous analysis is expected to improve our knowledge of the complex corporate 
decision-making processes by revealing new insights into the interdependences among the 
corporate decisions in practice.  
The second promising research idea relates to the role played by uncertainty in 
corporate decision-making processes. Although uncertainty associated with a company’s 
future prospects appears to be a critical factor in determining the company’s investment in 
capital stock, the relationship between investment and uncertainty is still theoretically 
ambiguous and empirically inconsistent. The empirical evidence on the 
investment-uncertainty relationship seems sensitive to both the model specification and the 
uncertainty measurement. Moreover, the importance of uncertainty in companies’ financing 
and payout policies has not been thoroughly evaluated in the empirical literature. 
Consequently, the effects of uncertainty on financial decisions as well as the influence of 
uncertainty on investment decisions through its effects on financial choices are largely 
overlooked. Therefore, a promising research idea is to fill these gaps in the literature by 
considering uncertainty as a common factor involved in each of the decisions modelled in the 
simultaneous equations system, in order to comprehensively investigate aspects of corporate 
behaviour under uncertainty. 
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The third promising research idea relates to the emerging body of literature on 
behavioural corporate finance which asserts that managers’ psychological bias may have a 
substantial impact on corporate decisions. Although the theoretical framework in this 
emerging area has not been firmly established and the empirical evidence is relatively rare, it 
is plausible to hypothesise that the state of managerial confidence has the potential to explain 
a wide range of patterns in corporate investment, financing and payout decisions. A promising 
research idea, therefore, is to explore the role of managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment in explaining aspects of corporate behaviour by relaxing the conventional 
assumption that managers are fully rational. Again, the simultaneous equations system of 
corporate decisions provides a desirable platform for a systematic attempt to discover the 
effects of managerial confidence and economic sentiment on corporate behaviour.  
The fourth promising research idea relates to the measurement of corporate investment 
in the empirical literature. Although the conflicting empirical evidence obtained from the 
tremendous amount of literature induces intense debates upon almost all aspects of corporate 
investment behaviour, the measure of corporate investment itself has received little attention. 
The literature review shows that the use of corporate investment to capital stock ratio as a 
measure of companies’ investment behaviour has become common practice in applied studies. 
However, different measures of investment as well as various proxies for capital stock have 
been used to construct the corporate investment to capital stock ratio. At least twenty versions 
of corporate investment to capital stock ratio have been identified in the existing literature. To 
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the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that provides comparison and evaluation 
among the various versions of corporate investment ratios which seem, at first sight, very 
similarly specified. Thus, we know little about how differently these investment ratios 
perform in empirical studies, and the extent to which the choice of measuring corporate 
investment influences their empirical results. A promising research idea is to fill this critical 
lacuna in the literature by conceptually discriminating and empirically evaluating the twenty 
most commonly used measures of corporate investment. Such analyses may improve our 
understanding of the financial information contained in different investment measures, and 
demonstrate whether the conflicting empirical evidence offered by the literature on corporate 
investment may be attributable to the differences in measuring corporate investment 
behaviour.  
The remainder of the thesis attempts to implement these promising research ideas 
derived from the review of existing literature. Specifically, the first two research ideas, i.e. the 
simultaneity of corporate decisions and the effects of uncertainty on corporate decisions, are 
addressed in Chapter 3. A systematic attempt to explore the influences of managerial 
confidence on aspects of corporate behaviour is made in Chapter 4. The comparison and 
evaluation analyses of the various versions of corporate investment to capital stock ratio are 
carried out in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the study by proposing a number of promising 
ideas for future research which are drawn from both the existing literature reviewed and the 
findings presented in this thesis. 
 – 99 – 
Appendix 2.A: Corporate investment theories and representative recent empirical evidence 
Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Tobin's Q theory 
(Hennessy et al., 2007) 
Main model 
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Variable 
Investment (INV) = Capital expenditures on property, plant and equipment – Sales of property 
Capital stock (K) = Total property, plant and equipment 
Tobin’s Q (Q) = Average Q as specified in Erickson and Whited (2000) 
Financial constraints index (FC index) adopted from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) or Whited and Wu (2006): 
KZ = –1.001909×Ratio of cash flow to book assets + 3.139193×Ratio of total long-term debt to book assets – 39.36780×Ratio 
of total dividends to book assets – 1.314759×Ratio of cash stock to book assets + 0.2826389×Ratio of market value of assets to 
book assets 
WW = –0.091×Ratio of cash flow to book assets – 0.062×Dividend payer dummy + 0.021×Ratio of total long-term debt to book 
assets – 0.044×Natural log of book assets + 0.102×Industry sales growth – 0.035×Own company sales growth 
Cash flow (CF) = Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and amortisation 
Method OLS and GMM 
Sample 
46,118 US company-year observations over the period from 1968 to 2003, excluding regulated, financial and public service 
companies. 
Finding 
The simple Q model of investment is easily rejected, because regressors other than Q enter significantly. The coefficient on 
either proxy for future collateral constraints is positive and significant, which indicates that a collateral channel is operative. 
Accelerator theory 
(Guariglia, 2008) 
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Variable 
Investment (INV) = Property, plant and equipmentt – Property, plant and equipmentt–1 + Depreciation, depletion and amortisationt 
Capital stock (K) = Replacement value of capital stock calculated using the perpetual inventory formula 
Sales (S) = Real sales 
Cash flow (CF) = After tax profit + Depreciation 
Error correction term (log Kt–2 – log St–2) = Difference between company’s capital stock level and its desired level 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Method Difference-GMM  
Sample 124,590 annual observations on 24,184 UK companies, both quoted and unquoted, over the period from 1993 to 2003. 
Finding 
The sales growth terms are both positive and statistically significant, and the error-correction term attracts a negative sign. The 
accelerator effect of sales on investment and the error-correction behaviour are confirmed. The coefficient associated with cash 
flow is positive and precisely determined, suggesting that a drop in cash flow is associated with a drop in investment. 
Financial constraints 
model 
(Almeida and Campello, 
2007) 
Main model 
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Variables 
Investment (INV) = Capital expenditures 
Capital stock (K) = Total property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the period 
Investment opportunities (Q) = (Total assets + Annual close price × Common shares outstanding – Total common equity – 
Deferred taxes) / Total assets 
Cash flow (CF) = Earnings before extraordinary items + Depreciation 
Tangibility (TAN) = 0.715 × Total receivables + 0.547 × Total inventory + 0.535 × Total property, plant and equipment 
Method OLS and GMM 
Sample 18,304 company-year observations from manufacturing companies over the period from 1985 to 2000. 
Finding 
Pledgeable assets support more borrowing, which allows for further investment in pledgeable assets. The credit multiplier 
suggests that investment-cash flow sensitivities should increase with the tangibility of companies’ assets (a proxy for 
pledgeability), but only if companies are financially constrained. The empirical results confirm that constrained companies’ 
investment-cash flow sensitivities are increasing in asset tangibility, while unconstrained companies’ sensitivities show little or 
no response to tangibility. The results strongly suggest that financing frictions affect investment decisions. 
Real options theory  
(Bloom et al., 2007) 
Main model   
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Variable 
Investment (INV) = Total new fixed assets – Sales of fixed assets 
Capital stock (K) = Replacement value of real capital stock constructed by applying a perpetual inventory procedure with a 
depreciation rate of 8% 
Sales (S) = Total sales, deflated by the aggregate GDP deflator 
Cash flow (CF) = Net profit + Depreciation 
Uncertainty (UNC) = Standard deviation of daily stock returns for company i in accounting year t 
Error correction term (log St–1 – log Kt–1) = Difference between company’s capital stock level and its desired level 
Method System-GMM 
Sample 
5,347 company-year observations from an unbalanced panel of 672 publicly traded UK manufacturing companies over the 
period from 1972 to 1991.  
Finding 
It is found that with partial irreversibility higher uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of investment to demand shocks. 
Uncertainty increases real option values making companies more cautious when investing or disinvesting. The investment 
behaviour of large companies is consistent with a partial irreversibility model in which uncertainty dampens the short-run 
adjustment of investment to demand shocks. 
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Appendix 2.B: Capital structure theories and representative recent empirical evidence 
Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Trade-off theory 
(Flannery and Rangan, 
2006) 
Main model 
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Variable 
Total debt (TD) = Long-term debt + Short-term debt 
Market value of equity (ME) = Annual close price × Common shares outstanding 
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) = Income before extraordinary items + Interest expense + Income taxes 
Total assets (TA) = Book value of total assets 
Market to book ratio of assets (MB) = (Long-term debt + Debt in current liabilities + Preferred stock + Annual close price × 
Common shares outstanding) / Book value of total assets 
Depreciation expense (DEP) = Depreciation and amortisation 
Company size (SZ) = Logarithm of total assets 
Fixed asset proportion of total assets (TAN) = Property, plant and equipment / Book value of total assets 
R&D dummy (RDD) = 1, if company did not report R&D expenses; and 0, otherwise 
Industry debt ratio (IND) = Median industry debt ratio calculated for each year based on industry groupings 
Rating dummy (RATED) = 1, if the company has a public debt rating; and 0, otherwise 
Method Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation and OLS 
Sample 
111,106 company-year observations consisting of 12,919 non-financial and non-regulated companies over the period from 1965 
to 2001. 
Finding 
Target debt ratios depend on well-accepted company characteristics. Most of the lagged variables representing the target debt 
ratio carry significant coefficients with appropriate signs. Companies that are under- or over-leveraged by this measure soon 
adjust their debt ratios to offset the observed gap. Targeting behaviour is evident in both market-valued and book-valued 
leverage measures. Companies return relatively quickly to their target leverage ratios when they are shocked away from their 
targets. 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Pecking order theory 
(Frank and Goyal, 2003) 
Main model 
) , , ,( CFWCINVDIVfNDF   
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Variable Net debt issued (NDF) = Long-term debt issuance – Long-term debt reduction 
 
Dividends paid (DIV) = Cash dividend paid to shareholders 
Capital investments (INV) = Capital expenditures + Increase in investments + Acquisitions + Other uses of funds - Sale of 
property – Sale of investments 
Change in working capital (ΔWC) = Change in working capital + Change in cash and cash equivalents + Change in current debt 
Cash flow (CF) = Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and amortisation 
Financing deficit (DEF) = DIV + INV + ΔWC - CF 
Tangibility (TAN) = Net fixed assets / Total assets 
Market-to-book ratio of assets (MB) = (Total assets + Annual close price × Common shares outstanding - Common equity) / 
Total assets  
Company size (SZ) = Natural logarithm of constant sales 
Profitability (PRO) = Operating income / Total assets 
Method OLS 
Sample A broad cross-section of publicly traded non-financial and non-regulated US companies over the period from 1971 to 1998. 
Finding 
The pecking order theory is tested using disaggregated financing deficit. The coefficient on cash dividends, investment in fixed 
assets and investments in working capital are all significantly positive. But pecking order theory predicts a positive sign and a 
unit coefficient; after controlling for internal cash flows, the uses of funds should be matched dollar by dollar by increases in 
debt issues. Internal cash flow does lead to some reduction in debt issues, but the magnitude of the effect is small. While large 
companies exhibit some aspects of pecking order behaviour, the evidence is robust neither to the inclusion of conventional 
leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in explaining net debt issues 
over time for companies of all sizes. 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Market timing theory 
(Mahajan and Tartaroglu, 
2008) 
Main model  11111  , , , ,  ititititit
it
SZPROTANMBEFWAMBf
TA
TD  
Variable 
Total debt (TD) = Total liabilities – Deferred taxes 
Total assets (TA) = Book value of total assets; or Total assets - Common equity + Annual close price × Common shares 
outstanding;  
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where e is the net equity issues, and d is net debt issues (see also Baker and Wurgler, 2002) 
Market-to-book ratio of assets (MB) = (Total assets - Common equity + Annual close price × Common shares outstanding) / 
Total assets 
Tangibility (TAN) = Net property, plant and equipment / Total assets 
Profitability (PRO) = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation / Total assets 
Company size (SZ) = Logarithm of net sales 
Method Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation 
Sample 
Non-financial and non-regulated companies from Canada (3,150), France (3,194), Germany (2,359), Italy (900), UK (7,071), 
US (18,463) and Japan (7,602) over the period from 1994 to 2005. 
Finding 
The equity market timing hypothesis suggests that capital structure is cumulative outcome of past equity market timing attempts. 
The results show that historical market-to-book ratio is inversely related to leverage in most industrialised countries. The results 
reveal that the effect of equity market timing on leverage is short lived and neutralised within at most five years of equity 
issuance. These findings contradict the market timing hypothesis which precludes companies from rebalancing their capital 
structure in response to temporary shocks such as equity market timing attempts.  
Agency theory  
(Brailsford et al, 2002) 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Variable 
Total debt (TD) = Book value of total debt 
Market value of equity (ME) = Annual close price × Common shares outstanding 
Managerial ownership (OWN) = Number of ordinary shares owned by all executive and non-executive directors / Number of 
ordinary shares outstanding 
Company size (SZ) = Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Industry dummy (IND) = 1, if the company is in the industrial sector; and 0, otherwise 
Volatility (VOL) = Standard deviation of annual percentage change in operating income before interest, taxes and depreciation 
Growth (GRO) = Annual percentage change in total assets 
Profitability (PRO) = Operating income before interest and taxes / Total assets 
Free cash flow (FCF) = (Operating income before income tax + Depreciation and amortisation expenses - Total tax paid - Total 
dividend paid) / Total assets 
Intangibility (INTAN) = Intangible assets / Total assets 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) = Depreciation expense / Total assets 
Franked dividends (DIV) = Franked dividends paid / Total dividends paid 
Method OLS 
Sample 49 large Australian companies over the period 1989 to 1995. 
Finding 
The empirical results provide support for a non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. 
Specifically, when the level of managerial share ownership is low, an increase in managerial share ownership has the effect of 
aligning management and shareholders’ interests, and hence managers have less incentive to reduce the debt level, resulting in a 
higher level of debt. However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of a company’s shares, the entrenchment 
effect sets in, resulting in higher managerial opportunism, and therefore a lower debt ratio. Besides, several of the control 
variables, including IND, VOL, GRO and PRO have statistically significant coefficients, and the signs on these coefficients are 
consistent with predictions. The results are consistent with the effects of convergence-of-interests and management 
entrenchment. 
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Appendix 2.C: Dividend policy theories and representative recent empirical evidence 
Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Bird in the hand  
(Baker et al., 2002) 
Main model 
Financial managers’ opinions on the statement that “investors generally prefer cash dividends today to uncertain future price 
appreciation”. 
Variable Response = –2, if strongly disagree; –1, if disagree; 0, if no opinion; 1, if agree; or 2 if strongly agree with above statement 
Method Survey of financial managers 
Sample Financial managers of 188 NASDAQ companies surveyed in 1999. 
Finding 
Consistent with previous evidence, no empirical support exists for the bird-in-the-hand explanation for why companies pay 
dividends. The evidence also shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity. Managers give the 
strongest support to a signalling explanation for paying dividends, and weak to little support for the tax-preference and agency 
cost explanations. The study provides evidence about how managers view dividend life cycles and residual dividend policy. 
Tax clientele 
(Lee et al., 2006) 
Main model )( DIVfOWN   
Variable 
Change in ownership structure (ΔOWN) = First difference in the proportion of shares held by various investor groups (including 
wealthy individuals, medium-wealth individuals, and less-wealth individuals) from before the announcement of change in 
dividend until afterward 
Change in cash dividend per share (ΔDIV) = Announced change (first difference) in cash dividends per share 
Method Cross-sectional regressions using OLS 
Sample A panel of Taiwan companies over the period 1995 to1999. 
Finding 
Strong evidence supports a clientele effect. Agents subject to high rates of taxation on dividends (wealthy individuals) tend to 
hold stocks with lower dividends and sell (buy) stock that raises (lowers) dividends. Agents in lower tax brackets (medium- and 
lower-wealth individuals) behave in the opposite manner. All of these patterns are completely consistent with the existence of 
dividend clientele. 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Signalling theory 
(Skinner and Soltes, 
2009) 
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Variable 
Earnings before interest (EBI) = Income before extraordinary items + 0.6 × (Interest expense - Interest income) 
Total assets (TA) = Book value of total assets 
Dividend dummy (DIV) = 1, if the company pays dividends; 0, otherwise 
Method OLS with two-way robust standard errors (that is, clustered by company and year) 
Sample 
123,728 company-year observations on non-utility and non-financial US companies that trade on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ over the period from 1974 to 2005. 
Finding 
The study posits and tests the idea that dividends allow investors to assess the underlying sustainability of the company’s 
earnings quality. Consistent with the idea that the dividend payments provide information about the quality of reported earnings, 
the results show that the relation between current earnings and future earnings is stronger for companies that pay dividends than 
for those that do not. The study also finds that the magnitude of the dividend, measured in term of payout ratio terms, does not 
affect this relation.  
Catering theory 
(Ferris et al., 2009) 
Main model ) , , , , , ,( 1
1
11111 

 it
it
itititititit DIVTA
RE
GROMBPROSZDPfDIV  
Variable 
Dividend payment (DIV) = 1, if the company pays dividends; and 0, otherwise 
Dividend premium (DP) = log(P/B)payer - log(P/B)nonpayer 
where log(P/B)payer is value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of payers  
log(P/B)nonpayer is value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of non-payers 
Company size (SZ) = Percentile ranking of company’s market capitalisation in a given year among all sample companies 
Profitability (PRO) = Operating income / Book value of total assets 
Market-to-book ratio (MB) = (Total assets - Common equity + Annual close price × Common shares outstanding) / Total assets 
Growth (GRO) = Annual percentage change in total assets 
Maturity (RE/TA) = Retained earnings / Book value of total assets 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Method Logistic regression with clustered standard errors 
Data 24,298 company-year observations drawn from a sample of 23 countries over the period from 1996 to 2004. 
Finding 
Evidence of catering is found among companies incorporated in common law countries but not those in civil law nations. 
Catering persists even after controlling for the effect of the company’s life cycle. Companies are more likely to pay dividends if 
they are large and profitable. The propensity to pay dividends is significantly negatively related with the market-to-book value 
of assets. 
Agency theory 
(Khan, 2006) 
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Variable 
Gross dividends (DIV) = Ordinary dividends + Tax credit 
Sales (S) = Total sales 
Net income (NI) = Net profits after tax, minority interest and preference dividends 
Leverage (LEV) = Total loan capital / Net fixed assets = (Long-term loans + Short-term loans + Convertible loans + Leasing 
finance and hire purchase) / (Fixed assets – Accumulated depreciation) 
Ownership (OWN) = The relevant ownership variable 
Method OLS and system-GMM 
Data A panel of 3,030 company-year observations from 330 large quoted UK companies over the period from 1985 to 1997. 
Finding 
The results indicate a negative relationship between dividends and ownership concentration. Ownership composition also 
matters, with a positive relationship observed for shareholding by insurance companies, and a negative one for individuals. The 
results are consistent with agency models in which dividends substitute for poor monitoring by a company’s shareholders but 
can also be explained by the presence of powerful principals who are able to impose their preferred payout policy upon 
companies. 
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Theory 
(Empirical work) 
Main model / Variable / Estimation method / Data / Finding 
Life cycle theory 
(Denis and Osobov, 
2008) 
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Variable 
Dividend payment (DIV) = 1, if the company pays dividends; and 0, otherwise 
Company size (SZ) = Percent of companies in the benchmark population with smaller market capitalisation 
Market-to-book ratio (MB) = (Total assets – Common equity + Annual close price × Common shares outstanding) / Total assets 
Growth (GRO) = Annual percentage change in total assets 
Profitability (PRO) = (Net income + Interest expense + Deferred taxes) / Book value of total assets 
Earned-to-contributed equity mix (RE/TE) = Retained earnings / Total book equity 
Method Logit regression using the Neway and West procedure 
Data 
Company-year observations from US (30,131), Canada (3,589), UK (9,382), Germany (2,377), France (3,678) and Japan 
(12,747) over the period from1989 to 2002. 
Finding 
The findings cast doubt on signalling, clientele and catering explanations for dividends, but support agency cost-based life cycle 
theories. Companies trade off the flotation cost savings against the agency costs of cash retention. As companies mature (as 
proxied by greater RE/TE), the expected cost of retention increase, perhaps due to greater free cash flow problems, and the 
propensity to pay dividends increases. 
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Appendix 2.D: Methodologies and findings of selected literature on simultaneity of corporate decisions 
Empirical 
work 
Dhrymes and 
Kurz  
(1967) 
Fama  
(1974) 
McDonald  
et al.  
(1975) 
McCabe  
(1979) 
Peterson and 
Benesh 
(1983) 
Mougoué and 
Mukherjee 
(1994) 
Noronha  
et al.  
(1996) 
Ding and 
Murinde 
(2010) 
Wang  
(2010) 
Corporate 
decisions 
modelled 
Investment; 
New debt; 
Dividend 
Investment; 
Dividend 
Investment; 
New debt; 
Dividend 
Investment; 
New debt; 
Dividend 
Investment; 
New debt; 
Dividend 
Investment; 
New debt; 
Dividend 
Capital 
structure; 
Dividend 
Capital 
structure; 
Dividend 
Investment; 
New debt; 
Dividend 
Country US US France US US US US UK China 
Sample 
period 
1951–1960 1946–1968 1962–1968 1966–1973 1975–1979 1978–1987 1986–1988 1997–2003 2000–2007 
Number of 
companies 
181 298 75 112 537–538 100 106 699 2710 
Estimation 
techniquesa 
OLS; 
2SLS; 
3SLS 
OLS; 
2SLS 
OLS; 
2SLS 
OLS; 
2SLS 
2SLS; 
3SLS; 
SUR 
VAR 3SLS Pooled OLS DAG; 
PA 
Joint 
determinationb 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  
a. OLS represents ordinary least squares; 2SLS represents two-stage least squares; 3SLS represents three-stage least squares; SUR represents seemingly unrelated 
regressions; VAR represents vector autoregressive model; PA represents path analysis; and DAG represents directed acyclic graph model. 
b. Findings with regard to whether the corporate decisions modelled in the system are jointly determined.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CORPORATE DECISIONS, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
AND UNCERTAINTY 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporations face investment, financing and payout choices which are known as the trilogy of 
corporate decisions (Wang, 2010). Although much effort has been devoted to investigating 
this key set of corporate decisions in the literature, they have typically been treated separately, 
and hence there has been little analysis of the simultaneity among them. A review of the 
conventional wisdom on the three aspects of corporate behaviour is provided in Section 2.2, 
but nothing at all about the interactions that may exist among them. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a comprehensive review of relevant literature. Suffice 
it to point out here that prior research has provided reasons and evidence that financial 
constraints, such as limited availability of internal finance and access to new external finance, 
may hamper companies’ ability to invest efficiently (see the literature reviewed in Section 2.3). 
According to this view, companies should consider their fund-raising choices alongside their 
fund-spending decisions. An important implication is that corporate investment, financing and 
payout decisions are likely to be interdependent upon one another and jointly determined by 
management. Nevertheless, previous studies that empirically investigate companies’ real and 
financial decisions overwhelmingly employ single equation techniques, and thus permit no 
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analysis of the contemporaneous interactions among these corporate decisions, leading to 
incomplete view of corporate behaviour (Gatchev et al., 2010). To overcome the shortcoming 
of single equation techniques, this chapter highlights the potential joint determination of 
corporate investment, financing and payout decisions by modelling them within a 
simultaneous system which explicitly allows for the interactions among them. The 
simultaneity analysis may reveal new insights into the inter-relationships that may exist 
among the set of corporate decisions, improving our knowledge of the complex corporate 
decision-making processes. 
The set of corporate decisions are potentially interdependent not only because they 
may affect one another directly, but also because they are likely to be affected by substantially 
overlapping information. As discussed in Section 2.4, recent literature that seeks to explore 
the determinants of corporate investment behaviour has highlighted the importance of 
uncertainty associated with companies’ prospects. However, the role that uncertainty plays in 
financing and payout decisions has received little attention. Due to the fact that all corporate 
decisions are made on the basis of uncertain information, it is plausible to argue that the 
degree of uncertainty matters in both financing and payout decisions as well. If this is true, 
uncertainty may not only influence corporate investment decisions directly on its own, but 
also indirectly through its effects on financing and payout choices. The omission of relevant 
information in modelling corporate decisions is likely to generate misleading results and lead 
to inappropriate inferences, which may bias our understanding of corporate behaviour. 
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Therefore, this chapter seeks to fill these gaps in the literature by considering uncertainty 
associated with a company’s future prospects as a common factor that involved in each of the 
decisions modelled in our simultaneous system, in an attempt to comprehensively investigate 
corporate behaviour under uncertainty. 
Based on a large panel of UK-listed companies within the period 1999–2008, this 
chapter empirically investigates the interactions among corporate investment, financing and 
payout decisions in the presence of financial constraints and uncertainty, contributing to the 
current knowledge of corporate behaviour in a number of ways. First, we develop a 
simultaneous equations system that explicitly accounts for the interactions among the three 
corporate decisions, with each of the decision variables being treated as endogenous and 
being subject to the constraint that sources must equal uses of funds, as implied by the 
flow-of-funds framework. The simultaneous equations analysis, therefore, overcomes the 
shortcomings of single equation techniques that are currently adopted in the existing literature, 
and provides new insights into the interdependences among corporate decisions in the real 
world. Second, we include the degree of uncertainty associated with a company’s prospects as 
an explanatory variable in each of the decisions equations modelled in our simultaneous 
system. By including an uncertainty variable into the simultaneous system, we explicitly 
allow uncertainty to not only affect each of the corporate decisions directly on its own, but 
also indirectly through its effect on other corporate decisions. Such analyses can provide us 
better knowledge of corporate decision-making behaviour under uncertain circumstances. 
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Third, we explicitly explore the possible mechanisms through which the set of corporate 
decisions are determined simultaneously, by splitting the whole sample into two with 
financially more constrained and financially less constrained companies, based on a financial 
leverage index. We believe that our exclusive research design can shed light and provide a 
deeper understanding on corporate decision-making behaviour in the real world. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
empirical measures of uncertainty used in the existing literature. Section 3.3 develops a 
theoretical framework. Section 3.4 specifies the corporate behavioural equations. Section 3.5 
discusses the sample, variables and preliminary analysis. Section 3.6 describes the estimation 
and testing procedures as well as the main results for the empirical models. Section 3.7 offers 
further evidence to check the robustness of our findings. Concluding remarks are drawn in 
Section 3.8. 
3.2 Empirical proxies for uncertainty 
The primary challenges of establishing the relations between uncertainty and corporate 
decisions are to identify the sources and to quantify the levels of uncertainty associated with 
companies’ future prospects (Carruth et al., 2000). There is a considerable debate regarding 
how uncertainty should be captured empirically. To date, no consensus has been reached 
about the best practice of measuring uncertainty in empirical analyses. A number of broad 
approaches have been employed in the existing literature to construct proxy measures for 
uncertainty, but none of them appears without its particular problems and criticisms. This 
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section, therefore, summarises the most commonly used empirical measures of uncertainty in 
the existing literature, which may provide us with guidance in formulating proxy measures for 
uncertainty. 
3.2.1 Output volatility 
Output volatility measures the variation in the expected revenue from an investment project. 
In the empirical literature, output volatility is typically defined as the variations in product 
price, product demand or total sales, which can be considered as consequences of 
demand-side shocks. According to the neoclassical investment model, a company’s profit is a 
convex function with respect to the output price. Increased output volatility, therefore, raises 
the expected present value of future profit and encourages the company to undertake 
investment opportunities (see, for example, Hartman, 1972; and Abel, 1983). 
Henley et al. (2003) measure industry-wide product price uncertainty using a moving 
standard deviation of the producer price index of the corresponding sector. However, the use 
of historical volatility has been widely criticised for being backward looking and failing to 
carry uncertainty information for future periods. In an attempt to devise a better proxy for 
uncertainty, Ghosal and Loungani (1996) assume that companies attempt to forecast their 
product prices using an autoregressive (AR) model. They argue that the unpredictable part of 
the stochastic process can be used to formulate a more reasonable measure that captures 
output price shocks. Accordingly, they calculate a rolling standard error of the forecasting 
residuals, and use it as the proxy for output price uncertainty. The major problem of using 
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product price volatility to measure uncertainty is that the price indices are normally only 
available at aggregate levels, and thus are unlikely to carry uncertainty information specific to 
individual companies. 
Guiso and Parigi (1999) employ product demand volatility to proxy for the output 
uncertainty. They draw information about managerial perception of future demand for their 
products from a survey conducted by the Bank of Italy. The conditional mean and variance 
derived from the survey data are used to measure the expected level of product demand and 
the expected degree of demand uncertainty, respectively. These measures, based on the 
managers’ subjective certainty about their expectations, are expected to be more closely 
related to the investment decisions made by individual companies under different 
circumstances. In much the same vein, Calcagnini and Saltari (2001) also derive a proxy for 
uncertainty from business survey results regarding expected growth in demand, and use it to 
analyse the relationship between investment and demand uncertainty at aggregate level. 
However, due to the limited availability of survey data, the use of survey-based demand 
uncertainty proxies is relatively rare in the existing literature. 
The most commonly used output uncertainty proxy is based on the volatility of 
companies’ total sales. Because sales data can be easily obtained from a company’s income 
statement, it enables empirical studies to more accurately explore the effect of a company’s 
idiosyncratic output uncertainty on its investment decisions by using company-specific 
information. Lensink and Sterken (2000) measure companies’ output uncertainty using the 
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standard deviation of historical total sales. To account for the size effect, the standard 
deviation of total sales is scaled by its mean value to form the coefficient of variation of the 
underlying variable. The use of proxy for uncertainty at disaggregate level can effectively deal 
with the problems of heterogeneity across companies which may potentially bias the results 
from studies at aggregate levels (Carruth et al., 2000).  
3.2.2 Input volatility 
Input volatility measures uncertainty with respect to the prices of labour, raw materials and 
other on-going operating expenses that extend over time once a project is committed. Input 
volatility measures are expected to capture the supply-side uncertainty. 
By assuming a fixed capital-labour ratio for a given level of technology, Huizinga 
(1993) considers the real wage as a proxy for the on-going operating expense. Accordingly, he 
constructs a bivariate autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model to estimate 
the conditional standard deviation of quarterly real wage, which is then used as a proxy for 
uncertainty associated with input costs in a model of aggregate investment. Besides this, 
Huizinga (1993) constructs another proxy for input uncertainty based on the volatility of 
material prices. It is found that aggregate investment appears to be negatively associated with 
both real wage and material price volatility. The results also indicate that any single volatility 
measure at aggregate levels is unlikely to adequately capture the various dimensions of 
uncertainty faced by a company. At disaggregate level, Lensink and Sterken (2000) use the 
volatility of employee costs as one of the proxies for uncertainty to investigation investment 
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behaviour of companies under uncertain circumstances. However, due to the limited time 
period for company-level data, they simply measure uncertainty using the coefficient of 
variation of the underlying variable. 
3.2.3 Profit volatility 
Profit variables take both sales and costs into consideration, and thus the variation in profit 
counts for both input and output uncertainties. Therefore, profit volatility is typically regarded 
as a more general and more plausible proxy for uncertainty that carries information more 
relevant to an individual company’s corporate decisions. 
The standard deviation of the unpredictable component of profit has been widely used 
in empirical studies as a proxy for uncertainty. For example, Ghosal and Loungani (2000) set 
up a basic autoregressive forecasting equation for profit variable, and measure uncertainty 
using the standard deviation of the forecasting residuals. However, it is documented that the 
main concern about proxies for uncertainty derived from the forecasting residuals is that they 
are likely to be sensitive to the specification of the forecasting models (Carruth et al., 2000). 
Therefore, it is important to carry out various specification tests to ensure that the forecasting 
model is correctly specified and statistically adequate.  
Bond and Cummins (2004) develop a more innovative approach to measure 
uncertainty based on analysts’ profits forecasts. They argue that more disagreement among 
different securities analysts is likely to be associated with greater underlying uncertainty 
about a company’s future prospects. Accordingly, Bond and Cummins (2004) measure the 
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dispersion across individual analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for each company, and use 
it as a proxy for the company’s profit uncertainty in their empirical investigation into the 
investment-uncertainty relationship. In addition, Bond and Cummins (2004) construct an 
alternative proxy for profit uncertainty using the variance of analyst forecast error, by arguing 
that large analyst forecast error is likely to reflect a high degree of uncertainty, and vice versa. 
The main advantage of Bond and Cummins’ (2004) novel measures of uncertainty is that they 
carry information directly related to agents’ expectation on companies’ future profitability. 
However, the sample size is limited by the number of companies with sufficient analyst 
following. 
3.2.4 Stock returns volatility 
Stock returns volatility measures the variation of the changes in a company’s share price. If 
the market is efficient, all information about a company’s asset fundamentals and growth 
opportunities should be properly translated into its share price. Thus, the volatility of a 
company’s stock returns is expected to summarise the volatilities of all aspects of the 
company’s future prospects, capturing the overall uncertainty relevant to the company’s 
investment decisions. This approach is adopted by most recent empirical studies to construct 
forward looking uncertainty measures, and the difference mainly lies in the statistics used to 
measure the volatility. 
The standard deviation of stock returns is the most commonly used statistic to measure 
uncertainty. For example, Bond and Cummins (2004) and Lensink and Murinde (2006) 
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simply quantify the degree of uncertainty faced by a company using the standard deviation of 
its daily stock returns observed over the period. A similar methodology is employed in Bulan 
(2005), where the standard deviation of daily stock returns is annualised to match the financial 
variables, which are only available on a yearly basis. However, there is a growing body of 
evidence suggests that the use of more sophisticated time series models can lead to better 
predictions of future volatility. 
Since the stock market data are reported at a sufficient high frequency, it facilitates the 
application of the generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH)-type 
modelling of volatility, which is able to generate more precise estimates of future uncertainty. 
To take the advantage of the high-frequency stock market information, Lensink and Murinde 
(2006) set up an autoregressive model to estimate the conditional mean of the stock returns, 
and simultaneously specify a GARCH model to estimate its conditional variance and thus 
conditional standard deviation. The average of the estimated conditional standard deviations 
over each period is then calculated for each company and used as a measure of the company’s 
idiosyncratic uncertainty for the corresponding period. In order to account for the asymmetric 
component embedded in the volatility of stock returns, Bo and Lensink (2005) specify both 
threshold ARCH (TARCH) and exponential GARCH (EGARCH) models to derive volatility 
measures. These extended GARCH-type model allow for the asymmetric response of stock 
return volatility to positive and negative shocks. Specifically, negative shocks are allowed to 
have more impact on future volatility than positive shocks are the same magnitude. 
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Similar methodologies are also employed to measure aggregate uncertainty at industry 
and market levels, for example, the standard deviation of monthly stock market returns is used 
in Lensink (2002) as an uncertainty measure at aggregate level. Moreover, the use of 
aggregate stock market series also provides a channel to decompose a company’s overall 
uncertainty into its market, industry and company-specific components. Bulan (2005) uses the 
volatility of daily stock returns as a proxy for the company’s overall uncertainty. Similarly, the 
volatilities of daily returns on market index and industry index are considered as proxies for 
total market uncertainty and total industry uncertainty, respectively. A recent study by Baum 
et al. (2008) also utilises the intra-annual volatilities of daily stock returns and market index 
returns to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty. 
However, the use of stock returns volatility as proxy for uncertainty can be criticised 
from several aspects. The main concern with this approach is that share prices may be too 
noisy to provide useful information, because the volatility in stock market returns is likely to 
be driven not only by movements in company fundamentals but also by speculative bubbles. 
Besides, there is also a criticism that, although stock market returns may contain certain 
information about a company’s cash flow uncertainty, they may reveal rather less about 
uncertainty associated with future economic shocks and policy changes, thus fail to capture 
the overall uncertainty associated with the company’s future prospects (Carruth et al. 2000). 
3.2.5 Macroeconomic volatility 
Macroeconomic uncertainty is also considered by some empirical studies, especially those at 
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aggregate levels. The volatilities of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, interest rate, 
inflation rate and exchange rate, are expected to have influence on the corporate decisions of a 
large number of companies in an economy.  
It is well documented that, since an economy faces more uncertainty in the distant 
future than in the near term, longer maturity of bonds entails greater uncertainty for investors. 
Under the assumption of risk aversion, the holders of long-term bonds, who are subject to 
greater risk, must be compensated by a risk premium. Therefore, the risk premium embedded 
in the term structure of interest rates facilitates the measuring of uncertainty associated with 
the macro economy. Accordingly, Ferderer (1993) uses the expected excess holding period 
return of long-term bonds over short-term bonds to estimate the risk premium. The implicit 
risk premium embedded in the term structure of interest rate is then used as a proxy for the 
uncertainty associated with interest rates and other macroeconomic variables.  
Apart from the measure derived from the term structure of interest rate, 
macroeconomic volatility is also typically estimated based on the variations in GDP, inflation 
rate and exchange rate. For example, Price (1995) utilises a GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) 
estimate of conditional variance of GDP as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. However, 
it is criticised that macroeconomic volatility measures are unlikely to adequately capture the 
various dimensions of uncertainty faced by corporate decision makers, and thus fail to capture 
all relevant uncertainty sources (Carruth et al., 2000). 
As can be seen, there is no consensus about how uncertainty should be captured 
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empirically. A number of broad approaches have been adopted in the existing literature to 
formulate proxy measures of uncertainty, ranging from output volatility to input volatility and 
from stock return volatility to macroeconomic volatility. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed 
that corporate decisions tend to be more sensitive to company idiosyncratic uncertainty than 
to macroeconomic uncertainty which affect all companies in general. Thus, uncertainty 
measures at disaggregate levels should be better able to capture all relevant uncertainty 
sources which may affect an individual company’s decisions. Meanwhile, it is also widely 
believed that, compared with backward looking measures, forward looking measures reveal 
more information about both the range and the magnitude of uncertainty facing corporate 
decision makers (Carruth et al., 2000). Therefore, it is desirable to construct forward looking 
measures of uncertainty at company level to investigate aspects of corporate behaviour under 
uncertain circumstances. 
3.3 An information asymmetry-based flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour 
To justify the fundamental interactions among corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions, we derive a model from a company’s flow-of-funds identity, i.e. a company’s uses 
of funds must equal its sources of funds. Based on stylised financial statements, a company’s 
main sources and uses of funds identity can be expressed as follows, 
 
DEPPROEQUSDLDDIVCAFA   (3.1) 
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where FA represents fixed assets, CA current assets, DIV dividends paid to shareholders, LD 
long-term debt, SD short-term debt, EQU common and preferred stock (exclusive of retained 
earnings), PRO net income after tax, DEP depreciation allowances, and ∆ the change in a 
variable from t–1 to t. The flow-of-funds identity states that companies raise funds from 
external debt (∆LD and ∆SD), external equity (∆EQU) as well as internally generated cash 
flow (PRO and DEP), and spend it on investment in assets (∆FA and ∆CA) and dividend 
payout (DIV). The overriding constraint presented in Equation 3.1 is that the uses of funds 
must equal the sources of funds. If the capital markets are sufficiently imperfect, companies 
have to consider the availability of internal and external funds alongside their investment and 
payout decisions, such that the set of corporate decisions may be determined jointly and 
should be viewed as a simultaneous and interdependent process. The flow-of-funds identity 
specified in Equation 3.1 can also be reparameterised into the following form, 
 
DEPPROEQUSDNDFDIVCAINV   (3.2) 
 
where INV represents investment, i.e. the change in fixed assets over a period (∆FA), NDF 
represents the net amount of new debt issued, i.e. the change in long-term debt outstanding 
(∆LD). Among the various uses and sources of funds specified in Equation 3.2, the primary 
focus of our model is on capital investment (INV), long-term debt financing (NDF) and 
dividend payout (DIV) decisions. Internally generated cash flow (CF), which can be defined 
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as the sum of net income (PRO) and non-cash expenses (DEP), is assumed to be determined 
by past investment and financing decisions.13 Following the tradition of the corporate finance 
literature, we treat internally generated cash flow as exogenous or predetermined in our model. 
Moreover, it is argued that the changes in the elements contained in current assets (CA) and 
short-term debts (SD), such as inventories, accounts receivable, and accounts payable, are 
likely to be triggered by economic conditions, thus cannot be interpreted as the result of 
conscious decisions made by managers (see, for example, Kadapakkam et al., 1998). 
Accordingly, we treat the net changes in working capital (∆WC, which is equivalent to
SDCA  ) as unintended residuals that balance the uses and sources of funds. Besides, in 
the presence of information asymmetry, external equity financing (∆EQU) is rationally 
viewed by investors as bad news that the stock is overpriced, thus managers are extremely 
reluctant to issue new equity in the stock market for fear of sending a negative signal to the 
markets. As a result, external equity financing is typically considered as a last resort and is 
rarely used. Given the fact that external equity finance is a less significant source of funds for 
listed companies after their initial public offerings, we drop ∆EQU from the flow-of-funds 
framework for simplicity. 14  Therefore, the reduced form flow-of-funds identity can be 
specified as follows, 
                                                 
13 It is believed that corporate decisions affect output (and profits) only with lags so that current corporate decisions affect 
only future output and hence profits, and that current output and current profits are not affected by current corporate decisions 
(see, for example, Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967; and McCabe, 1979). 
14 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that, in the presence of asymmetric information, external equity financing is only 
used in extreme circumstances after initial public offering. Cleary et al. (2007) show that debt finance is the most significant 
source of external finance in all countries, and new equity finance accounts for only a very small proportion of total corporate 
financing. 
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CFNDFWCDIVINV   (3.3) 
 
where INV, NDF and DIV are the three endogenous variables, representing investment outlays, 
net long-term debt financing and dividend payout respectively; CF represents cash flow, 
which is taken as exogenous; ∆WC represents the net change in working capital, which is 
considered as the residual to balance company’s uses and sources of funds. Since the external 
equity financing variable (∆EQU) is omitted in Equation 3.3, the reduced form flow-of-funds 
identity is no longer an equality (=) but an approximation ( ). Given the arguments presented 
above, the number of endogenous variables in the simultaneous equations system reduces to 
three, namely, capital investment, long-term debt financing and dividend payout. Thus, the 
empirical framework comprises estimation of the following simultaneous equations system, 
 
) , , ,( ACFDIVNDFfINV   (3.4) 
) , , ,( BCFDIVINVfNDF   (3.5) 
) , , ,( CCFINVNDFfDIV   (3.6) 
 
where A, B and C are vectors of other exogenous variables which, according to existing 
literature, are the stylised determinants of corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions, respectively. The three endogenous variables are the dependent variables for the 
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corresponding equations. Each equation contains the two remaining endogenous variables as 
explanatory variables, along with a predetermined cash flow variable and other exogenous 
determinants. It is worth mentioning that, although the net changes in working capital (∆WC) 
is considered as the residual to balance company’s uses and sources of funds, there is 
nevertheless a behavioural relation implied for working capital by Equations 3.4–3.6 through 
the adding-up restrictions implied by the reduced form flow-of-funds identity specified as 
Equation 3.3. The implication for working capital, however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
We hypothesise that, in the presence of information asymmetry, both internal and 
external funds available for investment are likely to be constrained. To provide further 
insights into the potential interactions among the set of corporate decisions, in particular the 
influence of a company’s financial decisions on its real decisions, we appeal to the superior 
knowledge that managers may possess about the company’s fundamentals and prospects. 
Miller and Rock (1985) hypothesise that, in the presence of information asymmetry, 
managers may use dividends as a signal to reveal some of their private information to the 
markets. The signalling effect of dividends is so well-known and widely accepted that 
mangers are not only reluctant to cut dividends in order to avoid the anticipated negative 
market reactions, but also reluctant to increase dividends for fear they will not be able to 
maintain them at a higher level and have to cut them in the future. Due to the stickiness of 
dividends under such circumstances, raising funds for investment from internally generated 
cash flow becomes less flexible. As a consequence, the variation in investment expenditures 
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cannot be soaked up freely by retained earnings. Therefore, the company may be forced to 
forego relatively low net present value investment projects to maintain its dividend payout at 
a desired level.  
On the other hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that the alternative sources 
of funds are no longer perfect substitutes owing to the costs created by managers’ superior 
information. Managers’ efforts to issue risky securities tend to be interpreted as a signal that 
the company is overvalued. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, in the presence of 
information asymmetry, outsiders are likely to underprice risky securities, thereby external 
finance is more costly than internal finance, and external equity is more costly than external 
debt. Accordingly, managers prefer to finance all of the uses of funds with internally 
generated funds, which have a cost advantage and no information asymmetry problem. If 
internal funds are exhausted and external finance is required, managers raise external funds 
with debt, which is less likely to be affected by revelation of managers’ superior information. 
Equity is only considered as a last resort. Therefore, if the level of debt is close to a 
company’s borrowing capacity at a given cost, a decline in new debt financing may inhibit the 
company’s capital spending and may also cause capital rationing. 
In a nutshell, asymmetric information not only constrains a company’s access to 
internally generated funds via its effect on dividends, it also limits the company’s ability in 
raising external funds. Therefore, corporate decisions are likely to be made simultaneously by 
managers with full recognition of competing needs for funds and alternative sources of funds. 
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The hypothesised relationships between each pair of the three endogenous variables are 
presented in Table 3.1. It is worth noting that the coefficient estimates for Equations 3.4– 3.6 
throughout the thesis reflect conditional responses and this conditioning includes the 
simultaneously determined variables, i.e. INV, NDF and DIV. Also note that this thesis does 
not aim to disentangle all possible mechanisms through which corporate decisions are likely 
to be interdependent upon one another, as discussed in Section 2.3. Rather, we focus on the 
information asymmetry-based flow-of-funds framework of corporate behaviour. Other 
approaches may have very different implications for the interactions among the corporate 
decisions.  
 
Table 3.1: Endogenous corporate decision variables and hypothesised interactions under 
the flow-of-funds framework for corporate behavioura 
Variable Economic argument Expected sign 
NDF→INV Decreases in new borrowing result to capital rationing and inhibits investment 
 
+ 
DIV→INV Increases in dividends reduce the pool of funds available to investment 
 
– 
INV→NDF Increases in investment motivate a company to utilise its borrowing capacity 
 
+ 
DIV→NDF Increases in dividends limit the access to retained earnings and force a 
company to rely more heavily on debt for financing 
+ 
INV→DIV Decreases in investment spending enable a company to pay more dividends 
 
– 
NDF→DIV Increases in debt financing allow a company to carry out planned dividend 
payout even when the profitability is low in the short run 
+ 
Notes:  
a. It is worth noting that the expected signs are hypothesised under the information asymmetry-based 
flow-of-funds framework. Other theoretical arguments of corporate behaviour may have very different 
implications for the interactions among corporate investment, financing, and dividend decisions. 
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3.4 Modelling corporate investment, financing and payout behaviour 
3.4.1 Corporate investment equation 
The investment equation specified in this thesis is based on a simple Q model, which is then 
extended by including the cash flow variable, used as a proxy for internal financial constraints, 
and debt financing and dividend payout variables that may potentially affect investment 
spending according to the flow-of-funds framework under information asymmetry. Besides, in 
order to empirically address the investment-uncertainty ambiguity, a proxy for uncertainty is 
included as well. Therefore, the investment equation is specified as follows, 
 
itit
it
it
itititit
UNC
K
INV
Q
K
CF
K
DIV
K
NDF
K
INV
  

16
1
543210
 (3.7) 
where INV represents the gross investment, NDF net new debt financing, DIV dividend 
payout, CF cash flow, Q the ratio of market to book value of total assets, UNC the measure of 
uncertainty, and   an error term. A lagged investment variable is also included to capture 
the dynamic structure of the investment decision as implied by many empirical studies in this 
area (see, for example, Guariglia, 2008; and Lensink and Murinde, 2006). In addition, the 
corporate decisions are assumed to be made at the beginning of each year, and thus a lagged 
uncertainty variable is included to proxy for the perception of uncertainty when companies 
make corporate decisions at the beginning of each fiscal year for the year ahead, i.e. managers 
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form their perceptions of uncertainty at the beginning of the year t (or end of year t–1) 
according to the information set available, and then decide how to finance and allocate their 
funds for the year t. The use of a lagged uncertainty variable, therefore, reduces the possibility 
of using more information in modelling corporate behaviour than managers actually have 
when they make their decisions (see, for example, Baum et al., 2008). 
All of the corporate decision and cash flow variables in Equation 3.7 are scaled by 
beginning-of-period capital stock (K), in order to control for company size and to reduce 
heteroscedasticity problems that may otherwise arise in the company-level data. We choose 
the beginning-of-period value as the deflator based on the assumption that all the key 
corporate decisions are made at the beginning of each fiscal year (see, for example, Bulan, 
2005). Scaling by capital stock rather than total assets or sales is done because capital stock is 
relatively more stable over time and less likely to be distorted by economic conditions, thus 
the corporate policies can be better isolated (see, for example, Bond and Meghir, 1994).15 
3.4.2 Debt financing equation 
In the spirit of the literature on the financing hierarchy with asymmetric information, we 
specify the financing equation on the basis of pecking order theory (see, for example, Bharath 
et al., 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2003; and Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Accordingly, the 
net amount of debt issued by a company is expected to be driven by the company’s financing 
                                                 
15 Bond and Meghir (1994) use investment to capital stock ratio, cash flow to capital stock ratio, debt to capital stock ratio 
and dividend payment to capital stock ratio to investigate the sensitivity of companies’ investment spending to the 
availability of funds, using a panel of UK companies. 
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deficit, which can be reasonably captured by the linear combination of investment, dividend 
and cash flow variables according to its accounting definition (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999).16 It is well documented that pecking order theory is only partially successful in 
explaining companies’ financing decisions, and its explanatory power can be significantly 
improved by including some factors suggested by other theories (see, for example, Leary and 
Roberts, 2010; and Bharath et al., 2009). Accordingly, we modify the strict pecking order 
model by controlling for stylised leverage factors such as company size and asset tangibility 
variables, which are used to proxy for companies’ ability to access to external capital market 
and their collateral value, respectively. Uncertainty is also included because of its potential 
effect on financing decision. Therefore, the financing equation is specified as follows, 
 
itititit
itititit
UNCSZTAN
K
CF
K
DIV
K
INV
K
NDF
  16543210
 (3.8) 
 
where TAN is asset tangibility; SZ represents company size; and   is an error term. Large 
companies tend to have a reputation of low default risk, with easy access to external capital 
markets. Tangible assets are easy for outsiders to value, mitigating the problem of information 
asymmetry and lowering the risk premium of borrowing. Thus, companies with both large 
                                                 
16 Financing deficit (DEF) can be derived from a partially aggregated form of the flow of fund identify. More specifically,
WCCFINVDIVDEF  .  
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size and high level of tangible assets should be able to carry more debt. Besides, greater 
uncertainty is likely to exacerbate the degree of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outside capital markets, which in turn may generate a more significant cost disadvantage of 
external debt financing or even result in credit rationing. Companies, therefore, are likely to 
be required to pay a higher premium for new borrowing or be denied loans. Accordingly, we 
hypothesise a negative effect of uncertainty on the net amount of debt issued. 
3.4.3 Dividend payout equation 
The corporate payout equation is modelled on the basis of the signalling hypothesis of 
information asymmetry. Since the existing empirical evidence suggests that no single theory 
can fully explain the dividend puzzle (see Frankfurter and Wood, 2002), we utilise additional 
company characteristics variables, such as ownership structure and financial life cycle stage, 
to explain dividend payout behaviour. These factors are generally believed to be the primary 
determinants of dividend policy, according to the stylised facts.17 Again, we include the 
proxy for uncertainty into the equation as well. The dividend model is specified as follows, 
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  16543210
 (3.9) 
                                                 
17 Some studies also employ lagged dividend status as an explanatory variable (see, for example, Ferris et al., 2009; and 
Khan, 2006). However, Fama and French (2001) argue that including a lagged dividend status is problematic because the 
resultant model seeks to explain a company’s current dividend decision on the basis of the same decision made recently by 
the same company. Therefore, we ignore lagged dividend status in modelling corporate payout behaviour. 
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where OWN is insider ownership structure; RE/TE is a retained earnings-to-total equity ratio, 
a proxy for a company’s financial life cycle stage; and   is an error terms. Cash flow and 
retained earnings-to-total equity ratio are expected to have positive effects on dividend payout, 
whilst insider ownership is expected to have a negative effect. The relationship between 
uncertainty and dividend payout, however, is not so clear-cut. It is reasonable to argue that, 
with asymmetric information, managers adjust dividend payouts upward or downward only 
on a permanent change in their business environment. If the prospects are uncertain, managers 
may choose to wait for more information rather than adjust dividend policy immediately, for 
fear of sending wrong information to the markets. If this argument is supported by empirical 
evidence, uncertainty may dampen the response of dividend payout to cash flow. It is equally 
plausible to argue that a company’s prospects are less predictable under uncertainty, so that 
managers’ confidence in maintaining dividend payouts at certainty level will collapse. Thus, 
managers’ perception of uncertainty may result in a cut in dividend payouts.18 We therefore 
expect the effect of uncertainty on corporate dividend payout to be neutral or negative. 
3.5 Data and preliminary analysis 
3.5.1 Data and measurement 
The data are collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. The 
                                                 
18 Sant and Cowan (1994) assert that, if managers’ confidence interval on the company’s future performances no longer 
reassures them that they will be able to continue the current payout, they may cut or even omit dividends. Both decreased 
expected performance and increased variance of future performances may make managers’ confidence interval less 
reassuring 
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initial sample includes all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), including 
both active and inactive companies within the period 1999–2008. We then discard utilities 
(Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 4900–4949), and financial companies (SIC 
code 6000–6999). Companies that do not have complete records for the key data, such as 
capital investment committed, new debt issued and cash dividends paid, and those with less 
than five years of continuous observations are dropped from our sample. We also exclude 
company-year observations with negative cash flow from our sample. An unbalanced panel of 
company-level data is formed to avoid survivorship bias.19 Stock prices are retrieved from 
DataStream for the same batch of companies over the same period of time. 
To make full use of the data, a company-year observation is included in the sample for 
single equation analyses as long as it has records on the relevant variables in determining the 
corporate decision under investigation. For example, our single equation analysis for 
corporate investment behaviour utilises all the company-year observations which have records 
for INV/K, NDF/K, DIV/K, CF/K, Q, (INV/K)-1 and UNC. However, for the simultaneous 
equations analyses, a company-year observation can be utilised only if it has complete records 
on all the relevant variables in determining the three corporate decisions. The number of 
company-year observations included in the final sample for our simultaneous equations 
analyses therefore reduces to 2,791.   
                                                 
19 The empirical investigation is based on an unbalanced panel of company-level data, which means that not only active but 
also dead and suspended listed companies on LSE are included in the sample. 
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Table 3.2: Description of main variables used in Chapter 3a 
Gross investment (INV): 
The sum of the changes in book value of net property, plant and equipment and depreciation expensesb 
Net debt financing (NDF): 
The change in the book value of long-term debt 
Dividends (DIV): 
The reported total dividends paid on common stock, including extra and special dividends 
Cash flow (CF): 
The sum of net income and depreciation expenses 
Capital stock (K): 
The book value of tangible fixed assets 
Average Q (Q): 
The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of total assets 
Company size (SZ): 
The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Asset tangibility (TAN): 
The ratio of the book value of net property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets 
Ownership structure (OWN): 
The percentage of common share outstanding that is held by insiders 
Retained earnings-to-total equity ratio (RE/TE): 
The ratio of the book value of retained earnings in balance sheet to the book value of total common equity 
Uncertainty measure 1 (UNC1): 
The difference between the highest and the lowest prices normalised by the mean over the period 
Uncertainty measure 2 (UNC2): 
The conventional standard deviation of daily stock market returns over the period 
Uncertainty measure 3 (UNC3): 
The average of conditional standard deviations of daily stock returns over the period 
Financial leverage index (FLI): 
The ratio of return on average assets to return on average equity 
Notes: 
a. The definition and measurement of the variables are based on the existing literature.  
b. The data are collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics, except the daily 
share prices used to construct uncertainty measures 2 and 3, which were obtained from the DataStream 
database. 
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The definition of each variable used in this chapter is described in Table 3.2. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, constructing an appropriate proxy for uncertainty is the primary 
challenge faced by studies investigating the effects of uncertainty on corporate behaviour. We 
construct three proxies for uncertainty based on stock prices, under the assumption that all the 
information about a company’s fundamentals and prospects will be properly transmitted into 
its share price.20 The first proxy for uncertainty is share price volatility (UNC1), which is 
measured as the difference between the highest and the lowest prices normalised by the mean 
value for each year. The second proxy is the conventional standard deviation of daily stock 
market returns for each year (UNC2). Besides, the possible volatility clustering effect of stock 
market returns motivates us to derive a third measure of uncertainty (UNC3), which is 
estimated from a GARCH (1, 1) model specified as follows, 
 
tttt uRRR   22110   (3.10) 
2
12
2
110
2
  ttt u   (3.11) 
 
where Rt denotes the stock market return at time t, and 2t denotes the conditional variance of 
the daily stock market return at time t. Both the conditional mean and conditional variance 
equations are estimated company by company over the entire sample period under 
                                                 
20 The proxies for uncertainty based on stock market information are expected to be forward-looking indicators and able to 
capture the overall uncertainty associated with the changing aspects of a company’s business environment. Share prices tend 
to fluctuate more when the prospects are less predictable.  
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investigation. To construct a proxy for uncertainty on yearly basis, we first take the square 
root of the estimated daily conditional variances to obtain the daily conditional standard 
deviation, and then calculate the average of the daily conditional standard deviations of the 
stock market returns over each year as an uncertainty measure for the corresponding period. 
All the three proxies for uncertainty are derived from information on the volatility of 
individual companies’ stock prices, and therefore are forward looking in nature. However, the 
main concern is that the high-frequency stock market data may reflect not only companies’ 
fundamentals but also bubbles and fads, making this type of proxy for uncertainty too noisy 
(see, for example, Bond and Cummins, 2004; and Bloom et al., 2007). In particular, the use of 
daily stock returns may produce extremely noisy proxies for uncertainty. Thus, among the 
three alternatives, UNC1 is treated as the primary measure of uncertainty, because it is 
constructed as the normalised difference between yearly high and yearly low prices, and 
hence should be better able to match companies’ annual financial data and to reduce the 
impact of high-frequency noise that may be present in the daily observations. UNC2 and 
UNC3 are used as supplementary measures of uncertainty. 21  Therefore, our empirical 
findings on the effects of uncertainty on corporate decisions are mainly drawn from the sign 
and significance level of the coefficient on UNC1 in the corresponding equations.  
                                                 
21 Lensink and Murinde (2006) also point out that the standard deviation of daily stock market returns and the average of 
daily conditional standard deviations of stock market returns do not measure annual volatility but the average daily volatility 
in the respective year. Another reason for using UNC1 as our primary measure of uncertainty is that the data on this variable, 
as well as the other accounting items, are collected from the Worldscope database, whereas the daily share prices used to 
compute UNC2 and UNC3 are collected from the DataStream database. Once the two datasets are merged, the number of 
observations declines significantly. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for main variables used in Chapter 3a 
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. 
 Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables without winsorisationb 
INV/K 0.8180  0.2388  960.43  –0.96  16.6124  56.8067  3279  3398 
NDF/K 0.3435  0.0000  243.45  –67.54  5.7114  27.8121  1083  3401 
DIV/K 0.3250  0.1020  48.00  0.00  1.4514  19.7664  521  3399 
CF/K 1.4156  0.4651  155.20  0.00  5.4895  15.4013  320  3398 
Q 2.1415  1.3779  143.71  0.02  5.2062  17.0323  383  3410 
TAN 0.2951  0.2470  0.95  0.00  0.2305  0.8798  3  3407 
SZ 5.5161  5.3538  12.05  –0.03  2.0197  0.2745  3  3411 
OWN 0.2447  0.2023  0.99  0.00  0.2093  0.8046  3  3393 
RE/TE 0.3081  0.5478  71.29  –437.33  8.2261  –44.0193  2358  3407 
UNC1 0.3122  0.2972  0.72  0.02  0.1046  0.7052  3  3423 
UNC2 0.0293  0.0231  0.35  0.00  0.0234  3.3704  31  1907 
UNC3 0.0299  0.0261  0.33  0.00  0.0198  3.1983  36  1799 
         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of variables winsorised at the top and bottom 5
th
 percentiles
c 
INV/K 0.4130  0.2388  2.3547  –0.0723  0.5313  2.3133  8.2628  3398  
NDF/K 0.1347  0.0000  1.9474  –0.6391  0.5292  2.0772  7.6866  3401  
DIV/K 0.2036  0.1020  1.0888  0.0000  0.2717  2.1325  6.9118  3399  
CF/K 0.9722  0.4651  6.1150  0.0733  1.3625  2.5842  9.2465  3398  
Q 1.6939  1.3779  4.5970  0.7125  0.9760  1.5863  4.9233  3410  
TAN 0.2920  0.2470  0.7871  0.0172  0.2222  0.7621  2.6143  3407  
SZ 5.4855  5.3538  8.9878  1.9947  1.8750  0.1343  2.2278  3411  
OWN 0.2410  0.2023  0.6713  0.0011  0.1999  0.6096  2.3451  3393  
RE/TE 0.4208  0.5478  0.9724  –1.2778  0.4996  –1.7403  6.1775  3407  
UNC1 0.3123  0.2972  0.5591  0.1714  0.0992  0.6307  2.7302  3423  
UNC2 0.0281  0.0231  0.0711  0.0054  0.0181  0.9267  2.9597  1907  
UNC3 0.0291  0.0261  0.0634  0.0078  0.0159  0.6123  2.3965  1799  
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year data observed within the period 1999–2008. 
b. Winsorisation is the transformation of extreme values in the statistical data.  
c. The transformed data are identical to the original data except that, in this case, all data below the 5th percentile 
are set to the 5th percentile and all data above the 95th percentile are set to the 95th percentile. 
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Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables from our 
raw data. As is evident, extreme values appear in almost all the variables, especially those that 
are constructed as ratios. Baum et al. (2008) point out that the values of the 
investment-to-capital, cash flow-to-capital, debt-to-capital ratios and Tobin’s Q outside the 5th 
and 95th percentile range should be judged implausible, and thus should be screened to reduce 
the potential impact of outliers upon the parameter estimates. Accordingly, we winsorise all 
the variables used in our analysis at the top and bottom 5th percentiles of their respective 
distributions. Specifically, the winsorisation transformation would set all observations below 
the 5th percentile equal to the 5th percentile, and observations above the 95th percentile equal 
to the 95th percentile. Such a transformation not only reduces the potential impact of outliers 
but also allows the full use of observations. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics after such 
a transformation is undertaken. It shows that the maximum values of INV/K, NDF/K and 
DIV/K reduce from 960.43, 243.45 and 48.00 to 2.35, 1.95 and 1.09, respectively. The 
standard deviations for each of these variables reduce from 16.61, 5.71 and 1.45 to 0.53, 0.53 
and 0.27, respectively, and more importantly, their distributions are more close to normality 
after the transformation, as suggested by the skewness and kurtosis statistics. Since the 
winsorisation estimators are expected to be more robust, our empirical results presented 
hereafter are, therefore, obtained by using the winsorised variables.22  
                                                 
22 It is believed that winsorisation is superior to the more standard transformations such as trimming. Winsorisation not only 
reduces the influences of outliers, but also allows us to make full use of the sample observations (see, for example, Chay and 
Suh, 2009). 
                Chapter 3: Corporate Decisions, Financial Constraints and Uncertainty  
– 141 – 
Table 3.4: Correlation coefficient matrix of variables used in Chapter 3a 
Variable 
K
INV  
K
NDF  
K
DIV
 K
CF
 
Q TAN SZ OWN 
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RE  UNC1 UNC2 UNC3 
K
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1.00 
 
           
K
NDF
 
0.38b 
***c 
1.00 
 
          
K
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0.34 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
1.00 
 
         
K
CF
 
0.57 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
0.67 
*** 
1.00 
 
        
Q 0.13 
*** 
0.03 
 
0.20 
*** 
0.19 
*** 
1.00 
 
       
TAN –0.33 
*** 
–0.15 
*** 
–0.50 
*** 
–0.53 
*** 
–0.16 
*** 
1.00 
 
      
SZ –0.08 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
–0.02 
 
–0.12 
*** 
0.02 
 
0.14 
*** 
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OWN 0.02 
 
–0.07 
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–0.04 
** 
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*** 
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–0.10 
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–0.04 
** 
0.06 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
–0.03 
* 
0.09 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
1.00 
 
   
UNC1 0.22 
*** 
–0.02 
 
–0.01 
 
0.21 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
–0.24 
*** 
–0.28 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
–0.29 
*** 
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UNC2 0.01 
 
0.03 
 
–0.03 
 
–0.01 
 
–0.16 
*** 
0.02 
 
–0.08 
*** 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
1.00 
 
 
UNC3 0.01 
 
0.03 
 
–0.03 
 
0.00 
 
–0.14 
*** 
0.01 
 
–0.10 
*** 
0.04 
 
–0.01 
 
0.05 
* 
0.91 
*** 
1.00 
 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year data observed for the period 1999–2008. 
b. For each cell, the reported figure is the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between the corresponding 
variables. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
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The pair-wise correlation among the main variables is presented in Table 3.4. It shows 
that the three endogenous variables (namely, INV/K, NDF/K and DIV/K) are significantly 
correlated with one another, and that the predetermined cash flow variable (CF/K) is 
significantly correlated with all three endogenous variables. However, the correlation 
coefficients between endogenous variables are uniformly positive, which is not entirely 
consistent with the implications of flow-of-funds framework. It is also evident that the 
uncertainty proxy (UNC1) is significantly and positively correlated with corporate investment 
(INV/K), and weakly and negatively correlated with the new debt financing ratio (NDF/K) and 
dividend payout ratio (DIV/K). Finally, the correlations between the endogenous variables and 
other relevant exogenous variables are also informative. According to Table 3.4, INV/K is 
significantly and positively correlated with investment opportunities (Q); NDF/K is positively 
correlated with company size (SZ) but negatively correlated with asset tangibility (TAN); 
DIV/K is positively correlated with company’s financial life cycle stage (RE/TE) but its 
correlation with insider ownership (OWN) is rather weak. In addition, there is no evidence of 
near multicollinearity presented in the correlation coefficient matrix. 
3.5.2 Preliminary diagnostic tests 
Since the simultaneous determination of corporate investment, financing and payout decisions 
hypothesised in this thesis is based on the reduced form flow-of-funds identity alongside a 
number of associated assumptions, it is desirable to explicitly test the validity of these 
assumptions using our dataset before we proceed to the analysis of simultaneity among the set 
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of corporate decisions. 
3.5.2.1 Test for validity of the reduced form flow-of-funds identity 
To derive the reduced form flow-of-funds identify, we assume that external equity financing is 
considered by managers as the last resort and thus rarely used in practice. Base on the 
assumption that external equity finance is a less significant source of funds for listed 
companies after their IPOs (see Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; and Cleary et al., 2007), we 
drop it from the flow-of-funds framework. To verify the assumption, we empirically test 
whether the reduced form flow-of-funds identity holds with respect to the UK-listed 
companies. Given the difficulties in measuring external equity financing in practice, we verify 
the validity of the reduced form identity and the associated assumption by testing the equality 
of the uses and sources of funds as specified in Equation 3.3. If the reduced form 
flow-of-funds identity is supported by our dataset, then external equity finance can be 
considered as a rarely used source of funds, and therefore can be dropped from the 
flow-of-funds framework.  
The main uses and sources of funds, apart from external equity finance, for the 
UK-listed companies over the period under investigation are summarised in Table 3.5. The 
total uses and sources of funds are compared under a t-test framework. Both paired and 
unpaired mean-comparison tests are carried out to test for equality between the uses and 
sources of funds. According to the evidence obtained from the panel of UK-listed companies, 
the reduced form flow-of-funds identity is empirically supported in most of instances, 
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suggesting that the sum of investment outlays, dividend payouts and change in working 
capital is approximately equal to the sum of external debt financing and internally generated 
cash flow. The uses and sources of funds identity is only rejected for years 2000 and 2007 
under the paired t-test and for year 2007 under the unpaired t-test. The rejections of equality 
for in both cases are likely to be caused by the extreme economic environment under the 
dot-com crisis in 2000 and the global financial crisis starts in 2007, respectively. Overall, the 
reduced form flow-of-funds identity is verified by the pooled UK company-year observations 
over the entire period under investigation. We, therefore, can conclude that the reduced form 
flow-of-funds identity holds in the context of our investigation. 
Another interesting result observed from Table 3.5 is that, compared with capital 
investment and dividends spending, the funds spent on working capital (ΔWC) is of minor 
significance for most of the years. The mean values for capital investment, dividend payout 
and spending on working capital made by UK-listed companies during the period from 1999 
to 2008 are 74.28, 31.09 and 0.80 million pounds, respectively. The empirical evidence 
clearly shows that compared with capital investment and dividend outlays the funds spent on 
working capital (∆WC) is of minor significance for UK-listed companies. In addition, the 
signs on the net spending on working capital are not consistent over the period under 
investigation, with 5 positive and 5 negative values observed during the ten-year observation 
window. This evidence empirically rationalises the view that net changes in working capital 
can be considered as residual to balancing the uses and sources of funds. 
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Table 3.5: Tests for equality of uses and sources of fundsa 
Year Obs.b INV  DIV  ΔWK 
Total 
 uses of  
funds NDF  CF  
Total 
sources of 
funds  
Difference 
between uses 
and sources 
Mean-comparison 
t-test (paired)c 
Mean-comparison 
t-test (unpaired)d 
1999 601 76.59 39.05 8.04 123.67 25.22 94.72 119.94 3.74 0.3190 (p=0.75) 0.1037 (p=0.92) 
2000 636 54.97 26.15 0.10 81.23 25.86 89.29 115.15 –33.92 –3.8363 (p=0.00) –0.9922 (p=0.32) 
2001 729 98.79 37.82 –4.88 131.73 30.63 95.92 126.55 5.18 0.1756 (p=0.86) 0.0983 (p=0.92) 
2002 821 84.32 30.53 –6.31 108.54 6.84 64.99 71.82 36.72 1.6205 (p=0.11) 0.8933 (p=0.37) 
2003 947 62.43 26.08 7.90 96.41 9.03 83.23 92.25 4.16 0.3038 (p=0.76) 0.1124 (p=0.91) 
2004 1064 55.39 25.87 22.67 103.94 –0.221 95.68 95.47 8.47 0.6072 (p=0.54) 0.2376 (p=0.81) 
2005 1062 74.36 30.05 8.39 112.81 3.39 113.5 116.98 –4.17 –0.3682 (p=0.71) –0.0956 (p=0.92) 
2006 1064 40.80 37.89 –3.52 75.17 7.77 98.87 106.64 –31.47 –1.4195 (p=0.16) –0.8515 (p=0.39) 
2007 1034 32.09 18.15 –7.93 42.31 10.63 62.08 72.71 –30.40 –5.3224 (p=0.00) –2.5870 (p=0.01) 
2008 990 170.51 42.61 –17.72 195.41 77.87 142.86 220.73 –25.32 –1.1906 (p=0.23) –0.3628 (p=0.72) 
Total 8948 74.28 31.09 0.80 106.17 18.75 94.89 113.64 –7.47 –1.3483(p=0.18) –0.5486(p=0.58) 
Notes: 
a. The values are translated into British Pound Sterling and scaled into millions.  
b. The sample contains all the company-year observations in our dataset which have records for INV, DIV, ΔWK, NDF and CF. To check the robustness of the test 
results, we also carry out the same tests for the subsample of 2,791 company-year observations used for our simultaneous equations analyses, and qualitatively 
similar results are obtained. 
c. This column presents the results of t tests on the equality of uses and sources of funds, assuming paired data. The exact significant level (p-value) of each t-statistic is 
reported in parentheses. 
d. This column presents the results of t tests on the equality of uses and sources of funds, assuming unpaired data. The exact significant level (p-value) of each t-statistic 
is reported in parentheses. 
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Overall, the empirical evidence presented in Table 3.5 clearly demonstrates that the 
UK-listed companies raise funds mainly from internally generated cash flow and external debt 
finance, and spend it chiefly on capital investment and dividend payouts. Therefore, it is valid 
to derive the simultaneous equations system based on the reduced form flow-of-funds identity, 
which allows us to focus directly on the possible interactions among corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions made by UK-listed companies. 
3.5.2.2 Test for endogeneity of corporate decisions variables 
Although the potential simultaneity that may exist among corporate investment, financing and 
payout decisions has been rationalised from a theoretical perspective, it is still important to 
test the hypothesis explicitly before proceeding to the simultaneous equations analysis of the 
set of corporate decisions. If the variables specified as endogenous can in fact be treated as 
exogenous, the coefficients estimated using simultaneous analyses are likely to be inefficient. 
To empirically justify the simultaneity of corporate decisions, we apply both the Hausman test 
for endogeneity and an enhanced test for endogeneity developed by Baum et al. (2007) to the 
corporate decision variables that are specified as endogenous in the simultaneous equations 
system. The enhanced test for endogeneity is equivalent to the Hausman test under 
conditional homoscedasticity. Unlike the Hausman test, the enhanced test for endogeneity 
provided by Baum et al. (2007) is robust to various violations of conditional homoscedasticity. 
Under the null hypothesis of the endogeneity test, the might-be-endogenous variables can 
actually be treated as exogenous, and the test statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution with 
                Chapter 3: Corporate Decisions, Financial Constraints and Uncertainty  
– 147 – 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of might-be-endogenous variables being tested. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, the necessity of a simultaneous equations model can be 
statistically justified. The endogeneity test results are presented in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6: Endogeneity tests for corporate decision variables 
 Investment Equation 
INV/K 
Financing Equation 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equation 
DIV/K 
Regressors testeda (NDF/K)t; (DIV/K)t (INV/K)t; (DIV/K)t (INV/K)t; (NDF/K)t 
    
Instrumental variables usedb TANt; SZt; OWNt; 
(RE/TE)t; 
Qt; (INV/K)t–1; OWNt; 
(RE/TE)t; 
Qt; (INV/K)t–1; TANt; 
SZt; 
    
Hausman test for endogeneityc 42.220***  15.950*** 16.090*** 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Enhanced test for endogeneityd 47.116***  12.931*** 16.092*** 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0003) 
Notes: 
a. The variables that are specified as endogenous in the regression. 
b. The variables that are used as instruments for the specified endogenous variables being tested. 
c. The Hausman test for endogeneity is formed by including the residuals of each right-hand side endogenous 
variable, as a function of the exogenous variables, in a regression of the original model. An F-test is then used 
to test a joint restriction that the coefficients on the residuals are all equal to zero. Under the null hypothesis 
that the specified endogenous regressors can be actually treated as exogenous, the test statistic follows an F 
distribution. The exact significant level (p-value) of the test statistics is reported in the parenthesis underneath. 
d. The enhanced endogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the 
equation with the smaller set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as endogenous, and one 
for the equation with larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under 
the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can be actually treated as exogenous, the test 
statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested. 
Under conditional homoscedasticity, this endogeneity test statistics is numerically equal to a Hausman test 
statistic. Unlike a Hausman test, the endogeneity test can report test statistics that are robust to various 
violations of conditional homoscedasticity (see Baum et al., 2007). The exact significant level (p-value) of the 
test statistics is reported in the parenthesis underneath. 
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According to Table 3.6, the results of both tests suggest that the exogeneity of debt 
financing and dividend payout variables in the investment equation can be firmly rejected; 
again, that of investment and dividend payout variables in the debt financing equation can be 
firmly rejected; finally, that of investment and debt financing variables in the payout equation 
can be firmly rejected as well. An important implication is that it is inappropriate and invalid 
to treat these endogenous variables as exogenous, and thus a simultaneous equations model is 
necessary in practice. The existing literature in corporate finance that ignores the endogeneity 
of investment, financing and payout decisions is likely to generate misleading results and lead 
to inappropriate inferences, which may bias our understanding of corporate behaviour. 
Therefore, corporate investment, financing and payout decisions should be better considered 
as a joint decision-making procedure. A preferred strategy is to simultaneously estimate the 
corporate decision equations within a system which allows for the interactions among the set 
of corporate decisions. 
3.5.2.3 Test for exogeneity of cash flow variable  
To derive the simultaneous equations system, we also assume that internally generated cash 
flow is predetermined by past corporate real and financial decisions (Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967; 
and McCabe, 1979), and thus can be treated as exogenous to the system. It is, therefore, also 
desirable to test the validity of this assumption explicitly. For this reason, we also carry out 
endogeneity tests for the cash flow variable in investment, financing and payout equations, 
respectively. The test results are reported in Table 3.7.  
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Table 3.7: Endogeneity test for cash flow variable 
 Investment Equation 
INV/K 
Financing Equation 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equation 
DIV/K 
Regressors testeda (CF/K)t (CF/K)t (CF/K)t 
    
Instrumental variables usedb (INV/K)t–1,…, t–3; 
(NDF/K)t–1,…, t–3; 
(DIV/K)t–1,…, t–3 
(INV/K)t–1,…, t–3; 
(NDF/K)t–1,…, t–3; 
(DIV/K)t–1,…, t–3 
(INV/K)t–1,…, t–3; 
(NDF/K)t–1,…, t–3; 
(DIV/K)t–1,…, t–3 
    
Hausman test for endogeneityc 2.82* 2.10 5.27*** 
(p-value) (0.0934) (0.1475) (0.0000) 
    
Enhanced test for endogeneityd 1.124 0.057 1.872 
(p-value) (0.2890) (0.8106) (0.1713) 
Notes: 
a. The variables that are specified as endogenous in the regression. 
b. The variables that are used as instruments for the specified endogenous variables being tested. 
c. The Hausman test for endogeneity is formed by including the residuals of each right-hand side endogenous 
variables, as a function of the exogenous variables, in a regression of the original model. An F-test is then used 
to test a joint restriction that the coefficients on the residuals are all equal to zero. Under the null hypothesis 
that the specified endogenous regressors can be actually treated as exogenous, the test statistic follows an F 
distribution. The exact significant level (p-value) of the test statistics is reported in the parenthesis underneath. 
d. The enhanced endogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the 
equation with the smaller set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as endogenous, and one 
for the equation with larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under 
the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can be actually treated as exogenous, the test 
statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested. 
Under conditional homoscedasticity, this endogeneity test statistics is numerically equal to a Hausman test 
statistic. Unlike a Hausman test, the endogeneity test can report test statistics that are robust to various 
violations of conditional homoscedasticity (see Baum et al., 2007).The exact significant level (p-value) of the 
test statistics is reported in the parenthesis underneath. 
 
According to the Hausman test, the cash flow variable seems not to be strictly 
exogenous to corporate investment and payout decisions, while the exogeneity of cash flow 
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variable with respect to the debt financing decision cannot be rejected. The Hausman test 
results suggest that current cash flow is not purely determined by previous corporate decisions, 
but also to some extent depend on concurrent decisions. However, the assumption of the 
exogeneity of the cash flow variable is empirically verified by the enhanced test for 
endogeneity developed by Baum et al. (2007). The null hypothesis that the cash flow variable 
can be treated as exogenous cannot be rejected throughout the tests regarding all the three 
equations. Accordingly, there should be no significant endogenous effect of cash flow variable 
on the estimates. The cash flow variable, therefore, can be validly taken as an exogenous 
variable in the simultaneous equations system, allowing us to focus directly on the 
simultaneity among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions. All in all, the 
preliminary tests presented in this section are reasonably satisfactory for us to move on to the 
joint determinations of corporate decisions as implied by the flow-of-funds framework for 
corporate behaviour. 
3.6 Empirical results and implications for corporate behaviour 
3.6.1 Single equation analyses 
Although the purpose of the study is to investigate the simultaneity among corporate 
investment, financing and payout decisions, it is desirable to first apply the single equation 
estimation technique to the corporate behaviour equations separately. The single equation 
estimation results presented in this section are comparable to those provided by the previous 
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studies which ignore the interdependence of the decision-making processes that we aim to 
investigate.  
Given the endogeneity of the corporate decision variables and the dynamic structures 
of the corporate behaviour models, we estimate Equations 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 separately using 
the system generalised methods of moments (system-GMM) estimators. This approach is an 
efficient extension of the first-difference generalised methods of moments (difference-GMM) 
estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).23 It combines an equation in differences 
of the variables with an equation in levels of variables to form a system, in which lagged 
levels are used as instruments for the differenced equation and lagged differences are used as 
instruments for the level equation (Aerllano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 
1998).24 The use of instruments in such a way is considered as a possible solution to the 
endogeneity problems as well as the weak instrument problems.  
In the implementation of system-GMM estimators, we are also confronted with the 
choice of using one-step or two-step estimation. The one-step estimators assume 
homoscedastic errors, whereas the two-step estimators generate heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. Thus, the two-step estimators are expected to be asymptotically more efficient 
                                                 
23 Arellano and Bond’s (1991) difference-GMM estimator can be subject to a large downward bias and very low precisions 
as a result of weak instruments in situations where the series are highly persistent and/or the relative variance of the fixed 
effects increases even for large n when t is small.  
24 The system-GMM estimator uses equations in first-differences, from which the company-specific effects are eliminated by 
the transformation, and for which endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided there 
is no serial correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms. These differenced equations are then combined with 
equations in levels for which the instruments used must be orthogonal to the company-specific effects. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) show that in autoregressive distributed lag models, the first-differences of the series can be uncorrelated with the 
company-specific effect provided that the series have stationary means. 
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than their one-step counterparts. However the reported standard errors in two-step estimation 
tend to be downward biased, it is important to use the finite-sample correction to the standard 
errors computed in two-step estimation (Roodman, 2009). We therefore resort to the two-step 
system-GMM estimators with finite-sample correction to estimate the structural equations for 
corporate behaviour. The two-step system-GMM estimation results are obtained using Stata 
11 as implemented by Roodman (2009).  
Given the fact that the reliability of the system-GMM method depends crucially on the 
validity of instruments and serial correlation of the error terms, we check them with Hensen’s 
J tests of over-identifying restrictions and Arellano-Bond’s tests of serial correlation, 
respectively. Year dummies also are included in all of the equations to account for the time 
effect that cannot be captured by the included regressors.25 Tables 3.8–3.10 present the 
estimation and testing results corresponding to the corporate investment, borrowing and 
dividend equations, respectively. 
3.6.1.1 Investment equation estimation results 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3.8 report the estimations and test results for three variants of the 
investment model specified as Equation 3.7. The three alternative proxies for uncertainty 
described in the previous section, namely, UNC1, UNC2 and UNC3, are used in the three 
                                                 
25 To implement GMM estimations, it is assumed that errors are only correlated within individuals, not across them. 
Therefore, it is almost always desirable to include time dummies in order to remove universal time-related shocks from the 
errors (Roodman, 2009). 
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model variants, respectively. Given the drawback of constructing uncertainty measures using 
high-frequency stock return information, we treat the results obtained from model variant 1, in 
which UNC1 is used as the proxy for uncertainty, as our primary results. 
Concentrating on the primary results presented in column 2, three features of these 
results are of particular interest. First, both the borrowing (NDF/K) and dividend (DIV/K) 
variables appear to be significant in the investment equation at the 1% and 5% significance 
level respectively. This result suggests that a company’s financial decisions do have impacts 
on its real decisions in reality, so that Modigliani-Miller’s independence proposition should be 
firmly rejected based on the evidence from UK-listed companies.  
Second, the significantly positive relationship between investment and dividend found 
in the pair-wise correlation analysis (see Table 3.4) is reversed to be significantly negative 
when the full structural investment equation is estimated. The statistically significant and 
negative effect of dividend payouts on investment outlays lends strong empirical support to 
the flow-of-funds framework, in which investment outlays and dividend payouts are viewed 
as competing uses of limited funds and thus should not vary in the same direction. UK-listed 
companies seem to trade-off between investment and payout during the period under 
investigation. The significantly positive coefficients found for the cash flow variable (CF/K) 
and the debt financing variable (NDF/K) are also consistent with the predictions of the 
flow-of-funds framework that corporate investment choices are subject to the availability of 
internal funds as well as the access to external debt finance in an information asymmetry 
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setting. An important implication of the first two features of our empirical findings from the 
investment regression is that UK-listed companies are likely to be financially constrained, 
both internally and externally, and they therefore have to consider their financial choices 
alongside their investment decisions, with full recognition of competing needs for funds and 
alternative sources of funds. 
Moreover, another result of particular interest is that the coefficient on the proxy for 
uncertainty (UNC1) appears to be significantly positive. The positive effect of uncertainty on 
corporate investment seems to favour the prediction of the Hartman-Abel framework as well 
as that of Mason and Weeds (2010). This result critically challenges the assertion of the 
established real option theory of investment, and empirically supports the argument of the 
recent theoretical innovation that greater uncertainty may lead companies to invest earlier to 
take advantage of pre-emption in a competitive business environment, thus encouraging 
current investment spending. In other words, the option value of delay is likely to be offset by 
the threat of being pre-empted under a competitive situation. Thus, if managers take the 
strategic interactions between players into consideration, the overall benefits from delay may 
be insufficient to deter investment. In addition, if the advantage of pre-emption is sufficiently 
strong, greater uncertainty may lead to higher levels of capital expenditure even if the 
investment projects are irreversible, resulting in a positive impact of uncertainty on corporate 
investment. 
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Table 3.8: System-GMM estimation results for corporate investment equation with 
uncertaintya 
Variable Model variant 1b Model variant 2c Model variant 3d 
NDF/K 0.2299***e 
(3.40)f 
0.3752*** 
(4.96) 
0.3650*** 
(4.82) 
DIV/K –0.3000** 
(2.33) 
–0.0629 
(–0.42) 
–0.0295 
(–0.17) 
CF/K 0.2303** 
(8.60) 
0.1638*** 
(5.12) 
0.1616*** 
(4.84) 
Q –0.0018 
(–0.15) 
0.0142 
(0.79) 
0.0151 
(0.86) 
(INV/K)–1 0.1848*** 
(3.43) 
0.2140*** 
(2.81) 
0.2108*** 
(2.72) 
UNC1–1 0.2566*** 
(2.93) 
  
UNC2–1  0.2063 
(0.36) 
 
UNC3–1   1.1647 
(1.35) 
Constant 0.1098*** 
(2.71) 
0.1399*** 
(2.89) 
0.1117*** 
(1.98) 
    
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first 
differenced errorsg 
 
–5.71*** 
(p = 0.000) 
–4.50*** 
(p = 0.000) 
–4.39*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first 
differenced errorsh 
 
–1.06 
(p = 0.289) 
–1.04 
(p = 0.300) 
–1.12 
(p = 0.263) 
Hansen test of 
over-identifying 
restrictionsi 
 
89.23 
(d.f. = 94; p = 0.620) 
96.75 
(d.f. = 94; p = 0.402) 
93.51 
(d.f. = 94; p = 0.495) 
Difference-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of 
instrument subsetsj 
GMM instruments     
for levels: 73.22 
(d.f. = 71; p = 0.405)  
 
 
GMM instruments     
for levels: 67.80 
(d.f. = 71; p = 0.586)  
 
 
GMM instruments     
for levels: 67.18 
(d.f. = 71; p = 0.607)  
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Variable Model variant 1b Model variant 2c Model variant 3d 
for differences: 16.01  
(d.f. = 23; p = 0.855) 
 
Standard instruments 
for levels: 81.16  
(d.f. = 83; p = 0.537)  
 
for differences: 8.07  
(d.f. = 11; p = 0.386) 
for differences: 28.95  
(d.f. = 23; p = 0.182) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 89.27  
(d.f. = 83; p = 0.299)  
 
for differences: 7.48  
(d.f. = 11; p = 0.759) 
for differences: 26.33  
(d.f. = 23; p = 0.286) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 86.94  
(d.f. = 83; p = 0.362)  
 
for differences: 6.57  
(d.f. = 11; p = 0.833) 
    
No. of companies 427 336 309 
No. of observationsk 2805 
 
1435 1376 
Instruments used Constant; Year dummies; 
(NDF/K)t–2,…, t–5; 
(DIV/K)t–2,…, t–5; 
(INV/K)t–3,…, t–5; 
(CF/K)t; Qt;  
UNC1t–1; 
∆(NDF/K)t–1; 
∆(DIV/K)t–1; 
∆(INV/K)t–2; 
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆Qt; ∆UNC1t–1 
 
Constant; Year dummies; 
(NDF/K)t–2,…, t–5; 
(DIV/K)t–2,…, t–5; 
(INV/K)t–3,…,t–5; 
(CF/K)t; Qt;  
UNC2t–1; 
∆(NDF/K)t–1; 
∆(DIV/K)t–1; 
∆(INV/K)t–2; 
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆Qt; ∆UNC2t–1 
Constant; Year dummies; 
(NDF/K)t–2,…, t–5; 
(DIV/K)t–2,…, t–5; 
(INV/K)t–3,…, t–5; 
(CF/K)t; Qt;  
UNC3t–1; 
∆(NDF/K)t–1; 
∆(DIV/K)t–1; 
∆(INV/K)t–2; 
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆Qt; ∆UNC3t–1 
Year dummiesl Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesm 
 
Not included Not included Not included 
F-statistic for the 
equationn 
34.04*** 
(d.f. = 14, 426; p = 0.000) 
16.02*** 
(d.f. = 14, 335; p = 0.000) 
17.13*** 
(d.f. = 14, 308; p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The investment equation is 
specified as Equation 3.7, and estimated by two-step system-GMM estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Variant 1 is specified as    161543210 1///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Variant 2 is specified as    161543210 2///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
d. Variant 3 is specified as    161543210 3///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
f. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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g. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the 
unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in the first 
differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
h. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship 
between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent 
variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, 
thus bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors at an order greater than one implies model misspecification. 
i. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. 
Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion 
function, is robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A 
statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test 
has its own problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
j. The difference-in-Hansen test tests for whether subsets of instruments are valid. To be precise, it reports one 
test for each group of instruments. 
k. 2,805 company-year observations are used to estimate model variant 1 in which all the relevant variables are 
computed using Worldscope data. The number of observation reduced to 1,435 for model variant 2, because 
UNC2 are derived from daily share returns which are collected from the DataStream database. The merge of 
the two datasets results in significant decrease in the number of observations. By excluding companies whose 
stock returns do not exhibit GARCH effect and thus UNC3 cannot be derived, the number of observations 
further reduces to 1,376 for model variant 3. 
l. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
m. In alternative estimates industry dummies are also included to account for the inter-industry variations. Since 
they are jointly insignificant, we ignored them in the final set of estimates.  
n. F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
Turning to the regression results of model variants 2 and 3 reported in Table 3.8, the 
coefficients of the endogenous explanatory variables remain qualitatively unchanged. But the 
dividend variables become statistically insignificant at the usual significance levels. 
Meanwhile, the supplementary uncertainty measures (i.e. UNC2 and UNC3) are also 
insignificant in their respective regressions. However, the estimated coefficients on all of the 
uncertainty proxies remain positive. The relatively disappointing explanatory powers of 
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UNC2 and UNC3 in the investment model are most likely attributable to the high-frequency 
noise contained in the daily stock return observations. Besides, the investment equation 
regression results also show that the coefficients on the proxy for Tobin’s Q are insignificant 
and inconsistent across the model variants. It is well documented that the low explanatory 
power of the Q variable is mainly due to its severe measurement problems. Thus, the poor 
performance of the Q variable in our regressions is not contradictory to the usual results from 
previous applied studies on corporate investment (see, for example, Lensink and Murinde, 
2006). The coefficients on the lagged investment variable, in contrast, are consistently 
positive and highly significant in all variants, suggesting that corporate investment behaviour 
is indeed a dynamic process, as expected. 
Besides, the results of diagnostic tests reported in Table 3.8 also suggest that the 
investment model performs reasonably well. Specifically, the results of Arellano-Bond test 
show that the first-differenced errors are autocorrelated at order 1, as expected. Meanwhile, 
the first-differenced errors are not autocorrelated at order 2, indicating that the model is well 
specified. In addition, the results of Hansen overidentifying restrictions test suggest that the 
instruments used in the system-GMM estimation are generally valid, both in the 
first-differenced and levels equations. 
3.6.1.2 Financing equation estimation results 
The results for the debt financing equation are presented in Table 3.9. Again, the only 
difference across the three model variants is that different uncertainty measures are used in 
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their respective regressions. Looking first at the primary results reported in column 2, it is 
shown that both the investment (INV/K) and dividend (DIV/K) variables are significant 
determinants of external debt financing (NDF/K) as implied by the flow-of-funds framework. 
The positive signs of the coefficients on the endogenous explanatory variables suggest that the 
level of new debt issued by a company depends primarily on the demand of its investment 
outlays and dividend payouts. Additionally, internally generated cash flow (CF/K) as an 
alternative source of funds has a significant and negative effect on borrowing. Thus, our 
empirical results obtained from the panel of UK-listed companies are entirely in line with the 
hierarchy of raising funds as predicted by the pecking order hypotheses. This shows that, in 
the presence of information asymmetry, companies rely heavily on their internally generated 
funds, while the net amount of debt issued during a fiscal year is chiefly driven by their 
financing deficits.  
Meanwhile, company size (SZ) is also proved to be an important determinant of new 
debt financing. Large companies are typically long-established, diversified, financially 
healthy companies with low default risks and good credit ratings, and hence are less likely to 
be constrained by access to external finance (see Guariglia, 2008). However, the coefficient 
on the asset tangibility variable (TAN) turns out to be significant but negative. This finding is 
contrary to the intuition that tangible assets, such as property, plant and equipment, can be 
easily valued by outsiders and used as collateral for loans, which is supposed to increase a 
company’s borrowing capacity.  
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Table 3.9: System-GMM estimation results for corporate financing equation with 
uncertaintya 
Variable Model variant 1b Model variant 2c Model variant 3d 
INV/K 0.5426 ***e 
(5.07)f 
0.5090*** 
(4.26) 
0.5019*** 
(4.12) 
DIV/K 0.4167** 
(2.29) 
–0.0083 
(–0.05) 
–0.0355 
(–0.18) 
CF/K –0.1184*** 
(–3.08) 
–0.0507 
(1.50) 
–0.0403 
(–1.11) 
TAN –0.2075*** 
(–2.90) 
–0.2005** 
(–2.23) 
–0.2082** 
(–2.28) 
SZ 0.0336*** 
(6.42) 
0.0400*** 
(4.66) 
0.0397*** 
(4.53) 
UNC1–1 –0.2357* 
(–1.88) 
  
UNC2–1  0.4830 
(0.50) 
 
UNC3–1   0.4784 
(0.46) 
Constant –0.0671 
(0.93) 
–0.1699* 
(–1.96) 
–0.1685* 
(–1.90) 
    
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first 
differenced errorsg 
 
–7.92*** 
(p = 0.000) 
–5.23*** 
(p = 0.000) 
–5.17*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first 
differenced errorsh 
 
0.09 
(p = 0.925) 
0.53 
(p= 0.599) 
0.49 
(p = 0.627) 
Hansen test of 
over-identifying 
restrictionsi 
 
63.98 
(d.f. = 66; p = 0.548) 
67.65 
(d.f. = 66; p = 0.421) 
65.79 
(d.f. = 66; p = 0.484) 
Difference-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of 
instrument subsetsj 
GMM instruments    
for levels: 51.39  
(d.f. = 50; p = 0.419)  
 
 
GMM instruments    
for levels: 41.68 
(d.f. = 50; p = 0.793)  
 
 
GMM instruments    
for levels: 41.70 
(d.f. = 50; p = 0.792)  
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Variable Model variant 1b Model variant 2c Model variant 3d 
for differences: 12.59 
(d.f. = 16; p = 0.703) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 53.28 
(d.f. = 54; p = 0.502)  
 
for differences: 10.70  
(d.f. = 12; p = 0.555) 
for differences: 25.97 
(d.f. = 16; p = 0.054) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 58.10 
(d.f. = 54; p = 0.327)  
 
for differences: 9.55  
(d.f. = 12; p = 0.656) 
for differences: 24.09 
(d.f. = 16; p = 0.088) 
 
Standard instruments 
for levels: 56.05 
(d.f. = 54; p = 0.398)  
 
for differences: 9.74  
(d.f. = 12; p = 0.639) 
    
No. of companies 427 336 309 
No. of observationsk 
 
2814 1442 1382 
Instruments used Constant; Year dummies; 
(INV/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(DIV/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(CF/K)t; 
TANt; SZt;  
UNC1t–1; 
∆(INV/K)t–1; 
∆(DIV/K)t–1;  
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆TANt; ∆SZt;  
∆UNC1t–1 
 
Constant; Year dummies; 
(INV/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(DIV/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(CF/K)t; 
TANt; SZt;  
UNC2t–1; 
∆(INV/K)t–1; 
∆(DIV/K)t–1;  
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆TANt; ∆SZt;  
∆UNC2t–1 
Constant; Year dummies; 
(INV/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(DIV/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(CF/K)t; 
TANt; SZt;  
UNC3t–1; 
∆(INV/K)t–1; 
∆(DIV/K)t–1;  
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆TANt; ∆SZt;  
∆UNC3t–1 
Year dummiesl Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesm 
 
Not included Not included Not included 
F-statistic for the 
equationn 
10.66*** 
(d.f. = 14, 426; p = 0.000) 
6.03*** 
(d.f. = 14, 335; p = 0.000) 
5.29*** 
(d.f. = 14, 308; p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The debt financing 
equation is specified as Equation 3.8, and estimated by two-step system-GMM estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Variant 1 is specified as   16543210 1//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
c. Variant 2 is specified as   16543210 2//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Variant 3 is specified as   16543210 3//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
f. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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g. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the 
unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in the first 
differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
h. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship 
between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent 
variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, 
thus bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors at an order greater than one implies model misspecification. 
i. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. 
Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion 
function, is robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A 
statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test 
has its own problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
j. The difference-in-Hansen test tests for whether subsets of instruments are valid. To be precise, it reports one 
test for each group of instruments. 
k. 2,814 company-year observations are used to estimate model variant 1 in which all the relevant variables are 
computed using Worldscope data. The number of observation reduced to 1,442 for model variant 2, because 
UNC2 are derived from daily share returns which are collected from the DataStream database. The merge of 
the two datasets results in significant decrease in the number of observations. By excluding companies whose 
stock returns do not exhibit GARCH effect and thus UNC3 cannot be derived, the number of observations 
further reduces to 1,382 for model variant 3. 
l. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
m. In alternative estimates industry dummies are also included to account for the inter-industry variations. Since 
they are jointly insignificant, we ignored them in the final set of estimates.  
n. F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
Finally, the effect of uncertainty on external debt financing is negative and significant 
at the 10% level according to the primary results. This is in line with our hypothesis that 
greater uncertainty may exacerbate the degree of information asymmetry which in turn 
exaggerates the cost disadvantage of debt or even results in credit rationing, reducing the 
availability of external financing. 
The results for the other two model variants are also reported in Table 3.9. The results 
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show that, among the set of potential determinants of companies’ borrowing decisions, only 
the investment and company size variables are uniformly and highly significant across all 
model variants. This indicates that investment demand and access to external finance are the 
most reliably important factors in the external debt financing decisions of UK-listed 
companies. The impacts of the dividend, cash flow and uncertainty variables turn into 
insignificant in model variants 2 and 3. The diminished explanatory power of the dividend 
variable may imply that companies are less likely to fund their desired dividend payouts by 
resorting to external finance.  
Besides, the results of diagnostic tests suggest that the specification of the debt 
financing equation is reasonably well, and that the instruments used in the system-GMM 
estimation are generally valid. 
3.6.1.3 Dividend equation estimation results 
Turing to the dividend equation, the estimation results are presented in Table 3.10. Among the 
potential determinants, the cash flow variable (CF/K) has the greatest impact on dividend 
decisions. The coefficient on CF/K is consistently positive and highly significant throughout 
all model variants. Thus the signalling hypothesis of dividends under information asymmetry 
is empirically supported by our sample, which means that managers in UK-listed companies 
signal their private knowledge about the distributional support of the project cash flow to the 
market through their choice of dividends.  
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Table 3.10: System-GMM estimation results for corporate dividend equation with 
uncertaintya 
Variable Model variant 1b Model variant 2c Model variant 3d 
INV/K –0.0033 
(–0.09)e 
0.0116 
(0.18) 
0.0044 
(0.07) 
NDF/K 0.0274 
(1.21) 
0.0269 
(0.76) 
0.0340 
(1.00) 
CF/K 0.1355***f 
(12.20) 
0.1257*** 
(8.65) 
0.1278*** 
(8.22) 
OWN –0.0152 
(–0.51) 
–0.0640 
(–1.46) 
–0.0805* 
(–1.83) 
RE/TE 0.0049** 
(2.03) 
0.0281 
(1.46) 
0.0290* 
(1.70) 
UNC1–1 –0.2655 *** 
(–3.31) 
  
UNC2–1  –0.0096 
(–0.03) 
 
UNC3–1   –0.1290 
(–0.23) 
Constant 0.1586*** 
(5.73) 
0.0831** 
(2.56) 
0.0982*** 
(2.78) 
    
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first 
differenced errorsg 
 
–3.01*** 
(p = 0.003) 
–2.18*** 
(p = 0.000) 
–2.65*** 
(p = 0.008) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first 
differenced errorsh 
 
–1.69* 
(p = 0.091) 
–1.52 
(p = 0.128) 
–1.54 
(p = 0.123) 
Hansen test of 
over-identifying 
restrictionsi 
 
68.40 
(d.f. = 66; p = 0.396) 
62.55 
(d.f. = 66; p = 0.598) 
60.01 
(d.f. = 66; p = 0.684) 
Difference-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of 
instrument subsetsj 
GMM instruments     
for levels: 48.18 
(d.f. = 50; p = 0.547)  
 
 
GMM instruments     
for levels: 41.58 
(d.f. = 50; p = 0.796)  
 
 
GMM instruments     
for levels: 41.25 
(d.f. = 50; p = 0.806)  
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Variable Model variant 1b Model variant 2c Model variant 3d 
for differences: 20.22 
(d.f. = 16; p = 0.210) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 44.21  
(d.f. = 54; p = 0.827)  
 
for differences:24.19  
(d.f. = 12; p = 0.019) 
for differences: 20.97  
(d.f. = 16; p = 0.180) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 53.38  
(d.f. = 54; p = 0.498)  
 
for differences: 9.17  
(d.f. = 12; p = 0.688) 
for differences: 18.76  
(d.f. = 16; p = 0.281) 
 
Standard instruments  
for levels: 50.91  
(d.f. = 54; p = 0.594)  
 
for differences: 9.11  
(d.f. = 12; p = 0.694) 
    
No. of companies 427 336 309 
No. of observations 
 
2800 1436 1377 
Instruments used Constant; Year dummies; 
(GI/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(NDF/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(CF/K)t; 
OWNt; RE/TEt; 
UNC1t–1; 
∆(GI/K)t–1; 
∆(BOR/K)t–1;  
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆OWNt;  
∆(RE/BE)t;  
∆UNC1t–1 
 
Constant; Year dummies; 
(GI/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(NDF/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(CF/K)t; 
OWNt; RE/TEt; 
UNC2t–1; 
∆(GI/K)t–1; 
∆(BOR/K)t–1;  
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆OWNt;  
∆(RE/BE)t;  
∆UNC2t–1 
Constant; Year dummies; 
(GI/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(NDF/K)t–2,..., t–5; 
(CF/K)t; 
OWNt; RE/TEt; 
UNC3t–1;  
∆(GI/K)t–1; 
∆(BOR/K)t–1;  
∆(CF/K)t;  
∆OWNt;  
∆(RE/BE)t;  
∆UNC3t–1 
Year dummiesk Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesl 
 
Not included Not included Not included 
F-statistic for the 
equationm 
27.70*** 
(d.f. = 14, 426; p = 0.000) 
13.51*** 
(d.f. = 14, 335; p = 0.002) 
16.28*** 
(d.f. = 14, 308; p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The dividend equation is 
specified as Equation 3.9, and estimated by two-step system-GMM estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Variant 1 is specified as   16543210 1///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
c. Variant 2 is specified as   16543210 2///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
d. Variant 3 is specified as   16543210 3///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
f. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
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g. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the 
unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in the first 
differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
h. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship 
between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent 
variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, 
thus bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors at an order greater than one implies model misspecification. 
i. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. 
Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion 
function, is robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A 
statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test 
has its own problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
j. The difference-in-Hansen test tests for whether subsets of instruments are valid. To be precise, it reports one 
test for each group of instruments. 
k. 2,800 company-year observations are used to estimate model variant 1 in which all the variables are computed 
using Worldscope data. The number of observation reduced to 1,436 for model variant 2, because UNC2 are 
derived from daily share returns which are collected from the DataStream database. The merge of the two 
datasets results in significant decrease in the number of observations. By excluding companies whose stock 
returns do not exhibit GARCH effect and thus UNC3 cannot be derived, the number of observations further 
reduces to 1,377 for model variant 3. 
l. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
m. In alternative estimates, industry dummies are also included to account for the inter-industry variations. Since 
they are jointly insignificant, we ignored them in the final set of estimates.  
n. F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
The coefficients on the two endogenous explanatory variables (INV/K and NDF/K), 
however, are not statistically significant in the dividend regression even though both of them 
bear the expected signs, as the flow-of-funds framework predicted, in model variant 1 where 
the primary measure of uncertainty is used. Given the significant impact of dividends on 
investment decision and the insignificant impact of investment on dividend decisions, it 
seems that, if the availability of funds is not sufficient to allow independence between 
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investment and dividend policies, UK-listed companies give dividends priority over 
investment. This leaves doubt as to whether dividend policy is independent of or 
interdependent with investment and financing choices.  
As for the exogenous variables in the payout regression, insider ownership (OWN) 
does not seem to perform well as a determinant of dividend payouts, but the consistently 
negative coefficients associated with it to some extent indicate that insider holding of the 
common shares reduces the need for dividends as a monitoring mechanism and then reduces 
the dividend payout. Compared with insider ownership, the companies’ financial life cycle 
stage variable (RE/TE) has a more significant impact on dividend decisions. The coefficients 
for RE/TE have the predicted positive sign everywhere, suggesting that companies in the 
mature life cycle stage tend to pay high dividends.  
Again, the results of diagnostic test reported in Table 3.10 suggest that both the model 
and the instruments are generally well specified. However, the results of Arellona-Bond test 
indicate that the first-differenced errors obtained by estimating model variant 1 are likely to 
be autocorrelated at the 10% significance level. 
3.6.2 Simultaneous equations analyses 
The system-GMM analysis reported above indicates that corporate investment, financing and 
payout decisions are likely to be endogenous and sensitive to uncertainty in reality. All of the 
coefficients of the right-hand side endogenous variables bear the expected signs, and four out 
of six of them are statistically significant. To provide further evidence and more insights into 
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the joint determination of the set of corporate decisions under uncertainty, we carry out 
simultaneous equations analyses. 
Specifically, we estimate Equations 3.7 through 3.9 within a simultaneous equations 
system using both the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) method, which explicitly allow for the interdependence of the set of corporate 
decisions, while controlling for effects that other factors may have on these decisions. The 
structure of the three corporate behaviour equations, i.e. Equations 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, suggests 
that the necessary condition, i.e. the order condition, for identification are satisfied, and thus 
the system can be identified.26 
To apply the 2SLS to the system of structural equations, the reduced form equations 
are estimated by the ordinary least squares method to obtain the fitted values for the 
endogenous variables in the first stage. The structural equations, in which the fitted values are 
used in place of the right-hand side endogenous variables, are then estimated in the second 
stage. Additionally, the 3SLS method provides a third step in the estimation procedure that 
allows for non-zero covariances between the error terms across equations. The essential 
advantage of the 3SLS estimation technique, therefore, is that it allows not only for 
simultaneity among the set of corporate decisions, but also for correlations among the error 
components. Thus, it is believed that 3SLS estimators are asymptotically more efficient.  
                                                 
26 Brooks (2008) explains the condition that could be examined to determine whether a given equation from a system is 
identified. Let G denote the number of structural equations in a simultaneous system. If the number of all endogenous and 
exogenous variables that are not presented in an equation is G–1, then the equation is just identified. If more than G–1 
variables are not presented, then the equation is over-identified. If less than G–1 variables are not presented, then the equation 
is not identified. 
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Table 3.11: 3SLS estimation results for investment, financing and payout equations with 
uncertaintya 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K  0.1931*** 
(2.94) 
–0.1177*** 
(–2.87) 
NDF/K 0.2588** e 
(2.52) f 
 0.4415*** 
(5.30) 
DIV/K –0.4340** 
(–2.49) 
0.7383*** 
(3.00) 
 
CF/K 0.2079*** 
(9.23) 
–0.0843** 
(–2.27) 
0.1340*** 
(13.07) 
Q 0.0119 
(1.19) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.3003*** 
(18.39) 
  
TAN  –0.2336*** 
(–2.79) 
 
SZ  0.0219*** 
(4.14) 
 
OWN   0.0400 
(1.57) 
RE/TE   0.0168 
(1.54) 
UNC1–1 0.2360** 
(2.59) 
0.0679 
(0.43) 
–0.2725*** 
(–3.72) 
Constant 0.0713 
(1.49) 
0.0181 
(0.19) 
0.0633 
(1.50) 
    
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 
Year dummiesg Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesh 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationi 
2562.05*** 
(p = 0.000) 
543.13*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1259.90*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The simultaneous structural 
form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9, and estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
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b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 1///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 1//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 1///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
h. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
i. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
The panel of UK company-year observations are pooled to gain degrees of freedom. 
Both year dummies and industry dummies are included in each equation to account for the 
time effect and inter-industry variations that cannot be captured by the included regressors. 
Besides, given the relatively disappointing explanatory powers of UNC2 and UNC3 in the 
single equation analyses, our empirical findings with respect to the effects of uncertainty on 
corporate decisions are drawn from the sign and significance of the coefficients on UNC1 in 
the corresponding equations.27 
The result from the 3SLS estimation to the system of equations is reported in Table 
3.11. Looking first at the investment regression, it suggests that the coefficients of NDF/K and 
CF/K are significantly positive as expected, indicating that investments made by UK-listed 
companies are likely to be constrained by the availability of internal funds as well as access to 
external finance. More importantly, the significant and positive relationship between the 
                                                 
27 3SLS estimation results for corporate investment, financing and payout equations in which UNC2 and UNC3 are used as 
the proxy for uncertainty are presented in Appendices 3.D and 3.E respectively. 
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investment and dividend variables detected in the pair-wise correlation analysis is reversed to 
be significant and negative when the full structural investment equation is estimated within 
the simultaneous equations system. The negative coefficient of DIV/K is not only statistically 
significant but also economically meaningful, suggesting that managers of UK-listed 
companies have to trade-off between investment outlays and dividend payouts in order to 
allocate scarce funds rationally. Our results lend strong empirical support to the predictions of 
the flow-of-funds framework that companies have to consider their financing choices 
alongside their investment decisions.  
Another result of particular interest is the significant and positive effect of uncertainty 
(UNC1) on investment, which is quite robust with respect to the methods of estimation.28 The 
positive effect of uncertainty observed from the panel of UK-listed companies critically 
challenges the assertion of the established real options theory of investment, but empirically 
supports the argument of the recent theoretical innovation by Mason and Weeds (2010). In a 
competitive business environment, greater uncertainty may lead companies to invest earlier to 
take the advantage of pre-emption, thus the option value of delay investment under 
uncertainty is offset by the threat of being pre-empted by their rivals.29 In fact, if the 
advantage of pre-emption is sufficiently strong, greater uncertainty can lead to a higher level 
of investment even if the projects are irreversible. Besides, the proxy for Tobin’s Q is 
                                                 
28 The system-GMM estimation results for the investment equation show that the coefficient on the proxy for uncertainty is 
positive and significant at a 1% significance level. 
29 Mason and Weeds (2010) show the possibility of pre-emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on 
the relationship between uncertainty and investment.  
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insignificant, although with a positive sign.30 The dynamic structure of corporate investment 
is statistically evident. 
Turning to the financing regression, the coefficients on the endogenous variables, i.e. 
INV/K and DIV/K, are highly significant and uniformly positive, as predicted by the 
flow-of-funds framework. It appears that companies’ external debt financing is driven not 
only by the demand from capital investment but also by that from dividend payouts. Moreover, 
internally generated cash flow (CF/K), as an alternative source of funds, has a significant and 
negative effect on the amount of new debt issued in the corresponding period, suggesting that 
companies with high levels of cash flow tend to borrow less. These results are entirely 
consistent with the predicted hierarchy of raising funds, suggesting that pecking-order 
behaviour is rather robust among UK-listed companies. Besides, the effect of company size 
(SZ) is highly significant, whilst the effect of asset tangibility (TAN) is also significant but 
with a wrong sign. However, the impact of uncertainty on external debt financing is relatively 
weak. 
Moving to the payout regression, the highly significant coefficients on INV/K and 
NDF/K reported in the 3SLS results suggest the importance of investment and financing 
choices in the dividends decision-making process. Compared with the statistically 
insignificant coefficients on INV/K and NDF/K estimated using system-GMM estimators (see 
                                                 
30 The low explanatory power of Tobin’s Q in investment regression has long been observed in the literature (see, for 
example, Lensink and Murinde, 2006; Bulan, 2005; and Erickson and Whited, 2000). 
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Table 3.10), it seems that the importance of investment and financing choices in the payout 
decision-making process is underestimated by the single equation estimation techniques. 
Companies with more investment spending and/or less external debt financing tend to pay 
less cash dividends. Thus, the simultaneous analysis clearly shows that the dividend decision 
is neither totally residual nor totally independent but is taken with reference to investment and 
financing decisions. However, the cash flow variable (CF/K) is still the most important 
determinant of dividend policy, which implies that UK-listed companies may signal their 
anticipated cash flow to the market through their choices of dividend payment. Besides, the 
effect of uncertainty (UNC1) on dividend payouts turns out to be negative and highly 
significant, lending strong support to our hypothesis that companies facing greater uncertainty 
tend to pay less dividends. The results also show that the impact of uncertainty on UK-listed 
companies’ payout decisions is statistically more significant and economically more 
meaningful than that of other factors which, according to the existing literature, are believed 
to be the primary determinants of dividend policy, such as insider ownership (OWN) and 
financial life cycle stage (RE/TE). This result implies that investment models that ignore the 
dividend payout-uncertainty relationship are likely to produce misleading estimates of the 
effect of uncertainty. 
To sum up, our results seem to substantiate the claim that corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions are indeed inextricably linked and jointly determined as 
implied by the flow-of-funds framework with financial constraints. In addition, companies are 
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likely to increase their investment spending in the face of greater uncertainty. To finance the 
increased investment under uncertainty, they tend to resort to internal funds by cutting 
dividends, rather than resorting to external funds by issuing new debts. These results clearly 
support the argument that managers do take uncertainty into consideration when they make 
real and financial decisions. Our key findings are summarised in Appendix 3.A. 
3.6.3 Long-run solution to the simultaneous equations system 
It is useful to note that the coefficient estimates for the simultaneous equations system 
reported in Table 3.11 reflect conditional responses, and the conditioning includes the 
simultaneously determined corporate decision variables, namely, INV/K, NDF/K and DIV/K. 
Given some of the coefficient matrices for the endogenous variables seem to be non-positive, 
it cannot be assumed that the solved-out coefficients have the same sign as the conditional 
coefficients reported in Table 3.11. The objective of this section, therefore, is to obtain a 
long-run solution to the dynamic simultaneous equations system. To this end, we define Y as a 
3×1 vector of endogenous corporate decision variables; Z as a 1k  vector of exogenous 
variables ( 7k , according to the specification of Equations 3.7–3.9), including cash flow, 
Tobin’s Q, company size, asset tangibility, insider ownership and financial life cycle stage; A 
as a 3×1 vector of constants; B and C as 3×3 matrices of coefficients; and D as a k3  
matrix of coefficients.31 The estimated simultaneous equations system, therefore, can be 
                                                 
31 Both the coefficient matrices B and C and the coefficient vector D include zeros depending on the model specification (see 
Equations 3.7–3.9). 
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written using matrix algebra as follows, 
 
tttt DZCYBYAY  1  (3.12) 
 
We further define I as a 3×3 identity matrix. So that the solution for Yt can be written as 
follows, 
 
)()( 1
1
ttt DZCYABIY  
  (3.13) 
 
Therefore, any long-run static equilibrium solution to the dynamic system can be obtained by 
computing the coefficient matrices in the following equation, 
 
      DZABICBIIY   111  (3.14) 
 
Time subscripts are removed from the variables because it is assumed that in the long run the 
variables attain some steady state values and are no longer changing, i.e. are in equilibrium.  
Table 3.12 presents the long-run solution to the simultaneous equations system, which 
is computed based on the 3SLS estimates reported in Table 3.11. It is evident that the 
solved-out coefficients presented in Table 3.12 are consistent generally with the conditional 
coefficients reported in Table 3.12 in terms of their signs and sizes.  
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Table 3.12: Long-run solution to the simultaneous equations systema 
 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
CF/K 0.2370 
 
0.0590 
 
0.1322 
 
Q 0.0187 
 
0.0029 
 
-0.0009 
 
TAN -0.0365 
 
-0.3523 
 
-0.1513 
 
SZ 0.0034 
 
0.0330 
 
0.0142 
 
OWN -0.0226 
 
0.0403 
 
0.0604 
 
RE/TE -0.0095 
 
0.0169 
 
0.0254 
 
UNC1–1 0.5344 
 
-0.1135 
 
-0.3855 
 
Constant 0.0788 
 
0.1086 
 
0.1020 
 
    
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 
Year dummiese Included  Included Included 
Industry dummiesf 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationg 
2562.05*** 
(p = 0.000) 
543.13*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1259.90*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The simultaneous 
structural form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9, and estimated by 3SLS estimators using 
Stata 11. The long-run solution to the dynamic system is then obtained by computing the coefficient matrices 
following the methodology discussed in Section 3.7.1 (see Equations 3.12–3.14). 
b. The estimated investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 1///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. The estimated financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 1//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. The estimated dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 1///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV .  
e. Year dummies are included in all of the estimated equations to account for the time effect. 
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f. Industry dummies are included in all of the estimated equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
g. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the estimated coefficients except the intercept coefficient are 
jointly zero. 
 
However, the coefficient of the cash flow variables in the financing equation turns out 
to be positive, which suggests that, in the long run, internally generated cash flow may 
increase a company’s borrowing capacity, allowing the company to take on more debt. The 
positive effect of cash flow on corporate debt finance lends support to the trade-off prediction 
that profitable companies face lower expected costs of financial distress and find interest tax 
shields more valuable, and thus tend to take on more debt. Moreover, the proxy for 
uncertainty in the financing equation becomes negative. This finding is more consistent with 
our prediction that greater uncertainty is likely to exacerbate the degree of information 
asymmetry between insiders and external capital markets, resulting in a more significant cost 
disadvantage of external debt financing. It also confirms that companies prefer to finance 
increased investment under uncertainty by resorting to internal funds rather than external 
funds. 
In addition, the long-run solution to the simultaneous equations system presented in 
Table 3.12 provides some further insights into the determination of corporate decisions. First, 
it shows that Tobin’s Q has a positive effect not only on corporate investment but also on debt 
financing, while its effect on dividend payouts is negative. These results are in line with the 
previous findings that companies are likely to use more debt and retain more cash flow to 
finance variable investment opportunities. Second, company size seems to have positive effect 
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on all the three corporate decisions, indicating that larger companies are likely to have more 
investments, use more debt and distribute more dividends to their shareholders. Third, the 
coefficients on the proxy for financial life cycle stage show that, as a company matures, it 
tends to have fewer attractive investment opportunities, better access to external funds and 
thus a higher propensity to pay dividends. Besides, the coefficients on the assets tangibility 
variables are uniformly negative across all the three corporate behaviour equations, and the 
coefficients on the insider ownership variable are positive in both the financing and dividend 
equations but negative in the investment equation.  
Overall, the long-run solution to the dynamic simultaneous equations system suggests 
that the solved-out coefficients have the same sign as the conditional coefficients reported in 
Table 3.11, except those on the cash flow and uncertainty variables in the financing equation. 
Nevertheless, since the coefficient estimates reported for the simultaneous equations system 
throughout the thesis reflect conditional responses, the empirical results presented here should 
be interpreted with cautions.  
3.7 Robustness tests and further evidence 
3.7.1 Robustness tests and results 
In order to check the robustness of our main findings, we carry out further estimation and 
testing procedures. First, instead of using 3SLS estimators, we re-estimate the simultaneous 
equations system using 2SLS estimators. Even though the 3SLS method is asymptotically 
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more efficient, it is also more vulnerable to specification errors as compared to limited 
information methods, such as 2SLS. Therefore, we apply the 2SLS estimation to the 
simultaneous equations system. As reported in Appendix 3.B, the 2SLS regression provides 
qualitatively similar results to those from the 3SLS estimation. 
Second, we re-specify the simultaneous equations system by excluding the uncertainty 
variable. The 3SLS estimation results for the simultaneous equations system without 
uncertainty variable are reported in Appendix 3.C. As can be seen, all the endogenous 
explanatory variables are statistically significance with expected signs. Therefore, the 
simultaneity among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions remain hold, in the 
absence of the proxy for uncertainty associated with companies’ future prospects.  
Third, to determine the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of uncertainty 
measurement, we also estimate simultaneous equations systems in which the alternative 
measures of uncertainty, i.e. UNC2 and UNC3, are utilised. The 3SLS estimation results are 
presented in Appendices 3.D and 3.E, respectively. As expected, the alternative measures of 
uncertainty derived from daily stock returns are insignificant in their respective system 
variants. The disappointing explanatory power of the alternative measures of uncertainty is 
largely attributable to the high-frequency noise contained in the daily stock returns.  
Overall, the robustness test results suggest that the corporate behavioural equations 
system performs reasonably well. The simultaneity among corporate decisions is robust with 
respect to different estimation techniques and model specifications. However, the results 
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regarding the effect of uncertainty on corporate decisions are, to some extent, sensitive to how 
uncertainty is empirically captured. 
3.7.2 Further evidence on the simultaneity of corporate decisions 
Furthermore, in an attempt to explicitly explore the possible mechanism through which the set 
of corporate decisions are jointly determined, we split the whole sample into two subsamples 
based on the financial leverage index (FLI), which is defined as the ratio of return on average 
assets to return on average equity and used as a proxy for company’s financial position.32 It is 
believed that companies with a lower financial leverage index are highly indebted and hence 
more financially constrained, while companies with a higher financial leverage index are less 
indebted and hence less financially constrained. The median value of financial leverage index 
is used to divide the sample into two subsamples. Those with a lower financial leverage index 
are classified as financially more constrained companies, and those with a higher financial 
leverage index are financially less constrained companies.33 Given the argument that the joint 
determination of corporate decisions is justified by the financial constrains caused by 
information asymmetry, the interactions among the set of corporate decisions are expected to 
be more pronounced for companies that are financially more constrained than for those that 
are financially less constrained. If this is the case, then the financial constraints may be 
                                                 
32 The financial leverage index is collected directly from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. It is 
defined as the ratio of return on average assets to return on average equity, which is equivalent to the ratio of average equity 
to average assets. Therefore, companies with a lower financial leverage index have higher financial leverage, while 
companies with a higher financial leverage index have lower financial leverage. 
33 Our sample split focuses on company-year observations rather than simply companies, and hence allows companies to 
transit between the two classes. See Guariglia (2008) for a similar approach. 
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viewed as the possible channel through which corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions are jointly determined by management. 
Panel A of Table 3.13 reports the 3SLS estimation results for the financially more 
constrained companies. As expected, companies which are financially more constrained 
exhibit much stronger simultaneity among the set of corporate decisions than the full sample 
results presented earlier. More specifically, the magnitude of the coefficient on dividend 
payout variable in investment equation increases considerably from –0.434 observed from the 
full sample results to –1.266 observed from the results for the financially more constrained 
group, suggesting that investment and dividends are extremely competitive in financially 
more constrained companies. This is also evident from the coefficient on the investment 
variable in the payout equation whose magnitude increases significantly from –0.118 to 
–0.223. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients on external debt financing and internal 
cash flow variables in the investment regression increase from 0.259 and 0.208 to 0.533 and 
0.405, respectively. These results are consistent with the well-documented phenomenon that 
the sensitivities of investment expenditures to internal cash flows and external debt finance 
are higher for financially more constrained companies. In addition, the effects of uncertainty 
on investment and payout decisions turn out to be insignificant, whilst the effect of 
uncertainty on debt financing becomes negative and marginally significant. It seems that 
financially more constrained companies act more defensively under uncertain circumstances, 
which may be due to the limited managerial flexibility caused by financial constraints.  
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Table 3.13: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
uncertainty using subsamplesa 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Panel A: Estimation results for the financially more constrained subsample  
INV/K  0.3559*** 
(2.71) 
–0.2231*** 
(–2.99) 
NDF/K 0.5326*** e 
(3.38) f 
 0.4375*** 
(4.26) 
DIV/K –1.2660*** 
(–4.50) 
0.8727*** 
(2.66) 
 
CF/K 0.4051*** 
(11.29) 
–0.1396* 
(–1.95) 
0.1785*** 
(7.55) 
Q –0.0152 
(–0.95) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.1852*** 
(8.64) 
  
TAN  –0.2345** 
(–2.34) 
 
SZ  0.0204** 
(2.31) 
 
OWN   0.0319  
(0.99) 
RE/TE   0.0086  
(1.54) 
UNC1–1 –0.1292  
(–0.89) 
–0.3197 
(–1.51) 
–0.0627 
(–0.52) 
Constant 0.1255 
(1.58) 
1.1491 
(1.24) 
–0.0029 
(–0.04) 
    
No. of observations 
 
1395 1395 1395 
Year dummiesg Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesh 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationi 
1392.93*** 
(p = 0.000) 
223.32*** 
(p = 0.000) 
598.13*** 
(p = 0.000) 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Panel B: Estimation results for the financially less constrained subsample 
INV/K  0.0844 
(0.95) 
–0.0955** 
(–2.08) 
NDF/K 0.2653 
(1.33) 
 0.4256*** 
(2.72) 
DIV/K –0.2377 
(–1.01) 
0.4215 
(0.99) 
 
CF/K 0.1438*** 
(4.84) 
–0.0296  
(–0.51) 
0.1232*** 
(10.17) 
Q 0.0273* 
(1.95) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.3495*** 
(13.94) 
  
TAN  –0.2505* 
(–1.66) 
 
SZ  0.0176** 
(2.32) 
 
OWN   0.0068 
(0.17) 
RE/TE   0.0373* 
(1.65) 
UNC1–1 0.4256** 
(2.53) 
0.2573 
(1.02) 
–0.4240*** 
(–4.55) 
Constant 0.0325 
(0.45) 
–0.0184 
(–0.11) 
0.1361** 
(2.49) 
    
No. of observations 
 
1396 1396 1396 
Year dummiesg Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesh 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationi 
1311.30*** 
(p = 0.000) 
114.83*** 
(p = 0.000) 
791.16*** 
(p = 0.000) 
    
Panel C: Tests for the equality of coefficients obtained from the two subsample regressions 
Hausman testj 1463.41*** 
(p = 0.000) 
470.11*** 
(p = 0.000) 
44.19*** 
(p = 0.007) 
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Notes: 
a. Those with lower than median financial leverage index (0.43) are classified as financially more constrained, 
and those with higher than median financial leverage index are classified as financially less constrained. The 
simultaneous structural form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9, and estimated by 3SLS 
estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 1///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 1//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 1///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
h. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
i. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
j. The Hausman test tests for the equality of the coefficients obtained using different subsamples. The null 
hypothesis is that difference in coefficients obtained from two subsample estimations is not systematic. The 
test statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution. The associated p-value is reported in parenthesis. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.13 reports the 3SLS estimation for the companies that are 
financially less constrained. It shows that, although all the endogenous variables still bear the 
expected signs, their explanatory powers decline considerably, with 4 out 6 being statistically 
insignificant. Overall, the magnitude of the coefficients on the endogenous variables reduces 
significantly, suggesting that the simultaneity among the set of corporate decisions is 
relatively weak for financially less constrained companies. Corporate investment decisions of 
financially less constrained companies are likely to be independent of their debt financing and 
dividend payout decisions, and are less subject to internally generated cash flow as well. The 
proxy for Tobin’s Q turns out to be positive and significant, which means that capital 
expenditure of financially less constrained companies depends relatively more on the real 
                Chapter 3: Corporate Decisions, Financial Constraints and Uncertainty  
– 185 – 
considerations and less on the financial considerations, leading to more efficient investment 
decisions. However, the effect of investment on payout decisions remains negative and 
significant, which implies that if the available funds are not sufficient to allow independence 
between investment and dividend decisions, financially less constrained companies give 
investment expenditure priority over dividend payouts. Besides, it is worth noting that the 
effects of uncertainty on investment and payout decisions turns out to be statistically 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This shows that companies which are 
financially less constrained tend to act more aggressively under greater uncertainty, i.e. invest 
more and payout less. Presumably, they are more able and more willing to take the advantage 
of pre-emption in a competitive business environment by investing earlier, even if the 
prospects are not clear. Managers of financially less constrained companies have more 
flexibility to raise funds either externally by issuing debt or internally by cutting dividends. 
In an attempt to formally test the difference in the results for the two subsamples, we 
carry out a Hausman test for each of the corporate behaviour equations. Under the null 
hypothesis, the coefficients estimated using financially more constrained companies are not 
systematically different from those estimated using financially less constrained companies. 
The test results reported in Panel C of Table 3.13 suggest that the null hypothesis of no 
substantial difference between the results reported in Panel A and those reported in Panel B 
should be resoundingly rejected with respect to all of the corporate behaviour equations. 
Therefore, financially more constrained companies indeed behave differently from those 
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which are financially less constrained. The keys findings of this chapter are summarised in 
Appendix 3.A, alongside the findings from prior research. 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we investigate the interactions among corporate investment, financing and 
payout decisions under financial constraints and uncertainty, using a large panel of UK-listed 
companies. The three main aspects of corporate behaviour are modelled within a simultaneous 
equations system where they are treated as endogenous.  
On the whole, our results suggest that corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions made by UK-listed companies are indeed inextricably linked and jointly determined 
as implied by the flow-of-funds framework, and the simultaneity among them is quite robust 
with respect to different methods of estimation. UK-listed companies are likely to be 
financially constrained by the availability of internal funds as well as by access to external 
finance. Therefore, managers have to consider their financing and payout choices alongside 
their investment decisions.  
We also find that the effect of uncertainty on corporate investment is positive and 
significant, while that on dividend payouts is negative and also significant, suggesting that 
uncertainty stimulates investment in our sample not only on its own but also through its effect 
on dividend payout policy. Accordingly, companies facing greater uncertainty appear to invest 
more, and fund the increased investment spending by resorting to internal finance by cutting 
dividends rather than resorting to external finance by issuing new debts. 
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Furthermore, we divide the entire sample into financially more constrained and less 
constrained subsamples, in order to provide further insights into the simultaneity of corporate 
decisions. Comparing the magnitude and significance level of coefficients on the endogenous 
variables between the two subsample results, we find that the simultaneity among the 
corporate decisions is more pronounced for more constrained companies, whist that for less 
constrained companies is relatively weak. Accordingly, we argue that the substantial 
economic interactions among the set of corporate decisions observed from UK-listed 
companies are likely to be caused by financial constraints.  
The subsample regressions also show that the effect of uncertainty is more significant 
for financially less constrained companies but insignificant for more constrained companies, 
suggesting that less constrained companies respond to uncertainty more aggressively than 
more constrained ones. Therefore, our results offer new insight that financial constraints 
intensify the simultaneity among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions, and 
reduce managerial flexibility in adjusting those corporate decisions in response to uncertainty.
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Appendix 3.A: Key findings from Chapter 3 versus findings from prior research 
Key findings from Chapter 3 Findings from prior research 
Panel A: Key findings with respect to corporate investment behaviour 
New debt financing has a significantly positive effect on investment, suggesting 
that corporate investment is constrained by external debt financing ability. 
Prior studies use debt ratios, such as debt to asset ratio and debt to equity ratio, 
to capture the financial constraint imposed by debt in the capital structure. 
Companies with higher debt ratios tend to invest less in imperfect capital 
markets (Ascioglu et al., 2008; Baum et al., 2008; Bulan, 2005; etc.). 
Internally generated cash flow has a significantly positive effect on investment, 
indicating that investment is also constrained by the availability of internal cash 
flow. 
Abroad consensus in the existing literature is that there is a significant positive 
relationship between investment levels and internal cash flow which is a proxy 
for a company’s internal fund availability (Baum et al., 2008; Almeida and 
Campello, 2007; Bloom et al., 2007; Lensink and Murinde, 2006; Bulan, 2005; 
and Ghosal and Loungani, 2000). 
Dividend payout has a significantly negative effect on investment, implying that 
investment and dividend payout are competing uses of funds under financial 
constraints, and companies have to trade-off between investment outlays and 
dividends payouts. 
Dividend ratios are used in the existing literature as a proxy for financial 
constraints. The intuition is that financially constrained companies have 
significantly lower payout ratios, thus companies without or with low payout 
distribution are assigned to the financially constrained (Fazzari et al., 1988; 
Almeida and Campello, 2007). 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunity is positive but insignificant in 
our investment equation. The insignificant Tobin’s Q is not contradictory to the 
usual results from empirical studies on investment. 
It is generally agreed that Tobin’s Q is positively related to investment (Baum et 
al., 2008; Almeida and Campello, 2007; and Bulan, 2005). But it is also well 
documented that Tobin’s Q has severe measurement problems and thus often 
turns out to be insignificant in empirical models (Lensink and Murinde, 2006). 
The lagged investment ratio as an explanatory variable is positive and highly 
significant in the investment equation, thus the dynamic structure of investment 
is statistically evident. 
The lagged dependent variable is basically taken into account to allow for a 
possible dynamic structure in the dynamic variable. This may be caused by 
inertia of the dependent variable. In addition, a possible advantage of adding a 
lagged term is that it may remove serial correlation. The lagged investment ratio 
is significant in the investment equation estimated in Baum et al. (2008), but 
insignificant in Lensink and Murinde (2006) and Bo and Lensink (2005). 
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Uncertainty has a significant and positive effect on investment, which is robust 
with respect to the method of estimation and the measure of uncertainty. Our 
results suggest that uncertainty encourages companies to make investment. The 
positive effect of uncertainty on corporate investment is more pronounced for 
financially less constrained companies.  
(In alternative estimates, we also include a quadratic term of uncertainty in our 
investment equation, but it turns out to be insignificant.) 
The broad consensus in existing empirical research is that the effect of 
uncertainty on investment is negative, as implied by the real option theory 
(Bloom et al., 2007; and Carruth et al., 2000). A number of studies also find a 
positive relationship between uncertainty and investment (Abdul-Haque and 
Wang, 2008; and Lensink and Sterken, 2000). Besides, Lensink and Murinde 
(2006) verify an inverted-U hypothesis of investment under uncertainty, using a 
panel of UK data. 
Panel B: Key findings with respect to corporate financing behaviour  
Dividend payout variable is highly significant and positive in the financing 
equation, implying that external financing is not only driven by the demand from 
capital investment but also by that from dividend payout. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) use dividend variable as either a proxy for 
profitability or a proxy for investment opportunities, and find it generally has a 
positive effect on leverage ratio. Frank and Goyal (2003) find that dividend 
distributed to shareholders as a component of disaggregated deficit is a 
significant driver of new debt issued. 
Internally generated cash flow as an alternative source of funds is negatively 
related to external debt financing, suggesting that companies with high level of 
cash flow tend to borrow less which is consistent with the prediction of 
pecking-order hypothesis. 
 
Profitable companies face lower expected costs of financial distress and find 
interest tax shields more valuable. Trade-off predicts a positive relation between 
leverage and profitability. The pecking order theory argues that companies prefer 
internal finance over external funds, thus if investment and dividends are fixed, 
then more profitable companies will become less levered over time. Frank and 
Goyal (2009) find that companies that have more profits tend to have lower 
leverage. 
Investment variable is highly significant and positive in our financing equation, 
suggesting that external financing is driven by the demand from capital 
investment. 
Brailsford et al. (2002) take investment in total asset ratio as control for agency 
cost of debt and/or control for profitability, and they find growth in total assets 
has a negative effect on leverage. Frank and Goyal (2003) find that investment 
expenditure as a component of disaggregated deficit has a significantly positive 
effect on new debt issued. 
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Company size as a proxy for borrowing ability has a highly significant and 
positive effect on debt financing. 
 
Large, more diversified, companies face lower default risk. In addition, older 
companies with better reputations in debt markets face lower debt-related 
agency costs. Thus, larger, more mature companies have relatively easier access 
to external finance, and thus carry more debt and higher leverage ratio (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009). 
Asset tangibility, which is expected to mitigate information asymmetry and 
enhance borrowing capacity, turns out to be significantly negative which is 
count-intuitive. 
Traditional capital structure models stress the collateral value of tangible assets 
and thus debt levels should be increased with more tangibility (Frank and Goyal, 
2009). But Seifert and Gonenc (2008) find the coefficient on tangibility is 
negative for British companies. 
Uncertainty variable is insignificant in our financing equation. But it becomes 
negative and marginally significant when the financially more constrained 
subsample is used to estimate the equations system, suggesting that uncertainty 
may further reduce a company’s borrowing ability if the company is already 
financially constrained. 
Baum et al. (2009) predict a negative relationship between uncertainty and 
optimal levels of borrowing. Their empirical results confirm that as uncertainty 
increases, companies decrease their level of short-term leverage. The effect is 
stronger for macroeconomic uncertainty than for idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
Panel C: Key findings with respect to corporate payout behaviour  
Companies with more investment spending tend to pay less cash dividends. The 
results from dividend equation confirm the trade-off between investment and 
distribution. The importance of investment decisions in corporate payout choices 
is likely to be underestimated by single equation estimation techniques. 
Companies with more investment have large cash requirements and thus may 
pay low dividends. If this is the case, the impact of investment on dividends is 
expected to be negative. Both Denis and Osobov (2008) and DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) find that growth in total assets is highly significant and negatively related 
to the probability of paying dividends, reflecting that companies with higher 
growth retain cash for investment. 
Companies with less new external funds tend to payout less. Hence, dividend 
payouts are also likely to be constrained by the access to the external financing. 
The importance of debt financing decisions in corporate payout choices is also 
likely to be underestimated when single equation framework is adopted. 
 
The leverage may help control agency costs, thus reducing the need to distribute 
cash to shareholders through dividends or repurchases. This view predicts a 
negative relationship between cash dividend and leverage. Alternatively, higher 
leverage might simply proxy for older, larger, more stable and more profitable 
companies that are better able to afford paying dividends. This view implies that 
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a positive relationship between cash dividends and leverage should be observed. 
Eije and Megginson (2008) find that leverage is highly significant and 
negatively related to the probability to pay cash dividends. 
Internally generated cash flow variable is the most significant determinant of 
dividend payout, suggesting that dividend policy signals current and future 
profitability. 
Profitability is cited as one of the important predictors of dividends in prior 
studies (Chay and Suh, 2009; Denis and Osobov, 2008; and DeAngelo et al., 
2006). 
Insider ownership has no significant effect on dividend payout policy. Existing literature shows no apparent link exists between share ownership and 
payouts. Chay and Suh (2009) show that on average the coefficient on insider 
owner does not have the predicted sign or is not statistically significant. 
Retained earnings to total equity ratio as a proxy for the financial life-cycle stage 
is positively related to dividend payout but statistically insignificant. 
Life cycle stage theory of dividend predicts that the key determinant of the 
decision to pay dividends is the ratio of internally generated to total (earned plus 
contributed) common equity. Empirical evidence from Chay and Suh (2009), 
Denis and Osobov (2008) and DeAngelo et al. (2006) uniformly and strongly 
indicates that the probability a company pays dividends increases with the 
relative amount of earned equity in its capital structure. 
The effect of uncertainty on dividend payouts is negative and highly significant, 
implying that companies facing greater uncertainty tend to pay fewer dividends. 
The negative effect of uncertainty on dividend payouts is more pronounced for 
financially less constrained companies.  
Companies facing high cash flow uncertainty are likely to pay low dividends and 
keep earnings inside the company in anticipation of funding shortfalls. The 
impact of cash flow uncertainty on dividends is found to be negative (Chay and 
Suh, 2009). 
Panel D: Key findings with respect to the simultaneity of corporate decisions  
Our results seem to substantiate the claim that corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions are indeed inextricably linked and jointly determined as 
implied by the flow-of-funds framework with financial constraints. Specifically, 
it is found that capital investment and dividend payout, as competing uses of 
limited funds, are negatively interrelated, but both are positively related to the 
net amount of new debt issued. 
Empirical evidence from US data suggests that imperfections in capital markets 
are sufficient to invalidate the Modigliani-Miller’s theorems, leading to a joint 
determination of corporate investment, financing and payout decisions as 
implied by the flow-of-funds approach (Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967; McCabe, 
1979; and Peterson and Benesh, 1983). In contrast to the findings on US data, 
McDonald et al. (1975) find that empirical evidence from a sample of French 
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companies in favour of Modigliani-Miller’s independence proposition, that is, 
the dividend and investment decisions of individual companies are completely 
independent of each other. 
It is found that the simultaneity among the corporate decisions is more 
pronounced for more constrained companies, whist that for less constrained 
companies is relatively weak. Accordingly, our results suggest that the 
substantial economic interactions among the set of corporate decisions observed 
from UK-listed companies are likely to be caused by financial constraints. 
To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has attempted to explicitly 
investigate the effect of financial constraints on the simultaneity among the set 
of corporate decisions.  
Our results show that companies which are financially less constrained tend to 
act more aggressively under greater uncertainty, i.e. invest more and payout less, 
whereas financially more constrained companies tend to behave more 
defensively under uncertain circumstances. It seems that financial constraints 
reduce managerial flexibility in adjusting those corporate decisions in response 
to uncertainty. 
To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has attempted to investigate the 
effect of uncertainty on the jointly determined corporate decisions within a 
simultaneous equations system. 
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Appendix 3.B: 2SLS estimation results for investment, financing and payout equations 
with uncertaintya 
 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K  0.1268* 
(1.89) 
–0.1118*** 
(–2.66) 
NDF/K 0.2296**e 
(2.22)f 
 0.4938*** 
(5.69) 
DIV/K –0.3299* 
(–1.88) 
–0.5028 
(–1.56) 
 
CF/K 0.1944*** 
(8.55) 
0.0968** 
(2.06) 
0.1288*** 
(12.36) 
Q 0.0149 
(1.47) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.3031*** 
(18.39) 
  
TAN  –0.3972*** 
(–3.82) 
 
SZ  0.0363*** 
(6.30) 
 
OWN   0.0970*** 
(2.86) 
RE/TE   0.0410*** 
(2.90) 
UNC1–1 0.2724*** 
(2.59) 
–0.4070*** 
(–2.19) 
–0.2472*** 
(–3.33) 
Constant 0.0543 
(1.13) 
0.2007* 
(1.74) 
0.0590 
(1.43) 
    
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 
Year dummiesg Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesh 
 
Included Included Included 
F-statistic for the 
equationi 
105.67*** 
(p = 0.000) 
10.97*** 
(p = 0.000) 
52.22*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The simultaneous structural 
form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9, and estimated by 2SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
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b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 1///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 1//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 1///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
h. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
i. F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 3.C: 3SLS estimation results for investment, financing and payout equations 
without uncertaintya 
 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K  0.1722** 
(2.53) 
–0.1194*** 
(–3.05) 
NDF/K 0.2930***e 
(2.81)f 
 0.4281*** 
(5.31) 
DIV/K –0.6359*** 
(–3.61) 
0.4502* 
(1.71) 
 
CF/K 0.2359*** 
(10.68) 
–0.0423 
(–1.05) 
0.1321*** 
(13.06) 
Q 0.0143 
(1.47) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.3004*** 
(17.81) 
  
TAN  –0.2823*** 
(–3.39) 
 
SZ  0.0266*** 
(4.64) 
 
OWN   0.0256 
(0.99) 
RE/TE   0.0376*** 
(3.43) 
Constant 0.1488*** 
(3.45) 
0.0478 
(0.66) 
0.0107 
(0.32) 
    
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 
Year dummiesg Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesh 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationi 
2488.67*** 
(p = 0.000) 
276.59*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1259.81*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The simultaneous structural 
form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9 but without uncertainty variable (UNC), and 
estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
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b. Investment equation is specified as 
  1543210 ///// KINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  SZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF 543210 //// . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  TEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV ///// 543210 . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
h. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
i. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 3.D: 3SLS estimation results for investment, financing and payout equations 
with alternative measure of uncertainty UNC2a 
 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K  0.0122 
(0.89) 
–0.0472 
(–1.04) 
NDF/K 0.2583**e 
(2.03)f 
 0.3729*** 
(4.07) 
DIV/K –0.5060** 
(–2.35) 
–0.6035 
(–1.38) 
 
CF/K 0.1903*** 
(6.93) 
0.1004 
(1.62) 
0.1260*** 
(11.31) 
Q 0.0328** 
(2.11) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.3578*** 
(16.44) 
  
TAN  –0.5992*** 
(–3.76) 
 
SZ  0.0468*** 
(4.64) 
 
OWN   0.0248 
(0.58) 
RE/TE   0.0643*** 
(3.62) 
UNC2–1 –0.7808 
(–1.27) 
–0.2654 
(–0.27) 
–0.3062 
(–0.64) 
Constant 0.1526** 
(2.31) 
0.1624 
(1.08) 
0.0422 
(0.79) 
    
No. of observationsg 
 
1429 1429 1429 
Year dummiesh Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesi 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationj 
1358.48*** 
(p = 0.000) 
107.71*** 
(p = 0.000) 
814.83*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The simultaneous structural 
form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9, and estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
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b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 2///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 2//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 2///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. The number of observation reduced to 1,429 because the accounting items used to compute corporate decision 
variables and company characteristic variables are collected from the Worldscope database, whereas the daily 
stock returns used to derive UNC2 are collected from the DataStream database. The merge of datasets results in 
significant decrease in the number of observations.  
h. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
i. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
j. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 3.E: 3SLS estimation results for investment, financing and payout equations 
with alternative measure of uncertainty UNC3a 
 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K  –0.0436 
(–0.44) 
–0.0156 
(–0.35) 
NDF/K 0.3123**e 
(2.52)f 
 0.3695*** 
(3.89) 
DIV/K –0.6287*** 
(–2.35) 
–0.7632 
(–1.54) 
 
CF/K 0.2021*** 
(7.15) 
0.1366* 
(1.95) 
0.1190*** 
(9.73) 
Q 0.0351** 
(2.35) 
  
(INV/K)–1 0.3707*** 
(17.06) 
  
TAN  –0.6165*** 
(–3.60) 
 
SZ  0.0479*** 
(4.40) 
 
OWN   0.0013 
(0.03) 
RE/TE   0.0720*** 
(3.80) 
UNC3–1 –0.4487 
(–0.63) 
00502 
(0.04) 
–0.7551 
(–1.39) 
Constant 0.1335** 
(1.97) 
0.1697 
(1.07) 
0.0298 
(0.55) 
    
No. of observations 
 
1371 1371 1371 
Year dummiesg Included Included Included 
Industry dummiesh 
 
Included Included Included 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationi 
1353.35*** 
(p = 0.000) 
100.86*** 
(p = 0.000) 
790.48*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. The simultaneous structural 
form equations are specified as Equations 3.7 through 3.9, and estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
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b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 3///// UNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 3//// UNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 3///// UNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. The number of observation reduced to 1,371 because the accounting items used to compute corporate decision 
variables and company characteristic variables are collected from the Worldscope database, whereas the daily 
stock returns used to derive UNC3 are collected from the DataStream database. The merge of datasets results in 
significant decrease in the number of observations. The number of observations further reduces by excluding 
companies whose stock returns do not exhibit GARCH effect and thus UNC3 cannot be derived,  
h. Year dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the time effect. 
i. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
j. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORPORATE DECISIONS, MANAGERIAL CONFIDENCE 
AND ECONOMIC SENTIMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Managerial confidence and economic sentiment are frequently cited and closely followed by 
practitioners, government bodies, financial institutions, research institutes and news media for 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis purposes. In his General Theory, Keynes (1936) 
links the notion of “sentiment” to the “state of long-term expectation” and the “state of 
confidence”. The level of confidence or sentiment reflects the prevailing attitude of economic 
agents towards anticipated economic and business developments. It is believed that they play 
key roles in the formation of companies’ expectations of future profit levels, and hence in the 
determination of their key corporate decisions. A high level of managerial confidence or 
economic sentiment creates favourable environment for a business to grow; conversely, a low 
confidence or sentiment level indicates a negative outlook for future business spending and 
capital investment. However, the concepts of managerial confidence and economic sentiment 
have not been embraced entirely into mainstream financial economics, which relies heavily on 
the rigid assumption of broad rationality in corporate decision-making processes. As 
researchers add more and more company fundamental characteristics in explaining corporate 
behaviour, these hard-to-define ideas such as managerial confidence and economic sentiment 
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are largely ignored and excluded from their empirical models. It is noted that the major 
challenge for incorporating such ideas into economic models is to construct plausible proxies 
for the state of confidence and sentiment (see Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  
This chapter represents one of the first studies to explicitly and systematically 
incorporate the state of managerial confidence and economic sentiment into the area of 
corporate finance. We employ a number of direct measures of agents’ perceptions about 
current and expected business and economic conditions to explore their potential effects on 
corporate investment, financing and payout decisions. These direct measures of the state of 
economic sentiment and managerial confidence are drawn up from a series of qualitative 
economic surveys of managers in four main industry sectors as well as consumers across the 
European Union (EU) member states and candidate countries. The surveys are carried out by 
the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG-ECFIN) of the European 
Commission (described in detail in Section 4.2). These novel measures of the state of 
confidence and sentiment are forward-looking in nature, and therefore are completely 
different from the ex post variables typically used in the previous literature.34 The managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment indicators employed in this chapter are expected to 
represent managers’ collective attitude towards the future prospects of the companies, the 
sectors and the economies at aggregate levels.  
                                                 
34 Previous studies typically assume rational expectations by using ex post variables such as GDP, industrial production or 
aggregate consumption as proxies for economic sentiment. The use of director measures of economic sentiment and 
managerial confidence obtained from the survey of agents’ expectations about economic and business conditions should, to a 
considerable degree, eliminate noise that may exist in ex post variables. 
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We model corporate investment, financing and payout decisions endogenously within 
the simultaneous equations system set up in Chapter 3, with reference to a large panel of 
UK-listed companies observed within the period from 1999 to 2008. The simultaneous 
equations system allows for contemporaneous interdependence among the three corporate 
decisions, in attempting to overcome the shortcomings of the single equation techniques. 
Given their potential influences in the determination of these corporate decisions, we 
explicitly investigate the role of the state of confidence in each of the corporate decisions 
modelled in our system. The UK and EU managerial confidence indicators and economic 
sentiment indicators are used as the alternative proxies for the state of confidence separately 
and treated as a common exogenous factor in their respective system variants.  
The empirical results presented in this chapter once again confirm the robustness of 
the joint determination of the three corporate decisions, as implied by the flow-of-funds 
framework for corporate behaviour. More importantly, it is found that both capital investment 
and debt financing variables are positively and significantly associated with the proxies for 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment, indicating that high levels of confidence and 
sentiment encourage companies to raise more funds through debt financing and to invest more 
intensively in their capital stock. The influence of confidence and sentiment on dividend 
payout policy is negative but rather weak. Our findings with regard to the influences of 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment on aspects of corporate behaviour persist even 
after controlling for company-level uncertainty and other fundamental characteristics. 
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Specifically, our empirical evidence shows that both the level of company idiosyncratic 
uncertainty and the state of aggregate confidence have significant and positive real effects on 
corporate investment decisions. Debt financing decisions are heavily influenced by the state 
of aggregate confidence but not by the level of company idiosyncratic uncertainty, whereas 
dividend payout decisions are mainly affected by company-specific uncertainty rather than the 
state of confidence at sector level or sentiment at economy level. Therefore, our results clearly 
show that the state of aggregate confidence and the level of company idiosyncratic uncertainty 
affect corporate behaviour independently through different channels. They both cause 
increases in corporate investment spending, but managers consider different financial choices 
in response to the increased demand for capital investment under different situations. In 
addition, it seems that UK-listed companies in the services sector behave more aggressively 
than others when the sector sentiment is high. Specifically, they invest in capital stock more 
intensively, use debt financing more heavily and cut dividends more decisively when their 
managers are confident about future performance. 
This chapter reveals new findings related to several branches of the literature, 
contributing to the current knowledge of corporate behaviour in the following ways. First, to 
the best of our knowledge, this chapter offers the first attempt to explicitly and systematically 
examine the effects of managerial confidence and economic sentiment on corporate decisions 
within a simultaneous equations system. By relaxing the conventional assumption that 
managers are fully rational, our study provides insight into the influences of managers’ 
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psychological bias on aspects of corporate behaviour, adding to the small but growing 
literature on behavioural corporate finance. Second, our study highlights and discriminates the 
roles played by the degree of uncertainty and by the state of confidence, in the determination 
of corporate decisions. Our findings contribute to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence that they both influence corporate policies but independently through different 
mechanisms. Besides, we carry out a comparison across four main industry sectors, revealing 
additional insights into the influences of managerial confidence and economic sentiment on 
the behaviour of companies with different characteristics. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the novel 
measures of sector-specific managerial confidence and economic sentiment used in this 
chapter. Section 4.3 specifies the empirical models. Section 4.4 discusses the sample, 
variables and preliminary analysis. Section 4.5 describes the estimation and testing procedures 
as well as the main results for the empirical models. Section 4.6 offers further evidence to 
check the robustness of our findings. Concluding remarks are drawn in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Measures of managerial confidence and economic sentiment 
The biggest challenge in incorporating the concepts of managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment into corporate behavioural modelling is to construct plausible measures of these 
hard-to-define ideas (see Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Previous studies under the assumption 
of rational expectations typically employ ex post variables such as gross domestic product 
(GDP), industrial production or aggregate consumption as proxies for economic sentiment. 
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Recent literature in behavioural corporate finance proposes more creative methods to proxy 
for managerial confidence. For example, Malmendier et al. (2011) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) exploit the overexposure of CEOs to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies, as 
reflected by their personal portfolio of their companies’ options and stockholdings, to measure 
managerial confidence in the US. Ben-David et al. (2007) measure overconfidence based on 
CFOs’ confidence intervals of their stock market predictions. Lin et al. (2005) construct a 
managerial confidence measure for Taiwanese companies based on CEOs’ forecast errors in 
their companies’ future earnings. Unfortunately, such data used to construct measures of 
managerial confidence at individual manager level are not publicly available in the UK.  
Unlike prior studies, the confidence indicators employed in the present study are direct 
measures of managerial confidence and economic sentiment drawn from the Joint 
Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys. The surveys are carried out 
by the European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG-ECFIN) across EU member states and candidate countries, aiming to obtain insights into 
the beliefs of economic agents, providing essential information for economic surveillance, 
short-term forecasting and economic research. Their results are often considered as early 
indicators for future economic developments (European Commission, 2007). The results of all 
surveys and the readings of all indicators are publicly available from the European 
Commission website. 35  The sample sizes for the Joint Harmonised EU Business and 
                                                 
35 See the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
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Consumer Surveys across countries can be found in Appendix 4.A. According to European 
Commission (2007), approximately 124,000 companies and almost 40,000 consumers are 
currently surveyed each month across the European Union, among which 3,800 companies 
and 2,000 consumers are surveyed in the UK. This chapter, therefore, focuses on managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment in the UK as well as their counterparts at EU level, using 
monthly data for the period from January 1999 to December 2008. 
4.2.1 Sector-specific managerial confidence indicators 
The general business and consumer surveys dataset is composed of five sets of sector-specific 
survey data, namely, industry (INDU), services (SERV), consumer (CONS), retail trade (RETA) 
and construction (BUIL).36 For each sector, several questions are asked in each survey (see 
Appendix 4.B for the complete questionnaires). Nearly all of the survey questions are of a 
qualitative nature, trying to assess the recent trends in business situations and monitor the 
current status of the economy. Typically, the survey questions have similar answer schemes 
which are given according to a three- or five-option ordinal scale, from optimism to 
pessimism. More specifically, the three-option questions have alternative answers of 
“positive”, “neutral” and “negative”. The questionnaires are addressed to senior managers, 
such as Chairmen, CEOs or functional directors, of the sample companies in each of the 
sectors, as well as to consumers. Answers obtained from the surveys are aggregated and 
                                                 
36 To be precise, industry (INDU) refers to manufacturing industry in the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and 
Consumer Surveys (European Commission, 2007).  
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expressed in the form of a “balance” for each equation which is defined as the difference 
between the percentages of respondents giving positive and negative replies, 
 
MPB   (4.1) 
 
where P denotes the percentage of positive replies, E denotes the percentage of neutral replies, 
M denotes the percentage of negative replies, and therefore %100 MEP . B denotes 
aggregate balance which is the percentage of net positive or optimistic responses. In the case 
of questions with five options, i.e. “very positive” and “very negative” in addition to the three 
options mentioned above, the balances are defined as the weighted average of the responses as 
follows, 
 
)
2
1
()
2
1
( MMMPPPB   (4.2) 
 
where PP denotes the percentage of very positive replies, MM denotes the percentage of very 
negative replies, and hence %100 MMMEPPP . According to above definitions, 
the balance values have a possible range between -100% and 100%. The balance value equals 
100% (-100%) if all respondents choose the positive (negative) option in the case of 
three-option questions, or the most positive (negative) option in the case of five-option 
questions.  
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Based on the responses to a selection of survey questions, which are closely related to 
the reference variables they are supposed to track (e.g. industrial production), the 
sector-specific confidence indicators (SCI) are constructed for each of the five sectors. The 
questions selected to construct the confidence indicator for each sector mainly focus on the 
development of the business situation over the past few months, the current situation of the 
business, and the expectation of changes in business activities over the next few months. The 
sector-specific confidence indicators are defined as the arithmetic average of the balances (in 
percentage points) of the answers to the selected questions,37 
 
n
B
SCI
n
i
i
 1  (4.3) 
 
where SCI stands for a sector-specific confidence indicator, Bi denotes the balance of the 
answers to question i in the corresponding sector-specific survey, and n is the number of 
questions selected to build the confidence indicator. It is worth noting that the balances of the 
answers to some of the selected questions enter Equation 4.3 with inverted signs (see the 
notes attached to Appendix 4.B). The sector-specific confidence indicators for the industry, 
services, retail trade and construction sectors thus reflect the collective perceptions and 
confidence of the managers towards future business development at sector level. For each of 
                                                 
37 The balance series from the selected questions are not standardised prior to their aggregation. The balance series used to 
calculate each confidence indicator are seasonally adjusted (European Commission, 2007).  
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the sectoral indices, positive values indicate a state of confidence above the average, whereas 
negative values indicate a below-average position.  
The methodological approach used to construct the sector-specific confidence 
indicators, however, has a number of limitations. First, the use of the balances of positive and 
negative responses to compute confidence indicators is potentially problematic. A positive 
response (or a negative response, if the balance enters Equation 4.3 with an inverted sign) to 
some of the survey questions may not be necessarily attributable to higher levels of 
managerial confidence and sentiment, while a negative response (or a positive response, if the 
balance enters Equation 4.3 with an inverted sign) may not be always associated with a poor 
outlook for future businesses. The lack of inherent linkage between some of the survey 
questions and the state of managerial or consumer sentiment may lead the indicators to be 
biased proxies for sector-specific confidence. Second, taking simple arithmetic average across 
the balances of the answers to the survey questions to obtain the sector-specific confidence 
indicator may also result in possible ambiguities about the information contained in the 
sector-specific confidence indicators. These methodological limitations of the confidence 
indicators, therefore, should be kept in mind when we interpret our empirical results.  
In order to provide a visual comparison between the evolutions of UK and EU 
sentiment at sector level, we plot the monthly UK and EU sector-specific confidence 
indicators for the five sectors over the period from January 1999 to December 2008 in Figures 
4.1–4.5, respectively.  
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Figure 4.1: Time series plot of UK versus EU manufacturing sector confidence indicatorsa 
 
Figure 4.2: Time series plot of UK versus EU services sector confidence indicatorsa 
 Note: a. The data are publicly available from the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
 
Note: a. The data are publicly available from the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
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Figure 4.3: Time series plot of UK versus EU consumer confidence indicatorsa 
 
Figure 4.4: Time series plot of UK versus EU retail trade sector confidence indicatorsa 
 Note: 
a. The data are publicly available from the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
 
Note: a. The data are publicly available from the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
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Figure 4.5: Time series plot of UK versus EU construction sector confidence indicatorsa 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that managers in manufacturing industry view the growth in 
industrial production pessimistically most of the time within our observation window. The 
industrial confidence indicator takes positive values only in 2004 and 2007 for the UK, and 
takes positive values in 2000, 2006 and 2007 for the EU. The UK industrial confidence 
indicator is lower than its EU counterpart most of the time, and appears to be more volatile in 
our observation window. Figure 4.2 shows that managers in the services sector are relatively 
more optimistic about the development of their businesses. Both the UK and the EU service 
confidence indicators remain positive in most of our sample period. Again, the UK service 
confidence indicator is slightly more volatile, especially in the second half of our observation 
Note: a. The data are publicly available from the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
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window. Consumers seem to be rather pessimistic about the financial conditions of their 
households as well as the economic situation in general, as shown in Figure 4.3. Compared 
with consumers in the EU as a whole, UK consumers are less pessimistic most of the time 
from 2002 to 2007. Figure 4.4 plots UK and EU retail trade sector confidence indicators over 
time. Managerial confidence in the retail trade sector in the UK outperforms that in the EU. 
However, the UK retail trade sector confidence indicator displays a rather large fluctuation, 
while the EU indicator is relatively stable over time. Figure 4.5 shows that the construction 
sector confidence indicators for the UK and the EU are less correlated with each other, other 
than being rather stable before 2008. There is no systematic pattern of one being consistently 
higher than the other. In all figures we can notice the magnitude of the downward shift in 
managerial confidence that characterises the last two years of the time series. The causes of 
the downwards shift may largely be attributed to the global financial crisis starts in late 2007. 
4.2.2 Economic sentiment indicators 
Based on the complete set of 15 balance series underlying the five sector-specific confidence 
indicators, the economic sentiment indicator (ESI) is formulated to synthesise the information 
contained in the individual surveys into a single variable, in an attempt to track the economy 
as a whole. Thus, this composite indicator can be considered as an aggregate indicator which 
summarises the information contained in the five sector-specific confidence indicators 
(European Commission, 2007). The economic sentiment indicator is defined as the weighted 
average of the standardised balance series, in which explicit weights are allocated to the five 
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surveyed sectors, i.e. industry 40%, services 30%, consumers 20%, retail trade 5% and 
construction 5%.38 
More specifically, the steps of the calculation of the economic sentiment indicator, 
according to European Commission (2007), can be summarised as follows. First, the balance 
series underlying the sector-specific confidence indicators are standardised,  
 
j
jt
jt S
BB
Y

  (4.4) 
 
where Bjt is the seasonally adjusted balance series j underlying the confidence indicators at 
time t, jB  is the arithmetic average of the balance series j, i.e. TBB
T
t jtj
/
11  , and jS  
is the sample standard deviation of the balance series j, i.e. )1/()(
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T
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.39 
Hence, jtY  is the standardised balance series j. The available standardised balance series are 
then used to compute the weighted average Zt as follows, 
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 
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38 The given weights are determined according to two criteria, namely, “representativeness” of the sector in question and 
tracking performance in relation to the reference variable. Corresponding to the broad scope of the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator, the obvious reference variable is GDP growth, tracking the movements of the economy as a whole. It is important 
to note that the weights are not directly applied to the five confidence indicators themselves but to their standardised 
individual component series (European Commission, 2007).  
39 The moments for standardisation are computed over a frozen sample to avoid monthly revisions of the index. Currently, 
the sample runs from January 1990 to December 2006, i.e. T = 204 (European Commission, 2007). 
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where wj is the weight of standardised balance series j used to construct the economic 
sentiment indicator, which is computed as the sector weights mentioned above divided by the 
number of balance series making up the related sector-specific confidence indicator.40
tj j
w )(  
is the sum of the weights of the available series at time t. Thus, Zt can be viewed as 
the weighted average of standardised balance series, if all 15 components are available; 
otherwise, it is the weighted sum of the available balance series divided by the sum of the 
allocated weights of the available components. Then, the weighted average Zt is standardised 
and scaled as follows, 
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where Z and ZS  are the arithmetic average and the standard deviation of Z, which are 
computed as TZZ
T
t t
/
1   and )1/()(1
2    TZZS
T
t tZ
. The standardised Zt is 
scaled to have a long-term mean of 100% and a standard deviation of 10%.41 Finally, the 
aggregate ESI for the EU is calculated as a weighted average of the ESI of each member state. 
The weights utilised to calculate the ESI for the EU take into account the relative volume of 
each economy within the European Union, and are revised periodically.  
  
                                                 
40 For example, there are three balance series related to the service confidence indicator, thus each of the standardised 
balances receive a weight of 10%, adding up to the total services sector weight of 30%. 
41 According to European Commission (2007), the imposed standard deviation of 10 implies that in about 68% of the cases 
the economic sentiment indicator will be within the range of 90 to 110, assuming the indicator is normally distributed. 
        Chapter 4: Corporate Decisions, Managerial Confidence and Economic Sentiment  
– 217 – 
Figure 4.6: Time series plot of UK versus EU economic sentiment indicatorsa 
 
 
Therefore, for both ESI at country level and ESI at EU level, values greater than 100% 
indicate an above-average economic sentiment, whereas values below 100% indicate a 
below-average position (European Commission, 2007). We plot the economic sentiment 
indicators for both the UK and the EU from 1999 to 2008 in Figure 4.6. It shows that the two 
indicators trend together around the long-term mean of 100%, exhibiting similar periodic 
patterns of business cycle. But there is no systematic pattern of one economic sentiment 
indicator being consistently higher than the other. Both indicators show that the economic 
sentiment experiences the steepest drop in 2008, reaching their lowest readings in recent years. 
The collapse of economic sentiment is mainly attributable to the global financial crisis which 
Note: a. The data are publicly available from the European Commission website via http://ec.europa.eu. 
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starts in late 2007 and deteriorates in 2008. 
Although the sector-specific managerial confidence indicators and the economic 
sentiment indicators are published at a monthly frequency, corporate decision variables and 
company characteristics variables are only available at an annual frequency. To empirically 
investigate the influence of managerial confidence and economic sentiment on corporate 
decisions, we have to convert the monthly-frequency indicators into their annual-frequency 
analogues. We therefore calculate the arithmetic averages of the monthly values over each 
calendar year as our proxies for managerial confidence and economic sentiment for the 
corresponding period. Given the argument that the key corporate decisions are likely to be 
made at the beginning of each fiscal year, the state of managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment in December tends to play a more important role than that in the other months of a 
year in making corporate decisions for the year ahead (Oliver and Mefteh, 2010). Therefore, 
we also consider the December figures as the relevant measures of managerial confidence and 
economic sentiment to check the robustness of our empirical results obtained using the 
arithmetic averages.42 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the UK and the EU indicators at both 
monthly frequency and annual frequency observed over the period from January 1999 to 
December 2008 
  
                                                 
42 Oliver and Mefteh (2010) take the December figure as the relevant measure of manager confidence to investigate the 
effect of confidence on the capital structure choices of a panel of French companies.  
        Chapter 4: Corporate Decisions, Managerial Confidence and Economic Sentiment  
– 219 – 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for sector-specific confidence and economic sentiment 
indicatorsa 
Indicator Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. 
Panel A: Monthly UK sector-specific confidence indicators
b 
INDUUK –0.0956  –0.0900  0.0900  –0.3300  0.0886 –0.3941  2.7923  120 
SERVUK 0.0683  0.1050  0.2600  –0.4100  0.1340 –1.0897  3.9929  120 
CONSUK –0.0545  –0.0400  0.0300  –0.2900  0.0585 –2.5028  9.5443  120 
RETAUK 0.0186  0.0300  0.2300  –0.4500  0.1280 –0.9824  4.4513  120 
BUILUK –0.0673  –0.0400  0.0600  –0.5800  0.1080 –2.8115  11.7169  120 
ESIUK 1.0310  1.0435  1.1450  0.7340  0.0736 –1.3400  5.6497  120 
Panel B: Monthly EU sector-specific confidence indicators
b 
INDUEU –0.0449  –0.0500  0.0700  –0.3200  0.0732 –0.5642  3.5507  120 
SERVEU 0.1120  0.1100  0.3100  –0.2100  0.1120 –0.2448  2.6031  120 
CONSEU –0.0860  –0.0900  0.0200  –0.3000  0.0603 –0.4978  3.6683  120 
RETAEU –0.0527  –0.0600  0.0800  –0.2700  0.0624 –0.1817  3.3173  120 
BUILEU –0.0741  –0.0800  0.0400  –0.3300  0.0675 –0.7095  4.5119  120 
ESIEU 1.0326  1.0370  1.1650  0.7210  0.0788 –0.7479  4.3837  120 
Panel C: Annual UK sector-specific confidence indicators
c 
INDUUK –0.0956  –0.1208  0.0283  –0.1608  0.0634 0.8073  2.4011  10 
SERVUK 0.0683  0.1267  0.1933  –0.1767  0.1224 –0.8743  2.5543  10 
CONSUK –0.0545  –0.0408  –0.0200  –0.1950  0.0509 –2.3846  7.2379  10 
RETAUK 0.0186  0.0450  0.1233  –0.1867  0.1026  –0.7724  2.5210  10 
BUILUK –0.0673  –0.0454  0.0142  –0.2875  0.0858 –1.7929  5.5498  10 
ESIUK 1.0310  1.0303  1.1070  0.9111  0.0590 –0.6451  2.7991  10 
Panel D: Annual EU sector-specific confidence indicators
c 
INDUEU –0.0449  –0.0725  0.0525  –0.1042  0.0597 0.5786  1.7044  10 
SERVEU 0.1120  0.1108  0.2842  –0.0183  0.1038 0.2115  1.9728  10 
CONSEU –0.0860  –0.0858  0.0050  –0.1767  0.0562 –0.0772  2.1293  10 
RETAEU –0.0527  –0.0663  0.0442  –0.1208  0.0535 0.5069  2.0964  10 
BUILEU –0.0741  –0.0788  0.0167  –0.1608  0.0590 0.1515  1.8866  10 
ESIEU 1.0326  1.0292  1.1452  0.9332  0.0686 0.1297  1.9695  10 
Notes:   
a. Five sectors are covered by the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys, namely, 
manufacturing industry (INDU), services (SERV), consumers (CONS), retail trade (RETA) and construction 
(BUIL). For each of the five surveyed sectors, confidence indicators are calculated as the arithmetic average of 
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the balances of the answers to the selected questions, to reflect overall perceptions and expectations at the 
individual sector level in a one-dimensional index. The economic sentiment indicator (ESI) is formulated to 
synthesise the information contained in the individual surveys into a single variable (European Commission, 
2007). The superscript (UK or EU) indicates the economy that the indicator tracks. 
b. The five sector-specific surveys are currently conducted on a monthly basis, and the results are published every 
month.  
c. To match the annual company-level variables, the monthly sector-specific confidence indicators and economic 
sentiment indicators are converted to their lower-frequency analogues by taking the arithmetic average of the 
monthly data over each year. 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the average value of the UK (EU) sector-specific managerial 
confidence indicator over our sample period is –9.56% (–4.49%) for industrial companies, 
6.83% (11.20%) for services companies, –5.45% (–8.60%) for consumers, 1.86% (–5.27%) 
for retailers, and –6.73% (–7.41%) for construction companies. Both the UK and EU 
economic sentiment indicators have an average value of 103% over the sample period, but the 
monthly EU indicator exhibits a slightly greater variation, ranging from 72.10% to 116.50% 
with a standard deviation of 7.88%.  
A correlation coefficient matrix of the monthly UK and EU indicators is presented in 
Table 4.2. The message conveyed by the matrix confirms the visual comparisons offered by 
the figures above, and is consistent with our expectation that the UK and EU indicators are 
closely related with each other given the considerable degree of European economic 
integration. It should also be noted that the pair-wise correlations among all the indicators are 
uniformly positive and highly significant, indicating that managers in different sectors as well 
as consumers, to a great extent, share the same sentiment towards the prospects of the 
business and economic conditions.  
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Table 4.2: Correlation coefficient matrix of the UK and EU sector-specific confidence and economic sentiment indicatorsa 
Indicator INDUUK SERVUK CONSUK RETAUK BUILUK ESIUK INDUEU SERVEU CONSEU RETAEU BUILEU ESIEU 
INDUUK 1.00 
 
           
SERVUK 0.46b 
***c 
1.00 
 
          
CONSUK 0.38 
*** 
0.67 
*** 
1.00 
 
         
RETAUK 0.51 
*** 
0.57 
*** 
0.59 
*** 
1.00 
 
        
BUILUK 0.52 
*** 
0.55 
*** 
0.79 
*** 
0.80 
*** 
1.00 
 
       
ESIUK 0.84 
*** 
0.82 
*** 
0.73 
*** 
0.71 
*** 
0.75 
*** 
1.00 
 
      
INDUEU 0.84 
*** 
0.59 
*** 
0.37 
*** 
0.44 
*** 
0.47 
*** 
0.80 
*** 
1.00 
 
     
SERVEU 0.41 
*** 
0.84 
*** 
0.50 
*** 
0.30 
*** 
0.31 
*** 
0.67 
*** 
0.67 
*** 
1.00 
 
    
CONSEU 0.37 
*** 
0.83 
*** 
0.61 
*** 
0.43 
*** 
0.45 
*** 
0.68 
*** 
0.61 
*** 
0.90 
*** 
1.00 
 
   
RETAEU 0.70 
*** 
0.52 
*** 
0.39 
*** 
0.71 
*** 
0.60 
*** 
0.73 
*** 
0.81 
*** 
0.48 
*** 
0.55 
*** 
1.00 
 
  
BUILEU 0.63 
*** 
0.67 
*** 
0.52 
*** 
0.53 
*** 
0.61 
*** 
0.76 
*** 
0.85 
*** 
0.71 
*** 
0.71 
*** 
0.83 
*** 
1.00 
 
 
ESIEU 0.66 
*** 
0.83 
*** 
0.57 
*** 
0.49 
*** 
0.52 
*** 
0.84 
*** 
0.89 
*** 
0.92 
*** 
0.88 
*** 
0.74 
*** 
0.87 
*** 
1.00 
 
Notes:  
a. Monthly UK and EU sector-specific confidence and economic sentiment indicators over the period 1999–2008 are used to produce the correlation coefficient matrix. 
b. For each cell, the reported figure is the pair-wise correlation coefficient between the corresponding indicators. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Although the managerial confidence indicators and the economic sentiment indicators 
drawn from the EU business and consumer surveys represent the combination of managerial 
confidence at aggregate levels, we can still use the term managerial overconfidence or 
optimism in this chapter, given the argument that the vast majority of managers provide 
responses which could be considered as overconfident on any reasonable scales (Ben-David et 
al., 2007).43  Oliver and Mefteh (2010) use the same set of indicators as proxies for 
managerial overconfidence to investigate the influence of managers’ psychological bias on 
capital structure choice with reference to a panel of French companies. 
4.3 Modelling corporate behavioural equations 
4.3.1 Corporate behavioural equations with proxy for the state of confidence 
This chapter incorporates managerial confidence and economic sentiment into corporate 
finance issues to investigate their impact on corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions. To explicitly allow for the contemporaneous interactions among the key set of 
corporate decisions, we model companies’ capital investment, debt financing and dividend 
payout behaviour endogenously within the simultaneous equations system set up in Chapter 3. 
Given the potential influences of managers’ psychological bias on aspects of corporate 
behaviour, we treat the state of confidence as a common factor involved in each of the 
decisions modelled in our simultaneous system. Therefore, the simultaneous equations system 
                                                 
43 This is a crude approximation of managerial overconfidence, however given the data this is the best we would do. 
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that models corporate behaviour with the state of confidence is specified as follows, 
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where INV represents gross investment, NDF net new debt financing, DIV dividend payout, 
CF cash flow, Q the ratio of market to book value of total assets, TAN asset tangibility, SZ 
company size, OWN ownership structure, RE/TE the ratio of retained earnings to total equity, 
and CONF the state of confidence, proxied either by the managerial confidence indicator or 
the economic sentiment indicator.  ,   and   are the error terms in their respective 
equations. A lagged investment variable is also included to capture the dynamic structure of 
the investment decision (see Guariglia, 2008; and Lensink and Murinde, 2006). In addition, 
the corporate decisions are assumed to be made at the beginning of each year, and thus a 
lagged confidence indicator is included to proxy for the managers’ perceptions and 
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expectations of future economic conditions when they make corporate decisions at the 
beginning of each fiscal year for the year ahead, i.e. managers form their perceptions and 
expectations at the beginning of the year t (or end of year t–1) according to the information set 
available, and then decide how to finance and allocate their funds for year t. All the corporate 
decision and cash flow variables are scaled by beginning-of-period capital stock (K), in order 
to control for company size and to reduce heteroscedasticity problems that may otherwise 
arise in the company-level data. 
According to the behavioural corporate finance literature, managerial overconfidence 
induces an underinvestment-overinvestment trade-off (see Heaton, 2002). If managers 
systematically overestimate future returns to their investment projects and thus overinvest, we 
expect the coefficient on the confidence variable in the investment equation to be positive. If 
managers consistently perceive their companies are undervalued by the capital market and 
thus are reluctant to access external finance, resulting in underinvestment, then we expect the 
coefficient on the confidence variable in Equation 4.7 to be negative. The overall effect of 
managerial confidence on corporate investment, therefore, is subject to empirical 
examination. 
The prediction with respect to managerial confidence on corporate debt financing 
decision is also theoretically ambiguous. If managers have an upward bias towards future 
profitability and a downward bias towards the riskiness of future earnings, we expect the 
coefficient on the confidence variable in the debt financing equation to be positive. If 
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managers consistently perceive their company as undervalued by the capital market, and 
external finance as unduly costly, we expect the coefficient on the confidence variable in 
Equation 4.8 to be negative. Thus, managers’ psychological bias in relation to corporate debt 
financing decisions also needs to be addressed empirically.  
Again, the relationship between the state of confidence and dividend payout is also not 
clear-cut. If managers are more confident about future cash flow and hence view dividend 
payout as more sustainable, we expect the coefficient on the confidence variable in the 
dividend payout equation to be positive. If managers overestimate both returns to investment 
and costs of external finance, and therefore view internally generated cash flows as more 
valuable, we expect managerial confidence in Equation 4.9 to have a negative effect on 
dividend payouts.  
Equations 4.7 through 4.9 form a simultaneous equations system, in which corporate 
decisions are jointly determined by managers based on their confidence towards future 
company performance. We employ two proxies for the state of confidence (CONF), i.e. a 
sector-specific managerial confidence indicator (SCI) and economic sentiment indicator (ESI), 
as described in Section 4.3. Both indicators are measured at two levels, i.e. the UK country 
level (SCIUK and ESIUK) and the EU regional level (SCIEU and ESIEU). The candidate 
indicators are used as the confidence variable separately in their respective simultaneous 
equations system variants. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account 
for inter-industry variations that cannot be captured by the included regressors. We do not 
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include year dummies in our equations because the variables employed to proxy for the state 
of confidence and sentiment in this chapter are all at aggregate levels, and their effects on 
corporate decisions may, to some extent, be captured by the year dummies.  
4.3.2 Corporate behavioural equations with confidence and uncertainty variables 
Recent literature in corporate finance has also recognised the importance of uncertainty 
associated with companies’ prospects in the determination of corporate decisions (see the 
literature reviewed in Section 2.4). Chapter 3 of this thesis also pays great attention to the 
impacts of uncertainty at company level on jointly determined corporate investment, 
financing and payout choices. We construct our proxies for uncertainty based on stock price 
volatility, under the assumption that all the information about a company’s fundamentals and 
prospects will be properly transmitted into its share price. Using a large panel of UK-listed 
companies within the period 1999–2008, we find that companies are likely to increase their 
investment outlays in the face of greater uncertainty. To finance the increased investment 
under uncertainty, they tend to resort to internal funds by cutting dividends rather than 
resorting to external funds by issuing new debts. Overall, the findings of Chapter 3 strongly 
support the argument that managers do take uncertainty associated with their company’s 
prospects into consideration when they make real and financial decisions.  
An interesting related question is whether the state of managerial confidence and 
economic sentiment towards future business performance can be adequately reflected in the 
changes in share prices and empirically captured by our proxy for company-level uncertainty 
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which is also forward looking in nature. To empirically address this research question, we also 
include our primary proxy for company-level uncertainty (UNC1) derived from the changes in 
share prices as an additional common exogenous determinant of corporate decisions into each 
of the behavioural equations modelled in our simultaneous equations system. Accordingly, the 
augmented equations system is specified as follows, 
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Where UNC1 represents the primary proxy for uncertainty constructed in Chapter 3. Again, 
the uncertainty variable enters the system with a lag in an attempt to reduce the possibility of 
using more information in modelling corporate decisions than managers actually have when 
they make corporate decisions. If the state of managerial confidence and economic sentiment 
can be captured by the proxy for uncertainty, then the confidence variables will lose their 
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explanatory powers for corporate decisions once the company-level uncertainty is 
incorporated in the system. On the other hand, if the confidence variables do indeed hold 
additional information useful in explaining corporate behaviour, their explanatory powers are 
expected to persist even after controlling for company-level uncertainty. 
4.4 Data and preliminary analysis 
Our data are collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. The 
initial sample includes all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), including 
both active and inactive companies, within the period 1999–2008. We then discard utilities 
(SIC code 4900–4949), and financial companies (SIC code 6000–6999). Companies that do 
not have complete records on all the relevant variables in determining corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions as well as those with less than five years of continuous 
observations are dropped from our sample. We also exclude company-year observations with 
negative cash flow from our sample. The number of company-year observations included in 
the final sample for the simultaneous equations analyses therefore reduces to 2,791. The 
indicators for managerial confidence and economic sentiment at UK level and EU level are 
publicly available from the European Commission website. An unbalanced panel of 
company-level data, therefore, is formed to avoid survivorship bias and to make full use of the 
company-year observations. The measurement of each variable used in this chapter is 
described in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3: Description of main variables used in Chapter 4a 
Gross investment (INV): 
The sum of the changes in book value of net property, plant and equipment and depreciation expensesb 
Net debt financing (NDF): 
The change in the book value of long-term debt 
Dividends (DIV): 
The reported total dividends paid on common stock, including extra and special dividends 
Cash flow (CF): 
The sum of net income and depreciation expenses 
Average Q (Q): 
The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of total assets 
Capital stock (K): 
The book value of tangible fixed assets  
Company size (SZ):  
The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Asset tangibility (TAN):  
The ratio of the book value of net property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets 
Ownership structure (OWN): 
The percentage of common share outstanding that is held by insiders  
Retained earnings-to-total equity ratio (RE/TE): 
The ratio of the book value of retained earnings in the balance sheet to the book value of total common 
equity 
Uncertainty measure 1 (UNC1): 
The difference between the highest and the lowest prices normalised by the mean over the period 
UK industrial sector managerial confidence indicator (INDUUK): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 1,500 UK companies in the manufacturing 
sector to the survey questions on production expectations, order books and stocks of finished productsc 
UK services sector managerial confidence indicator (SERVUK): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 1,000 UK companies in the services sector 
to the survey questions on business climate and on recent and expected evolution of demand 
UK consumer confidence indicator (CONSUK): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 2,000 UK consumers to the survey 
questions on the financial situation of households, the general economic situation, unemployment 
expectations and saving, all over the next months 
UK retail trade sector managerial confidence indicator (RETAUK): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 500 UK companies in the retail trade sector 
to the survey questions on the present and future business situation, and on stocks 
UK construction confidence indicator (BUILUK): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 800 UK companies in the construction 
sector to the survey questions on order book and employment expectations 
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UK sector-specific managerial confidence indicator (SCIUK): 
The value of the industry-wide managerial confidence in the UK for a company, which is equal to INDUUK 
for companies in the manufacturing sector, SERVUK for companies in the services sector, RETAUK for 
companies in the retail trade sector and BUILUK for companies in the construction sector  
UK economic sentiment indicator (ESIUK): 
The indicator which is made up of 15 individual components of UK sector-specific confidence indicators to 
track cyclical movements in the UK economy as a whole 
EU industrial sector managerial confidence indicator (INDUEU): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 38,250 EU companies in the manufacturing 
sector to the survey questions on production expectations, order books and stocks of finished products 
EU services sector managerial confidence indicator (SERVEU): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 34,730 EU companies in the services sector 
to the survey questions on business climate and on recent and expected evolution of demand 
EU consumer confidence indicator (CONSEU): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 39,900 EU consumers to the survey 
questions on the financial situation of households, the general economic situation, unemployment 
expectations and saving, all over the next months 
EU retail trade sector managerial confidence indicator (RETAEU): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 31,780 EU companies in the retail trade 
sector to the survey questions on the present and future business situation, and on stocks 
EU construction sector managerial confidence indicator (RETAEU): 
The arithmetic average of the balances of the answers given by 20,750 EU companies in the construction 
sector to the survey questions on order book and employment expectations 
EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicator (SCIEU): 
The value of the industry-wide managerial confidence in the EU for a company, which is equal to INDUEU 
for companies in the manufacturing sector, SERVEU for companies in the services sector, RETAEU for 
companies in the retail trade sector and BUILEU for companies in the construction sector  
EU economic sentiment indicator (ESIEU): 
The indicator which is made up of 15 individual components of EU sector-specific confidence indicators to 
track cyclical movements in the EU economy as a whole 
Notes: 
a. The definition and measurement of the company characteristic variables are based on the existing literature.  
b. The data are collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. 
c. The sector-specific confidence indicators and economic sentiment indicators are publicly available from the 
European Commission website. 
 
The descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this chapter, both before and 
after winsorisation transformation, are presented in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for main variables used in Chapter 4a 
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables without winsorisation
b 
INV/K 0.8180  0.2388  960.43  –0.96  16.6124  56.8067  3279  3398 
NDF/K 0.3435  0.0000  243.45  –67.54  5.7114  27.8121  1083  3401 
DIV/K 0.3250  0.1020  48.00  0.00  1.4514  19.7664  521  3399 
CF/K 1.4156  0.4651  155.20  0.00  5.4895  15.4013  320  3398 
Q 2.1415  1.3779  143.71  0.02  5.2062  17.0323  383  3410 
TAN 0.2951  0.2470  0.95  0.00  0.2305  0.8798  3  3407 
SZ 5.5161  5.3538  12.05  –0.03  2.0197  0.2745  3  3411 
OWN 0.2447  0.2023  0.99  0.00  0.2093  0.8046  3  3393 
RE/TE 0.3081  0.5478  71.29  –437.33  8.2261  –44.0193  2358  3407 
UNC1 0.3122  0.2972  0.72  0.02  0.1046  0.7052  3  3423 
SCIUK –0.0217  –0.0325  0.19 –0.29  0.1124 0.2493  2  3423 
SCIEU –0.0001  –0.0183  0.28 –0.16 0.0982 0.9457  3  3423 
ESIUK 1.0315  1.0288  1.11 0.91 0.0586 –0.6033  3  3423 
ESIEU 1.0295  1.0258  1.15 0.93 0.0642 0.1287  2  3423 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of variables winsorised at the top and bottom 5
th
 percentiles
c 
INV/K 0.4130  0.2388  2.3547  –0.0723  0.5313  2.3133  8.2628  3398  
NDF/K 0.1347  0.0000  1.9474  –0.6391  0.5292  2.0772  7.6866  3401  
DIV/K 0.2036  0.1020  1.0888  0.0000  0.2717  2.1325  6.9118  3399  
CF/K 0.9722  0.4651  6.1150  0.0733  1.3625  2.5842  9.2465  3398  
Q 1.6939  1.3779  4.5970  0.7125  0.9760  1.5863  4.9233  3410  
TAN 0.2920  0.2470  0.7871  0.0172  0.2222  0.7621  2.6143  3407  
SZ 5.4855  5.3538  8.9878  1.9947  1.8750  0.1343  2.2278  3411  
OWN 0.2410  0.2023  0.6713  0.0011  0.1999  0.6096  2.3451  3393  
RE/TE 0.4208  0.5478  0.9724  –1.2778  0.4996  –1.7403  6.1775  3407  
UNC1 0.3123  0.2972  0.5591  0.1714  0.0992  0.6307  2.7302  3423  
SCIUK –0.0217  –0.0325  0.1933  –0.2875  0.1124 0.2493  1.9163  3423 
SCIEU –0.0001  –0.0183  0.2842  –0.1608  0.0982 0.9457  3.3526  3423 
ESIUK 1.0315  1.0288  1.1070  0.9111  0.0586 –0.6033  2.5758  3423  
ESIEU 1.0295  1.0258  1.1452  0.9332  0.0642 0.1287  1.9270  3423  
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. 
b. Winsorisation is the transformation of extreme values in the statistical data.  
c. The transformed data are identical to the original data except that, in this case, all data below the 5th percentile 
are set to the 5th percentile and all data above the 95th percentile are set to the 95th percentile. Variables at 
aggregate levels, i.e. SCIUK, SCIEU, ESIUK and ESIEU, are not winsorised. 
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Panel A in Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables from our 
raw data. As is evident, extreme values appear in almost all the variables, especially those that 
are in the form of ratios. In order to cope with the potential impact of outliers upon our 
empirical tests, we winsorise all the company-level variables used in our analysis at both the 
top and bottom 5th percentiles of their respective distributions. Panel B in Table 4.4 reports the 
descriptive statistics after such a transformation has been undertaken. Since the proxies for 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment are at aggregated levels, we do not winsorise 
them. Given the desired properties of the winsorisation estimators, our empirical results 
presented this chapter are based on the variables winsorised at both the top and bottom 5th 
percentiles.  
A pair-wise correlation among the main variables is presented in Table 4.5. It shows 
that the three endogenous variables, namely, INV/K, NDF/K and DIV/K, are significantly and 
positively correlated with one another, and that the predetermined cash flow variable CF/K is 
significantly correlated with all three endogenous variables. It is also evident that the 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment variables, namely, SCIUK, SCIEU, ESIUK and 
ESIEU, are significantly correlated with all three corporate decisions variables at the 1% 
significance level. The correlations between the confidence variables and corporate decisions 
variables are uniformly positive, indicating capital investment and debt financing as well as 
dividend payouts of UK-listed companies are likely to increase with the level of managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment.  
 – 233 – 
Table 4.5: Correlation coefficient matrix of variables used in Chapter 4a 
Variable INV/K NDF/K DIV/K CF/K Q TAN SZ OWN RE/TE UNC1 SCIUK SCIEU ESIUK ESIUK 
NDF/K 0.38b 
***c 
1.00 
 
            
DIV/K 0.34 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
1.00 
 
           
CF/K 0.57 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
0.67 
*** 
1.00 
 
          
Q 0.13 
*** 
0.03 
 
0.20 
*** 
0.19 
*** 
1.00 
 
         
TAN –0.33 
*** 
–0.15 
*** 
–0.50 
*** 
–0.53 
*** 
–0.16 
*** 
1.00 
 
        
SZ –0.08 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
–0.02 
 
–0.12 
*** 
0.02 
 
0.14 
*** 
1.00 
 
       
OWN 0.02 
 
–0.07 
*** 
0.00 
 
0.02 
 
–0.05 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
–0.48 
*** 
1.00 
 
      
RE/TE –0.10 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
0.06 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
–0.03 
* 
0.09 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
1.00 
 
     
UNC1 0.25 
*** 
0.00 
 
0.05 
** 
0.25 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
–0.26 
*** 
–0.27 
*** 
0.14 
*** 
–0.28 
*** 
1.00 
 
     
SCIUK 0.16 
***  
0.09 
***  
0.09 
***  
0.11 
***  
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
*  
–0.04 
* 
 0.06 
*** 
1.00     
SCIEU 0.20 
***   
0.11 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
–0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
* 
–0.09 
*** 
0.04 
** 
0.79 
*** 
1.00   
ESIUK 0.09 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
0.07 
*** 
–0.04 
** 
–0.06 
*** 
0.04 
* 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
–0.02 
 
0.53 
*** 
0.48 
*** 
1.00 
 
 
ESIEU 0.07 
***  
0.09 
***  
0.05 
***  
0.04 
**  
–0.04 
**  
–0.03 
*  
0.08 
***  
–0.03 
 
0.03 
*  
–0.12 
*** 
0.41 
***  
0.58 
*** 
0.79 
***  
1.00 
 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. 
b. For each cell, the reported figure is the pair-wise correlation coefficient between the corresponding variables. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
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The correlations between the endogenous variables and other relevant exogenous 
variables are also informative. According to Table 4.5, INV/K is significantly and positively 
correlated with Q and UNC1; NDF/K is positively correlated with SZ but negatively 
correlated with TAN; DIV/K is positively correlated with RE/TE and UNC1, but its correlation 
with OWN is rather weak. Besides, the proxy for company-level uncertainty UNC1 is 
positively correlated with the sector-specific managerial confidence indicators SCIUK and 
SCIEU, negatively correlated with the overall economic sentiment indicators ESIUK and ESIEU.  
In addition, there is no evidence of near multicollinearity presented in the correlation 
coefficient matrix. Although the proxies for the state of managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment are highly correlated with one another (both the correlation coefficient between 
SCIUK and SCIEU and that between ESIUK and ESIEU are as high as 0.79), they do not cause the 
problem of multicollinearity since they do not enter the corporate behavioural equations at the 
same time. Instead, we include the alternative proxies for managerial confidence and 
economic sentiment into their respective system variants separately.  
4.5 Empirical results and implications for corporate behaviour 
To obtain our main empirical results, we apply the 3SLS estimation to all the simultaneous 
equations system variants that include one structural equation for each of the three policy 
choices specified in Section 4.3. The essential advantage of the 3SLS estimation technique is 
that it allows for not only simultaneity among the set of corporate decisions, but also for 
correlations among the error components. Therefore, 3SLS estimation is asymptotically more 
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efficient than the limited information methods, such as 2SLS estimation. 
We test the significance of the confidence variables within an individual equation as 
well as across all equations in the system using the Wald test.44 The null hypothesis is that the 
confidence variable or the set of confidence variables does not help in explaining the 
variations in the corresponding corporate decision variable, and thus can be dropped from the 
equation. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it means that the managerial confidence or 
economic sentiment in fact plays a role in the determination of the corresponding corporate 
decision.45 
The same test is also carried out to test the joint significance of a confidence variable 
in all corporate behavioural equations modelled in the system. The null hypothesis for the 
cross-equation test is that the coefficients on the confidence variable in all equations in which 
it appears are jointly equal to zero. In other words, under the null hypothesis, the confidence 
variable being tested does not contain useful information which can help in explaining any 
aspect of corporate behaviour, and hence should be excluded from the simultaneous equations 
system. If the composite hypothesis is rejected, the presence of the confidence variable in the 
system is justified, suggesting that modelling corporate behaviour without considering the 
state of managerial confidence or economic sentiment is economically incomplete and 
statistically inadequate. 
                                                 
44 These test statistics are asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared. 
45 The Wald test result is identical to the corresponding z-statistic reported in the regression results, if there is only one 
coefficient under test. 
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4.5.1 Simultaneous analyses with proxy for the state of confidence 
Table 4.6 reports the empirical results by applying the 3SLS estimation to Equations 4.7–4.9, 
where the managerial confidence indicators SCIUK and SCIEU are used as the proxy for the 
state of confidence in their respective system variants. The regression results for the 
investment, financing and payout equations, in which the UK managerial confidence indicator 
is used, are presented in columns 2, 4 and 6, respectively.  
Looking first at the investment equation, it is evident that the coefficients on the two 
endogenous explanatory variables, i.e. NDF/K and DIV/K, are both significant at the 5% 
significance level. The significantly positive relationship between investment and dividend 
variables evidenced in the simple pair-wise correlation analysis is reversed to be significantly 
negative when the full structural investment equation is estimated within the simultaneous 
equations system, suggesting that they represent competing uses of limited funds. The 
coefficient on the cash flow variable CF/K is positive and highly significant as expected. The 
significantly positive effect of internally generated cash flow further confirms that UK-listed 
companies are financially constrained, and thus their investments display high sensitivity to 
the availability of internal funds. More importantly, the proxy for the UK managerial 
confidence SICUK in the investment equation turns out to be positive and highly significant at 
the 1% significance level, after controlling for the set of company fundamental variables 
which, according to the existing literature, are the primary determinants of corporate 
investment. It appears that UK-listed companies tend to invest more intensively in their 
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capital stock when their managers are more confident, or possibly overconfident, about the 
future company performance. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions made by 
Heaton (2002) and empirical findings offered by Ben-David et al. (2007) that overconfident 
managers systematically overestimate the returns to their investment projects, and 
simultaneously underestimate the risks associated with those projects, resulting in unintended 
overinvestment and risk-taking behaviour. Besides, the proxy for investment opportunity Q is 
positively related to the investment variable, but not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. The dynamic structure of corporate investment is statistically evident.  
Turing to the financing regression reported in column 4 of Table 4.6, the coefficients 
on the endogenous variables INV/K and DIV/K are both positive and marginally significant, 
while the coefficient on the cash flow variable CF/K is negative and highly significant, as 
predicted by the flow-of-funds framework. These findings are in line with the hierarchy of 
raising funds as implied by the pecking-order theory. The coefficient on the UK managerial 
confidence indicator SICUK turns out to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
It shows that managerial confidence or overconfidence is an important factor in explaining 
corporate debt financing behaviour, even after controlling for the major conventional capital 
structure determinants. Managerial confidence is clearly associated with aggressive borrowing 
policies of the UK-listed companies, implying that managers tend to overestimate their 
companies’ growth rate of earnings and underestimate the associated risks when they are more 
confident, and thus use debt financing more aggressively. Our finding is consistent with the 
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prior studies on managerial overconfidence and corporate financial policies, for example 
Hackbarth (2008), Ben-David et al. (2007) and Malmendier et al. (2011). We do not find 
evidence that overconfident managers view external funds as unduly costly and are reluctant 
to raise funds externally. The results for the control variables are similar to those reported in 
Chapter 3 that the effect of company size SZ is highly significant as expected, whist the effect 
of asset tangibility TAN is also significant but with an unexpected sign.  
Column 6 of Table 4.6 reports the estimation results for the dividend payout regression. 
The coefficients estimated for the endogenous variables INV/K and NDF/K as well as the 
predetermined cash flow variable CF/K have their expected signs and are highly significant at 
the 1% level, which further confirms the simultaneity among the key set of corporate 
decisions. The payout decisions of the UK-listed companies are neither totally residual nor 
entirely independent but are taken with reference to their investment and financing decisions. 
However, the effect of managerial confidence on corporate payout decisions is relatively weak. 
Although the coefficient on the managerial confidence variable SCIUK is not significant at the 
usual significance levels, its negative sign implies that confident managers may have a 
stronger preference for internal funds and are more likely to retain internally generated cash 
flows in an attempt to finance their investment opportunities at a lower cost. Besides, the 
ownership structure and the financial life cycle stage variables (OWN and RE/TE) are both 
positively related to corporate payout decisions, and the highly significant coefficient on 
RE/TE is consistent with the predictions of the life cycle theory of dividend payout.  
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Table 4.6: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
sector-specific managerial confidencea 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1373* 
(1.88) 
0.1233* 
(1.65) 
–0.1114*** 
(–2.80) 
–0.1060*** 
(–2.65) 
NDF/K 0.2601**e 
(2.50)f 
0.2170** 
(2.04) 
  0.4313*** 
(5.77) 
0.4263*** 
(5.66) 
DIV/K –0.4605** 
(–2.56) 
–0.3969** 
(–2.16) 
0.3600 
(1.26) 
0.3671 
(1.28) 
  
CF/K 0.2143*** 
(9.68) 
0.2076*** 
(9.20) 
–0.0251 
(–0.57) 
–0.0242 
(–0.55) 
0.1304*** 
(12.98) 
0.1302*** 
(12.90) 
Q 0.0068 
(0.70) 
0.0052 
(0.53) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.2993*** 
(17.99) 
0.2991*** 
(18.05) 
    
TAN   –0.3268*** 
(–3.54) 
–0.3213*** 
(–3.49) 
  
SZ   0.0284*** 
(4.86) 
0.0288*** 
(4.89) 
  
OWN     0.0364 
(1.39) 
0.0395 
(1.49) 
RE/TE     0.0394*** 
(3.59) 
0.0383*** 
(3.51) 
UKSCI 1  0.3476***  
(4.33) 
 0.3610*** 
(3.22) 
 –0. 0987 
(–1.53) 
 
EUSCI 1   0.3876***  
(4.33) 
 0.4056*** 
(3.44) 
 –0.1369** 
(–1.96) 
Constant 0.1575*** 
(4.97) 
0.1588*** 
(4.99) 
–0.0181 
(–0.27) 
–0.0191 
(–0.29) 
0.0170 
(0.62) 
0.0156 
(0.57) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of SCI in 
the equationi 
 
18.73*** 
(p = 0.000) 
18.76*** 
(p = 0.000) 
10.38*** 
(p = 0.001) 
11.83*** 
(p = 0.001) 
2.34 
(p = 0.12) 
3.83** 
(p = 0.050) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of SCI in 
the systemj 
 
28.29*** 
(p = 0.000) 
29.05*** 
(p = 0.000) 
28.29*** 
(p = 0.000) 
29.05*** 
(p = 0.000) 
28.29*** 
(p = 0.000) 
29.05*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2535.86*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2526.82*** 
(p = 0.000) 
256.85*** 
(p = 0.000) 
255.79*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1278.87*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1284.84*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators (SCIUK and SCIEU) are used as a proxy for the 
state of confidence in their respective system variants. The sample contains UK company-year observations 
within the period 1999–2008. Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation:    161543210 ///// SCIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation:   16543210 //// SCISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation:   16543210 ///// SCITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either SCIUK or 
SCIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
SCIUK or SCIEU in this case) across all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test report 
results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
Reported in columns 3, 5 and 7 of Table 4.6 are the estimation results for investment, 
financing and payout regressions of the system variant in which the managerial confidence 
indicator at EU level (SICEU) is used as the proxy for the state of confidence. As is evident, 
replacing the UK managerial confidence indicators with their EU counterparts does not cause 
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significant changes in our results. However, the coefficient on the managerial confidence 
variable SICEU in the payout equation (see column 7) turns out to be negative and statistically 
significant. It seems that the dividend payout policies of the UK-listed companies are more 
likely to be influenced by the collective managerial confidence and sentiment at higher levels 
of aggregation. In accordance with the prediction of managerial psychological bias, 
overconfident managers misperceive the profitability of their investment opportunities as well 
as the value of their companies. Consequently, they tend to overinvest in projects whose net 
present values are possibly overestimated, resulting in higher financing needs. Meanwhile, 
they also try to avoid external financing which is possibly misperceived as unduly costly. 
Under such circumstances, overconfident managers view internal funds as more valuable and 
have a stronger preference for internal financing. Therefore, managers are likely to retain 
more internally generated cash flow when they are more confident, in order to prevent losses 
from underinvestment, and to keep their overall cost of capital as low as possible. Besides, the 
Wald test results reported at the bottom of Table 4.6 strongly suggest that our proxies for 
managerial confidence do indeed play an important role in the determination of the corporate 
decisions. Therefore, modelling corporate behaviour using company fundamental 
characteristics without considering the state of managerial confidence is incomplete.  
An alternative measure of the state of confidence used in this chapter is the economic 
sentiment indicator (ESI). The UK economic sentiment indicator (ESIUK) and the EU 
economic sentiment indicator (ESIEU) are employed in their respective system variants, and 
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the 3SLS estimation results are reported in Table 4.7. The regression results obtained by using 
the economic sentiment indicator as the proxy for the state of confidence are similar to those 
reported in Table 4.6 in the terms of the significance levels and the sizes of the coefficients for 
the confidence variable as well as the control variables. First, the coefficients on the 
endogenous explanatory variables are not only statistically significant but also economically 
meaningful, which lends strong empirical support to the prediction of the flow-of-funds 
framework that corporate investment, financing and payout decisions are simultaneously 
determined by the UK-listed companies. The UK economic sentiment indicator (ESIUK) enters 
both the investment equation and the financing equation with a positive sign, and is 
statistically significant in both equations, indicating that UK-listed companies invest in capital 
stock more intensively and use debt more aggressively when the economic sentiment in the 
UK is high. The UK economic sentiment indicator enters the payout equation with a negative 
sign but its influence on dividend payout decisions of UK companies is rather weak. 
Compared with the UK economic sentiment indicator, its EU counterpart (ESIEU) seems to be 
better able to explain the debt financing and dividend payout decisions of UK companies, 
while it provides less explanatory power for corporate investment decisions. The Wald test 
results exhibit high joint significance of the economic sentiment variables in their respective 
system variants. In summary, our results for both managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment are statistically significant, particularly in explaining the corporate investment and 
debt financing decisions of UK-listed companies.  
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Table 4.7: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with economic 
sentimenta 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1725** 
(2.51) 
0.1701** 
(2.47) 
–0.1220*** 
(–3.15) 
–0.1230*** 
(–3.13) 
NDF/K 0.2838*** e 
(2.74) f 
0.2948*** 
(2.82) 
  0.4224*** 
(5.48) 
0.4342*** 
(5.48) 
DIV/K –0.6179*** 
(–3.52) 
–0.6194*** 
(–3.53) 
0.4446* 
(1.64) 
0.4369* 
(1.60) 
  
CF/K 0.2341*** 
(10.62) 
0.2342*** 
(10.63) 
–0.0417 
(–1.00) 
–0.0399 
(–0.95) 
0.1333*** 
(13.52) 
0.1326*** 
(13.12) 
Q 0.0109 
(1.14) 
0.0104 
(1.09) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.3002*** 
(17.79) 
0.2995*** 
(17.78) 
    
TAN   –0.2885*** 
(–3.38) 
–0.2882*** 
(–3.37) 
  
SZ   0.0277*** 
(4.79) 
0.0268*** 
(4.65) 
  
OWN     0.0295 
(1.16) 
0.0291 
(1.14) 
RE/TE     0.0374*** 
(3.48) 
0.0376*** 
(3.44) 
UKESI 1  0.4179**  
(2.29) 
 0.6388*** 
(2.70) 
 –0.1240 
(–0.85) 
 
EUESI 1   0.1835 
(1.29) 
 0.5848*** 
(3.32) 
 –0.1743 
(–1.51) 
Constant –0.2766 
(–1.44) 
–0.0310 
(–0.21) 
–0.7035*** 
(–2.90) 
–0.6375*** 
(–3.51) 
0.1510 
(1.00) 
0.2016 
(1.70) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of ESI in 
the equationi 
 
5.24** 
(p = 0.022) 
1.67 
(p = 0.197) 
7.32*** 
(p = 0.007) 
11.00*** 
(p = 0.001) 
0.73 
(p = 0.394) 
2.29 
(p = 0.130) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of ESI in 
the systemj 
 
12.22*** 
(p = 0.007) 
12.48*** 
(p = 0.006) 
12.22*** 
(p = 0.007) 
12.48*** 
(p = 0.006) 
12.22*** 
(p = 0.007) 
12.48*** 
(p = 0.006) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2458.31*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2454.17*** 
(p = 0.000) 
261.98*** 
(p = 0.000) 
263.91*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1291.99*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1253.22*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU economic sentiment indicators (ESIUK and ESIEU) are used as a proxy for the state of 
confidence in their respective system variants. The sample contains company-year observations within the 
period 1999–2008. Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation:    161543210 ///// ESIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation:   16543210 //// ESISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation:   16543210 ///// ESITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either ESIUK or 
ESIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
ESIUK or ESIEU in this case) across equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test report 
results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
4.5.2 Simultaneous analyses with confidence and uncertainty variables 
To address the research question that whether the state of confidence can be captured by the 
company’s overall uncertainty, we add a proxy for company-level uncertainty into our 
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simultaneous equations system as another common exogenous determinant of corporate 
decisions modelled in the system. Equations 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 are estimated simultaneously 
using the 3SLS estimators. The results are presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 where different 
proxies for the state of confidence are used in their respective system variants. As is evident, 
our findings with regard to the influences of managerial confidence and economic sentiment 
on aspects of corporate behaviour persist even after controlling for company-level uncertainty 
(UNC1). This clearly shows that managerial confidence and economic sentiment at aggregate 
levels and the uncertainty at company level influence the corporate decisions of UK-listed 
companies independently through different channels. More specifically, both the state of 
aggregate confidence and the level of company idiosyncratic uncertainty have positive and 
significant effects on corporate investment decisions. Debt financing decisions are heavily 
influenced by the state of aggregate confidence but not by the level of company idiosyncratic 
uncertainty, while dividend payout decisions are mainly affected by company idiosyncratic 
uncertainty rather than the state of confidence at aggregate levels. The Wald test results report 
in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggest that the state of confidence remain statistically significant even 
in the presence of a proxy for overall uncertainty at company level. 
According to our empirical results, corporate investment increases with both the state 
of confidence at aggregate levels and the degree of uncertainty at company level. However, 
managers of the UK-listed companies consider different financial choices in response to the 
increased financing needs caused by different factors. If the increased investment spending is 
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due to high levels of managerial confidence or economic sentiment, companies tend to use 
external debt financing more aggressively, but they are unlikely to cut dividends in response 
to the increased financing needs. If the increased investment spending is caused by high levels 
of company idiosyncratic uncertainty, companies tend to resort to internal funds by cutting 
dividends rather than resorting to external funds by issuing new debts.  
The different financial choices in response to the increased investment spending under 
different situations might be interpreted as follows. When managerial confidence or economic 
sentiment is high, managers are prone to attach higher probabilities to good outcomes, and 
believe that their company is more profitable and less risky than it actually is. Therefore, they 
are more confident of repaying debts in the future and maintaining dividend payout at desired 
levels. Under this circumstance, managers are likely to resort to external debt financing to 
finance the increased investment spending.  
However, if the increased investment is due to high levels of uncertainty associated 
with the company’s future prospects, managers are more cautious about possible future 
financial distress if the outcomes turn out to be unfavourable. Accordingly, managers prefer to 
retain the internally generated funds that otherwise would have been paid out to shareholders 
as dividends to finance the increased investment spending under uncertainty. Debt financing is 
used by managers with caution under uncertain circumstances, because higher levels of debt 
are likely to exacerbate the degree of uncertainty and further increase the premium charged on 
external funds.  
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Table 4.8: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
company-level uncertainty and sector-specific managerial confidencea 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1702** 
(2.45) 
0.1527** 
(2.14) 
–0.1152*** 
(–2.75) 
–0.1072** 
(–2.55) 
NDF/K 0.2280**e 
(2.22)f 
0.1826* 
(1.74) 
  0.4532*** 
(5.78) 
0.4435 *** 
(5.64) 
DIV/K –0.2510 
(–1.41) 
–0.1893 
(–1.04) 
0.6351** 
(2.35) 
0.6049** 
(2.20) 
  
CF/K 0.1840*** 
(8.16) 
0.1774*** 
(7.70) 
–0.0665* 
(–1.64) 
–0.0606** 
(–1.46) 
0.1324*** 
(12.82) 
0.1323*** 
(12.83) 
Q 0.0035 
(0.36) 
0.0016 
(0.16) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.2985*** 
(18.32) 
0.2977*** 
(18.32) 
    
TAN   –0.2784*** 
(–2.98) 
–0.2844*** 
(–3.03) 
  
SZ   0.0224*** 
(4.21) 
0.0233*** 
(4.32) 
  
OWN     0.0510** 
(1.97) 
0.0543** 
(2.06) 
RE/TE     0.0182* 
(1.65) 
0.0176 
(1.61) 
UNC1–1 0.2920***  
(2.95) 
0.3163***  
(3.15) 
–0.0510 
(–0.32) 
–0.0441 
(–0.27) 
–0.2263*** 
(–3.10) 
–0.2372*** 
(–3.28) 
UKSCI 1  0.3560***  
(4.47) 
 0.3367*** 
(3.09) 
 –0.1057 
(–1.60) 
 
EUSCI 1   0.4135*** 
(4.64) 
 0.3910*** 
(3.40) 
 –0.1559** 
(–2.19) 
Constant 0.0633* 
(1.47) 
0.0575 
(1.33) 
–0.0100 
(–0.10) 
–0.0088 
(–0.09) 
0.0971*** 
(2.71) 
0.0985*** 
(2.77) 
       
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of SCI in 
the equationi 
 
19.95*** 
(p = 0.000) 
21.52*** 
(p = 0.000) 
9.54*** 
(p = 0.002) 
11.54*** 
(p = 0.001) 
2.55 
(p = 0.110) 
4.79** 
(p = 0.029) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of SCI in 
the systemj 
 
28.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
31.46*** 
(p = 0.000) 
28.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
31.46*** 
(p = 0.000) 
28.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
31.46*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2584.23*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2567.12*** 
(p = 0.000) 
283.25*** 
(p = 0.000) 
278.83*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1248.61*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1266.88*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators (SCIUK and SCIEU) are used as a proxy for the 
state of confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of 
UK-listed companies after controlling for the company-level uncertainty. The sample contains UK 
company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. Equations 4.10 through 4.12 are estimated by 3SLS 
estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   17161543210 1///// SCIUNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
   1716543210 1//// SCIUNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
   1716543210 1///// SCIUNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either SCIUK or 
SCIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
SCIUK or SCIEU in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test reports 
results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Table 4.9: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
company-level uncertainty and economic sentimenta 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.2010*** 
(3.05) 
0.1946*** 
(2.94) 
–0.1262*** 
(–3.09) 
–0.1245*** 
(–3.02) 
NDF/K 0.2674***e 
(2.62)f 
0.2661*** 
(2.58) 
  0.4430*** 
(5.48) 
0.4500 *** 
(5.48) 
DIV/K –0.4438*** 
(–2.57) 
–0.4328** 
(–2.51) 
0.7219*** 
(2.83) 
0.7142*** 
(2.78) 
  
CF/K 0.2082*** 
(9.30) 
0.2072*** 
(9.26) 
–0.0832** 
(–2.16) 
–0.0810** 
(–2.09) 
0.1356*** 
(13.41) 
0.1350*** 
(13.12) 
Q 0.0086 
(0.89) 
0.0081 
(0.84) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.2991*** 
(18.17) 
0.2988*** 
(18.21) 
    
TAN   –0.0832*** 
(–2.16) 
–0.2412*** 
(–2.78) 
  
SZ   0.0222*** 
(4.19) 
0.0218*** 
(4.12) 
  
OWN     0.0431* 
(1.72) 
0.0433* 
(1.72) 
RE/TE     0.0172 
(1.60) 
0.0173 
(1.59) 
UNC1–1 0.2346**  
(2.36) 
0.2516**  
(2.51) 
–0.0057 
(–0.04) 
0.0307 
(0.20) 
–0.2276*** 
(–3.14) 
–0.2441*** 
(–3.35) 
UKESI 1  0.4192**  
(2.33) 
 0.5837** 
(2.55) 
 –0.1602 
(–1.08) 
 
EUESI 1   0.2369* 
(1.67) 
 0.5611*** 
(3.26) 
 –0.2338** 
(–2.01) 
Constant –0.3543* 
(–1.44) 
–0.1680 
(–1.08) 
–0.6537*** 
(–2.66) 
–0.6336*** 
(–3.15) 
0.2690* 
(1.76) 
0.3478*** 
(2.86) 
       
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of ESI in 
the equationi 
 
5.42** 
(p = 0.020) 
2.79* 
(p = 0.095) 
6.50** 
(p = 0.011) 
10.61*** 
(p = 0.001) 
1.16 
(p = 0.281) 
4.02** 
(p = 0.045) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of ESI in 
the systemj 
 
11.83*** 
(p = 0.008) 
13.38*** 
(p = 0.004) 
11.83*** 
(p = 0.008) 
13.38*** 
(p = 0.004) 
11.83*** 
(p = 0.008) 
13.38*** 
(p = 0.004) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2529.11*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2526.38*** 
(p = 0.000) 
289.60*** 
(p = 0.000) 
290.54*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1266.26*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1241.63*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU economic sentiment indicators (ESIUK and ESIEU) are used as a proxy for the state of 
confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of UK-listed 
companies after controlling for the company-level uncertainty. The sample contains company-year 
observations within the period 1999–2008. Equations 4.10 through 4.12 are estimated by 3SLS estimators 
using Stata 11. 
b.    17161543210 1///// ESIUNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c.    1716543210 1//// ESIUNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d.    1716543210 1///// ESIUNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either ESIUK or 
ESIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
ESIUK or ESIEU in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test reports 
results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
Overall, our findings strongly support the argument that jointly determined corporate 
real and financial decisions are indeed influenced by both company fundamental uncertainty 
and managerial confidence and sentiment. Managerial confidence and economic sentiment do 
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provide additional information in explaining aspects of corporate behaviour over the 
fundamental factors, as indicated by the statistically significant Wald test results across all of 
the simultaneous equations system variants.  
4.6 Robustness tests and further evidence 
4.6.1 Robustness tests and results 
To gauge the sensitivity of using the arithmetic average of monthly values over each year as 
proxies for managerial confidence and economic sentiment, we also follow Oliver and 
Mefteh’s (2010) methodology by considering the December figures (SCIUKDEC, SCIEUDEC, 
ESIUKDEC and ESIEUDEC) as the relevant measures of managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment and re-estimating our simultaneous equations system. As can be seen from 
Appendices 4.C and 4.D, the results replicated using the December figures are largely 
consistent with those reported in Section 4.5 in terms of the signs and significance levels of 
the estimated coefficients in all of the corporate behavioural equations, except that the state of 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment in December is likely to have a more 
significant negative influence on corporate payout decisions than the arithmetic average 
values of managerial confidence and economic sentiment indicators over the year.  
In addition, we also calculate series with the percentage changes in the economic 
sentiment indicators as alternative proxies for the state of confidence to re-estimate our 
systems. The 3SLS estimation results are reported in Appendices 4.E. Compared with the 
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economic sentiment indicators in levels (see Table 4.7), the percentage changes in the 
economic sentiment indicators ( EUESI 1 ) have lower explanatory powers in both the debt 
financing and dividend payout equations, suggesting that corporate financial decisions are 
more likely to be influence by the level of economic sentiment rather than the changes in it. 
We do not attempt to calculate series with the percentage changes in the managerial 
confidence indicators. Unlike the economic sentiment indicators which are scaled to have a 
long-run mean of 100%, the value of managerial confidence indicators are close to zero with 
both positive and negative values. The percentage changes in such time series, thus, are likely 
to be extremely noisy and carry little information about changes in managerial confidence. 
Furthermore, given the fact that 3SLS estimators are more likely to be vulnerable to 
specification errors as compared to the limited information methods, we also apply the 2SLS 
estimation to the simultaneous equations system variants as robustness check. The 2SLS 
estimation results are presented in Appendices 4.F and 4.G. The influences of the state of 
managerial confidence and economic sentiment indicated in the 2SLS estimation results seem 
to be more pronounced compared with those suggested by 3SLS estimation results reported in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. However, the simultaneity among the corporate decisions seems to be 
relatively weak when the 2SLS estimations are applied.  
Overall, we conclude that our results for the relations between corporate decisions and 
the state of managerial confidence and economic sentiment are robust to different model 
specifications, variable measurements and estimation methods. 
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4.6.2 Further evidence on the influence of managerial confidence on corporate behaviour 
To further explore the differential influence of managerial confidence on the corporate 
decisions of companies operating in different sectors, we re-specify our simultaneous 
equations system by interacting the sector-specific managerial confidence indicator with a set 
of sector dummies. Specifically, instead of estimating our simultaneous equations system on 
separate subsamples of companies, we interact the sector-specific managerial confidence 
variable in all of our specifications with a set of dummy variables indicating the sector to 
which a company belongs. This approach allows us not only to uncover the differential 
influence of managerial confidence on corporate behaviour of different categories of 
companies, but also to gain degrees of freedom for regression analyses. The interactive terms 
enter our simultaneous equations system as follows, 
 
ititit
itit
it
it
itititit
DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCI
DUMSERVSCIDUMINDUSCI
K
INV
Q
K
CF
K
DIV
K
NDF
K
INV









1918
1716
1
543210
              
              
 (4.13) 
ititit
itit
itit
itititit
DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCI
DUMSERVSCIDUMINDUSCI
SZTAN
K
CF
K
DIV
K
INV
K
NDF








1918
1716
543210
              
              
 (4.14) 
ititit
itit
it
it
itititit
DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCI
DUMSERVSCIDUMINDUSCI
TE
RE
OWN
K
CF
K
NDF
K
INV
K
DIV








1918
1716
543210
              
               
 (4.15) 
 
        Chapter 4: Corporate Decisions, Managerial Confidence and Economic Sentiment  
 
– 254 – 
where DUMINDU, DUMSERV, DUMRETA and DUMBUIL are the sector dummy variables 
represent manufacturing, services, retail trade and construction sectors, respectively. A sector 
dummy variable is set equal to 1 for companies operating in the sector; and 0, otherwise. The 
estimated coefficients for the interactive terms are expected to show the differences in the 
influence of managerial confidence on corporate decisions across the four sectors. In addition, 
we also augment the simultaneities equation system with interactive terms by including the 
proxy for company-level uncertainty (UNC1) as follows, 
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Table 4.10 reports the estimation results for the system variants which are comprised 
of Equations 4.13–4.15. The results for the endogenous variables and the other control 
variables are similar to those reported in Section 4.5. Moreover, the results reported in Table 
4.10 reveal more detailed evidence on how managerial confidence influences corporate 
decisions of companies in different sectors.  
Specifically, the corporate investment decisions in all sectors are positively correlated 
with the shifts in sectoral managerial confidence. The positive effect of managerial confidence 
on corporate investment spending is particularly profound for the construction sector, as 
indicated by the large and highly significant coefficient estimated for the interactive terms for 
the construction sector. However, the influence of managerial confidence on manufacturing 
companies’ investment behaviour is rather weak and not significant at the usual significance 
levels. As for debt financing decisions, services and manufacturing companies are likely to 
borrow more aggressively when the sectoral sentiment is high, while retail trade and 
construction companies’ financing decisions are not evidently influenced by the level of 
managerial confidence and sentiment. Although the effect of managerial confidence on 
dividend payout policies of UK-listed companies is insignificant as a whole, the coefficients 
on the interactive terms reported in Table 4.10 indicate that companies in the services sector 
tend to retain more internally generated cash flow by cutting dividend payouts to finance their 
increased financing needs when their managers are confident about future company 
performance.  
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Table 4.10: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
sector-specific managerial confidence interacted with sector dummiesa 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1388* 
(1.82) 
0.1295* 
(1.68) 
–0.1169*** 
(–2.82) 
–0.1134*** 
(–2.76) 
NDF/K 0.2703***e 
(2.59)f 
0.2507** 
(2.39) 
  0.4372*** 
(5.79) 
0.4287*** 
(5.70) 
DIV/K –0.4459** 
(–2.45) 
–0.4259** 
(–2.31) 
0.3714 
(1.30) 
0.3592 
(1.24) 
  
CF/K 0.2192*** 
(9.82) 
0.2184*** 
(9.71) 
–0.0293 
(–0.65) 
–0.0250 
(–0.55) 
0.1328*** 
(12.61) 
0.1321*** 
(12.52) 
Q 0.0033 
(0.33) 
0.0015 
(0.15) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.2910*** 
(17.55) 
0.2904*** 
(17.69) 
    
TAN   –0.3251*** 
(–3.51) 
–0.3253*** 
(–3.52) 
  
SZ   0.0279*** 
(4.75) 
0.0285*** 
(4.82) 
  
OWN     0.0378 
(1.44) 
0.0396 
(1.50) 
RE/TE     0.0382*** 
(3.49) 
0.0382*** 
(3.49) 
DUMINDUSCI UK 1  0.2043 
(1.53) 
 0.3409* 
(1.77) 
 –0.0699 
(–0.64) 
 
DUMSERVSCI UK 1  0.3249** 
(2.40) 
 0.5049*** 
(2.83) 
 –0.2036* 
(–1.93) 
 
DUMRETASCI UK 1  0.4274**  
(2.06) 
 0.0266 
(0.09) 
 0.0871 
(0.52) 
 
DUMBUILSCI UK 1  3.1665***  
(5.53) 
 –0.2444 
(–0.28) 
 0.4157 
(0.84) 
 
DUMINDUSCI EU 1   0.2836 
(1.58) 
 0.4798* 
(1.90) 
 –0.1013 
(–0.70) 
DUMSERVSCI EU 1   0.2433** 
(2.03) 
 0.4332*** 
(2.73) 
 –0.1906** 
(–2.09) 
DUMRETASCI EU 1  
 
 
 0.1852 
(0.68) 
 0.1292 
(0.34) 
 0.0332 
(0.15) 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
DUMBUILSCI EU 1   2.4265***  
(6.62) 
 0.1913 
(0.34) 
 0.0979 
(0.31) 
Constant 0.1525*** 
(4.74) 
0.1590*** 
(4.96) 
–0.0158 
(–0.24) 
–0.0206 
(–0.31) 
0.0170 
(0.62) 
0.0218 
(0.79) 
       
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Wald test for the 
significance of the set 
of confidence variables 
in the equationi 
 
46.87*** 
(p = 0.000) 
50.78*** 
(p = 0.000) 
13.70*** 
(p = 0.008) 
12.73** 
(p = 0.013) 
5.70 
(p = 0.223) 
5.17 
(p = 0.270) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of the set 
of confidence variables 
in the systemj 
 
61.36*** 
(p = 0.000) 
64.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
61.36*** 
(p = 0.000) 
64.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
61.36*** 
(p = 0.000) 
64.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2596.19*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2610.60*** 
(p = 0.000) 
258.20*** 
(p = 0.000) 
255.90*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1263.16*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1290.44*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The UK and EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators (SCIUK and SCIEU) interacted with sector 
dummy variables (DUMINDU, DUMSERV, DUMRETA and DUMBUIL) are used as a proxy for the state of 
confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of UK-listed 
companies. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. Equations 4.13 
through 4.15 are estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11.  
b. Investment equation is specified as 






DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCIDUMSERVSCI
DUMINDUSCIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV
191817
161543210 /////
.
 
c. Financing equation is specified as 






DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCIDUMSERVSCI
DUMINDUSCISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF
191817
16543210 ////
.
 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 






DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCIDUMSERVSCI
DUMINDUSCITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV
191817
16543210 /////
.
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e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficients on the set of interaction terms are zero in 
the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is 
reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the interaction terms in all 
equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
Taken together, it seems that company in the services sector act more aggressively 
when their managers are confident. Specifically, they tend to invest in capital stock more 
intensively, use debt financing more heavily and cut dividends more decisively when the 
sectoral sentiment is high. There are a number of possible explanations for these results found 
for the services sector. One reason for these results might be the basic characteristic of the 
companies in this sector. Unlike companies in the other sectors, companies in services sector 
offer the production of services using their knowledge and time. They typically do not have a 
large stock of capital goods and finished products, which leads naturally to a relatively low 
level of asset tangibility. Given the lack of pledgeable assets, companies in service sector are 
more likely to be externally financially constrained, and therefore they might be forced not 
only to resort to external funds by issuing new debt but also to resort to internal funds by 
cutting dividends, in an attempt to finance increased investments when the sectoral sentiment 
is high. 
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Table 4.11: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
company-level uncertainty and sector-specific managerial confidence interacted with 
sector dummiesa 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1731** 
(2.40) 
0.1624** 
(2.21) 
–0.1209*** 
(–2.78) 
–0.1155*** 
(–2.68) 
NDF/K 0.2383**e 
(2.30)f 
0.2217** 
(2.14) 
  0.4586*** 
(5.80) 
0.4463*** 
(5.68) 
DIV/K –0.2479 
(–1.38) 
–0.2397 
(–1.32) 
0.6553** 
(2.45) 
0.6247** 
(2.29) 
  
CF/K 0.1903*** 
(8.36) 
0.1910*** 
(8.30) 
–0.0725* 
(–1.75) 
–0.0657 
(–1.55) 
0.1351*** 
(12.51) 
0.1345*** 
(12.47) 
Q 0.0001 
(0.01) 
–0.0015 
(–0.15) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.2904*** 
(17.87) 
0.2891*** 
(17.97) 
    
TAN   –0.2732*** 
(–2.94) 
–0.2801*** 
(–2.99) 
  
SZ   0.0219*** 
(4.13) 
0.0228*** 
(4.24) 
  
OWN     0.0516* 
(1.99) 
0.0533** 
(2.04) 
RE/TE     0.0168 
(1.53) 
0.0173 
(1.57) 
UNC1–1 0.2853***  
(2.87) 
0.2858***  
(2.86) 
–0.0368 
(–0.23) 
–0.0380 
(–0.23) 
–0.2320*** 
(–3.15) 
–0.2361*** 
(–3.26) 
DUMINDUSCI UK 1  0.1787 
(1.34) 
 0.3110* 
(1.64) 
 –0.0512 
(–0.45) 
 
DUMSERVSCI UK 1  0.3755*** 
(2.76) 
 0.4935*** 
(2.83) 
 –0.2404** 
(–2.23) 
 
DUMRETASCI UK 1  0.4196**  
(2.04) 
 –0.0166 
(–0.06) 
 0.0879 
(0.51) 
 
DUMBUILSCI UK 1  3.0683***  
(5.39) 
 –0.4023 
(–0.47) 
 0.4930 
(0.98) 
 
DUMINDUSCI EU 1   0.2814 
(1.58) 
 0.4394* 
(1.79) 
 –0.1056 
(–0.71) 
DUMSERVSCI EU 1  
 
 0.2854** 
(2.38) 
 0.4314*** 
(2.78) 
 –0.2160** 
(–2.33) 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
 
DUMRETASCI EU 1   0.1690 
(0.63) 
 0.1119 
(0.30) 
 –0.0021 
(–0.01) 
DUMBUILSCI EU 1   2.3948***  
(6.59) 
 0.0977 
(0.18) 
 0.1190 
(0.37) 
Constant 0.0588 
(1.34) 
0.0657 
(1.49) 
–0.0147 
(–0.14) 
–0.0173 
(–0.17) 
0.1023*** 
(2.78) 
0.1050*** 
(2.91) 
       
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Wald test for the 
significance of the set 
of confidence 
variables in the 
equationi 
 
47.29*** 
(p = 0.000) 
52.54*** 
(p = 0.000) 
13.58*** 
(p = 0.009) 
12.58** 
(p = 0.014) 
6.97 
(p = 0.138) 
6.34 
(p = 0.175) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of the set 
of confidence variables 
in the systemj 
 
61.82*** 
(p = 0.000) 
65.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
61.82*** 
(p = 0.000) 
65.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
61.82*** 
(p = 0.000) 
65.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2641.63*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2655.15*** 
(p = 0.000) 
258.44*** 
(p = 0.000) 
280.74*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1235.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1271.70*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The UK and EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators (SCIUK and SCIEU) interacted with sector 
dummy variables (DUMINDU, DUMSERV, DUMRETA and DUMBUIL) are used as a proxy for the state of 
confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of UK-listed 
companies after controlling for the company-level uncertainty. The sample contains UK company-year 
observations within the period 1999–2008. Equations 4.16 through 4.18 are estimated by 3SLS estimators 
using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 






DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCIDUMSERVSCI
DUMINDUSCIUNCKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV
1101918
17161543210 1/////
.
 
        Chapter 4: Corporate Decisions, Managerial Confidence and Economic Sentiment  
 
– 261 – 
c. Financing equation is specified as 






DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCIDUMSERVSCI
DUMINDUSCIUNCSZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF
1101918
1716543210 1////
.
 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 






DUMBUILSCIDUMRETASCIDUMSERVSCI
DUMINDUSCIUNCTEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV
1101918
1716543210 1/////
.
 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficients on the set of interaction terms are zero in 
the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is 
reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the interaction terms in all 
equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
 
Table 4.10 also shows that replacing the UK sector-specific managerial confidence 
indicators with their EU counterparts does not cause a significant change in the results. In 
addition, our findings remain qualitatively unchanged even after augmenting the simultaneous 
equations system by controlling for company-level uncertainty. The estimation results for the 
augmented Equations 4.16–4.17 are reported in Table 4.11. The results further confirm that 
sectoral sentiment and company-specific uncertainty indeed influence corporate behaviour 
through different channels, and both of them play important roles in the corporate 
decision-making processes. Besides, the Wald test results reported in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 
indicate that the interactive terms of the sector-specific managerial confidence indicator and 
sector dummies are jointly significant in all the specifications. 
 
        Chapter 4: Corporate Decisions, Managerial Confidence and Economic Sentiment  
 
– 262 – 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we offer the first systematic attempt to investigate the impacts of managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment at aggregate levels on jointly determined corporate 
investment, financing and payout decisions, using a large panel of UK-listed companies 
observed within the period from 1999 to 2008. The relations between corporate decisions and 
the state of sentiment and confidence are examined within a simultaneous equations system 
which allows for contemporaneous interdependence among the corporate decisions. Our 
empirical results confirm the joint determination of these corporate decisions, as implied by 
the flow-of-funds framework. More importantly, we find that the state of confidence at 
aggregate levels, as proxied by the UK or EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators 
or economic sentiment indicators, has significantly positive effects on companies’ real 
investment and debt financing decisions. The positive effects remain statistically significant 
even after controlling for company-specific uncertainty and other fundamental variables.  
This chapter, therefore, provides empirical evidence shows that managerial 
psychological bias does indeed play an important role in the determination of corporate 
decisions, contributing to the small but growing literature on behavioural corporate finance. In 
addition, our results also provide empirical evidence that managers’ psychological bias and 
companies’ fundamental uncertainty influence corporate decisions independently through 
different channels. Both managerial confidence and fundamental uncertainty have a positive 
real effect on corporate investment decisions. However, managers consider different financial 
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choices in response to the increased financing needs caused by different factors. To finance 
the increased investment spending caused by high managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment, companies tend to use external debt financing rather than cutting dividends paid to 
their shareholders. To finance the increased investment spending under high levels of 
uncertainty, companies prefer to resort to internal finance by cutting dividends rather than 
resorting to external finance by issuing new debts.  
Besides, we find that companies in the services sector tend to behave more 
aggressively when their managers are confident, which might be attributable to the lack of 
pledgeable assets. Specifically, they invest in capital stock more intensively, use debt 
financing more heavily, and cut dividends more decisively when the sectoral sentiment is 
high. 
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Appendix 4.A: Sample sizes of the Joint Harmonised EU Business and Consumer 
Surveysa 
Country Industry Services. Consumer Retail Trade Construction Total 
Belgium 1,550  1,700  1,600  1,150  880  6,880  
Bulgaria 1,290  970  1,000  1,100  610  4,970  
Czech Republic 1,000  900  1,000  600  600  4,100  
Denmark 500  500  1,500  300  750  3,550  
Germany 3,600  2,650  2,000  810  1,400  10,460  
Estonia 250  400  800  170  110  1,730  
Ireland 1,100  650  1,300  640  500  4,190  
Greece 1,700  900  1,500  480  440  5,020  
Spain 2,300  700  2,000  540  380  5,920  
France 4,000  4,500  3,300  3,750  3,000  18,550  
Italy 4,100  2,000  2,000  1,000  500  9,600  
Cyprus 480  610  1,000  440  230  2,760  
Latvia 720  900  1,000  600  300  3,520  
Lithuania 840  730  1,200  850  590  4,210  
Luxembourg 110  N/Ab 500  N/A 40  650  
Hungary 1,500  1,500  1,500  1,500  1,500  7,500  
Malta 640  N/A 1,000  N/A N/A 1,640  
Netherlands 1,700  1,600  1,500  400  600  5,800  
Austria 810  1,150  1,500  5,800  220  9,480  
Poland 3,500  5,500  1,000  5,000  5,000  20,000  
Portugal 1,200  960  2,100  560  320  5,140  
Romania 1,530  1,970  1,000  2,300  1,110  7,910  
Slovenia 710  680  1,500  1,120  400  4,410  
Slovakia 600  580  1,400  600  550  3,730  
Finland 850  500  2,200  470  120  4,140  
Sweden 980  1,180  1,500  1,100  160  4,920  
United Kingdom 1,500 1,000 2,000 500 800 5,800 
EU 38,250 34,730 39,900 31,780 20,750 166,580 
Notes: 
a. Five surveys are currently conducted on a monthly basis in the following areas: industry (manufacturing), 
services, consumer, retail trade and construction. The sample size for each survey across countries according to 
the heterogeneity of their economies, and is generally positively related to their respective population size 
(European Commission, 2007). 
b. N/A stands for not available or not applicable.  
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Appendix 4.B: EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys 
Panel A: The Joint Harmonised EU Industry Survey Questionnaire 
Q1  How has your production developed over the past 3 months?  
It has… 
 +  increased 
 = remained unchanged 
– decreased 
 
Q2 Do you consider your current overall order books to be…?*a 
 +  more than sufficient (above normal) 
 = sufficient (normal for the season) 
– not sufficient (below normal) 
 
Q3 Do you consider your current export order books to be…? 
 +  more than sufficient (above normal) 
 = sufficient (normal for the season) 
– not sufficient (below normal) 
 
Q4 Do you consider your current stock of finished products to be…?*b 
 +  too large (above normal) 
 = adequate (normal for the season) 
– too small (below normal) 
 
Q5 How do you expect your production to develop over the next 3 months?  
It will…* 
 +  increase 
 = remain unchanged 
– decrease 
 
Q6 How do you expect your selling prices to change over the next 3 months?  
They will… 
 +  increase 
 = remain unchanged 
– decrease 
 
Q7 How do you expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3 months?  
It will… 
 +  increase 
 = remain unchanged 
– decrease 
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Panel B: The Joint Harmonised EU Services Survey Questionnaire 
Q1  How has your business situation developed over the past 3 months?  
It has…* 
 +  increased 
 = remained unchanged 
– decreased 
 
Q2 How has demand (turnover) for your company’s services changed over the past 3months?  
It has…* 
 +  increased 
 = remained unchanged 
– decreased 
 
Q3 How do you expect the demand (turnover) for your company’s services to change over the next 3 months? 
It will…* 
 +  increase 
 = remain unchanged 
– decrease 
 
Q4 How has your firm’s total employment changed over the past 3 months?  
It has… 
 +  increased 
 = remained unchanged 
– decreased 
 
Q5 How do you expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3 months?  
It will… 
 +  increase 
 = remain unchanged 
– decrease 
 
Q6 How do you expect the prices you charge to change over the next 3 months?  
They will… 
 +  increase 
 = remain unchanged 
– decrease 
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Panel C: The Joint Harmonised EU Retail Trade Survey Questionnaire 
Q1 How has (have) your business activity (sales) developed over the past 3 months?  
It has (They have)…* 
 + improved (increased) 
 = remained unchanged 
 – deteriorated (decreased) 
 
Q2 Do you consider the volume of stock you currently hold to be…?*c 
 + too large (above normal) 
 = adequate (normal for the season) 
 – too small (below normal) 
 
Q3 How do you expect your orders placed with suppliers to change over the next 3 months?  
They will… 
 + increase 
 = remain unchanged 
 – decrease 
 
Q4 How do you expect your business activity (sales) to change over the next 3 months?  
It (They) will…* 
 + improve (increase) 
 = remain unchanged 
 – deteriorate (decrease) 
 
Q5 How do you expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3 months?  
It will… 
 + increase 
 = remain unchanged 
 – decrease 
  
Q6 How do you expect the prices you charge to change over the next 3 months?  
They will… 
 + increase 
 = remain unchanged 
 – decrease 
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Panel D: The Joint Harmonised EU Construction Survey Questionnaire 
Q1 How has your building activity developed over the past 3 months?  
It has… 
 + increased 
 = remained unchanged 
 – decreased 
 
Q2 What main factors are currently limiting your building activity? 
 · none 
 · insufficient demand 
 · weather conditions 
 · shortage of labour force 
 · shortage of material and/or equipment 
 · financial constraints 
 · other factors 
 
Q3 Do you consider your current overall order books to be…?* 
 + more than sufficient (above normal) 
 = sufficient (normal for the season) 
 – not sufficient (below normal) 
 
Q4 How do you expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3 months?  
It will…* 
 + increase 
 = remain unchanged 
 – decrease 
 
Q5 How do you expect the prices you charge to change over the next 3 months?  
They will… 
 + increase 
 = remain unchanged 
 – decrease 
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Panel E: The Joint Harmonised EU Consumer Survey Questionnaire 
Q1 How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months?  
It has… 
 + +  got a lot better 
 + got a little better 
 = stayed the same 
 – got a little worse 
 – – got a lot worse 
N don’t know 
 
Q2 How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months?  
It will…* 
 + +  get a lot better 
 + get a little better 
 = stay the same 
 – get a little worse 
 – – get a lot worse 
 N don’t know 
 
Q3 How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12 months?  
It has… 
 + +  got a lot better 
 + got a little better 
 = stayed the same 
 – got a little worse 
 – – got a lot worse 
 N don’t know 
 
Q4 How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months?  
It will…* 
 + +  get a lot better 
 + get a little better 
 = stay the same 
 – get a little worse 
 – – get a lot worse 
 N don’t know 
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Q5 How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?  
They have… 
 + +  risen a lot 
 + risen moderately 
 = risen slightly 
 – stayed about the same 
 – – fallen 
 N don’t know 
 
Q7 How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change over the next 12 months?  
The number will…*d 
 + +  increase sharply 
 + increase slightly 
 = remain the same 
 – fall slightly 
 – – fall sharply 
 N don’t know 
 
Q8 In view of the general economic situation, do you think that now it is the right moment for people to make 
major purchases such as furniture, electrical/electronic devices, etc.? 
 + +  yes, it is the right moment now 
 = it is neither the right moment nor the wrong moment 
 – – no, it is not the right moment now 
 N don’t know 
 
Q9 Compared to the past 12 months, do you expect to spend more or less money on major purchases (furniture, 
electrical/electronic devices, etc.) over the next 12 months?  
I will spend… 
 + +  much more 
 + a little more 
 = about the same 
 – a little less 
 – – much less 
 N don’t know 
 
Q10 In view of the general economic situation, do you think that now is…? 
 + +  a very good moment to save 
 + a fairly good moment to save 
 – not a good moment to save 
 – – a very bad moment to save 
 N don’t know  
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Q11 Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any money?* 
 + +  very likely 
 + fairly likely 
 – not likely 
 – – not at all likely 
 N don’t know 
 
Q12 Which of these statement best describes the current financial situation of your household? 
 + +  we are saving a lot 
 + we are saving a little 
 = we are just managing to make ends meet on our income 
 – we are having to draw on our savings 
 – – we are running into debt 
 N don’t know 
 
Notes: 
a. * indicates questions chosen from the full set of questions in each individual survey to construct the 
corresponding sector-specific confidence indicator and the economic sentiment indicator.  
b. The balance value of Q4 in Panel A is used to construct the managerial confidence indicator for manufacturing 
sector with an inverted sign. 
c. The balance value of Q2 in Panel C is used to construct the managerial confidence indicator for retail trade 
sector with an inverted sign.  
d. The balance value of Q7 in Panel E is used to construct the consumer confidence indicator with an inverted 
sign 
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Appendix 4.C: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
sector-specific managerial confidence at year enda 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1452** 
(2.02) 
0.1305* 
(1.78) 
–0.1141*** 
(–2.94) 
–0.1100*** 
(–2.84) 
NDF/K 0.2702***e 
(2.60)f 
0.2343** 
(2.22) 
  0.4196*** 
(5.70) 
0.4132*** 
(5.59) 
DIV/K –0.5178*** 
(–2.86) 
–0.4627** 
(–2.52) 
0.3102 
(1.07) 
0.2985 
(1.02) 
  
CF/K 0.2209*** 
(9.89) 
0.2155*** 
(9.50) 
–0.0206 
(–0.46) 
–0.0176 
(–0.39) 
0.1321*** 
(13.56) 
0.1324*** 
(13.60) 
Q 0.0063 
(0.65) 
0.0048 
(0.48) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.3004*** 
(17.95) 
0.3010*** 
(18.05) 
    
TAN   –0.3336*** 
(–3.61) 
–0.3354*** 
(–3.61) 
  
SZ   0.0295*** 
(4.97) 
0.0301*** 
(5.04) 
  
OWN     0.0354 
(1.36) 
0.0387 
(1.47) 
RE/TE     0.0403*** 
(3.71) 
0.0396*** 
(3.65) 
UKDECSCI 1  0.2324***  
(3.49) 
 0.2572*** 
(2.90) 
 –0. 0880* 
(–1.73) 
 
EUDECSCI 1   0.2814***  
(3.17) 
 0.3662*** 
(5.04) 
 –0.1300** 
(–2.18) 
Constant 0.1599*** 
(5.03) 
0.1609*** 
(5.04) 
–0.0202 
(–0.31) 
–0.0188 
(–0.28) 
0.0177 
(0.66) 
0.0165 
(0.62) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of SCI in 
the equationi 
 
12.15*** 
(p = 0.000) 
10.06*** 
(p = 0.001) 
8.41*** 
(p = 0.003) 
10.55*** 
(p = 0.001) 
3.00* 
(p = 0.083) 
3.91** 
(p = 0.048) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of SCI in 
the systemj 
 
20.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
20.01*** 
(p = 0.000) 
20.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
20.01*** 
(p = 0.000) 
20.68*** 
(p = 0.000) 
20.01*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2509.82*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2497.57*** 
(p = 0.000) 
251.02*** 
(p = 0.000) 
250.80*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1324.54*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1336.59*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators at year end (SCIUKDEC and SCIEUDEC) are used 
as a proxy for the state of confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on 
corporate decisions of UK-listed companies. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the 
period 1999–2008. Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11.  
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 ///// SCIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 //// SCISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 ///// SCITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included.  
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either SCIUKDEC 
or SCIEUDEC in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. 
The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
SCIUKDEC or SCIEUDEC in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test 
report results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 4.D: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
economic sentiment at year enda 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1652** 
(2.37) 
0.1593** 
(2.27) 
–0.1211*** 
(–3.18) 
–0.1198*** 
(–3.13) 
NDF/K 0.2853***e 
(2.76)f 
0.2914*** 
(2.80) 
  0.4105*** 
(5.51) 
0.4134*** 
(5.45) 
DIV/K –0.6192*** 
(–3.53) 
–0.6224*** 
(–3.55) 
0.3234 
(1.12) 
0.2958 
(1.02) 
  
CF/K 0.2345*** 
(10.65) 
0.2351*** 
(10.69) 
–0.0253 
(–0.58) 
–0.0210 
(–0.48) 
0.1341*** 
(14.00) 
0.1339*** 
(13.81) 
Q 0.0087 
(0.91) 
0.0090 
(0.94) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.3008*** 
(17.78) 
0.3000*** 
(17.77) 
    
TAN   –0.3198*** 
(–3.57) 
–0.3244*** 
(–3.59) 
  
SZ   0.0296*** 
(5.00) 
0.0294*** 
(4.95) 
  
OWN     0.0315 
(1.23) 
0.0311 
(1.21) 
RE/TE     0.0398*** 
(3.71) 
0.0405*** 
(3.73) 
UKDECESI 1  0.2632**  
(2.13) 
 0.3886** 
(2.41) 
 –0.1083 
(–1.15) 
 
EUDECESI 1   0.0566 
(0.47) 
 0.4754*** 
(3.18) 
 –0.1547* 
(–1.68) 
Constant –0.1139 
(–0.87) 
–0.0310 
(–0.21) 
–0.4353 
(–2.52) 
–0.5149*** 
(–3.21) 
0.1332 
(1.34) 
0.1791* 
(1.86) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of ESI in 
the equationi 
 
4.53** 
(p = 0.033) 
0.22 
(p = 0.637) 
5.82** 
(p = 0.016) 
10.09*** 
(p = 0.001) 
1.32 
(p = 0.251) 
2.81* 
(p = 0.093) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of ESI in 
the systemj 
 
10.13** 
(p = 0.018) 
10.24** 
(p = 0.016) 
10.13** 
(p = 0.018) 
10.24** 
(p = 0.016) 
10.13** 
(p = 0.018) 
10.24** 
(p = 0.016) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2462.19*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2451.40*** 
(p = 0.000) 
252.08*** 
(p = 0.000) 
253.77*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1347.60*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1333.33*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU economic sentiment indicators at year end (ESIUKDEC and ESIEUDEC) are used as a proxy for the 
state of confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of 
UK-listed companies. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. 
Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 ///// ESIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 //// ESISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 ///// ESITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either ESIUKDEC 
or ESIEUDEC in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. 
The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
ESIUKDEC or ESIEUDEC in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test 
report results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 4.E: 3SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
changes in economic sentimenta 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.1681** 
(2.31) 
0.1660** 
(2.38) 
–0.1208*** 
(–3.18) 
–0.1205**
* 
(–3.17) 
NDF/K 0.2869***e 
(2.79)f 
0.2869*** 
(2.79) 
  0.4118*** 
(5.57) 
0.4090 *** 
(5.54) 
DIV/K –0.6147*** 
(–3.50) 
–0.6177*** 
(–3.52) 
0.3630 
(1.28) 
0.3409 
(1.19) 
  
CF/K 0.2337*** 
(10.63) 
0.2343*** 
(10.64) 
–0.0302 
(–0.70) 
–0.0275 
(–0.63) 
0.1337*** 
(13.92) 
0.1340 *** 
(13.99) 
Q 0.0095 
(1.00) 
0.0091 
(0.95) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.3012*** 
(17.82) 
0.3007*** 
(17.78) 
    
TAN   –0.3126*** 
(–3.54) 
–0.3170*** 
(–3.55) 
  
SZ   0.0293*** 
(4.98) 
0.0297 *** 
(5.01) 
  
OWN     0.0312 
(1.23) 
0.0313 
(1.23) 
RE/TE     0.0390*** 
(3.66) 
0.0395*** 
(3.69) 
UKESI 1  0.3347*** 
(2.77) 
 0.2608 
(1.59) 
 –0.0433 
(–0.47) 
 
EUESI 1   0.1598 
(1.29) 
 0.2577  
(1.54) 
 –0.0505 
(–0.53) 
Constant 0.1560*** 
(4.89) 
0.1589 *** 
(4.97) 
–0.0366 
(–0.57) 
–0.0341  
(–0.53) 
0.0213 
(0.81) 
0.0209 
(0.79) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of ∆ESI in 
the equationi 
 
7.67*** 
(p = 0.006) 
1.67 
(p = 0.197) 
2.51 
(p = 0.113) 
2.37 
(p = 0.124) 
0.22 
(p = 0.642) 
0.28 
(p = 0.595) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of ∆ESI in 
the systemj 
 
9.96** 
(p = 0.019) 
3.88 
(p = 0.274) 
9.96** 
(p = 0.019) 
3.88 
(p = 0.274) 
9.96** 
(p = 0.019) 
3.88 
(p = 0.274) 
Chi2-statistic for the 
equationk 
2467.16*** 
(p = 0.000) 
2452.43*** 
(p = 0.000) 
250.22*** 
(p = 0.000) 
247.81*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1343.41*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1352.24*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The percentage changes in the UK and EU economic sentiment indicators (∆ESIUK and ∆ESIEU) are used as a 
proxy for the state of confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate 
decisions of UK-listed companies. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 
1999–2008. Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 3SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 ///// ESIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV  
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 //// ESISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF  
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 ///// ESITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV  
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. z-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either ∆ESIUK or 
∆ESIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the Chi2-statistic. The 
associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
∆ESIUK or ∆ESIEU in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test reports 
results using the Chi2-statistic. The associated z-statistic is reported in parenthesis. 
k. Chi2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 4.F: 2SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
sector-specific managerial confidencea 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.0503 
(1.54) 
0.0369 
(1.48) 
–0.1081*** 
(–2.80) 
–0.1045*** 
(–2.56) 
NDF/K 0.2413**e 
(2.31)f 
0.2111** 
(1.98) 
  0.4743*** 
(6.14) 
0.4718*** 
(6.06) 
DIV/K –0.3812** 
(–2.10) 
–0.3536* 
(–1.91) 
0.1231 
(1.26) 
0.1225 
(1.24) 
  
CF/K 0.2036*** 
(9.12) 
0.2011*** 
(8.85) 
–0.0291 
(–0.55) 
–0.0313 
(–0.58) 
0.1265*** 
(12.43) 
0.1266*** 
(12.39) 
Q 0.0129 
(1.32) 
0.0109 
(1.09) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.3010*** 
(18.02) 
0.2997*** 
(18.00) 
    
TAN   –0.4628*** 
(–4.40) 
–0.4573*** 
(–3.72) 
  
SZ   0.0423*** 
(6.75) 
0.0423*** 
(6.72) 
  
OWN     0.0834** 
(2.55) 
0.0857*** 
(2.61) 
RE/TE     0.0505*** 
(3.88) 
0.0487*** 
(3.77) 
UKSCI 1  0.3531***  
(4.38) 
 0.4323*** 
(3.77) 
 –0. 1181* 
(–1.82) 
 
EUSCI 1   0.3890***  
(4.33) 
 0.4056*** 
(3.44) 
 –0.1592** 
(–2.25) 
Constant 0.1461*** 
(4.59) 
0.1588*** 
(4.33) 
0.0263 
(0.36) 
0.0271 
(0.37) 
–0.0035 
(–0.13) 
–0.0039 
(–0.14) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of SCI in 
the equationi 
 
19.18*** 
(p = 0.000) 
18.75*** 
(p = 0.000) 
14.23*** 
(p = 0.000) 
13.84*** 
(p = 0.000) 
3.30* 
(p = 0.069) 
5.08** 
(p = 0.024) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of SCI in 
the systemj 
 
12.24*** 
(p = 0.000) 
12.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
12.24*** 
(p = 0.000) 
12.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
12.24*** 
(p = 0.000) 
12.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
F-statistic for the 
equationk 
157.23*** 
(p = 0.000) 
156.75*** 
(p = 0.000) 
14.83*** 
(p = 0.000) 
14.75*** 
(p = 0.000) 
79.73*** 
(p = 0.000) 
80.12*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The UK and EU sector-specific managerial confidence indicators (SCIUK and SCIEU) are used as a proxy for the 
state of confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of 
UK-listed companies. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. 
Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 2SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 ///// SCIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 //// SCISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 ///// SCITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. t-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either SCIUK or 
SCIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the F-statistic. The 
associated p-value is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
SCIUK or SCIEU in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test report 
results using the F-statistic. The associated p-value is reported in parenthesis. 
k. F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 4.G: 2SLS estimation results for corporate behavioural equations with 
economic sentimenta 
Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
INV/K   0.0846 
(1.19) 
0.0806 
(1.13) 
–0.1187*** 
(–2.99) 
–0.1181*** 
(–2.93) 
NDF/K 0.2497**e 
(2.39)f 
0.2600** 
(2.47) 
  0.4718*** 
(5.89) 
0.4837*** 
(5.87) 
DIV/K –0.4916*** 
(–2.76) 
–0.4928*** 
(–2.76) 
0.0983 
(1.28) 
0.0912 
(1.19) 
  
CF/K 0.2175*** 
(9.74) 
0.2176*** 
(9.74) 
–0.0147 
(–1.35) 
–0.0117 
(–1.63) 
0.1289*** 
(12.90) 
0.1279*** 
(12.48) 
Q 0.0181* 
(1.85) 
0.0176* 
(1.81) 
    
(INV/K)–1 0.3041*** 
(17.93) 
0.3035*** 
(17.92) 
    
TAN   –0.4031*** 
(–4.07) 
–0.4086*** 
(–4.10) 
  
SZ   0.0422*** 
(6.83) 
0.0403*** 
(6.68) 
  
OWN     0.0826** 
(2.52) 
0.0831** 
(2.51) 
RE/TE     0.0501*** 
(3.85) 
0.0516*** 
(3.87) 
UKESI 1  0.4331** 
(2.37) 
 0.8491*** 
(3.54) 
 –0.1716 
(–1.17) 
 
EUESI 1   0.2001 
(1.40) 
 0.7119*** 
(3.99) 
 –0.2145* 
(–1.84) 
Constant –0.3068 
(–1.59) 
–0.0627 
(–0.42) 
–0.8885*** 
(–3.64) 
–0.7320*** 
(–4.00) 
0.1771 
(1.17) 
0.2183 
(1.83) 
 
 
      
No. of observations 
 
2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 2791 
Industry dummiesg 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummiesh 
 
 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
Not 
Included 
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Variable 
Investment Equationb 
INV/K 
Financing Equationc 
NDF/K 
Dividend Equationd 
DIV/K 
Wald test for the 
significance of ESI in 
the equationi 
 
5.60** 
(p = 0.018) 
1.97 
(p = 0.161) 
12.56*** 
(p = 0.000) 
15.89*** 
(p = 0.000) 
1.37 
(p = 0.243) 
3.39* 
(p = 0.066) 
Wald test for the joint 
significance of ESI in 
the systemj 
 
6.51*** 
(p = 0.000) 
7.08*** 
(p = 0.000) 
6.51*** 
(p = 0.000) 
7.08*** 
(p = 0.000) 
6.51*** 
(p = 0.000) 
7.08*** 
(p = 0.000) 
F-statistic for the 
equationk 
152.32*** 
(p = 0.000) 
152.05*** 
(p = 0.000) 
14.94*** 
(p = 0.000) 
15.10*** 
(p = 0.000) 
80.55*** 
(p = 0.000) 
78.15*** 
(p = 0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The changes in the UK and EU economic sentiment indicators (ESIUK and ESIEU) are used as a proxy for the 
state of confidence in their respective system variants to investigate their impacts on corporate decisions of 
UK-listed companies. The sample contains UK company-year observations within the period 1999–2008. 
Equations 4.7 through 4.9 are estimated by 2SLS estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Investment equation is specified as 
   161543210 ///// ESIKINVQKCFKDIVKNDFKINV . 
c. Financing equation is specified as 
  16543210 //// ESISZTANKCFKDIVKINVKNDF . 
d. Dividend equation is specified as 
  16543210 ///// ESITEREOWNKCFKNDFKINVKDIV . 
e. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. 
f. t-statistics for the coefficients on the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses. 
g. Industry dummies are included in all of the equations to account for the inter-industry variations. 
h. Year dummies are not included. 
i. We perform the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the confidence variable (either ESIUK or 
ESIEU in this case) is zero in the corresponding equation. The test reports results using the F-statistic. The 
associated p-value is reported in parenthesis. 
j. We perform the Wald test to test the joint hypotheses that the coefficients on the confidence variable (either 
ESIUK or ESIEU in this case) in all equations in the system are simultaneously equal to zero. The test reports 
results using the F-statistic. The associated p-value is reported in parenthesis. 
k. F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MEASUREMENT OF CORPORATE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 
MATTERS 
5.1 Introduction 
Corporate investment behaviour is one of the most widely and intensively investigated areas 
in corporate finance. As can be seen in Chapter 2, with theoretical developments relating to 
corporate investment behaviour has come a large body of literature devoted to empirically 
investigating the relations between capital investment decision and relevant company-level 
characteristics, such as the investment opportunity set, financial constraints, uncertainty, 
managerial confidence, etc. Although the empirical models used to examine corporate 
investment behaviour differ in their objectives and approaches, the use of a ratio of corporate 
investment to capital stock as the empirical measure of the conceptual variable of corporate 
investment behaviour has become a common practice in the literature.  
The ratios of corporate investment to capital stock used in the literature, which seem at 
first sight to be very similarly specified, are in fact different both on the numerator and the 
denominator. Specifically, corporate investment spending has been empirically measured 
using a wide range of methods, either based on a cash flow statement or a balance sheet, 
either on a gross or net basis, and either with or without considering disinvestment. 
Meanwhile, capital stock has also been proxied in a number of different ways, either using 
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tangible fixed assets or total assets, either based on book value or replacement value, either 
with or without taking a time lag. The combinations of different measures of corporate 
investment spending alongside various proxies for capital stock generate numerous ways in 
which the ratio of corporate investment to capital stock can be specified, making the 
measurement of corporate investment behaviour even more problematic. 
At least twenty different versions of corporate investment to capital stock ratio 
calculations have been identified in the existing literature. However, no attempt has been 
made to provide a comparison among various corporate investment measures. One claim 
which has been implicitly made is that different measures of corporate investment behaviour 
will always yield the same, or at least qualitatively similar, results in empirical analyses. As a 
consequence, we know little about how differently these corporate investment measures 
perform in empirical analyses, and the extent to which the choice of corporate investment 
measures may influence the conclusions drawn from the analyses. Therefore, the purpose of 
this chapter is to fill the gap by conceptually discriminating and empirically evaluating twenty 
alternative measures of corporate investment behaviour which are currently used in the 
literature.  
Using data from a balanced panel of 432 UK-listed companies over the period 
1999–2008, this chapter discriminates conceptually and evaluates empirically twenty 
alternative measures of corporate investment behaviour, contributing to the existing literature 
in a number of ways. First, this chapter calls attention to the potential misuse of numerous 
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corporate investment measures in applied corporate finance research. The question of whether 
the measurement of corporate investment behaviour matters, which has never been raised, is 
empirically addressed in this chapter. Second, this chapter highlights the distinctions between 
accrual based and cash flow based corporate investment measures as well as between gross 
and net corporate investment measures from an accounting perspective, providing insight into 
the fundamental differences among the similarly specified alternatives. Third, using a large 
panel of UK-listed companies, this chapter empirically evaluates the performance of the 
alternative investment measures in terms of their volatility and information content. The 
evaluation results are of great interest to corporate finance researchers as well as other users 
of financial statements. Furthermore, based on the evaluation results, we suggest a set of best 
performing measures of corporate investment behaviour, which are less noisy and more 
informative, for researchers to utilise. Taking all the innovations together, this chapter may 
shed some light and provide some guidance for measuring corporate investment behaviour in 
empirical analyses.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 highlights and 
explains the differences among various corporate investment measures utilised in the existing 
empirical literature. Section 5.3 develops a number of testable hypotheses. Section 5.4 
describes the sample selection, corporate investment measures, and preliminary analysis. 
Section 5.5 offers an illustrative example to determine the extent to which the choice of 
corporate investment measures influences the conclusions drawn from empirical analyses. 
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Sections 5.6 and 5.7 assess the volatility around the trends and the information content of the 
corporate investment measures, respectively. Concluding remarks are drawn in Section 5.8. 
5.2 Empirical measures of corporate investment behaviour 
Although the relevant literature has been reviewed in Chapter 2, it is useful to highlight the 
key aspects of the literature that illustrate the numerous corporate investment measures that 
are in vogue in empirical works. As can be seen in Chapter 2, corporate investment decisions 
play an important role in maintaining and increasing the scope of a company’s operations, and 
have been the focus of a large amount of academic research. Existing literature in corporate 
finance mainly focuses on the effect of relevant company characteristics, such as investment 
opportunity set (see Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008), internal financial constraints (see 
Guariglia, 2008; Cummins et al., 2006; and Barran and Peeters, 1998), external financial 
constraints (see Guariglia, 2008; and Aggarwal and Zong, 2006), information asymmetry (see 
Ascioglu et al., 2008), managerial optimism (see Ben-David et al., 2007; and Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005), and uncertainty (see Baum et al., 2008; and Lensink and Murinde, 2006), on 
corporate investment behaviour. Conflicting empirical evidence obtained from the 
tremendous amount of literature induces intense debates upon almost all aspects of corporate 
investment behaviour. For example, Fazzari et al. (1988) and Ascioglu et al. (2008), among 
many others, find a higher sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow for companies that 
are more likely to be financially constrained, whereas Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary 
(1999) and some others find the opposite. Abdul-Haque and Wang (2008) and Lensink and 
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Sterken (2000) find a positive effect of company-specific uncertainty on corporate investment, 
whereas Bloom et al. (2007), Xie (2009) and many others find the opposite. Some innovative 
models, therefore, have been developed in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting findings 
from theoretical points of view (see, for example, Cleary et al., 2007; and Sarkar, 2000). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no attention has been directed to the 
measurement of corporate investment behaviour in the existing literature. The equation of 
whether the measurement of corporate investment behaviour matters has never been raised. 
One claim which has been implicitly made is that the different measures of corporate 
investment behaviour are equivalent to one another, and can be used interchangeably. Thus we 
know little about how differently the measures of corporate investment perform in applied 
studies, and the extent to which the choice for measuring corporate investment influences the 
results of empirical analyses. Although corporate investment is customarily measured by the 
ratio of corporate investment to capital stock, the seemingly similarly specified investment 
ratios actually vary both on the numerator and on the denominator. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to posit that the conflicting conclusions drawn from the existing literature on corporate 
investment may partly be attributable to the differences in measuring companies’ investment 
behaviour.  
Twenty different versions of corporate investment to capital stock ratio specifications, 
ranging from simply constructed measures based on reported accounting items to relatively 
complex measures which involve estimating the replacement value of capital stock, have been 
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identified in the recent empirical works published in highly cited academic journals.46 
Different measures of capital investment spending alongside various proxies for capital stock 
are used in the specification of these investment ratios. As pointed out by Adam and Goyal 
(2008), the lack of understanding of measurements is a crucial problem in empirical corporate 
finance research. Likewise, the potential misuse of corporate investment measures in the 
applied corporate finance literature may also be largely due to a lack of understanding of the 
financial information provided by relevant accounting items. Therefore, the starting point for 
conceptually discriminating various measures of corporate investment should be their 
respective accounting definitions. 
5.2.1 Cash based versus accrual based corporate investment measures 
Corporate investment refers to the amount of investment made by a company to its capital 
stock during certain period of time. The measurement of corporate investment relies heavily 
on the relevant accounting information reported in a company’s financial statements. More 
specifically, a measure of corporate investment can either be taken directly from a cash flow 
statement or be derived indirectly from a balance sheet. Given the fact that different 
accounting principles are involved in the preparation of cash flow statements and balance 
sheets, corporate investment measures can be classified into two broad categories, namely, 
cash based and accrual based measures. 
                                                 
46 The studies, from which different corporate investment to capital stock ratios are identified, are all published in journals 
listed in the Association of Business School’s (ABS) Academic Journal Quality Guide. Most of them are published in 
journals that are rated as 4*, 4, or 3 by ABS. A list of cited studies can be found in Table 5.1. 
                    Chapter 5: The Measurement of Corporate Investment Behaviour Matters  
– 288 – 
5.2.1.1 Cash based corporate investment measures 
The most commonly used measures of corporate investment in the existing literature are 
based on capital expenditures (CAPX) which is a reported item on a company’s cash flow 
statement under the investing subsection (see, for example, Grundy and Li, 2010; Bakke and 
Whited, 2010; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Adam, 2009; Hovakimian and Titman, 2006; etc.). 
Since cash flow statements are prepared using the cash basis accounting method, the measures 
of corporate investment based on the cash flow statement item of capital expenditures can be 
classified as cash based measures. 
A cash flow statement is concerned with inflows and outflows of cash and cash 
equivalent of a company, without considering transactions that do not directly affect cash 
receipts and payments. The capital expenditures item reported on a cash flow statement 
represents the funds used by a company to acquire fixed assets and those associated with the 
acquisitions over the reporting period. Under cash basis accounting, capital expenditures are 
recognised immediately at historical costs when cash is paid out either to buy fixed assets or 
to add to the value of an existing fixed asset. Therefore, the capital expenditures item showing 
up on a company’s cash flow statement can be adopted directly as a measure of the amount of 
funds spent by a company on its capital stock over the reporting period. It is worth noting that, 
according to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 7, the funds used to acquire fixed assets 
associated with acquisitions are not included in capital expenditures.  
The main advantage of using the reported capital expenditures to measure corporate 
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investment is that the cash based figures are less subject to distortions from differing 
accounting practices, and thus are able to more objectively reflect a company’s investing 
activities (Dechow, 1994). However, a fundamental drawback of cash based investment 
measures is that cash flows have timing and mismatching problems which may cause them to 
be noisy (Dechow, 1994). Specifically, capital expenditures under cash basis accounting are 
recognised when cash is paid out to purchase a fixed asset, regardless of whether the fixed 
asset is in place. To mitigate the timing and mismatching problems of cash based figures, the 
accrual basis accounting method has been implemented to alter the timing of cash flow 
recognition, aiming to more closely reflect business activities.  
5.2.1.2 Accrual based corporate investment measures 
Instead of using cash based measures, a body of literature derives measures of corporate 
investment from a company’s balance sheet, using the book value of tangible fixed assets (see, 
for example, Engel and Middendorf, 2009; Guariglia, 2008; Gan, 2007; and Lensink and 
Murinde, 2006).47 Tangible fixed assets are also referred to as property, plant and equipment 
which can be found on a company’s balance sheet under the non-current assets section. The 
difference in the carrying amount of tangible fixed assets (NPPE) between the end and 
beginning of a period, therefore, reflects net additions to the availability of a company’s 
capital assets. Since balance sheets are prepared under accrual basis accounting, corporate 
                                                 
47 In most cases, only tangible assets are referred to as fixed. 
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investment measures derived from the balance sheet item of property, plant and equipment 
can be classified as accrual based measures. 
Accrual basis accounting is a method that measures the financial position and 
performance of a company by recognising economic events regardless of when cash 
transactions occur. Because it is supposed to provide a more accurate picture of a company’s 
current financial conditions by reducing noise from timing mismatches between when cash is 
paid out and when an asset is recognised, accrual basis accounting has been generally 
accepted as the standard accounting practice for most businesses. Under accrual basis 
accounting, a capital asset is recognised as a historical cost when it is incurred, and reflected 
as an addition to tangible fixed assets on the balance sheet.48 Since accrual basis accounting 
mitigates the timing and matching problems of cash flows, accrual based corporate investment 
measures should be able to more closely reflect net additions to the availability of a 
company’s capital assets. 
However, the implementation of accrual basis accounting creates a new set of 
problems. Previous studies question the reliability and relevance of accrual basis accounting 
figures because of the accrual components (see, for example, Wilson, 1986). It is argued that 
management typically have some discretion over the recognition of accruals, and this 
discretion might be used by management to opportunistically manipulate the reported 
accounting figures, including the carrying amount of tangible fixed assets. The managerial 
                                                 
48 The historical cost of a tangible fixed asset is subject to revaluations and writedowns. 
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manipulation of accruals, therefore, may reduce the credibility and relevance of accrual based 
investment measures. In addition, the accrual based investment measures are likely to be 
distorted by asset revaluations and writedowns. Both revaluations and writedowns of fixed 
assets are different from planned depreciation in the sense that they aim to bring the fair 
market value of the capital goods into the books. However, it is found that, in practice, the 
most important determinant of writedown decisions is changes in senior management (Strong 
and Meyer, 1987). Thus, the accrual based measures of corporate investment derived from 
balance sheet are more vulnerable to managers’ opportunistic manipulation. The question of 
whether the net effect of accruals is to improve or reduce the ability of investment measures 
to reflect business investment behaviour must be addressed empirically.  
The use of accrual based measures of corporate investment is mainly driven by a 
number of considerations. First, cash based measures of capital expenditures are not always 
readily available. Some studies utilise the first difference of tangible fixed assets as a proxy 
for corporate investment spending simply because no any independent estimate of corporate 
investment, such as reported capital expenditures, is available to the public in the market 
being investigated (see, for example, Garcia-Marco and Ocana, 1999). Second, some 
theoretical considerations may lead naturally to the use of balance sheet-based measures of 
corporate investment. For example, the accelerator model of corporate investment asserts that 
a company’s capital stock should be proportional to its level of production, and companies 
engage in capital investment in an attempt to close the gap between the desired level of capital 
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stock and the existing level of capital stock left over from the previous period. Accordingly, 
empirical investment equations formulated based on the accelerator model typically specify 
the change in capital stock of a company as a function of the change in the company’s output 
over the same period. The first difference transformation of tangible fixed assets, therefore, 
can be utilised as an ideal approximation of the change in capital stock and employed in the 
accelerator model of investment as the dependent variable (see, for example, Engel and 
Middendorf, 2009; Bo and Lensink, 2005). In addition, a strand of literature based on the 
flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour also tends to measure corporate investment 
using balance sheet items (see, for example, Mougoué and Mukherjee, 1994; Fama, 1974; and 
Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967). This is because the budget constraint that overrides the 
flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour is essentially derived from the accounting 
identity that change in assets must equal the sum of changes in liability and equity. 
A few studies also consider using the changes in total assets as a proxy for capital 
investment (see, for example, Adedeji, 1998). However, it is generally believed that the 
changes in total assets that arise from changes in its elements of current assets, such as 
accounts receivable and inventories, are likely to be triggered by economic conditions, and 
thus cannot be interpreted as the results of corporate investment decisions made by 
management (see, for example, Kadapakkam et al., 1998). By contrast the changes in tangible 
fixed assets, which focus on investment in property, plant and equipment, should be better 
able to reflect the conscious investment decisions taken by management.  
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To sum up, cash basis accounting is fundamentally different from accrual basis 
accounting (see Salmi et al., 1990). Since different accounting principles are involved in the 
preparation of the accounting items used to empirically measure a company’s investment 
spending, accrual based measures of corporate investment may contain information about a 
company’s investing activities which is not present in their cash based counterparts, and vice 
versa. Therefore, it is meaningful to investigate whether cash based and accrual based 
measures of corporate investment behaviour perform similarly in empirical analyses. 
5.2.2 Gross versus net corporate investment measures 
In accounting, a capital expenditure is required to be capitalised and recorded as a tangible 
fixed asset on a company’s balance sheet. According to the basic matching principle of 
accounting, the tangible fixed asset is then required to be depreciated over its useful life, 
allocating its cost as a depreciation expense to the periods in which the asset is expected to be 
used. Therefore, both cash based and accrual based measures of corporate investment 
behaviour can be adjusted to be either gross investment measures (see, for example, Grundy 
and Li, 2010; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; Guariglia, 2008; and Lensink and Murinde, 
2006) or net investment measures (see, for example, Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Wang et al., 
2009; Firth et al., 2008; and Rousseau and Kim, 2008), by adding or netting depreciation, 
depletion and amortisation expense (DDA) recognised in the corresponding period. 
According to Standard Accounting Statement (SAS) 3 and IAS 16, the value of a 
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tangible fixed asset is required to be carried at its net book value, which is essentially the 
difference between the historical cost of the asset and its associated accumulated 
depreciation.49 Thus, by definition, the carrying amount of tangible fixed assets reported on a 
balance sheet has already taken depreciated capital goods into account. The accrual based 
corporate investment measures, which are simply calculated as the first difference of the 
carrying amount of tangible fixed assets, therefore represent net additions to the availability of 
a company’s capital goods, and can be classified as net investment measures. Accrual based 
gross investment measures can be obtained by adding depreciation expense charged over the 
period back to the change in the carrying amount of tangible fixed assets. Gross investment 
measures, thus, are concerned with the overall investment in capital stock made by a company 
over a period. The use of the change in carrying amount of tangible fixed assets to measure 
net corporate investment is observed in Chow et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2009), Rousseau and 
Kim (2008), Mueller and Peev (2007), etc.; while the use of the sum of the change in the 
carrying amount of tangible fixed assets and depreciation expenses to measure gross corporate 
investment is adopted by Engel and Middendorf (2009), Guariglia (2008), Bo (2007), Lensink 
and Murinde (2006), etc. 
Turing to cash based corporate investment measures, the reported capital expenditures 
item on the cash flow statement represents the funds spent by a company both to acquire new 
                                                 
49 The net book value of tangible fixed assets is considered the best way of consciously presenting the true and fair value of 
capital assets to the owner of the business and other users of the financial statements. 
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fixed capital assets and to maintain or upgrade existing tangible fixed assets, without 
considering the non-cash expenses such as depreciation. Thus, the reported capital 
expenditures can be used directly to construct cash based gross investment measures. This 
type of gross corporate investment measure is utilised by a large number of applied studies 
(see, for example, Grundy and Li, 2010; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Brown and Petersen, 2009; 
Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; Ratti et al., 2008; Cummins et al., 2006; etc.). Cash based net 
investment measures can be easily obtained by subtracting depreciation expense charged for 
the reporting period from the amount of total spending on capital goods over the same period. 
The use of cash based net investment measures can be found in Denis and Sibilkov (2010), 
Firth et al. (2008), Cleary (1999), etc.  
Besides, some studies, such as Kang et al.(2010), Bloom et al. (2007), Hennessy et 
al.(2007) and Lin et al. (2005), define corporate investment as the net spending on fixed 
assets (NSFA), in an attempt to construct a relatively more accurate measure which captures 
both capital investment and disinvestment, using cash based accounting figures. Accordingly, 
they compute the difference between capital expenditures (CAPX) and revenue from sales of 
property, plant and equipment (SPPE), both of which can be found on the cash flow statement 
under the investing activities subsection, as a measure of net spending on fixed assets. The net 
spending on fixed assets takes proceeds from the sale of fixed assets into account, and thus 
could take both positive and negative signs.  
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5.2.3 Book versus replacement values of capital stock 
To account for heteroscedasticity across companies, capital investment spending is typically 
normalised by a proxy for capital stock to construct a ratio of corporate investment to capital 
stock. The book value of net tangible fixed assets (K) and book value of total assets (TA) on 
the balance sheet are often chosen as proxies for capital stock to normalise the investment 
measures. The use of book value of net tangible fixed assets to scale capital investment is 
adopted by the majority of applied studies, such as Chow et al. (2010), Grundy and Li (2010), 
Engel and Middendorf (2009), Ratti et al. (2008), Hennessy et al. (2007), etc. Bond and 
Meghir (1994) argue that book value of net tangible fixed assets is preferred because it is 
relatively more stable over time and less likely to be distorted by economic conditions. The 
use of book value of total assets can be observed in Bakke and Whited (2010), Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010), Kang et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2009), etc. Brown and Petersen (2009) 
argue that the book value of total assets is chosen because they wish to maintain a common 
scale factor for all regressors, including research and development expenditures. Therefore, 
the choice between book value of tangible fixed assets and that of total assets as a proxy for 
capital stock is largely determined by the model specification. 
Given the fact that the books record the historical costs of capital goods, which may 
deviate from their fair market values, it is also common to derive a replacement value of 
capital stock (Kr) from the book value of tangible fixed assets (see, for example, Guariglia, 
2008; Baum et al., 2008; Bloom et al., 2007; Cummins et al., 2006; etc.). Replacement value 
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of capital stock is preferred by some researchers because it represents the actual cost to 
replace the current productive capacity of a company at the present time. Replacement value, 
however, is difficult to estimate in the absence of active markets for used capital goods 
(Perfect and Wiles, 1994). In practice, replacement value of capital stock is conventionally 
estimated using a standard perpetual inventory method initially proposed by Salinger and 
Summers (1983). Under the standard perpetual inventory method, the book value of tangible 
fixed assets is treated as the historical value of the capital stock. The replacement value and 
historical value are assumed to be the same in the first year of data, which is then adjusted for 
each following period in accordance with the corresponding price deflator of non-residential 
investment goods (see Appendix 5.A for a detailed explanation of the perpetual inventory 
method). Because the price level for capital goods normally increases over time, the 
replacement value of capital stock estimated using the perpetual inventory method is typically 
greater than the corresponding book value. However, owing to the assumptions necessary to 
implement the estimation, the standard perpetual inventory procedure may lead to negative 
replacement value of capital stock in certain instances, which is intuitively undesirable. 
5.2.4 Contemporaneous versus lagged proxies for capital stock 
Researchers also face a choice between contemporaneous or lagged deflator when they 
construct a ratio of corporate investment to capital stock. Some studies choose to use a 
contemporaneous proxy for capital stock as the deflator of corporate investment in an attempt 
to make full use of their company-year observations and maximise sample size for their 
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analyses (see, for example, Bakke and Whited, 2010; Ratti et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2008; and 
Lensink and Murinde, 2006); while others argue that all of the investment decisions are made 
at the beginning of each fiscal year, and thus it is more appropriate to use the 
beginning-of-period value of capital stock to deflate corporate investment, especially for 
companies with substantial growth over the sample period. In addition, the use of lagged 
proxy for capital stock can effectively reduce the possibility of using more information in 
modelling corporate investment behaviour than managers actually have when they make their 
decisions. However, if a lagged proxy for capital stock is chosen to construct corporate 
investment measures, the first year observation for each company has to be sacrificed, leading 
to relatively lower degrees of freedom for regression analyses. The use of corporate 
investment to lagged capital stock ratios can be found in Grundy and Li (2010), Chow et al. 
(2010), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), Kang et al. (2010), etc. 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
The review of relevant literature shows that, although the use of corporate investment to 
capital stock ratio to measure companies’ investment behaviour has become common practice 
in applied studies, there is no consensus about how the ratio should be empirically specified. 
The combinations of different measures of capital investment spending alongside various 
proxies for capital stock generate a large number of ways in which the ratio of corporate 
investment to capital stock can be specified. More importantly, given the fact that different 
accounting principles are involved in the preparation of relevant accounting items used to 
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measure corporate investment behaviour, corporate investment to capital stock ratios with 
different specifications are likely to carry different information about a company’s investing 
activities. The implicit assumption that different corporate investment ratios will always yield 
equivalent results in empirical analyses may not be valid. Therefore, it is necessary to 
compare and contrast these alternative measures of corporate investment behaviour, which are 
potentially misused in the existing empirical literature. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
the question of whether the measurement of corporate investment behaviour matters has never 
been raised, and thus we know little about how differently these alternative measures perform 
in applied analyses, and the extent to which the choice of corporate investment measures 
influence the conclusions drawn from empirical analyses. Therefore, we seek to fill this 
important gap by discriminating and evaluating twenty different corporate investment 
measures used in the existing literature, in an attempt to provide some guidance for measuring 
companies’ investment behaviour.  
The twenty corporate investment measures alongside their respective definitions and 
representative recent studies are summarised in Table 5.1, where GINV and NINV represent 
accrual based measures of gross and net additions to tangible fixed assets, respectively; 
GCAPX and NCAPX represent cash based measures of gross and net capital expenditures, 
respectively; NSFA represents cash based measure of net spending on fixed assets; K and TA 
represent book values of net tangible fixed assets and total assets, respectively; and Kr 
represents replacement value of tangible fixed assets.
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Table 5.1: Corporate investment measures and representative recent studies 
No. Corporate investment measure Definitiona Representative recent studies  
1. The ratio of gross additions to fixed assets 
(GINVt) to fixed assets (Kt) t
ttt
t
t
NPPE
DDANPPENPPE
K
GINV 
 1  
Lensink and Murinde (2006); Bo and Sterken (2002); Barran and Peeters 
(1998) 
2. The ratio of gross additions to fixed assets 
(GINVt) to lagged fixed assets (Kt–1) 1
1
1 




t
ttt
t
t
NPPE
DDANPPENPPE
K
GINV  Engel and Middendorf (2009); Bo and Lensink (2005); Koo and Maeng 
(2005); Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) 
3. The ratio of gross additions to fixed assets 
(GINVt) to replacement value of fixed assets (Krt) t
ttt
t
t
RNPPE
DDANPPENPPE
Kr
GINV 
 1
 
Garcia-Marco and Ocana (1999) 
4. The ratio of gross additions to fixed assets 
(GINVt) to lagged replacement value of fixed 
assets (Krt–1) 
1
1
1 




t
ttt
t
t
RPPE
DDANPPENPPE
Kr
GINV  Guariglia (2008); Gan (2007) 
5. The ratio of gross additions to fixed assets 
(GINVt) to total assets (TAt) t
ttt
t
t
TA
DDANPPENPPE
TA
GINV 
 1  
Bo (2007) 
6. The ratio of net additions to fixed assets (NINVt) 
to fixed assets (Kt) t
tt
t
t
NPPE
NPPENPPE
K
NINV 1
 
Kato et al. (2002); Lensink and Sterken (2000) 
7. The ratio of net additions to fixed assets (NINVt) 
to lagged fixed assets (Kt–1) 1
1
1 




t
tt
t
t
NPPE
NPPENPPE
K
NINV
 
Chow et al. (2010); Rousseau and Kim (2008); Mueller and Peev (2007); 
Kadapakkam et al. (1998) 
8. The ratio of net additions to fixed assets (NINVt) 
to lagged total assets (TAt–1) 1
1
1 




t
tt
t
t
TA
NPPENPPE
TA
NINV
 
Wang et al. (2009); Abdul-Haque and Wang (2008) 
9. The ratio of gross capital expenditures (GCAPXt) 
to fixed assets (Kt) t
t
t
t
NPPE
CAPX
K
GCAPX

 
Ratti et al. (2008) 
10. The ratio of gross capital expenditures (GCAPXt) 
to lagged fixed assets (Kt–1) 11 

t
t
t
t
NPPE
CAPX
K
GCAPX  Grundy and Li (2010); Adam (2009); Hilary and Hui (2009); Hovakimian 
(2009); Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009); Polk and Sapienza (2009); 
Xie (2009); Agca and Mozumdar (2008); Ascioglu et al. (2008); Chava 
and Roberts (2008); Almeida and Campello (2007); Cleary (2006); 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006); Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
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No. Corporate investment measure Definitiona Representative Reference studies  
11. The ratio of gross capital expenditures (GCAPXt) 
to replacement value of fixed assets (Krt) t
t
t
t
RNPPE
CAPX
Kr
GCAPX
  
Cummins et al. (2006); Bond and Cummins (2004); Henley et al. (2003); 
Leahy and Whited (1996) 
12. The ratio of gross capital expenditure (GCAPXt) 
to lagged replacement value of fixed assets (Krt–1) 11 

t
t
t
t
RNPPE
CAPX
Kr
GCAPX
 
Carpenter and Guariglia (2008); Baum et al. (2008); Bulan (2005); Bond 
et al. (2003); Fazzari et al. (1988) 
13. The ratio of gross capital expenditures (GCAPXt) 
to total assets (TAt) t
t
t
t
TA
CAPX
TA
GCAPX
  
Bakke and Whited (2010); Duchin et al. (2010); Lin and Smith (2007); 
Ahn and Denis (2004) 
14. The ratio of gross capital expenditures (GCAPXt) 
to lagged total assets (TAt–1) 11 

t
t
t
t
TA
CAPX
TA
GCAPX  Brown and Petersen (2009); Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009); 
Chemmanur et al. (2009); Wei and Zhang (2008); Chen et al. (2007); 
Alderson and Betker (2006); Alderson et al. (2006) 
15. The ratio of net capital expenditures (NCAPXt) to 
lagged fixed assets (Kt–1) 11 


t
tt
t
t
NPPE
DAACAPX
K
NCAPX
 
Aivazian et al. (2005); Cleary (1999); Lang et al. (1996) 
16. The ratio of net capital expenditures (NCAPXt) to 
total assets (TAt) t
tt
t
t
TA
DAACAPX
TA
NCAPX 

 
Firth et al. (2008) 
17. The ratio of net capital expenditures (NCAPXt) to 
lagged total assets (TAt-1) 11 


t
tt
t
t
TA
DAACAPX
TA
NCAPX
 
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) 
18. The ratio of net spending on fixed assets (NSFAt) 
to fixed assets (Kt) t
tt
t
t
NPPE
SPPECAPX
K
NSFA 
  
Hennessy et al. (2007) 
19. The ratio of net spending on fixed assets (NSFAt) 
to lagged replacement value of fixed assets (Krt–1) 11 


t
tt
t
t
RNPPE
SPPECAPX
Kr
NSFA  Bloom et al. (2007) 
20. The ratio of net spending on fixed assets (NSFAt) 
to lagged total assets (TAt–1) 11 


t
tt
t
t
TA
SPPECAPX
TA
NSFA
 
Kang et al. (2010); Lin et al. (2005) 
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Note: 
a. All items used to define and compute the corporate investment measures refer to annual data items from the 
Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. GINV and NINV represent accrual based measures 
of gross and net additions to tangible fixed assets, respectively. GCAPX and NCAPX represent cash based 
measures of gross and net capital expenditures, respectively. NSFA represents cash based measure of net 
spending on fixed assets. K and TA represent book values of net tangible fixed assets and total assets, 
respectively. Kr represents replacement value of tangible fixed assets. NPPE represents net property, plant and 
equipment, which equals to gross property, plant and equipment (GPPE) less accumulated depreciation, 
depletion and amortisation. RNPPE represents the replacement value of tangible fixed assets, calculated using 
the standard perpetual inventory method. DDA represents depreciation, depletion and amortisation expense. 
CAPX represents the funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions. SPPE 
represents sales of property, plant and equipment, which is the amount a company received from the disposal 
of fixed assets. Items with subscript t are measured at the end of the fiscal year, while the items with subscript 
t–1 are beginning-of-period values, i.e. lagged values. 
  
5.3 Development of hypotheses 
Based on the review of the measurement of corporate investment behaviour in the existing 
literature, a number of testable hypotheses are formulated in this section. The hypotheses 
formulated here can be summarised in three research questions, i.e. whether the different 
measures of corporate investment can always yield equivalent results in empirical analyses, 
which measures are relatively less noisy and thus more predictable, and which measures have 
greater information content.  
5.3.1 Hypotheses regarding whether the measurement of investment matters 
The review of literature shows that numerous versions of corporate investment to capital stock 
ratio have been widely used in the empirical studies to capture corporate investment 
behaviour. The claim is implicitly made that various corporate investment measures will 
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always yield equivalent empirical results. In other words, it is assumed that these corporate 
investment measures can be used interchangeably without altering the conclusions drawn 
from empirical analyses. However, we argue that, because different accounting principles are 
involved in the calculation of relevant accounting figures, accrual based measures of 
corporate investment may contain information about a company’s investment activities which 
is not present in their cash based counterparts, and vice versa. Meanwhile, gross investment 
measures and net investment measures are also likely to provide different information about 
companies’ future productive capacity. Thus, the first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is formulated 
as follows: 
HN: Conclusions drawn from empirical analyses are not sensitive to the choice of 
corporate investment measures; 
HA: Conclusions drawn from empirical analyses are sensitive to the choice of 
corporate investment measures.50 
Hypothesis 1 can be tested by examining the pair-wise correlation coefficients among 
the alternative corporate investment measures. The correlation coefficients can quantify the 
amount of overlapping information contained in the alternatives. The correlation coefficient 
analysis results are presented in Section 5.4. In addition, to better illustrate the extent to which 
the choice of corporate investment measures may affect conclusions drawn from empirical 
analyses, a conventional Tobin’s Q model is repeatedly estimated in Section 5.5 using 
                                                 
50 HN and HA represent the null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis, respectively.  
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different measures of corporate investment as the dependent variable in their respective 
regressions. The differences in the estimation results across regressions are expected to show 
whether the measurement of corporate investment behaviour matters in empirical analyses.  
5.3.2 Hypotheses regarding the volatility of investment measures 
As discussed in Section 5.2, there is a potential timing difference in recognising capital 
investment between accrual basis and cash basis accounting methods. Specifically, capital 
investment is recognised when it is incurred under accrual basis accounting, whereas it is 
recognised when cash is paid under cash basis accounting. Thus, cash based corporate 
investment measures are subject to timing and mismatching problems which may cause them 
to be noisy and unpredictable. By contrast, accrual based corporate investment to capital stock 
ratios, which are supposed to mitigate the timing and mismatching problems of cash based 
accounting figures, can be considered as smoothed measures of corporate investment 
behaviour. Accordingly, the second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) is formulated as follows: 
HN: Cash based corporate investment measures are as noisy as their accrual based 
counterparts; 
HA: Cash based corporate investment measures are noisier than their accrual based 
counterparts. 
In addition, gross corporate investment measures are likely to behave differently from 
net corporate investment measures, since the former focus on the overall investment in capital 
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stock made by a company over certain period, whereas the latter further take depreciated 
capital goods into consideration by subtracting depreciation expense charged for the same 
period from the overall spending on capital stock. Because net corporate investment measures 
are jointly determined by gross investment spending and depreciation expense, they are 
expected to exhibit greater volatility than gross corporate investment measures. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect that gross corporate investment measures are relatively less noisy and 
more predictable than net corporate investment measures, especially when the managers have 
an incentive to opportunistically manipulate depreciation figures. Accordingly, the third 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) can be formulated as follows: 
HN: Net corporate investment measures are as noisy as their corresponding gross 
corporate investment measures; 
HA: Net corporate investment measures are noisier than their corresponding gross 
corporate investment measures. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 regarding the volatility (or predictability) of the corporate 
investment measures are empirically tested in Section 5.6 using trend analysis.  
5.3.3 Hypotheses regarding the information content of investment measures 
Although the cash based measures are expected to contain more noise than their accrual based 
counterparts, the proponents of cash flow basis accounting believe that cash flow measures 
are less subject to distortions from differing accounting practices and managers opportunistic 
manipulation, and thus impart such additional information that is not contained in the accrual 
               Chapter 5: The Measurement of Corporate Investment Behaviour Matters  
– 306 – 
based measures (see, for example, Salmi et al., 1990). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 4) is developed as follows: 
HN: Cash based corporate investment measures are as informative as their accrual 
based counterparts; 
HA: Cash based corporate investment measures are more informative than their accrual 
based counterparts. 
Meanwhile, it is also believed that net corporate investment measures contain more 
information about a company’s future prospects than do gross corporate investment measures. 
It is argued that gross investment includes both new investments and replacement investments. 
New investments are undertaken to increase the scope of a company’s operations, while 
replacement investments are made to maintain a company’s current operations. Since new 
investments in additional operating capacity are expected to have a more significant effect on 
the company’s future earnings, net corporate investment measures are likely to provide more 
forward-looking information about company value and thus shareholders’ wealth. 
Accordingly, the fifth hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) can be formulated as follows: 
HN: Net corporate investment measures are as informative as their corresponding gross 
corporate investment measures; 
HA: Net corporate investment measures are more informative than their corresponding 
gross corporate investment measures. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 regarding the information content of the corporate investment 
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measures are tested in Section 5.7. Given the argument that changes in a company’s corporate 
investment yield information about changes in the company’s future earnings that is not 
captured by unexpected earnings (see, for example, Kerstein and Kim, 1995; and Park and 
Pincus, 2003), we focus on the value relevant information content provided by the alternative 
corporate investment measures.  
5.4 Data and preliminary analysis 
5.4.1 Data and measurement 
The data are collected from the Worldscope database via Thomson One Banker Analytics. The 
initial sample includes all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), during the 
period 1999–2008. We then discard utilities (SIC code 4900–4949), and financial companies 
(SIC code 6000–6999), as these two industries are highly regulated. Companies that do not 
have complete records of key data, such as net property, plant and equipment (NPPE), gross 
property, plant and equipment (GPPE), total assets (TA), depreciation, depletion and 
amortisation (DDA), capital expenditure (CAPX), and sales of property, plant and equipment 
(SPPE), are dropped from our sample. A strongly balanced panel of company-level data over 
the period from 1999 to 2008 is formed with 4,320 company-year observations. The balanced 
panel dataset is preferred because it eliminates the potential effect of missing values on our 
empirical results, allowing us to focus on our research question of whether the measurement 
of corporate investment matters. The twenty alternative measures of corporate investment 
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identified in the existing literature (see Table 5.1 for detailed definitions) are calculated using 
the data from the panel of UK-listed companies over the period 1999–2008.  
5.4.2 Summary statistics 
The summary statistics of the alternative measures of corporate investment are presented in 
Table 5.2. In addition to the conventional statistics, we also calculated the coefficient of 
variation (CV) for each of the corporate investment measures. The coefficient of variation is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the absolute mean of the underlying variable. 
Thus, it is a dimensionless statistic which can be used to compare volatility among variables 
with widely different means. As is evident in Panel A, extreme values appear in almost all the 
corporate investment to capital stock ratios, indicating that the observed corporate investment 
measures are severely distorted by outliers which may have a significant effect upon the 
results of our empirical tests. In order to reduce the potential impact of outliers, the observed 
corporate investment measures are winsorised at both the top and bottom 5th percentiles. 
Specifically, for all of the investment ratios, the extreme values, which are defined as the top 
and bottom 5 percent of the sample observations, are assigned to the cut-off values. This 
approach not only reduces the potential impact of outliers but also allows the full use of 
observations. Given the argument that winsorisation estimators are expected to be more 
plausible and robust than those of the standard transformations such as trimming (Baum et al, 
2008; and Chay and Suh, 2009), the empirical results presented in this chapter are obtained 
based on the observations that are winsorised at both the top and bottom 5th percentiles.  
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for corporate investment measures examined in Chapter 5a 
Variableb Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. C.V. Skewness Kurtosis 
         
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of investment measures without winsorisation
c 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.20  0.22  15.02  –210.88  3.57  17.99  –49.14  2842.71  
2. GINVt /Kt–1 2.36  0.22  4621.51  –0.97  78.22  33.11  52.09  2923.71  
3. GINVt /Krt 0.19  0.17  43.16  –38.47  1.04  5.49  3.54  1127.96  
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.72  0.17  1278.57  –41.75  20.58  28.49  57.50  3486.23  
5. GINVt /TAt 0.05  0.04  1.50  –3.58  0.15  3.15  –8.65  162.58  
6. NINVt /Kt –0.18  0.02  1.00  –220.38  3.96  22.28  –44.47  2308.70  
7. NINVt /Kt–1 1.89  0.02  4238.52  –1.00  72.94  38.60  50.77  2777.33  
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.03  0.00  10.59  –0.89  0.26  9.33  26.58  983.59  
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.27  0.19  103.48  0.00  1.61  6.03  61.82  3961.42  
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.61  0.19  994.33  0.00  15.46  25.22  61.88  3960.67  
11. GCAPXt /Krt –0.28  0.15  37.78  –260.01  12.51  44.66  –20.02  412.82  
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 –0.63  0.16  540.36  –1752.39  35.50  56.78  –33.47  1512.95  
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.06  0.04  26.97  0.00  0.41  7.01  63.89  4159.26  
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.07  0.04  28.33  0.00  0.45  6.47  59.11  3703.13  
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.14  0.00  611.34  –19.99  9.77  69.69  57.58  3553.84  
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.01  0.00  26.93  –1.30  0.41  34.74  63.77  4149.42  
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.02  0.00  28.29  –0.59  0.45  24.65  59.56  3741.21  
18. NSFAt /Kt –0.17  0.13  80.95  –224.13  5.67  33.96  –28.50  1003.78  
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 –0.35  0.15  3181.49  –2163.73  67.34  194.04  14.84  1462.69  
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.04  0.03  22.17  –2.06  0.37  10.15  50.51  2979.98  
         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of investment measures winsorised at the 5
th
 percentiles
d 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.28  0.22  0.89  –0.21  0.28  1.03  0.64  2.91  
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.37  0.22  1.61  –0.16  0.45  1.21  1.55  4.77  
3. GINVt /Krt 0.21  0.17  0.74  –0.18  0.23  1.06  0.71  3.12  
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.28  0.17  1.26  –0.15  0.34  1.23  1.54  4.94  
5. GINVt /TAt 0.06  0.04  0.22  –0.05  0.06  1.11  0.89  3.83  
6. NINVt /Kt 0.01  0.02  0.47  –0.52  0.23  20.74  –0.37  3.34  
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.07  0.02  0.88  –0.35  0.28  3.88  1.21  4.63  
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.02  0.00  0.23  –0.09  0.07  3.73  1.39  5.24  
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.23  0.19  0.61  0.04  0.15  0.68  1.03  3.31  
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.25  0.19  0.82  0.03  0.20  0.82  1.45  4.46  
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.21  0.15  0.67  0.01  0.18  0.87  1.23  3.71  
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.24  0.16  0.92  0.01  0.24  1.01  1.59  4.81  
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.05  0.04  0.18  0.00  0.04  0.87  1.43  4.67  
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.06  0.04  0.22  0.00  0.05  0.93  1.64  5.36  
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Variableb Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. C.V. Skewness Kurtosis 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 –0.01  0.00  0.44  –0.39  0.19  16.46  –0.01  3.52  
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.01  0.00  0.12  –0.04  0.04  5.66  1.22  4.46  
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.01  0.00  0.14  –0.04  0.04  4.70  1.45  5.03  
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.13  0.13  0.53  –0.36  0.21  1.61  –0.43  3.53  
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.23  0.15  1.38  –0.57  0.45  1.93  0.82  4.01  
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.04  0.03  0.19  –0.07  0.06  1.57  0.78  4.08  
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations over the period 1999–2008.  
b. See detailed definitions of the corporate investment measures in Table 5.1. 
c. Winsorisation is the transformation of extreme values in the statistical data.  
d. The transformed data are identical to the original data except that, in this case, all data below the 5th percentile 
are set to the 5th percentile and data above the 95th percentile are set to the 95th percentile. 
 
The summary statistics for the winsorised corporate investment measures are 
presented in Panel B of Table 5.2. After getting rid of the most extreme observations on both 
sides of their respective distributions, the standard deviations as well as the coefficients of 
variations for all the corporate investment measures reduce significantly. More importantly, 
the distributions of the corporate investment measures are much closer to normality after 
winsorisation, although the results of skewness and kurtosis test for normality can still reject 
the hypotheses that the winsorised measures are normally distributed. After controlling for the 
effect of outliers, a number of patterns can be observed from the descriptive statistics. 
First, accrual based corporate investment measures are systematically higher than their 
cash based counterparts. For example, the mean values of GINVt /Kt–1 and GCAPXt /Kt–1 are 
0.37 and 0.25 respectively, and those of NINVt /Kt–1 and NCAPXt /Kt–1 are 0.07 and –0.01 
respectively. Although there is a timing difference in recognising capital investment under 
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different accounting methods, the timing difference cannot adequately justify the large gap 
between the mean values of accrual based and cash based investment measures. The 
differences between accrual based and cash based investment measures are largely due to 
asset revaluations as well as assets associated with acquisitions, which are reflected in the 
carrying amount of tangible fixed assets on balance sheet but cannot be captured by capital 
expenditures on cash flow statement. In addition, the coefficients of variation suggest that, on 
average, cash flow based investment measures are less volatile that their accrual based 
counterparts. For example, the coefficients of variation of GINVt /Kt and GCAPXt /Kt are 1.03 
and 0.68 respectively, and those of GINVt /Krt and GCAPXt /Krt are 1.06 and 0.87 respectively. 
It is worth noting that the extremely high levels of volatility of NINVt /Kt, NCAPXt /Kt–1 and 
NCAPXt /TAt, as suggested by their respective coefficients of variation, are likely to be caused 
by their low mean values, which are close to zero. It is acknowledged that, when the mean 
value is close to zero, the coefficient of variation is highly sensitive to small changes in the 
mean, limiting its usefulness. 
Second, it is evident that the mean values of gross corporate investment measures are 
systematically higher than those of their corresponding net corporate investment measures. 
For example, the mean value of GINVt /Kt is 0.28, while that of NINVt /Kt is 0.01; the mean 
values of GCAPXt /Kt–1 and NCAPXt /Kt–1 are 0.25 and –0.01, respectively. The difference in 
the mean values of gross and net investment measures is directly related to their respective 
definitions. Deducting depreciation expense from overall investment creates a large wedge 
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between the mean values of gross investment measures and those of net investment measures. 
Meanwhile, as expected, gross investment measures are less volatile than net investment 
measures, as indicated by the coefficients of variation. However, the higher values of the 
coefficient of variation for the net investment measures may also be attributable to their lower 
mean values.  
Third, the use of lagged proxies of capital stock to scale investment spending inflates 
the values of corporate investment measures significantly. After lagging the proxy for capital 
stock by one period, the mean of gross investment to fixed assets ratio (GINV/K) increases 
from 0.28 to 0.37 and the mean of gross investment to replacement value of fixed assets ratio 
(GINV/Kr) increases from 0.21 to 0.28. Meanwhile, the volatilities of the corporate investment 
measures are also likely to be inflated by lagging the proxy for capital stock. For example, the 
coefficients of variation of GINVt /Kt and GINVt /Kt–1 are 1.03 and 1.21 respectively, and those 
of GINVt /Kr and GINVt /Kr–1 are 1.06 and 1.23 respectively. 
In addition, the choice of the proxies for capital stock influences the mean values of 
the corporate investment measures substantially. In general, corporate investment measures 
scaled by the replacement value of fixed assets are lower than those scaled by the book value 
of fixed assets, implying that changes in price level have a substantial impact on the value of 
capital goods, while the corporate investment measures scaled by book value of total assets 
typically have the lowest means values among the alternatives.  
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The observed differences in the mean values of the corporate investment measures are 
formally tested using mean-comparison tests. The results of the pair-wise t tests on the 
equality of means are reported in Appendix 5.B. The null hypothesis that the means of the 
corresponding corporate investment measures are equal can be firmly rejected in almost all 
instances. In addition, the annual mean value of each corporate investment measure is plotted 
over time in Appendix 5.C, providing a visual comparison among the alternative measures of 
corporate investment.  
5.4.3 Correlation coefficient analysis 
To gauge the extent of correlation among the twenty measures of corporate investment, we 
compute correlation coefficients between each pair of them. A number of distinct patterns can 
be observed from the Pearson correlation coefficients presented in Table 5.3. 
First, the correlation coefficients reveal a considerable degree of association between 
each pair of corporate investment measures with only five exceptions. Most of the correlation 
coefficients are significantly positive at the 1% significance level, suggesting that, although 
the corporate investment measures are specified differently, they do provide similar 
information about a company’s investing activities. However, it is also found that the 
correlation coefficients among the corporate investment measures are not uniformly positively. 
Seven pairs of corporate investment measures are found to be negatively correlated with each 
other, which appears surprising given that all the measures are supposed to depict the 
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investment behaviour of the same batch of companies over the same period of time. 
Specifically, the correlation coefficient matrix shows that GINVt /Kt is negatively correlated 
with GCAPXt /TAt, NCAPXt /Kt–1, NCAPXt /TAt and NCAPXt /TAt–1, while NCAPXt /Kt–1 is 
negatively correlated with GINVt /Kt–1, GINVt /Krt and GINVt /Krt–1. The negative correlation 
coefficients vary between –0.03 and –0.31. Four of them are statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level, and the others are also marginally significant. The strongest negative 
correlation is observed between GINVt /Kt and NCAPXt /Kt–1. The correlation coefficient of 
–0.31 suggests that the negative assocation between the two corporate investment measures is 
not only statistically significant but also economically significant. If these two significantly 
and negatively correlated corporate investment measures are used to investigate the same 
research question, they are likely to yield qualitatively dissimilar results. Since the negative 
correlations are only observed between accrual based and cash based corporate investment 
measures, it is plausible to argue that the differences among alternative measures are 
primarily attributable to the different accounting principles involved in the preparation of 
relevant accounting figures. 
Second, a significant definitional correlation effect can be observed from the 
correlation coefficient matrix. In other words, corporate investment measures which are 
similarly specified are likely to be highly correlated with each other. For example, the highest 
correlation coefficients are observed between GINVt /Kt and GINVt /Kt–1, GINVt /Krt and 
GINVt /Krt–1, NINVt /Kt and NINVt /Kt–1, GCAPXt /Kt and GCAPXt /Kt–1, GCAPXt /Krt and 
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GCAPXt /Krt–1, GCAPXt /TAt and GCAPXt /TAt–1, and NCAPXt /TAt and NCAPXt /TAt–1, 
ranging from 0.85 to 0.96. These significant associations also suggest that lagging the proxy 
for capital stock by one period does not create many changes in the behaviour of corporate 
investment measures. Therefore, the empirical results of corporate investment research are 
unlikely to be affected by different assumptions regarding the specific time point at which the 
investment decisions are made. Moreover, the correlation coefficients between GINVt /Kt and 
GINVt /Krt, GINVt /Kt–1 and GINVt /Krt–1, GCAPXt /Kt and GCAPXt /Krt, and GCAPXt /Kt–1 and 
GCAPXt /Krt–1 are 0.81, 0.81, 0.62 and 0.72, respectively, suggesting that the choice between 
using book value or replacement value of capital stock to deflate corporate investment is also 
unlikely to have significant influence upon the results of empirical analyses.  
Third, the weakest pair-wise correlations are found between corporate investment 
measures which are constructed in completely different ways. The correlation coefficient 
between GINVt /Kt–1 and GCAPXt /TAt, for example, is as low as 0.005 and is not significantly 
different from zero. The independence of the two corporate investment measures is likely to 
be caused by the differences in measuring both investment spending and capital stock, which 
leads to less overlapping information being conveyed by the two variables. Overall, the 
correlation coefficients represented in Table 5.3 suggest that the conflicting results observed 
in the existing literature may, at least partially, be attributable to the choice of corporate 
investment measures.  
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Table 5.3: Pearson correlation coefficients of alternative corporate investment measuresa 
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4. 
1t
t
Kr
GINV
 0.746 
(0.0000) 
0.806 
(0.0000) 
0.909 
(0.0000) 
       
         
5. 
t
t
TA
GINV
 0.512 
(0.0000) 
0.429 
(0.0000) 
0.567 
(0.0000) 
0.492 
(0.0000) 
      
         
6. 
t
t
K
NINV
 0.619 
(0.0000) 
0.564 
(0.0000) 
0.667 
(0.0000) 
0.600 
(0.0000) 
0.673 
(0.0000) 
     
         
7. 
1t
t
K
NINV
 0.608 
(0.0000) 
0.758 
(0.0000) 
0.660 
(0.0000) 
0.744 
(0.0000) 
0.599 
(0.0000) 
0.848 
(0.0000) 
    
         
8. 
1t
t
TA
NINV
 0.445 
(0.0000) 
0.478 
(0.0000) 
0.542 
(0.0000) 
0.558 
(0.0000) 
0.844 
(0.0000) 
0.699 
(0.0000) 
0.751 
(0.0000) 
   
         
9. 
t
t
K
GCAPX
 
0.465 
(0.0000) 
0.493 
(0.0000) 
0.399 
(0.0000) 
0.416 
(0.0000) 
0.115 
(0.0000) 
0.115 
(0.0000) 
0.277 
(0.0000) 
0.112 
(0.0000) 
  
         
10. 
1t
t
K
GCAPX
 0.636 
(0.0000) 
0.721 
(0.0000) 
0.604 
(0.0000) 
0.657 
(0.0000) 
0.341 
(0.0000) 
0.494 
(0.0000) 
0.665 
(0.0000) 
0.390 
(0.0000) 
0.846 
(0.0000) 
 
         
11. 
t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 0.563 
(0.0000) 
0.547 
(0.0000) 
0.732 
(0.0000) 
0.701 
(0.0000) 
0.311 
(0.0000) 
0.348 
(0.0000) 
0.423 
(0.0000) 
0.291 
(0.0000) 
0.625 
(0.0000) 
0.672 
(0.0000)          
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0.619 
(0.0000) 
0.715 
(0.0000) 
0.959 
(0.0000)         
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 –0.025 
(0.1071) 
0.005 
(0.7344) 
0.100 
(0.0000) 
0.105 
(0.0000) 
0.535 
(0.0000) 
0.227 
(0.0000) 
0.224 
(0.0000) 
0.394 
(0.0000) 
0.290 
(0.0000) 
0.322 
(0.0000) 
0.238 
(0.0000) 
0.273 
(0.0000)        
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 0.107 
(0.0000) 
0.154 
(0.0000) 
0.246 
(0.0000) 
0.268 
(0.0000) 
0.624 
(0.0000) 
0.362 
(0.0000) 
0.393 
(0.0000) 
0.582 
(0.0000) 
0.320 
(0.0000) 
0.434 
(0.0000) 
0.324 
(0.0000) 
0.370 
(0.0000) 
0.922 
(0.0000)       
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 –0.308 
(0.0000) 
–0.186 
(0.0000) 
–0.050 
(0.0009) 
–0.025 
(0.1056) 
0.209 
(0.0000) 
0.306 
(0.0000) 
0.325 
(0.0000) 
0.344 
(0.0000) 
0.151 
(0.0000) 
0.288 
(0.0000) 
0.060 
(0.0000) 
0.135 
(0.0000) 
0.535 
(0.0000) 
0.559 
(0.0000)      
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 –0.052 
(0.0006) 
0.012 
(0.4262) 
0.096 
(0.0000) 
0.118 
(0.0000) 
0.410 
(0.0000) 
0.337 
(0.0000) 
0.350 
(0.0000) 
0.515 
(0.0000) 
0.271 
(0.0000) 
0.360 
(0.0000) 
0.192 
(0.0000) 
0.251 
(0.0000) 
0.797 
(0.0000) 
0.796 
(0.0000) 
0.707 
(0.0000)     
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 –0.024 
(0.1139) 
0.054 
(0.0004) 
0.129 
(0.0000) 
0.163 
(0.0000) 
0.444 
(0.0000) 
0.342 
(0.0000) 
0.384 
(0.0000) 
0.574 
(0.0000) 
0.285 
(0.0000) 
0.395 
(0.0000) 
0.220 
(0.0000) 
0.288 
(0.0000) 
0.783 
(0.0000) 
0.847 
(0.0000) 
0.723 
(0.0000) 
0.964 
(0.0000)    
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 0.471 
(0.0000) 
0.365 
(0.0000) 
0.450 
(0.0000) 
0.364 
(0.0000) 
0.366 
(0.0000) 
0.468 
(0.0000) 
0.368 
(0.0000) 
0.282 
(0.0000) 
0.387 
(0.0000) 
0.480 
(0.0000) 
0.386 
(0.0000) 
0.374 
(0.0000) 
0.245 
(0.0000) 
0.285 
(0.0000) 
0.143 
(0.0000) 
0.210 
(0.0000) 
0.211 
(0.0000)   
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 0.285 
(0.0000) 
0.289 
(0.0000) 
0.391 
(0.0000) 
0.384 
(0.0000) 
0.224 
(0.0000) 
0.280 
(0.0000) 
0.299 
(0.0000) 
0.232 
(0.0000) 
0.291 
(0.0000) 
0.377 
(0.0000) 
0.485 
(0.0000) 
0.508 
(0.0000) 
0.153 
(0.0000) 
0.214 
(0.0000) 
0.141 
(0.0000) 
0.153 
(0.0000) 
0.178 
(0.0000) 
0.413 
(0.0000)  
20. 
1t
t
TA
NSFA
 0.262 
(0.0000) 
0.217 
(0.0000) 
0.349 
(0.0000) 
0.303 
(0.0000) 
0.635 
(0.0000) 
0.469 
(0.0000) 
0.410 
(0.0000) 
0.559 
(0.0000) 
0.255 
(0.0000) 
0.401 
(0.0000) 
0.317 
(0.0000) 
0.342 
(0.0000) 
0.694 
(0.0000) 
0.771 
(0.0000) 
0.414 
(0.0000) 
0.609 
(0.0000) 
0.646 
(0.0000) 
0.686 
(0.0000) 
0.350 
(0.0000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations over the period 1999–2008. 
b. See detailed definitions of the corporate investment measures in Table 5.1. 
c. For each cell, the reported figure is the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between the corresponding corporate investment measures. 
d. Figures in parentheses underneath denote p-values, reporting the significance level of each correlation coefficient.  
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Given the fact that the winsorised corporate investment measures are still skewed and 
leptokurtotic, a nonparametric method, i.e. Spearman’s rank correlation, is also employed to 
check the robustness of the association between each pair of corporate investment measures. 
Spearman’s rank correlation assesses how well the relationship between a pair of corporate 
investment measures can be described as a monotonic function. More specifically, this 
method converts the values of the corporate investment measures into ranks, and evaluate 
whether the orders ranked by different corporate investment measures are monotonically 
related. Increasing positive values imply increasing agreement between the rankings 
according to different corporate investment measures. Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients are presented in Appendix 5.D. The associations among the corporate investment 
measures observed from Table 5.3 are confirmed by the results of the nonparametric method, 
except that the negative pair-wise correlations reduce to four and become less significant 
when the assumption of normality are relaxed.  
5.5 A simple regression of Tobin’s Q model of investment 
Although our preliminary analysis reveals that most of the corporate investment measures are 
positively correlated with one another, this does not necessarily imply that they will behave 
similarly in empirical analyses. More importantly, negative pair-wise associations are also 
found between some corporate investment measures. These negatively associated corporate 
investment measures are likely to yield qualitatively dissimilar results in empirical analyses. 
Therefore, the principal purpose of this section is to illustrate the extent to which the choice of 
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corporate investment measures affects the conclusions drawn from empirical analyses. 
5.5.1 Empirical procedures 
To illustrate the potential impact of the choice of corporate investment measures on the results 
of empirical analyses, a simple Tobin’s Q model of investment is estimated in this section 
with reference to a balanced panel of UK-listed companies. Specifically, all the corporate 
investment measures listed in Table 5.1 are used as the dependent variable and regressed on 
the same proxy for Tobin’s Q in their respective regressions. The extent to which the choice 
of corporate investment measures may affect conclusions drawn from empirical studies can be 
determined by examining the differences in the estimation results across regressions in which 
different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable. The simple 
Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment is specified as follows, 
 
itititit INVQINV   1210  (5.1) 
 
where INV represents corporate investment measure, Q represents a proxy for Tobin’s Q 
which is measured as the market-to-book value of total assets, and   represents the error 
term. According to the standard Q theory, all of the information relevant to the future 
prospects affects investment decisions through Tobin’s Q. Thus, the coefficient on the proxy 
for Tobin’s Q is expected to be positive in all the regressions. A lagged corporate investment 
measure is also included to capture the dynamic structure of companies’ investment behaviour. 
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Moreover, we control for time effects by adding year dummies. Equation 5.1 is estimated 
repeatedly for different corporate investment measures, using system-GMM estimators.  
5.5.2 Empirical results 
The system-GMM estimation results for the simple Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment 
are reported in Table 5.4. As expected, distinct conclusions with respect to the association 
between Tobin’s Q and companies’ investment behaviour can be drawn when different 
corporate investment measures are employed as the dependent variable.  
More specifically, as shown in column 3 of Table 5.4, the coefficient on Tobin’s Q 
turns out to be positive in 14 regressions, indicating that higher Q values encourage 
companies to undertake more investment projects. However, the estimation results for the 
remaining 6 regressions indicate the opposite that the Tobin’s Q affects corporate investment 
adversely. When GINVt /Kt–1, GCAPXt /Kt, GCAPXt /Kt–1, GCAPXt /Krt–1, NSFAt /Kt and NSFAt 
/Krt–1 are regressed on the proxy for Tobin’s Q, the estimation results suggest that the positive 
association between corporate investment and Tobin’s Q is statistically significant, whereas, 
when GINVt /TAt and NINVt /TAt–1 are regressed on the same proxy for Tobin’s Q, the 
association between corporate investment and Tobin’s Q is also statistically significant but 
negative. Therefore, it is shown that no consensus can be reached about either the sign or the 
significance level of the relation between corporate investment behaviour and Tobin’s Q 
across regressions where different measures of corporate investment are employed.  
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Table 5.4: System-GMM estimation results for Tobin’s Q model of corporate investmenta 
Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.1099***
c 
(2.90)d 
0.0023 
(0.62) 
0.7872*** 
(5.84) 
–6.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
2.84*** 
(p=0.000) 
29.24* 
(p=0.062) 
14.54*** 
(p=0.000) 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.3471*** 
(4.26) 
0.0117* 
(1.90) 
0.3330* 
(1.94) 
–3.54*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.54 
(p=0.590) 
23.62 
(p=0.211) 
11.82*** 
(p=0.000) 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.1232*** 
(5.25) 
0.0020 
(0.80) 
0.5829*** 
(5.49) 
–6.31*** 
(p=0.000) 
2.79*** 
(p=0.005) 
24.66 
(p=0.172) 
12.81*** 
(p=0.000) 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.1946*** 
(6.41) 
0.0055 
(1.07) 
0.3716*** 
(3.93) 
–6.02*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.12 
(p=0.262) 
26.22** 
(p=0.124) 
9.87*** 
(p=0.000) 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0487*** 
(6.26) 
–0.0011* 
(–1.82) 
0.2595** 
(1.96) 
–4.07*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.50 
(p=0.615) 
28.98* 
(p=0.066) 
6.68*** 
(p=0.000) 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.0670*** 
(4.42) 
–0.0047 
(–1.21) 
0.2775* 
(1.74) 
–3.63*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.80 
(p=0.422) 
19.57 
(p=0.421) 
11.35*** 
(p=0.000) 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.1463*** 
(5.07) 
–0.0018 
(–0.46) 
0.1150 
(0.74) 
–3.13*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.28 
(p=0.782) 
14.26 
(p=0.769) 
12.24*** 
(p=0.000) 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0320*** 
(6.73) 
–0.0013* 
(–1.82) 
0.0741 
(0.63) 
–3.50*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.99 
(p=0.322) 
26.01 
(p=0.130) 
10.93*** 
(p=0.000) 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1535*** 
(7.14) 
0.0075*** 
(4.29) 
0.3059*** 
(3.32) 
–4.99*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.55 
(p=0.580) 
28.56* 
(p=0.073) 
9.06*** 
(p=0.000) 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2028*** 
(8.67) 
0.0077*** 
(3.02) 
0.2675*** 
(3.43) 
–5.28*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.21 
(p=0.226) 
24.17 
(p=0.190) 
10.41*** 
(p=0.000) 
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Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1314*** 
(8.16) 
0.0029 
(1.46) 
0.3602*** 
(4.78) 
–5.22*** 
(p = 0.000) 
–0.99 
(p=0.324) 
24.98 
(p=0.161) 
12.98*** 
(p=0.000) 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.1500*** 
(7.37) 
0.0065** 
(2.29) 
0.3070*** 
(3.89) 
–4.84*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.88 
(p=0.378) 
26.21 
(p=0.124) 
14.52*** 
(p=0.000) 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0198*** 
(4.92) 
0.0002 
(0.55) 
0.5204*** 
(6.32) 
–5.75*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.04 
(p=0.299) 
22.59 
(p=0.256) 
22.05*** 
(p=0.000) 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0289*** 
(7.30) 
0.0002 
(0.51) 
0.4227*** 
(6.19) 
–5.79*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.88 
(p=0.381) 
20.41 
(p=0.370) 
28.38*** 
(p=0.000) 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 –0.0139 
(–1.24) 
–0.0001 
(–0.04) 
0.4844*** 
(4.22) 
–4.78*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.67 
(p=0.503) 
28.98* 
(p=0.066) 
10.81*** 
(p=0.000) 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0041*** 
(2.43) 
–0.0001 
(–0.25) 
0.3732*** 
(6.09) 
–5.76*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.77* 
(p=0.077) 
16.32 
(p=0.636) 
17.37*** 
(p=0.000) 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0051** 
(2.54) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
0.3844*** 
(5.72) 
–5.41*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.66* 
(p=0.097) 
18.35 
(p=0.499) 
12.83*** 
(p=0.000) 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.0787*** 
(3.54) 
0.0065** 
(2.56) 
0.3990** 
(2.49) 
–4.15*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.43 
(p=0.154) 
23.83 
(p=0.203) 
2.81*** 
(p=0.002) 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.2479*** 
(3.31) 
0.0181** 
(2.22) 
–0.1447 
(–0.43) 
–3.15*** 
(p=0.002) 
–0.77 
(p=0.422) 
15.94 
(p=0.661) 
2.80*** 
(p=0.002) 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0214*** 
(5.20) 
0.0008 
(1.41) 
0.3892*** 
(4.21) 
–5.55*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.75 
(p=0.451) 
18.00 
(p=0.522) 
8.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The simple Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment is estimated by two-step 
system-GMM estimators using Stata 11. The first year observation for each company is lost because the dynamic structure of the model. 
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b. Different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable (INV) in their respective regressions. The simple Tobin’s Q model is specified as
itititit INVQINV   1210 . 
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables. The instruments used for the regression include Constant, Year dummies, Qt, INVt-3… t-5, 
∆Year dummies, ∆Qt, and ∆INVt-2. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is 
robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test has its own 
problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
h. F-statistic for the regression which tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Although it is well known that Tobin’s Q has severe measurement problems (see, for 
example, Erickson and Whited, 2000), the distinct empirical results obtained by regressing 
different corporate investment measures on the same proxy Tobin’s Q clearly illustrate that 
the choice of corporate investment measures, to a considerable extent, influences the 
conclusions drawn from empirical analyses. 
In spite of the inconsistent results obtained regarding the association between 
corporate investment and Tobin’s Q, the estimation results reported in Table 5.4 exhibit a 
number of features which are of particular interest. First, both accrual based and cash based 
gross corporate investment measures, apart from GINVt /TAt, seem to be positively influenced 
by the proxy of Tobin’s Q. Second, the association between Tobin’s Q and net corporate 
investment appears to be negative, with only one exception, i.e. NCAPXt /TAt–1. However, the 
association between Tobin’s Q and net corporate investment is rather weak and is not 
significant at the usual significance levels. Moreover, the cash based measures of net spending 
on fixed assets, namely, NSFAt /Kt, NSFAt /Krt–1 and NSFAt /TAt–1, are uniformly and 
positively related to the proxy for Tobin’s Q. Accordingly, the differences in estimation 
results across regression suggest that Tobin’s Q performs better in explaining variations in 
gross corporate investment than those in net corporate investment. Besides, it is also shown 
that corporate investment behaviour is likely to be a dynamic process as indicated by the 
positive and significant coefficients found for the lagged corporate investment variables in 
most of the regressions. 
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After estimating the Tobin’s Q model using two-step system-GMM estimators, we 
carry out a number of conventional diagnostic tests. We test both first-order and second-order 
serial correlation of the first-differenced errors using Arellona-Bond tests. In addition, we test 
the validity of the instruments used in both the levels and the differenced equations using the 
Hansen overidentifying restrictions test. The diagnostic test results reported in Table 5.4 
suggest that the Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment is well specified and the instruments 
used to implement the system-GMM estimation are generally valid. Therefore, it is 
satisfactory for us to estimate Equation 5.1 using system-GMM estimators. 
5.5.3 Robustness tests and results 
To check the robustness of the system-GMM estimation results, we first re-estimate Equation 
5.1 using an alternative econometric method for dynamic panel data, i.e. the difference-GMM 
estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The difference-GMM estimation results 
presented in Appendix 5.E confirm that the conclusions drawn from the simple regression of 
the Tobin’s Q model is indeed sensitive to the choice of corporate investment measures. The 
sensitivity of empirical results to the choice of corporate investment measures is, therefore, 
robust with respect to different estimation techniques.  
Second, we re-specify the standard Tobin’s Q model by excluding the lagged corporate 
investment measure from Equation 5.1. The system-GMM estimation results for the 
re-specified Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment are presented in Appendix 5.F. Again, 
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the results presented in Appendix 5.F are similar to those reported in Table 5.4 in terms of the 
signs and the significance levels of the coefficients on the proxy for Tobin’s Q. However, the 
results of Arellona-Bond test for second-order serial correlation of the first-differenced errors 
reported in Appendix 5.F are statistically significant with only two exceptions, suggesting that 
without considering the dynamic structure of corporate investment, the Tobin’s Q model is 
potentially misspecified.  
Furthermore, given the fact that the empirical measure of Tobin’s Q is also subject to 
considerable measurement error, we also construct an alternative proxy for Tobin’s Q using 
market-to-book value of common equity. Equation 5.1 is then re-estimated with the 
alternative proxy for Tobin’s Q. The system-GMM estimation results are reported in 
Appendix 5.G. The results show that our findings are also robust with respect to alternative 
proxies for Tobin’s Q.  
5.5.4 Conclusion 
Overall, an important lesson to be learned from this illustrative example is that that various 
corporate investment measures behave rather differently in empirical analyses. As a 
consequence, the results of empirical analyses exhibit high sensitivity to the choice of 
corporate investment measures. More precisely, distinct conclusions with respect to 
companies’ investment behaviour are likely to be drawn when different measures of corporate 
investment are used in analyses. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 that the choice of corporate 
investment measures has no significant impact on the conclusions drawn from empirical 
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analyses should be firmly rejected based on our evidence. In addition, it is also plausible to 
argue that the inconsistent empirical findings from the existing literature on corporate 
investment may, at least partially, be attributable to the differences in measuring corporate 
investment behaviour. Therefore, the measurement of corporate investment behaviour does 
indeed matter. 
5.6 Trend analysis 
The empirical evidence obtained from the preliminary analysis and the illustrative example 
clearly shows that various corporate investment measures tend to behave differently and yield 
qualitatively dissimilar results in empirical analyses. Therefore, it is desirable to evaluate the 
relative performance of the corporate investment measures from different perspectives. This 
section assesses the predictability of the alternative measures by examining their volatilities 
around their respective underlying trends. Corporate investment measures that contain low 
levels of noise are expected to be less volatile around their respective trends and thus are 
relatively more predictable, whereas those containing higher levels of noise are expected to 
exhibit high volatility, making them less predictable. 
5.6.1 Empirical procedures 
To carry out the trend analysis, we simply regress the various corporate investment measures 
on an artificial time trend variable in separate regressions. To capture the possible nonlinear 
trend of corporate investment behaviour, we also add a quadratic term of the time trend 
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variable to the regression. In addition, a lagged corporate investment measure is also included 
to capture the dynamic structure of companies’ investment behaviour. We do not attempt to 
estimate the “best” investment equation by controlling other explanatory variables, because 
the most commonly used explanatory variables in investment equations, such as Tobin’s Q 
and cash flow, are also subject to considerable measurement errors. In order to allow us to 
focus directly on the empirical performance of the corporate investment measures, we 
estimate a trend regression model which is specified as follows, 
 
ititttit INVTTINV   13
2
210  (5.2) 
 
where INV represents corporate investment measure, T represents a time trend, T2 represents 
the quadratic term of the time trend variable, and   represents the error term. The time trend 
variables T and T2, alongside the autoregressive term INV–1, are expected to capture the trend 
underlying corporate investment behaviour, leaving the random noise in the error term ε.  
Based on the residuals obtained from the trend regressions, a number of statistics can 
be calculated to quantify the volatility of each corporate investment measure around its 
underlying trend, which can then be used to evaluate the level of noise contained in the 
corporate investment measure. More specifically, for each corporate investment measure, its 
volatility around the underlying trend is measured by the corresponding root mean square 
error which can be computed as follows, 
               Chapter 5: The Measurement of Corporate Investment Behaviour Matters  
– 329 – 
 
N
VNIINV itit 

2)ˆ(
RMSE  (5.3) 
 
where RMSE represents the root mean square error, INV and VNI ˆ  represent the observed 
and fitted value of corporate investment measures respectively and N represents the total 
sample size. According to its definition, the RMSE aggregates the individual residuals into a 
single measure of volatility around the underlying trend for each of the corporate investment 
measures. For unbiased estimators, the RMSE can be considered as the standard error of the 
residuals from the trend regression. Like the standard error, the RMSE is on the same scale as 
the observed variable, and thus it cannot be used to compare the volatilities across various 
corporate investment measures with different scales. Hyndman and Koehler (2006) point out 
that the RMSE of a regression must be understood in the context of the mean of the observed 
variable. Accordingly, we further calculate the coefficient of variation of the root mean square 
error for each of the corporate investment measures by scaling the RMSE with the 
corresponding absolute mean of the corporate investment measures. The coefficient of 
variation of the root mean square error is a similar concept to the coefficient of variation, and 
is defined as follows,  
 
VNI
RMSE
CV(RMSE) 
 
(5.4)  
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where CV(RMSE) represents the coefficient of variation of the root mean square error, and 
VNI  represents the mean of the observed corporate investment measure. Thus, the 
CV(RMSE) is a dimensionless statistic which can be used to compare the volatilities of 
various corporate investment measures around their respective trends. It is worth noting that, 
like the coefficient of variation, the usefulness of the coefficient of variation of the root mean 
squared error is limited when the mean value of the observed variable is close to zero. 
5.6.2 Empirical results 
Table 5.5 presents the system-GMM estimation results of the trend regression specified as 
Equation 5.2 for each of the corporate investment measures. As is evident, the time trend 
variables are highly significant in their linear as well as quadratic forms in almost all 
regressions. Estimated coefficients for the linear time trend term are uniformly negative, 
whereas those for the quadratic term are consistently positive, indicating that corporate 
investment behaviour trends around a U-shaped curve over the period 1999–2008. In addition, 
the autoregressive term turns out to be positive in all of the regressions, and statistically 
significant in most cases, suggesting the existence of a dynamic structure in corporate 
investment behaviour. Moreover, the results of the diagnostic tests for the trend regressions 
also suggest that the model specification is reasonably well and the instruments used are 
generally valid. Therefore, the residuals from the estimated trend regressions can be 
satisfactorily used to assess the level of noise contained in the corporate investment measures.  
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Table 5.5: System-GMM estimation results for the trend regression of corporate investment measuresa 
Investment measureb Constant T T2 INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.1759***
c 
(3.50)d 
–0.0460*** 
(–5.08) 
0.0044*** 
(6.05) 
0.6739*** 
(4.56) 
–5.42*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.47 
(p=0.142) 
21.03 
(p=0.335) 
28.34*** 
(=0.000) 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.5533*** 
(5.67) 
–0.1140*** 
(–5.94) 
0.0101*** 
(6.64) 
0.2203 
(1.39) 
–3.41*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.11 
(p=0.911) 
17.41 
(p=0.562) 
24.52*** 
(p=0.000) 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.1855*** 
(4.70) 
–0.0423*** 
(–5.53) 
0.0037*** 
(6.35) 
0.5623*** 
(5.15) 
–6.25*** 
(p=0.000) 
2.66 
(p=0.008) 
20.29 
(p=0.377) 
32.54*** 
(p=0.000) 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.4160*** 
(7.27) 
–0.0887*** 
(–6.36) 
0.0071*** 
(6.76) 
0.2793*** 
(2.99) 
–5.69*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.68 
(p=0.499) 
20.75* 
(p=0.088) 
22.19*** 
(p=0.000) 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0702*** 
(5.33) 
–0.0113*** 
(–4.71) 
0.0009*** 
(5.03) 
0.1947 
(1.33) 
–3.51*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.14 
(p=0.889) 
27.06 
(p=0.103) 
11.85*** 
(p=0.000) 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.1400*** 
(3.78) 
–0.0644*** 
(–4.79) 
0.0056*** 
(5.50) 
0.2837* 
(1.89) 
–3.83*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.86 
(p=0.391) 
17.76 
(p=0.539) 
26.32*** 
(p=0.000) 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.3416*** 
(5.69) 
–0.1126*** 
(–6.05) 
0.0094*** 
(6.55) 
0.0635 
(0.44) 
–3.15*** 
(p=0.002) 
–0.54 
(p=0.587) 
15.63 
(p=0.682) 
31.96*** 
(p=0.000) 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0710*** 
(5.89) 
–0.0232*** 
(–6.35) 
0.0019*** 
(6.87) 
0.0320 
(0.26) 
–3.19*** 
(p=0.001) 
–1.19 
(p=0.234) 
20.69 
(p=0.354) 
28.19*** 
(p=0.000) 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1880*** 
(6.19) 
–0.0125*** 
(–2.61) 
0.0012*** 
(3.04) 
0.2581*** 
(2.69) 
–4.56*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.89 
(p=0.375) 
24.29 
(p=0.186) 
8.64*** 
(p=0.000) 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2932*** 
(7.58) 
–0.0443*** 
(–5.12) 
0.0039*** 
(5.69) 
0.2087*** 
(2.63) 
–4.87*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.48** 
(p=0.013) 
19.45 
(p=0.428) 
20.32*** 
(p=0.000) 
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Investment measureb Constant T T2 INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.2133*** 
(8.52) 
–0.0244*** 
(–5.78) 
0.0018*** 
(5.60) 
0.2840*** 
(3.67) 
–4.76*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.34 
(p=0.179) 
20.67 
(p=0.355) 
27.68*** 
(p=0.000) 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.3006*** 
(7.67) 
–0.0417*** 
(–5.20) 
0.0030*** 
(4.99) 
0.2108** 
(2.51) 
–4.33*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.36 
(p=0.174) 
29.36* 
(p=0.061) 
21.13*** 
(p=0.000) 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0268*** 
(2.98) 
–0.0019 
(–1.20) 
0.0001 
(1.15) 
0.5274*** 
(5.92) 
–5.50*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.99 
(p=0.321) 
24.51 
(p=0.177) 
60.94*** 
(p=0.000) 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0535*** 
(5.01) 
–0.0079*** 
(–3.63) 
0.0006*** 
(3.76) 
0.3853*** 
(4.79) 
–5.13*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.00 
(p=0.318) 
27.02 
(p=0.104) 
69.82*** 
(p=0.000) 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0077 
(0.25) 
–0.0092 
(–0.87) 
0.0008 
(1.01) 
0.4946*** 
(4.24) 
–4.75*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.63 
(p=0.527) 
39.97*** 
(p=0.003) 
27.80*** 
(p=0.000) 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0117** 
(2.58) 
–0.0046*** 
(–3.18) 
0.0004*** 
(3.66) 
0.3892*** 
(6.50) 
–5.83*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.71*** 
(p=0.000) 
19.30 
(p=0.438) 
47.76*** 
(p=0.000) 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0123** 
(2.28) 
–0.0044*** 
(–2.64) 
0.0004*** 
(3.08) 
0.3899*** 
(5.73) 
–5.40*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.59 
(p=0.111) 
21.33 
(p=0.319) 
33.97*** 
(p=0.000) 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.0685* 
(1.69) 
–0.0083 
(–0.83) 
0.0009 
(1.18) 
0.4433** 
(2.33) 
–3.79*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.50 
(p=0.134) 
22.92 
(p=0.241) 
3.43*** 
(p=0.017) 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.3772*** 
(2.91) 
–0.0659*** 
(–2.61) 
0.0052*** 
(2.71) 
0.0286 
(0.08) 
–1.40 
(p=0.163) 
–0.38 
(p=0.705) 
16.77 
(p=0.605) 
2.90*** 
(p=0.035) 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0 .0352*** 
(3.16) 
–0.0065** 
(–2.35) 
0.0005** 
(2.56) 
0 .3885*** 
(3.68) 
–5.10*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.74 
(p=0.457) 
16.60 
(p=0.671) 
20.95*** 
(p=0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The trend regressions are estimated by two-step system-GMM estimators using 
Stata 11. The first year observation for each company is lost because the dynamic structure of the model. 
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b. Different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable in their respective time trend regressions. The time trend regression is specified as
ititttit INVTTINV   13
2
210 . 
The instruments used for the regression include Constant, T, T2, INVt-3… t-5, ∆T, ∆T
2, and ∆INVt-2. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is 
robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test has its own 
problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
h. F-statistic for the regression which tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Based on the residuals obtained by estimating the trend regression as specified in 
Equation 5.2, the RMSE, absolute mean and CV(RMSE) for each of the corporate investment 
measures are calculated and reported in Table 5.6. In addition, according to their respective 
CV(RMSE)s, the corporate investment measures are ranked from lowest volatility to highest 
volatility. Several features of these results are of particular interest.  
First, corporate investment measures in the highest ranked (lowest volatility) group are 
without exception gross investment measures, and those in the lowest ranked (highest 
volatility) group are all net investment measures. This finding suggests that the gross 
corporate investment measures are systematically less volatile around their respective trends 
than the net corporate investment measures. Our results indicate that if depreciated capital 
goods are taken into account, corporate investment behaviour becomes more volatile and thus 
less predictable. The excess volatility of the net corporate investment measures over the gross 
investment measures is directly attributable to the depreciation component which is 
potentially subject to managers’ opportunistic manipulation. Our empirical evidence, 
therefore, lends strong support to the prediction that net corporate investment measures, 
which are jointly determined by gross investment and depreciation expense, are noisier than 
gross corporate investment measures, and thus Hypothesis 3 should be firmly rejected. 
However, the high CV(RMSE) values for the net corporate investment measures may also be 
attributable to their low mean values, and therefore the results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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Table 5.6: Coefficients of variation of the root mean square error of the corporate 
investment measuresa 
INV measure RMSEb Absolute mean of INV CV(RMSE)c Rankd 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.3011  0.2772  1.0862  7 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.5881  0.3683  1.5968  11 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.2278  0.2144  1.0625  6 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.4033  0.2773  1.4544  10 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0682  0.0560  1.2179  9 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.2977  0.0113  26.3451  20 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.3571  0.0722  4.9460  17 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0828  0.0186  4.4516  15 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1465  0.2281  0.6423  1 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2248  0.2506  0.8970  5 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1619  0.2076  0.7799  3 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.2662  0.2375  1.1208  8 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0341  0.0501  0.6806  2 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0453  0.0566  0.8004  4 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2113  0.0114  18.5351  19 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0337  0.0065  5.1846  18 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0405  0.0090  4.5000  16 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.3099  0.1293  2.3968  13 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.6921  0.2347  2.9489  14 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0614  0.0365  1.6822  12 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The residuals are 
obtained by estimating the trend regressions specified as Equation 5.2 using two-step system-GMM estimators.  
b. The root mean square error, which is defined as the square root of the mean square error (see Equation 5.3). 
c. The coefficient of variation of the root mean square error, which is defined as the ratio of the root mean square 
error to the absolute mean of the observed values (see Equation 5.4). 
d. The corporate investment measures are ranked based on their coefficients of variation of the root mean square 
error, from lowest volatility to highest volatility around their respective trends.  
  
Second, the statistics reported in Table 5.6 show that cash based corporate investment 
measures do not exhibit higher levels of volatility around their respective trends than do their 
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accrual based counterparts. Although accrual based accounting figures are typically 
considered as smoothed measures of cash flow based accounting figures since they are 
supposed to mitigate the timing and mismatching problems of cash flows, we do not find 
empirical evidence that accrual based corporate investment measures are systematically less 
noisy than cash based measures. Surprisingly, for gross corporate investment measures, cash 
based measures appear to be systematically less volatile around their respective trends than 
accrual based measures, as indicated by the CV(RMSE)s. This is largely due to the fact that 
accrual based measures of corporate investment, according to accounting standards, take asset 
revaluations and writedowns as well as disinvestments into account, which introduce 
additional fluctuations into these measures. On the other hand, cash based measures focus on 
the amount of funds spent by a company on its fixed assets and are not affected by the amount 
of disinvestment, and therefore behave relatively stable over time. According to our results, 
we do not find any empirical evidence that cash based corporate investment measures are 
nosier than their accrual based counterparts, and thus Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. 
Third, the results presented in Table 5.6 also show that the cash based measures of net 
spending on fixed assets (i.e. NSFAt /Kt, NSFAt /Krt–1 and NSFAt /TAt–1), which take into 
account the revenue from the sales of fixed assets, are more volatile than gross corporate 
investment measures due to the additional volatilities brought in by disinvesting activities. 
However, they are less volatile than the net corporate investment measures, indicating that 
depreciation which may opportunistically manipulated by management is the most volatile 
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and unpredictable component in measuring corporate investment behaviour, although it has 
been conventionally considered as a process of smoothly allocating the cost of a tangible 
fixed asset over its useful life. 
5.6.3 Robustness tests and results 
To assess the robustness of our trend analysis results, we also carry out further estimation and 
testing procedures to gauge the sensitivity of our results with respect to the measurement of 
volatility, estimation techniques and model specifications.  
First, instead of using the RMSE, we calculate the mean absolute error (MAE) to 
measure the volatilities of the corporate investment measures around their respective trends. 
Hyndman and Koehler (2006) highlight an attractive additional property of the MAE that it is 
less sensitive to outliers compared to the RMSE. As shown in Appendix 5.H, the results based 
on the MAE are consistent with those based on the RMSE reported in Table 5.6. Although the 
orders of corporate investment measures ranked by different statistics are slightly different, 
our conclusions drawn from the trend analysis remain hold. 
Second, we re-estimate the trend regression model specified as Equation 5.2 using 
difference-GMM estimators. The difference-GMM estimation results reported in Appendix 
5.I are similar to those obtained from system-GMM estimation in terms of the signs and 
significant levels of the estimated coefficients. As can be seen from Appendix 5.J, the ranking 
of the corporate investment measures based on the difference-GMM estimation residuals are 
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also generally consistent with our earlier evidence presented in Table 5.6.  
Third, we examine how robust the results of trend analysis are with respect to the 
specification of the lag structure of the corporate investment measure in the regressions. In 
addition to the lagged dependent variable (INV–1), we also include a corporate investment 
measure which is lagged twice (INV–2) as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficients 
estimated for the additional lagged dependent variable are statistically insignificant in most of 
the regressions. Meanwhile, the inclusion of the additional lagged dependent variable also 
suppresses the explanatory power of other explanatory variables. However, the ranking of the 
corporate investment measures produced under this alternative specification of lag structure is 
largely consistent with our main results reported in Table 5.6. It is also found that corporate 
investment measures lagged beyond two periods have little explanatory power in all of the 
regressions.  
Besides, we also estimate a trend regression in which the time trend is included only 
as a linear term rather than as linear and quadratic terms. We find that the linear time trend 
term becomes statistically insignificant when the quadratic term is ignored, which suggests 
that the underlying trend of corporate investment behaviour over the period under 
investigation is indeed nonlinear.  
5.6.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the trend analysis of the corporate investment measures shows that the 
investment behaviour of UK-listed companies follows a U-shaped trend over the period 
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1999–2008. It is found that the gross investment measures are systematically less volatile 
around their respective trends, and thus are less noisy than the net investment measures. The 
excess volatility of net investment measures is largely due to the noise contained in 
depreciation expense which is subject to opportunistic manipulation by management. 
However, our empirical results do not show any evidence that cash based measures contain 
higher levels of noise than do their accrual based counterparts. In fact, it is suggested that cash 
based gross investment measures exhibit the lowest volatilities around their respective trends 
among the alternatives. The trend analysis results presented in this section are robust with 
respect to the measurement of volatility, model specification and estimation techniques. 
5.7 Information content analysis 
We turn now to the information content of the corporate investment measures. Information 
content analysis has been used extensively in accounting studies to address different research 
questions (see Biddle et al., 1995). However, few previous studies have applied information 
content comparisons in the field of corporate investment. Two exceptions are Park and Pincus 
(2003) and Kerstein and Kim (1995), who explicitly examine the incremental information 
about a company’s future earnings provided by capital expenditures which is not captured by 
current earnings. To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made to provide a 
comparison of the information content of the alternative corporate investment measures. To 
fill the gap, this section examines whether the alternative corporation investment measures 
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yield value relevant information which is incremental to that of current earnings; and if they 
do, which measures have the greatest value relevant incremental information content. 
5.7.1 Incremental and relative information content 
There are two types of information content analysis, namely, relative information content 
analysis and incremental information content analysis. Adam and Goyal (2008) indicate that 
incremental comparison is useful in determining whether one variable provides information 
beyond that provided by another, while relative comparison is useful in determining which 
variable has the greatest information content among the alternatives.51 
The logical relations between the relative and incremental information content 
comparisons of two variables (say X and Y, for example) can be illustrated by the Venn 
diagrams presented in Figure 5.1, which adopted from Biddle et al. (1995). The areas covered 
by the circles, as defined by Biddle et al. (1995), represent the proportion of variation in a 
dependent variable explained by predictor variables X and Y, i.e. the relative information 
content of the two predictor variables with respect to the dependent variable. The left hand 
column of Figure 5.1 portrays three possible relationships between the relative information 
contents of X and Y, while the right hand column portrays the corresponding possible 
relationships between X and Y in terms of their incremental information content with respect 
to each other.    
                                                 
51 Biddle et al. (1995) also point out that relative information content analysis applies when making mutually exclusive 
choices among alternatives, or when rankings by information content are desired. 
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Figure 5.1: Logical relation between incremental and relative information content of two 
variablesa 
 
Panel A: X and Y have equal relative information content
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a. Adopted from Biddle et al. (1995), Figure 1 on page 4.  
b. Areas covered by circles represent variation in a dependent variable explained by predictor variables X and Y. 
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provided by the two variables is exactly the same, then the two circles coincide and neither X 
or Y is incremental with respect to each other (i.e. YXYX  ). But if they provide 
different sets of information related to the dependent variable, both of them are incremental. 
This is because the information content of X and Y together is greater than that of one variable 
alone (i.e. XYX  and YYX  ). The intersection of the two circles (i.e. YX  ) 
represents the overlapping information contained in both X and Y, which can be quantified by 
the correlation between X and Y. The area in Y but not in X represents the incremental 
information content provided by Y beyond that provided by X, and vice versa. 
In Panel B of Figure 5.1, the size of the circle for X is larger than that for Y, indicating 
that variable X has greater relative information content than Y (i.e. X >Y). There are also two 
possible incremental information content outcomes. If Y is a subset of X (i.e. XY  ), then the 
information content provided by Y is already included in X and therefore only X is incremental. 
However, as long as Y is not entirely included in X, then both variables X and Y are 
incremental. In this case, although Y has smaller relative information content, it also provides 
additional information content beyond that provided by X, contributing to the information 
content of the union of the two variables. Similarly, Panel C of Figure 5.1 portrays the 
relationship between relative and incremental information content under the condition that X 
has smaller relative information content than Y.  
To sum up, the relationships between relative and incremental information are not a 
one-to-one correspondence. Each relative information content condition can be matched to at 
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least two incremental outcome conditions as shown in each of the panels of Figure 5.1. The 
relative information content of a variable is determined by its explanatory power for the 
variability of the dependent variable, which can be visualised by the size of a circle in Figure 
5.1, while the variable’s incremental information content with respect to another variable is 
determined by the additional explanatory power it provides, as reflected by the position of the 
circle relative to another circle. 
5.7.2 Empirical procedures 
In the context of corporate finance, it is generally believed that changes in corporate 
investment yield information about the changes in a company’s future prospects that is not 
captured by the company’s unexpected current earnings (see Park and Pincus, 2003; and 
Kerstein and Kim, 1995). It is argued that, if the capital market is strong form efficient, 
corporate investment decisions would not be value relevant, because the information based on 
which investment decisions are made should be fully available to the capital market and 
appropriately reflected in the security prices. However, in the real world, where information 
asymmetry exists, managers know more than outsiders about a company’s future prospects, 
and they may use their private information to make corporate investment decisions. Under 
such circumstances, unexpected changes in corporate investment would signal managers’ 
private information, such as the availability of valuable investment opportunities to the 
company and the growth opportunities of the industry, to the capital market. Therefore, 
Kerstein and Kim (1995) predict that, because managers may respond to the private 
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information about their company’s future prospects through their investment decisions, 
unexpected corporate investments are expected to be reflected in the company’s stock returns 
in a forward-looking capital market, providing value relevant information beyond that 
provided by the company’s current earnings. 
To formally assess the information content of the alternative corporate investment 
measures, we adopt the regression-based methodology developed by Biddle et al. (1995). 
Specifically, we first examine whether corporate investment measures provide value relevant 
information content beyond that of current earnings by regressing market adjusted return on 
unexpected current earnings and unexpected corporate investment. More specifically, we 
estimate the regression model specified as follows, 
 
itititit eUINVUEPSMAR  210   (5.5) 
 
where MARit denotes market adjusted return for company i over year t, which is calculated as 
the sum of capital gains and dividend incomes per share deflated by the share price at the 
beginning of the period, and then adjusted to the stock market return over the same period; 
UEPSit denotes unexpected earnings per share of company i’s common stock in year t scaled 
by the beginning of the period share price; and UINVit denotes unexpected change in the 
measure of investment ratio for company i in year t. Following the previous studies of Park 
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and Pincus (2003) and Kerstein and Kim (1995), we assume that both earnings per share and 
corporate investment follow a random walk process, so that the entire change in these two 
variables from one period to the next is considered as unexpected change.  
The model specified in Equation 5.5 first tests whether changes in corporate 
investment provide information about company’s future earnings growth opportunities in the 
presence of current earnings surprises, by examining the sign and significance level of the 
coefficient estimated for UINV (Kerstein and Kim, 1995). If the measures of corporate 
investment do indeed provide incremental value relevant information after controlling for the 
unexpected changes in earnings per share, the coefficient estimated for the changes 
incorporate investment variable is expected to be positive and statistically significant.  
If unexpected corporate investment is incremental with respect to unexpected current 
earnings, our primary focus will be shifted to the comparison of the relative information 
content of the alternative corporate investment measures. The corporate investment measures 
that have greater relative information content are expected to be statistically more significant 
in their respective regressions. The significance level of the unexpected corporate investment 
variable in the regression model can be tested using the Wald test. Under the Wald test, the 
null hypothesis that unexpected corporate investment is not informative should be rejected 
more resoundingly if the corporate investment measure being tested has greater information 
content on a relative scale. Therefore, the information content of the corporate investment 
measures can be ranked based on their respective Wald test results.  
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5.7.3 Empirical results 
The system-GMM estimation results for the regression of market adjusted returns on 
unexpected earnings and unexpected corporate investment, as specified in Equation 5.5, are 
reported in Table 5.7. As expected, the coefficients estimated for UEPS are highly significant 
in all regressions, indicating that unexpected current earnings have significant explanatory 
power for the market adjusted returns. More importantly, it is found that changes in corporate 
investment measures have the predicted positive sign everywhere and are statistically 
significant in 19 out of 20 regressions. The significantly positive coefficients found for UINV 
clearly show that unexpected corporate investment does indeed provide value relevant 
information which is incremental to that provided by current earnings. We, therefore, 
conclude that unexpected current earnings and unexpected corporate investment are 
incremental with respect to each other, and market adjusted returns are sensitive to both of 
them. The results presented in Table 5.7 are highly consistent with the theoretical argument as 
well as the empirical evidence provided by previous studies (see, for example, Park and 
Pincus, 2003; and Kerstein and Kim, 1995). Besides, results of the Arellona-Bond test for 
serial correlations and the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions reported in Table 5.7 
suggest that the model used to assess the information content of corporate investment 
measures is well specified, and the instruments used to implement the system-GMM 
estimation are generally valid. 
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Table 5.7: System-GMM estimation results for the regression of stock returns on unexpected earnings and unexpected corporate 
investmenta 
Investment measureb Constant UEPS UINV Test for AR(1)e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich Wald testi Rankj 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.0498***
c 
(2.76)d 
0.7802*** 
(7.19) 
0.0985** 
(2.17) 
–11.92*** 
(0.000) 
–1.52 
(0.128) 
66.64 
(0.230) 
22.90 
(p=0.000) 
4.71** 
(p=0.031) 
17 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.0493*** 
(2.70) 
0.777*** 
(7.34) 
0.0614** 
(2.58) 
–11.88*** 
(0.000) 
–1.52 
(0.127) 
66.31 
(0.239) 
22.97 
(p=0.000) 
6.66** 
(p=0.010) 
15 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.0446** 
(2.48) 
0.7506*** 
(7.08) 
0.1494** 
(2.47) 
–11.97*** 
(0.000) 
–1.58 
(0.114) 
66.93 
(0.223) 
22.20 
(p=0.000) 
6.10** 
(p=0.014) 
16 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.0419** 
(2.25) 
0.7459*** 
(6.98) 
0.0966*** 
(2.95) 
–11.94*** 
(0.000) 
–1.52 
(0.128) 
62.66 
(0.347) 
21.70 
(p=0.000) 
8.70*** 
(p=0.003) 
14 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0490*** 
(2.72) 
0.7544*** 
(7.00) 
0.2277 
(1.18) 
–11.87*** 
(0.000) 
–1.61 
(0.107) 
49.11 
(0.817) 
23.32 
(p=0.000) 
1.39 
(p=0.239) 
20 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.0482** 
(2.56) 
0.7524*** 
(6.69) 
0.1520*** 
(3.24) 
–11.97*** 
(0.000) 
–1.63 
(0.103) 
70.55 
(0.144) 
23.01 
(p=0.000) 
10.50*** 
(p=0.001) 
12 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.0535*** 
(2.90) 
0.7573*** 
(6.89) 
0.1427*** 
(3.85) 
–11.98*** 
(0.000) 
–1.61 
(0.107) 
65.51 
(0.261) 
25.22 
(p=0.000) 
14.82*** 
(p=0.000) 
7 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0528*** 
(2.98) 
0.7500*** 
(6.96) 
0.5329*** 
(3.34) 
–11.91*** 
(0.000) 
–1.60 
(0.110) 
58.60 
(0.490) 
24.46 
(p=0.000) 
11.16*** 
(p=0.001) 
10 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.0557*** 
(2.85) 
0.6836*** 
(6.28) 
0.3982*** 
(3.68) 
–11.78*** 
(0.000) 
–1.57 
(0.116) 
83.16** 
(0.021) 
19.73 
(p=0.000) 
13.54*** 
(p=0.000) 
9 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0457** 
(2.37) 
0.7354*** 
(6.94) 
0.3294*** 
(5.07) 
–11.02*** 
(0.000) 
–1.61 
(0.1074) 
70.10 
(0.152) 
23.77 
(p=0.000) 
25.70*** 
(p=0.000) 
1 
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Investment measureb Constant UEPS UINV Test for AR(1)e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich Wald testi Rankj 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.0453** 
(2.30) 
0.6593*** 
(6.13) 
0.5068*** 
(4.32) 
–11.82*** 
(0.000) 
–1.66* 
(0.097) 
77.64* 
(0.052) 
21.50 
(p=0.000) 
18.66*** 
(p=0.000) 
3 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.0508** 
(2.57) 
0.6676*** 
(6.44) 
0.2734*** 
(4.15) 
–11.86*** 
(0.000) 
–1.66* 
(0.096) 
75.61* 
(0.071) 
20.40 
(p=0.000) 
17.22*** 
(p=0.000) 
5 
13. GCAPXt/TAt 0.0551*** 
(3.04) 
0.7063*** 
(6.67) 
0.9042** 
(2.13) 
–11.89 *** 
(0.000) 
–1.53 
(0.126) 
54.30 
(0.649) 
20.69 
(p=0.000) 
4.54** 
(p=0.034) 
18 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0504*** 
(2.67) 
0.6946*** 
(6.61) 
1.5800*** 
(4.13) 
–11.98*** 
(0.000) 
–1.40 
(0.162) 
55.37 
(0.610) 
22.12 
(p=0.000) 
17.06*** 
(p=0.000) 
6 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0435** 
(2.36) 
0.7019*** 
(6.68) 
0.2825*** 
(4.38) 
–11.82*** 
(0.000) 
–1.56 
(0.119) 
71.17 
(0.133) 
23.36 
(p=0.000) 
19.18*** 
(p=0.000) 
2 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0429*** 
(2.40) 
0.7006*** 
(6.85) 
1.6433*** 
(3.83) 
–11.93*** 
(0.000) 
–1.52 
(0.129) 
66.37 
(0.237) 
24.57 
(p=0.000) 
14.67*** 
(p=0.000) 
8 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0501*** 
(2.76) 
0.7118*** 
(6.93) 
1.5575*** 
(4.24) 
–11.94*** 
(0.000) 
–1.47 
(0.142) 
63.82 
(0.310) 
24.86 
(p=0.000) 
17.98*** 
(p=0.000) 
4 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.0399** 
(2.14) 
0.7595*** 
(6.96) 
0.1580*** 
(3.29) 
–11.87*** 
(0.000) 
–1.44 
(0.150) 
70.51 
(0.145) 
21.06 
(p=0.000) 
10.82*** 
(p=0.001) 
11 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.0580*** 
(3.11) 
0.6776*** 
(6.12) 
0.0385* 
(1.88) 
–11.82*** 
(0.000) 
–1.66 
(0.097) 
67.16 
(0.217) 
16.93 
(p=0.000) 
3.53** 
(p=0.061) 
19 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0341* 
(1.80) 
0.7364*** 
(6.86) 
0.8043*** 
(3.21) 
–11.95*** 
(0.000) 
–1.34 
(0.180) 
63.01 
(0.336) 
20.87 
(p=0.000) 
10.30*** 
(p=0.001) 
13 
Notes:  
a. The sample 4,320 contains UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The model specified as Equation 5.5 is estimated by two-step system-GMM 
estimators using Stata 11.  
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b. Unexpected change in corporate investment measures are used as an explanatory variable in their respective regressions. The regression is specified as 
itititit eUINVUEPSMAR  210   
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables. The instruments used for the regression include Constant, Year dummies, UEPSt-1…, t-3, 
UINVt-1…, t-3, ∆Year dummies, ∆UEPSt and ∆UINVt. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is 
robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test has its own 
problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
h. F-statistic for the regression which tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
i. We perform Wald test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on UINV is equal to zero. The test reports results using the F-statistic. The associated p-value is 
reported in parenthesis. 
j. The corporate investment measures are ranked based on their respective Wald test results from the highest informative to lowest informative. 
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We now focus on the relative information content of the alternative corporate 
investment measures. The Wald test is carried out to test the significance of the unexpected 
corporate investment variable in each regression. The Wald test results are reported in Table 
5.7. In addition, the alternative corporate investment measures are ranked from the most 
informative to the least informative based on their respective Wald test results. It is found that 
cash based corporate investment measures are systematically more informative compared to 
their accrual based counterparts. This finding lends strong support to the prediction that 
investors are more concerned with cash flow based measures, which are less subject to 
distortions from differing accounting practices. The accrual based corporate investment 
measures, which are more likely to be distorted by the choices of discretionary accounting 
policies and by managers’ opportunistic manipulations, are thus less relevant to company 
value. Therefore, our empirical evidence rejects Hypothesis 4 that cash based and accrual 
based corporate investment measures are equally informative, in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis that cash based measures are relatively more informative.  
Besides, the results presented in Table 5.7 do not show any systematic difference 
between the gross and net corporate investment measures in terms of their value relevant 
information content. However, for the accrual based measures, net corporate investment 
measures seem to be slightly more informative than gross corporate investment measures. 
Overall, we do not find significant evidence that net corporate investment measures are more 
informative than gross corporate investment measures. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 that net 
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corporate investment measures are as informative as their corresponding gross corporate 
investment measures cannot be rejected based on our empirical evidence.  
5.7.4 Robustness tests and results 
To ensure the robustness of the results regarding the information content of the corporate 
investment measures presented in this section, we carry out further estimation and testing 
procedures. First, we re-estimate Equation 5.5 using fixed effect estimators to determine the 
robustness of the results of the regression analysis with respect to changes in estimation 
techniques. The fixed effect estimation is implemented because the model specified in 
Equation 5.5 does not have a dynamic structure, and thus the econometric techniques for 
dynamic panel data are not required. However, we also confronted with the choice of using 
fixed effect or random effect estimators. As reported in Appendix 5.K, the results of Hausman 
test are highly significant everywhere, indicating that the fixed effect estimation should be 
more appropriate. The fixed effect estimation results presented in Appendix 5.K are largely 
consistent with our main results discussed earlier in terms of the sign and significance level of 
the estimated coefficients as well as the order of the corporate investment measures ranked on 
the basis of the Wald test results. 
Second, instead of assuming a random walk process, we assume that corporate 
investment behaviour follows an underlying trend as modelled by Equation 5.2. Accordingly, 
we use the residuals obtained from estimating Equation 5.2 as an alternative measure of 
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unexpected corporate investment. The results of information content analysis based on the 
alternative measures of unexpected corporate investment are presented in Appendix 5.L. 
Although there are some differences in the ranking of the corporate investment measures, they 
do not alter the conclusions drawn from our main results.  
In addition to the information content analysis, we also carry out a factor analysis in 
an attempt to form a most informative single variable by extracting a common factor from the 
twenty corporate investment measures. However, it is found that the common factor extracted 
from the corporate investment measures does not outperform the individual measures in the 
highest ranked group in terms of value relevant information content.  
5.7.5 Conclusion 
To sum up, the information content analysis shows that corporate investment indeed provides 
value relevant information which is incremental to that provided by current earnings. More 
importantly, it is found that cash based corporate investment measures are systematically 
more informative than their accrual based counterparts, suggesting that investors are more 
concerned with cash flow based measures which are less likely to be distorted by the choices 
of discretionary accounting policies and by managers’ opportunistic manipulations in practice. 
However, our results do not show a systematic difference between gross and net corporate 
investment measures in terms of their value relevant information content. The conclusions 
drawn from our information content analysis are robust with respect to various estimation 
techniques and alternative construction of variables.  
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Table 5.8: Volatility-information content matrix for corporate investment measuresa 
Notes:  
a. The volatility-information content matrix for corporate investment measures is constructed based on the results 
of trend analysis and information content analysis presented in Sections 5.6 and 5.7. 
b. Corporate investment measures whose volatility around its underlying trend is lower than the median are 
defined as low-volatility measures; and the opposite as high-volatility measures. 
c. Corporate investment measures whose information content is greater than the median are defined as 
high-information content measures; and the opposite as low-information content measures. 
 
The empirical findings drawn from the information content analysis alongside those 
drawn from the trend analysis can be summarised in Table 5.8. Specifically, we define the 
corporate investment measures whose volatility around the trend is lower than the median as 
low-volatility measures, and the opposite as high-volatility measures. Similarly, we define the 
corporate investment measures whose information content is greater than the median as 
high-information content measures, and the opposite as low-information content measures. 
The corporate investment measures are then grouped based on their volatilities and value 
relevant information contents.  
The volatility-information content matrix clearly shows that cash based gross 
 Low-volatilityb High-volatility 
High-information contentc 
GCAPXt /Kt; 
GCAPXt /Kt–1; 
GCAPXt /Krt; 
GCAPXt /Krt–1; 
GCAPXt /TAt–1; 
NCAPXt /Kt–1;  
NCAPXt /TAt; 
NCAPXt /TAt–1; 
NINVt /Kt–1; 
NINVt /TAt–1; 
Low-information content 
GCAPXt /TAt; 
GINVt /Kt; 
GINVt /Krt;  
GINVt /Krt–1; 
GINVt /TAt;  
GINVt /Kt–1; 
NINVt /Kt; 
NSFAt /Kt; 
NSFAt /Krt–1; 
NSFAt /TAt–1; 
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corporate investment measures, except GCAPXt /TAt, contain less noise and provide greater 
value relevant information, and thus are the best performing measures among the alternatives. 
Both cash based and accrual based net corporate investment measures, excluding NINVt /Kt, 
are also rather informative, but they exhibit relatively high levels of volatility around their 
respective underlying trends, which makes them noisy and less predictable. In contrast, 
accrual based gross corporate investment measures, with the exception of GINVt /Kt–1, are 
found to be less volatile and thus more predictable. However, they are relatively less relevant 
to company value, and hence less useful in explaining variations in company value. Besides, 
cash based net spending on fixed assets measures are without exception characterised by high 
volatility and low information content, therefore are less attractive compared to the 
alternatives.  
5.8 Concluding remarks 
The use of corporate investment to capital stock ratio as a measure of corporate investment 
behaviour has been common practice in empirical analyses. Although the corporate 
investment measures are similarly constructed, they in fact vary both in terms of the 
numerator and the denominator. However, no attempt has been made to provide a comparison 
among various corporate investment measures. One claim which has been implicitly made is 
that different measures of corporate investment behaviour will always yield the same, or at 
least qualitatively similar, results in empirical analyses. As a consequence, we know little 
about how differently these corporate investment measures perform in empirical analyses, and 
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the extent to which the choice of corporate investment measures may influence the 
conclusions drawn from empirical analyses. This chapter, therefore, aims to fill these gaps by 
offering the first attempt to discriminate conceptually and evaluate empirically twenty 
different corporate investment measures which are currently used in the literature.  
We first discriminate various corporate investment measures from an accounting 
perspective. Given the fact that different accounting principles as well as different elements 
are involved in the preparation of relevant accounting items used to construct the corporate 
investment measures, corporate investment to capital stock ratios with different specifications 
are likely to carry different sets of information about a company’s investing activities. Due to 
a lack of understanding of the financial information provided by the relevant accounting items, 
corporate investment measures are potentially misused in empirical analyses of corporate 
investment behaviour. The conflicting conclusions drawn from the existing literature on 
corporate investment, therefore, may also be attributable to the differences in measuring 
companies’ investment behaviour. 
Based on a balanced panel of UK-listed companies over the period 1999–2008, it is 
found that the corporate investment measures with different specifications are not uniformly 
positively correlated with one another. Significantly negative correlations are also observed 
among the alternatives, which appear surprising since they are supposed to measure the 
investment behaviour of the same batch of companies over the same period of time. Therefore, 
we argue that the choice of corporate investment measures is likely to have a profound impact 
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on the conclusions drawn from the empirical analyses of corporate investment behaviour. Our 
argument is empirically supported by the results obtained from estimating a simple Tobin’s Q 
model. As expected, distinct conclusions with respect to the association between Tobin’s Q 
and companies’ investment behaviour can be drawn when different corporate investment 
measures are employed as the dependent variable, indicating that the measurement of 
corporate investment behaviour does indeed matter in empirical analyses. 
To evaluate the empirical performance of the alternative corporate investment 
measures, we carry out both trend analysis and information content analysis. The trend 
analysis results suggest that the gross investment measures are systematically less volatile 
around their respective trends, and thus are less noisy compared to the net investment 
measures. The excess volatility of net investment measures is largely due to the noise 
contained in the depreciation component which is potentially subject to managerial 
manipulation. Meanwhile, the information content analysis results show that cash based 
corporate investment measures are systematically more informative than their accrual based 
counterparts, suggesting that investors are more concerned with cash flow based measures 
which are less likely to be distorted by the choices of discretionary accounting policies and by 
managers’ opportunistic manipulations as compared to the accrual based measures. 
According to the results from both analyses, we conclude that cash based gross 
corporate investment to capital stock ratios are the best performing measures of corporate 
investments behaviour among the alternatives, as they contain relatively less noise and greater 
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value relevant information. Researchers in the area of corporate finance, therefore, are 
suggested to utilise cash based gross corporate investment measures for their future empirical 
analyses if they have to make mutually exclusive choices among the alternatives without any 
particular preference. Overall, this chapter may shed some light and provide some guidance 
for measuring corporate investment behaviour. 
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Appendix 5.A: Perpetual inventory method for estimating the replacement value of 
capital stock 
 
Replacement value of capital stock (Kr) used in this chapter is calculated on the basis on the standard perpetual 
inventory formula developed by Salinger and Summers (1983). Specifically, we treat book value of net property, 
plant and equipment (NPPE) as historic value of capital stock, and assume that replacement value and historic 
value are the same in the first year of data for each company. We then apply the perpetual inventory formula as 
follows: 
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where Lit represents the useful life of company i’s capital goods in year t; GPPEt–1 represents book value of gross 
property, plant and equipment at the beginning of year t; INVt represents corporate investment in year t; DDAt 
represents accounting depreciation, depletion and amortization in year t; Kr represents the replacement value of 
capital stock; and pt represents the price of investment goods, which is proxied by the implicit deflator for gross 
fixed capital formation obtained from UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). Since Lit fluctuates from year to 
year, we use Li which is an average of Lit over time as a proxy for the useful life of company i’s capital goods. 
The amount of the capital stock depreciated each year is calculated based on the assumption that economic 
depreciation is double declining balance (this may result in negative replacement value of capital stock). See 
Salinger and Summer (1983) for the other assumptions necessary to use this method of calculation. 
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Appendix 5.B: Mean-comparison test results for alternative corporate investment measuresa 
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GCAPX
 
12. 
1t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 
2. 
1t
t
K
GINV
 –0.091
c 
(0.0000)
d 
                  
3. 
t
t
Kr
GINV
 0.063 
(0.0000) 
0.154 
(0.0000) 
                 
4. 
1t
t
Kr
GINV
 0.000 
(0.9662) 
0.091 
(0.0000) 
–0.063 
(0.0000) 
                
5. 
t
t
TA
GINV
 0.221 
(0.0000) 
0.312 
(0.0000) 
0.158 
(0.0000) 
0.221 
(0.0000) 
               
6. 
t
t
K
NINV
 0.266 
(0.0000) 
0.357 
(0.0000) 
0.203 
(0.0000) 
0.266 
(0.0000) 
0.045 
(0.0000) 
              
7. 
1t
t
K
NINV
 0.205 
(0.0000) 
0.296 
(0.0000) 
0.142 
(0.0000) 
0.205 
(0.0000) 
–0.162 
(0.0000) 
–0.061 
(0.0000) 
             
8. 
1t
t
TA
NINV
 0.259 
(0.0000) 
0.350 
(0.0000) 
0.196 
(0.0000) 
0.259 
(0.0000) 
0.037 
(0.0000) 
–0.007 
(0.0000) 
0.054 
(0.0000) 
            
9. 
t
t
K
GCAPX
 
0.049 
(0.0000) 
0.140 
(0.0000) 
–0.014 
(0.0000) 
0.049 
(0.0000) 
–0.172 
(0.0000) 
–0.217 
(0.0000) 
–0.156 
(0.0000) 
–0.210 
(0.0000) 
           
10. 
1t
t
K
GCAPX
 0.027 
(0.0000) 
0.118 
(0.0000) 
–0.036 
(0.0000) 
0.027 
(0.0000) 
–0.195 
(0.0000) 
–0.239 
(0.0000) 
–0.178 
(0.0000) 
–0.232 
(0.0000) 
–0.022 
(0.0000) 
          
11. 
t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 0.070 
(0.0000) 
0.161 
(0.0000) 
0.007 
(0.0029) 
0.070 
(0.0000) 
–0.152 
(0.0000) 
–0.196 
(0.0000) 
–0.135 
(0.0000) 
–0.189 
(0.0000) 
0.020 
(0.0000) 
0.043 
(0.0000) 
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Variableb 
1.
t
t
K
GINV
 
2.
1t
t
K
GINV
 
3.
t
t
Kr
GINV
 
4.
1t
t
Kr
GINV
 
5.
t
t
TA
GINV
 
6.
t
t
K
NINV
 
7.
1t
t
K
NINV
 
8.
1t
t
TA
NINV
 
9. 
t
t
K
GCAPX
 
10. 
1t
t
K
GCAPX
 
11. 
t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
12. 
1t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 
12. 
1t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 0.040 
(0.0000) 
0.131 
(0.0000) 
–0.023 
(0.0000) 
0.049 
(0.0000) 
–0.182 
(0.0000) 
–0.226 
(0.0000) 
–0.165 
(0.0000) 
–0.219 
(0.0000) 
–0.009 
(0.0007) 
0.013 
(0.0000) 
–0.030 
(0.0000) 
        
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 0.227 
(0.0000) 
0.318 
(0.0000) 
0.164 
(0.0000) 
0.227 
(0.0000) 
0.006 
(0.0000) 
–0.039 
(0.0000) 
0.022 
(0.0000) 
–0.032 
(0.0000) 
0.178 
(0.0000) 
0.200 
(0.0000) 
0.158 
(0.0000) 
0.187 
(0.0000) 
       
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 0.221 
(0.0000) 
0.321 
(0.0000) 
0.158 
(0.0000) 
0.221 
(0.0000) 
–0.001 
(0.4100) 
–0.045 
(0.0000) 
0.016 
(0.0000) 
–0.038 
(0.0000) 
0.172 
(0.0000) 
0.194 
(0.0000) 
0.151 
(0.0000) 
0.181 
(0.0000) 
–0.006 
(0.0000) 
      
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 0.289 
(0.0000) 
0.380 
(0.0000) 
0.226 
(0.0000) 
0.289 
(0.0000) 
0.067 
(0.0000) 
0.226 
(0.0000) 
0.084 
(0.0000) 
0.030 
(0.0000) 
0.240 
(0.0000) 
0.262 
(0.0000) 
0.219 
(0.0000) 
0.249 
(0.0000) 
0.062 
(0.0000) 
0.068 
(0.0000) 
     
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 0.271 
(0.0000) 
0.362 
(0.0000) 
0.208 
(0.0000) 
0.271 
(0.0000) 
0.050 
(0.0000) 
0.005 
(0.1550) 
0.066 
(0.0000) 
0.012 
(0.0000) 
0.222 
(0.0000) 
0.244 
(0.0000) 
0201. 
(0.0000) 
0.231 
(0.0000) 
0.044 
(0.0000) 
0.050 
(0.0000) 
–0.018 
(0.0000) 
    
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 0.268 
(0.0000) 
0.360 
(0.0000) 
0.205 
(0.0000) 
0.268 
(0.0000) 
0.047 
(0.0000) 
0.002 
(0.4980) 
0.063 
(0.0000) 
0.010 
(0.0000) 
0.219 
(0.0000) 
0.242 
(0.0000) 
0.199 
(0.0000) 
0.229 
(0.0000) 
0.041 
(0.0000) 
0.048 
(0.0000) 
–0.020 
(0.0000) 
–0.003 
(0.0000) 
   
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 0.148 
(0.0000) 
0.239 
(0.0000) 
0.085 
(0.0000) 
0.148 
(0.0000) 
–0.073 
(0.0000) 
–0.118 
(0.0000) 
–0.057 
(0.0000) 
–0.111 
(0.0000) 
0.099 
(0.0000) 
0.121 
(0.0000) 
0.078 
(0.0000) 
0.108 
(0.0000) 
–0.079 
(0.0000) 
–0.073 
(0.0000) 
–0.141 
(0.0000) 
–0.123 
(0.0000) 
–0.120 
(0.0000) 
  
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 0.043 
(0.0000) 
0.134 
(0.0000) 
–0.020 
(0.0000) 
0.043 
(0.0000) 
–0.179 
(0.0000) 
–0.223 
(0.0000) 
–0.162 
(0.0000) 
–0.216 
(0.0000) 
–0.007 
(0.3035) 
0.016 
(0.0094) 
–0.027 
(0.0000) 
0.003 
(0.0000) 
–0.185 
(0.0000) 
–0.178 
(0.0000) 
–0.246 
(0.0000) 
–0.228 
(0.0000) 
–0.226 
(0.0000) 
–0.105 
(0.0000) 
 
20. 
1t
t
TA
NSFA
 0.241 
(0.0000) 
0.332 
(0.0000) 
0.178 
(0.0000) 
0.241 
(0.0000) 
0.019 
(0.0000) 
–0.025 
(0.0000) 
0.036 
(0.0000) 
–0.018 
(0.0000) 
0.192 
(0.0000) 
0.214 
(0.0000) 
0.171 
(0.0000) 
0.201 
(0.0000) 
0.014 
(0.0000) 
0.020 
(0.0000) 
–0.048 
(0.0000) 
–0.030 
(0.0000) 
–0.028 
(0.0000) 
0.093 
(0.0000) 
0.198 
(0.0000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations over the period 1999–2008. 
b. See detailed definitions of the corporate investment measures in Table 5.1. 
c. For each cell, the reported figure is the pair-wise difference in the means between the corresponding investment measures. 
d. Figures in parentheses underneath denote p-values, reporting the significance level of the difference in the means between the corresponding investment measures.  
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Appendix 5.C: Time series plot of annual mean values of corporate investment measuresa 
    
    
1. GINVt /Kt
b 2. GINVt /Kt–1 3. GINVt /Krt 4. GINVt /Krt–1 
    
    
5. GINVt /TAt 6. NINVt /Kt 7. NINVt /Kt–1 8. NINVt /TAt–1 
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9. GCAPXt /Kt 10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 11. GCAPXt /Krt 12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 
    
    
13. GCAPXt /TAt 14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 16. NCAPXt /TAt 
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17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 18. NSFAt /Kt 19. NSFAt /Krt–1 20. NSFAt /TAt–1 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations over the period 1999–2008.  
b. See detailed definitions of the corporate investment measures in Table 5.1. 
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Appendix 5.D: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of alternative corporate investment measuresa 
Variableb 
1.
t
t
K
GINV
 
2.
1t
t
K
GINV
 
3.
t
t
Kr
GINV
 
4.
1t
t
Kr
GINV
 
5.
t
t
TA
GINV
 
6.
t
t
K
NINV
 
7.
1t
t
K
NINV
 
8.
1t
t
TA
NINV
 
9. 
t
t
K
GCAPX
 
10. 
1t
t
K
GCAPX
 
11. 
t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
12. 
1t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 
2. 
1t
t
K
GINV
 0.989
c 
(0.0000)
d          
         
3. 
t
t
Kr
GINV
 0.887 
(0.0000) 
0.901 
(0.0000)         
         
4. 
1t
t
Kr
GINV
 0.883 
(0.0000) 
0.905 
(0.0000) 
0.990 
(0.0000)        
         
5. 
t
t
TA
GINV
 0.565 
(0.0000) 
0.618 
(0.0000) 
0.633 
(0.0000) 
0.663 
(0.0000)       
         
6. 
t
t
K
NINV
 0.635 
(0.0000) 
0.721 
(0.0000) 
0.693 
(0.0000) 
0.734 
(0.0000) 
0.698 
(0.0000)      
         
7. 
1t
t
K
NINV
 0.635 
(0.0000) 
0.721 
(0.0000) 
0.693 
(0.0000) 
0.734 
(0.0000) 
0.698 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
(0.0000)     
         
8. 
1t
t
TA
NINV
 0.593 
(0.0000) 
0.673 
(0.0000) 
0.660 
(0.0000) 
0.702 
(0.0000) 
0.785 
(0.0000) 
0.920 
(0.0000) 
0.920 
(0.0000)    
         
9. 
t
t
K
GCAPX
 
0.553 
(0.0000) 
0.538 
(0.0000) 
0.482 
(0.0000) 
0.462 
(0.0000) 
0.164 
(0.0000) 
0.251 
(0.0000) 
0.251 
(0.0000) 
0.210 
(0.0000)   
         
10. 
1t
t
K
GCAPX
 0.723 
(0.0000) 
0.734 
(0.0000) 
0.674 
(0.0000) 
0.669 
(0.0000) 
0.381 
(0.0000) 
0.540 
(0.0000) 
0.540 
(0.0000) 
0.476 
(0.0000) 
0.908 
(0.0000)  
         
11. 
t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 0.579 
(0.0000) 
0.586 
(0.0000) 
0.733 
(0.0000) 
0.714 
(0.0000) 
0.397 
(0.0000) 
0.428 
(0.0000) 
0.429 
(0.0000) 
0.398 
(0.0000) 
0.646 
(0.0000) 
0.722 
(0.0000) 
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Variableb 
1.
t
t
K
GINV
 
2.
1t
t
K
GINV
 
3.
t
t
Kr
GINV
 
4.
1t
t
Kr
GINV
 
5.
t
t
TA
GINV
 
6.
t
t
K
NINV
 
7.
1t
t
K
NINV
 
8.
1t
t
TA
NINV
 
9. 
t
t
K
GCAPX
 
10. 
1t
t
K
GCAPX
 
11. 
t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
12. 
1t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 
12. 
1t
t
Kr
GCAPX
 0.569 
(0.0000) 
0.583 
(0.0000) 
0.722 
(0.0000) 
0.711 
(0.0000) 
0.419 
(0.0000) 
0.465 
(0.0000) 
0.465 
(0.0000) 
0.433 
(0.0000) 
0.644 
(0.0000) 
0.731 
(0.0000) 
0.993 
(0.0000) 
        
13. 
t
t
TA
GCAPX
 –0.028 
(0.0677) 
0.025 
(0.1016) 
0.115 
(0.0000) 
0.138 
(0.0000) 
0.561 
(0.0000) 
0.291 
(0.0000) 
0.291 
(0.0000) 
0.345 
(0.0000) 
0.275 
(0.0000) 
0.320 
(0.0000) 
0.326 
(0.0000) 
0.363 
(0.0000) 
       
14. 
1t
t
TA
GCAPX
 0.100 
(0.0000) 
0.161 
(0.0000) 
0.248 
(0.0000) 
0.275 
(0.0000) 
0.635 
(0.0000) 
0.436 
(0.0000) 
0.436 
(0.0000) 
0.484 
(0.0000) 
0.298 
(0.0000) 
0.407 
(0.0000) 
0.401 
(0.0000) 
0.441 
(0.0000) 
0.951 
(0.0000) 
      
15. 
1t
t
K
NCAPX
 –0.051 
(0.0007) 
0.036 
(0.0188) 
0.090 
(0.0000) 
0.124 
(0.0000) 
0.295 
(0.0000) 
0.472 
(0.0000) 
0.472 
(0.0000) 
0.482 
(0.0000) 
0.262 
(0.0000) 
0.353 
(0.0000) 
0.240 
(0.0000) 
0.291 
(0.0000) 
0.641 
(0.0000) 
0.666 
(0.0000) 
     
16. 
t
t
TA
NCAPX
 –0.009 
(0.5428) 
0.068 
(0.0000) 
0.112 
(0.0000) 
0.144 
(0.0000) 
0.314 
(0.0000) 
0.471 
(0.0000) 
0.471 
(0.0000) 
0.538 
(0.0000) 
0.286 
(0.0000) 
0.377 
(0.0000) 
0.254 
(0.0000) 
0.303 
(0.0000) 
0.645 
(0.0000) 
0.674 
(0.0000) 
0.919 
(0.0000) 
    
17. 
1t
t
TA
NCAPX
 –0.021 
(0.1692) 
0.056 
(0.0002) 
0.100 
(0.0000) 
0.133 
(0.0000) 
0.307 
(0.0000) 
0.455 
(0.0000) 
0.455 
(0.0000) 
0.527 
(0.0000) 
0.284 
(0.0000) 
0.369 
(0.0000) 
0.247 
(0.0000) 
0.297 
(0.0000) 
0.645 
(0.0000) 
0.669 
(0.0000) 
0.931 
(0.0000) 
0.991 
(0.0000) 
   
18. 
t
t
K
NSFA
 0.587 
(0.0000) 
0.586 
(0.0000) 
0.548 
(0.0000) 
0.541 
(0.0000) 
0.360 
(0.0000) 
0.416 
(0.0000) 
0.416 
(0.0000) 
0.375 
(0.0000) 
0.688 
(0.0000) 
0.732 
(0.0000) 
0.552 
(0.0000) 
0.554 
(0.0000) 
0.278 
(0.0000) 
0.332 
(0.0000) 
0.245 
(0.0000) 
0.263 
(0.0000) 
0.258 
(0.0000) 
  
19. 
1t
t
Kr
NSFA
 0.420 
(0.0000) 
0.436 
(0.0000) 
0.524 
(0.0000) 
0.522 
(0.0000) 
0.355 
(0.0000) 
0.399 
(0.0000) 
0.399 
(0.0000) 
0.382 
(0.0000) 
0.401 
(0.0000) 
0.485 
(0.0000) 
0.606 
(0.0000) 
0.612 
(0.0000) 
0.251 
(0.0000) 
0.313 
(0.0000) 
0.241 
(0.0000) 
0.240 
(0.0000) 
0.240 
(0.0000) 
0.605 
(0.0000) 
 
20. 
1t
t
TA
NSFA
 0.256 
(0.0000) 
0.304 
(0.0000) 
0.363 
(0.0000) 
0.386 
(0.0000) 
0.659 
(0.0000) 
0.496 
(0.0000) 
0.496 
(0.0000) 
0.545 
(0.0000) 
0.273 
(0.0000) 
0.408 
(0.0000) 
0.386 
(0.0000) 
0.415 
(0.0000) 
0.723 
(0.0000) 
0.783 
(0.0000) 
0.517 
(0.0000) 
0.532 
(0.0000) 
0.529 
(0.0000) 
0.658 
(0.0000) 
0.526 
(0.0000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations over the period 1999–2008. 
b. See detailed definitions of the corporate investment measures in Table 5.1. 
c. For each cell, the reported figure is the pair-wise Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the corresponding corporate investment measures. 
d. Figures in parentheses underneath denote p-values, reporting the significance level of each correlation coefficient. 
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Appendix 5.E: Difference-GMM estimation results for Tobin’s Q model of corporate investmenta  
Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Sargan testg Wald testh 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.2861***
c 
(15.55)d 
0.0013 
(0.25) 
0.2152*** 
(7.39) 
–10.59*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.56 
(p=0.119) 
32.75 
(p=0.577) 
170.31*** 
(p=0.000) 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.4199*** 
(13.01) 
0.0048 
(0.55) 
0.1631*** 
(5.80) 
–9.16*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.43 
(p= 0.664) 
49.61* 
(p=0.052) 
143.53*** 
(p=0.000) 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.2077*** 
(12.39) 
0.0004 
(0.12) 
0.1899*** 
(7.85) 
–11.03*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.58 
(p=0.113) 
45.17 
(p=0.116) 
177.33*** 
(p=0.000) 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.2467*** 
(13.17) 
0.0038 
(0.64) 
0.1787*** 
(7.82) 
–8.72*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.07 
(p=0.942) 
52.60** 
(p=0.028) 
196.53*** 
(p=0.000) 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0518*** 
(11.13) 
0.0006 
(0.66) 
0.1760*** 
(6.30) 
–10.09*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.15 
(p=0.881) 
44.02 
(p=0.141) 
114.96*** 
(p=0.000) 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.0586*** 
(3.72) 
–0.0024 
(–0.40) 
0.1776*** 
(7.47) 
–11.20*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.84 
(p=0.398) 
27.90 
(p=0.797) 
152.92*** 
(p=0.000) 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.1517*** 
(6.14) 
–0.0049 
(–0.77) 
0.1461*** 
(6.52) 
–10.48*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.33 
(p=0.739) 
37.00 
(p=0.376) 
163.44*** 
(p=0.000) 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0297*** 
(5.93) 
–0.0017* 
(–1.69) 
0.1888*** 
(7.67) 
–9.49*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.58 
(p=0.556) 
51.12** 
(p=0.038) 
176.93*** 
(p=0.000) 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1383*** 
(12.92) 
0.0069*** 
(2.72) 
0.3094*** 
(11.01) 
–9.33*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.71 
(p=0.473) 
41.83 
(p=0.198) 
188.87*** 
(p=0.000) 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.1779*** 
(12.24) 
0.0097*** 
(2.56) 
0.2599*** 
(10.91) 
–8.95*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.68* 
(p=0.093) 
38.47 
(p=0.315) 
236.99*** 
(p=0.000) 
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Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Sargan testg Wald testh 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1236*** 
(10.85) 
0.0057*** 
(3.31) 
0.4035*** 
(12.77) 
–8.16*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.88 
(p=0.378) 
42.56 
(p=0.177) 
294.61*** 
(p=0.000) 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.1406*** 
(11.28) 
0.0072** 
(2.18) 
0.3182*** 
(13.35) 
–7.29*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.95 
(p=0.337) 
46.17* 
(p=0.0981) 
294.21*** 
(p=0.000) 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0298*** 
(12.54) 
0.0006 
(1.30) 
0.4114*** 
(14.71) 
–8.39*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.47  
(p=0.139) 
41.81  
(p= 0.198) 
364.69*** 
(p=0.000) 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0372*** 
(11.08) 
0.0005 
(0.97) 
0.4033*** 
(15.71) 
–8.07 
(p=0.000) 
–0.99 
(p=0.318) 
47.56* 
(p=0.076) 
460.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0048 
(0.38) 
0.0051 
(1.53) 
0.3719*** 
(12.63) 
–9.22*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.28 
(p=0.197) 
41.69 
(p=0.202) 
358.55*** 
(p=0.000) 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0020 
(1.10) 
0.0009* 
(1.86) 
0.4342*** 
(16.28) 
–9.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.74* 
(p=0.081) 
33.87 
(p=0.522) 
409.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0037*** 
(1.53) 
0.0004 
(0.80) 
0.4096*** 
(14.87) 
–8.30*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.70* 
(p= 0.087) 
34.31 
(p=0.501) 
352.26*** 
(p=0.000) 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.0599** 
(2.56) 
0.0162*** 
(2.87) 
0.0982*** 
(4.33) 
–9.06*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.17 
(p=0.861) 
37.32 
(p=0.362) 
45.73*** 
(p=0.000) 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.2050*** 
(5.87) 
0.0141 
(1.32) 
0.0904*** 
(3.64) 
–8.74*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.80 
(p=0.421) 
31.74 
(p=0.626) 
39.47*** 
(p=0.000) 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0282*** 
(6.44) 
0.0008 
(0.84) 
0.2383*** 
(8.66) 
–10.18*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.08 
(p=0.931) 
44.26 
(p=0.135) 
102.75*** 
(p=0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The simple Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment is estimated by 
difference-GMM estimators using Stata 11. The first year observation for each company is lost because the dynamic structure of the model. 
 – 368 – 
b. Different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable (INV) in their respective regressions. The Tobin’s Q model is specified as
itititit INVQINV   1210  
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables. The instruments used for the regression include Constant, ∆Year dummies, ∆Qt, and 
INVt-2…. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Sargan overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test 
statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. Under the null hypothesis of instrument validity, the Sargan test has an asymptotic Chi-squared 
distribution. 
h. The Wald test tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 5.F: System-GMM estimation results for Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment without dynamic structurea 
Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q Test for AR(1)e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.2230***
c 
(7.00)d 
0.0103 
(0.86) 
–10.05*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.76* 
(p=0.079) 
29.09 
(p=0.142) 
6.47*** 
(p=0.000) 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.3010***
c 
(3.37)d 
0.0301*** 
(2.95) 
–8.53*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.80* 
(p=0.075) 
23.21 
(p=0.395) 
5.47*** 
(p=0.000) 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.1831*** 
(9.11) 
0.0188*** 
(2.75) 
–9.72*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.52 
(p=0.128) 
25.61 
(p=0.269) 
7.96*** 
(p=0.000) 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.2379*** 
(7.41) 
0.0375*** 
(3.93) 
–8.55*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.14** 
(p=0.032) 
17.78 
(p=0.719) 
10.64*** 
(p=0.000) 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0674*** 
(11.54) 
–0.0004 
(–0.24) 
–9.57*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.47** 
(p=0.013) 
21.06 
(p=0.517) 
6.25*** 
(p=0.000) 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.0577*** 
(2.21) 
–0.0027 
(–0.31) 
–10.61*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.12** 
(p=0.034) 
25.21 
(p=0.287) 
6.45*** 
(p=0.000) 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.1405*** 
(4.13) 
–0.0036 
(–0.31) 
–9.81*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.46** 
(p=0.014) 
30.25 
(p=0.112) 
8.14*** 
(p=0.000) 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0359*** 
(5.22) 
–0.0015 
(–0.78) 
–9.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
–3.02*** 
(p=0.003) 
31.03* 
(p=0.096) 
9.98*** 
(p=0.000) 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1999*** 
(13.90) 
0.0133** 
(2.59) 
–8.56*** 
(p=0.000) 
–4.48*** 
(p=0.000) 
27.35 
(p=0.1982) 
4.26*** 
(p=0.000) 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2359*** 
(10.26) 
0.0211** 
(2.44) 
–8.18*** 
(p=0.000) 
–5.46*** 
(p=0.000) 
23.78 
(p=0.3589) 
6.37*** 
(p=0.000) 
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Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q Test for AR(1)e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.2076*** 
(13.00) 
0.0124** 
(2.10) 
–6.62*** 
(p=0.000) 
–5.04*** 
(p=0.000) 
35.96** 
(p=0.031) 
7.27*** 
(p=0.000) 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.2466*** 
(10.30) 
0.0175** 
(1.99) 
–6.64*** 
(p=0.000) 
–4.79*** 
(p=0.000) 
34.45** 
(p=0.044) 
8.53*** 
(p=0.000) 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0640*** 
(17.66) 
0.0006 
(0.73) 
–7.07*** 
(p=0.000) 
–4.49*** 
(p=0.000) 
27.02 
(p=0.210) 
9.66*** 
(p=0.000) 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0768*** 
(19.01) 
0.0014** 
(1.99) 
–6.31*** 
(p=0.000) 
–4.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
31.06* 
(p=0.095) 
10.88*** 
(p=0.000) 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0561*** 
(2.47) 
0.0079 
(0.98) 
–7.91*** 
(p=0.000) 
–4.98*** 
(p=0.000) 
35.49** 
(p=0.034) 
9.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0203*** 
(6.77) 
–0.0001 
(–0.03) 
–6.80*** 
(p=0.000) 
–5.84*** 
(p=0.000) 
43.52*** 
(p=0.004) 
9.89*** 
(p=0.000) 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0241*** 
(6.47) 
0.0006 
(0.74) 
–6.47*** 
(p=0.000) 
–4.91*** 
(p=0.000) 
50.59 
(p=0.001) 
9.27*** 
(p=0.000) 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.1033*** 
(4.50) 
0.0118 
(1.49) 
–9.07*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.85 
(p=0.397) 
32.96* 
(p=0.062) 
1.70* 
(p=0.079) 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.1773*** 
(3.62) 
0.0323** 
(1.96) 
–8.60*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.75* 
(p=0.081) 
32.23* 
(p=0.073) 
1.57 
(p=0.112) 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0486*** 
(9.91) 
0.0017 
(1.57) 
–9.43*** 
(p=0.000) 
–2.61*** 
(p=0.009) 
27.96 
(p=0.177) 
4.67*** 
(p=0.000) 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The re-specified Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment is estimated by 
two-step system-GMM estimators using Stata 11. 
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b. Different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable (INV) in their respective regressions. The Tobin’s Q model is re-specified as
ititit QINV   10 . 
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables. The instruments used for the regression include Constant, Year dummies, Qt-2, Qt-3, ∆Year 
dummies, and ∆Qt. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is 
robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test has its own 
problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
h. F-statistic for the regression which tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 5.G: System-GMM estimation results for Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment with alternative measure of Qa 
Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.1326***
c 
(3.37)d 
0.0179*** 
(2.95) 
0.6883*** 
(5.17) 
–5.20*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.78* 
(p=0.075) 
23.90 
(p=0.200) 
11.85*** 
(p=0.000) 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.3820*** 
(3.74) 
0.0296** 
(1.99) 
0.1756 
(0.68) 
–2.11** 
(p=0.035) 
–0.09 
(p=0.926) 
25.07 
(p=0.158) 
7.69*** 
(p=0.000) 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.1422*** 
(5.47) 
0.0124** 
(2.47) 
0.5019*** 
(4.26) 
–5.09*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.42 
(p=0.154) 
16.00 
(p=0.657) 
12.20*** 
(p=0.000) 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.2572*** 
(4.62) 
0.0194* 
(1.82) 
0.1492 
(0.71) 
–2.45** 
(p=0.014) 
–0.43 
(p=0.666) 
26.61 
(p=0.114) 
8.38*** 
(p=0.000) 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0613*** 
(6.60) 
0.0032* 
(1.79) 
0.0313 
(0.18) 
–2.24** 
(p=0.025) 
–0.97 
(p=0.330) 
17.87 
(p=0.531) 
5.56*** 
(p=0.000) 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.0737*** 
(4.43) 
–0.0057 
(–0.84) 
0.3258** 
(2.39) 
–4.09*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.01 
(p=0.311) 
26.32 
(p=0.121) 
6.52*** 
(p=0.000) 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.1643*** 
(5.38) 
–0.0051 
(–0.57) 
–0.0272 
(–0.13) 
–2.04*** 
(p=0.042) 
–0.80 
(p=0.422) 
19.41 
(p=0.431) 
7.94*** 
(p=0.000) 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0316*** 
(6.24) 
–0.0009 
(–0.52) 
0.0671 
(0.42) 
–2.66*** 
(p=0.008) 
–0.84 
(p=0.398) 
17.61 
(p=0.549) 
6.67*** 
(p=0.000) 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1296*** 
(4.41) 
0.0147*** 
(3.52) 
0.3263** 
(2.29) 
–3.63*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.45 
(p=0.148) 
29.99* 
(p=0.052) 
6.12*** 
(p=0.000) 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.1839*** 
(6.11) 
0.0213*** 
(3.65) 
0.2491** 
(2.05) 
–3.53*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.32 
(p=0.187) 
26.15 
(p=0.126) 
7.18*** 
(p=0.000) 
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Investment measureb Constant Tobin’s Q INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1084*** 
(5.04) 
0.0132*** 
(2.89) 
0.4227*** 
(3.78) 
–3.96*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.55 
(p=0.120) 
23.43 
(p=0.219) 
8.50*** 
(p=0.000) 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.1369*** 
(5.26) 
0.0180** 
(2.33) 
0.3257** 
(2.49) 
–3.39*** 
(p=0.001) 
–1.61 
(p=0.108) 
32.34** 
(p=0.029) 
9.22*** 
(p=0.000) 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0223*** 
(3.72) 
0.0025** 
(2.28) 
0.3996*** 
(3.01) 
–3.50*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.22 
(p=0.221) 
22.91 
(p=0.241) 
10.55*** 
(p=0.000) 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0253*** 
(3.54) 
0.0017 
(1.42) 
0.4855*** 
(3.53) 
–3.66*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.60 
(p=0.550) 
18.46 
(p=0.492) 
15.92*** 
(p=0.000) 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 –0.0229* 
(–1.96) 
0.0078 
(1.45) 
0.2721** 
(2.21) 
–3.62*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.53 
(p=0.126) 
26.14 
(p=0.126) 
4.91*** 
(p=0.000) 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0022 
(1.25) 
–0.0005 
(–0.56) 
0.3698*** 
(4.75) 
–4.56*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.84* 
(p=0.065) 
21.62 
(p=0.304) 
10.24*** 
(p=0.000) 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0041** 
(1.82) 
–0.0003 
(–0.33) 
0.3121*** 
(3.71) 
–4.01*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.31 
(p=0.191) 
23.86 
(p=0.201) 
7.64*** 
(p=0.000) 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.0752*** 
(3.28) 
0.0244 
(3.53) 
0.2055*** 
(1.17) 
–2.81*** 
(p=0.005) 
0.12 
(p=0.907) 
25.32 
(p=0.150) 
1.84* 
(p=0.054) 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.2958*** 
(4.24) 
0.0606*** 
(3.10) 
–0.4652* 
(–1.80) 
–2.19** 
(p=0.028) 
–0.47 
(p=0.638) 
16.00 
(p=0.657) 
1.88** 
(p=0.047) 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0216*** 
(3.39) 
0.0054*** 
(3.36) 
0.2802* 
(1.67) 
–3.10*** 
(p=0.002) 
–0.40 
(p=0.688) 
14.91 
(p=0.728) 
3.68*** 
(p=0.000) 
Notes:  
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a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The simple Tobin’s Q model of corporate investment is estimated by two-step 
system-GMM estimators using Stata 11. Tobin’s Q is measured as the market-to-book value of common equity. The first year observation for each company is lost 
because the dynamic structure of the model. 
b. Different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable (INV) in their respective regressions. The Tobin’s Q model is specified as
itititit INVQINV   1210 . 
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables. The instruments used for the regression include Constant, Year dummies, Qt, INVt-3… t-5, 
∆Year dummies, ∆Qt and ∆INVt-2. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is 
robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test has its own 
problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
h. F-statistic for the regression which tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 5.H: Rankings of the corporate investment measures based on an alternative 
measure of volatilitya 
INV measure MAEb Absolute mean of INV Scaled MAEc Rankd 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.2021 0.2772  0.7290 8 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.3564 0.3683  0.8538 11 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.1537 0.2144  0.7221 7 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.2429 0.2773  0.8049 9 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0457 0.0560  0.8389 10 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.1917 0.0113  29.9578 20 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.2212 0.0722  2.5221 16 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0501 0.0186  2.4432 15 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1066 0.2281  0.4577 2 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.1461 0.2506  0.5529 5 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1148 0.2076  0.5299 4 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.1650 0.2375  0.6382 6 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0220 0.0501  0.4281 1 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0289 0.0566  0.4916 3 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.1309 0.0114  4.9210 19 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0221 0.0065  3.3924 18 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0251 0.0090  2.5392 17 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.1807 0.1293  1.7645 14 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.4081 0.2347  1.7372 13 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0389 0.0365  1.1212 12 
Notes:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The errors are obtained 
from estimating the time trend regressions specified as Equation 5.2 using two-step system-GMM estimators.  
b. The mean absolute error is defined as the square root of the mean square error which can be calculated as 
follows,  
N
VNIINV
n
i itit  

1
ˆ
MAE  
where 
itVNI ˆ  denotes the estimated value of INVit obtained from estimating the trend regression, and N denotes 
the total sample size. 
c. The scaled mean absolute error is defined as the ratio of the mean absolute error to the mean of the absolute 
mean of the observed values  
d. The corporate investment measures are ranked based on their respective scaled mean absolute errors, from 
lowest volatility to highest volatility around their respective trends.  
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Appendix 5.I: Difference-GMM estimation results for the trend regression of corporate investment measuresa 
Investment measureb Constant T T2 INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Sargan testg Wald testh 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.3208***
c 
(11.61)d 
–0.0550*** 
(–6.24) 
0.0052*** 
(7.46) 
0.1970*** 
(6.92) 
–10.49*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.30 
(p=0.193) 
38.34 
(p=0.320) 
130.36*** 
(p=0.000) 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.5447*** 
(10.14) 
–0.1213*** 
(–6.87) 
0.0108*** 
(7.61) 
0.1781*** 
(6.51) 
–9.27*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.18 
(p=0.849) 
39.65 
(p=0.270) 
108.88*** 
(p=0.000) 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.3005*** 
(12.38) 
–0.0546*** 
(–7.42) 
0.0045*** 
(8.05) 
0.1909*** 
(8.02) 
–11.07*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.48 
(p=0.137) 
45.13 
(p=0.117) 
142.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.4108*** 
(10.64) 
–0.0842*** 
(–6.99) 
0.0066*** 
(7.29) 
0.1889*** 
(8.36) 
–9.03*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.20 
(p=0.838) 
54.90** 
(p=0.017) 
117.16*** 
(p=0.000) 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0709*** 
(10.55) 
–0.0118*** 
(–5.70) 
0.0010*** 
(6.06) 
0.1931*** 
(6.94) 
–10.20*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.29 
(p=0.769) 
41.02 
(p=0.2234) 
86.99*** 
(p=0.000) 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.1571*** 
(5.20) 
–0.0692*** 
(–6.48) 
0.0059*** 
(6.97) 
0.1758*** 
(7.35) 
–11.24*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.79 
(p= 0.426) 
29.00 
(p=0.752) 
112.02*** 
(p=0.000) 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.2874*** 
(7.96) 
–0.0992*** 
(–7.96) 
0.0084*** 
(8.48) 
0.1424*** 
(6.40) 
–10.33*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.26 
(p=0.794) 
39.32 
(p=0.282) 
108.77*** 
(p=0.000) 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0525*** 
(6.44) 
–0.0182*** 
(–6.65) 
0.0015*** 
(7.32) 
0.1893*** 
(7.64) 
–9.51*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.51 
(p=0.607) 
41.16 
(p=0.219) 
121.26*** 
(p=0.000) 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1707*** 
(12.50) 
–0.0114*** 
(–2.91) 
0.0011*** 
(3.46) 
0.3092*** 
(10.61) 
–9.16*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.84 
(p=0.395) 
44.79 
(p=0.124) 
130.34*** 
(p=0.000) 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2527*** 
(11.68) 
–0.0382*** 
(–5.55) 
0.0034*** 
(6.13) 
0.2751*** 
(11.21) 
–8.83*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.67* 
(p=0.094) 
42.56 
(p=0.177) 
180.54*** 
(p=0.000) 
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Investment measureb Constant T T2 INV–1 Test for AR(1)
e Test for AR(2)f Sargan testg Wald testh 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1736*** 
(11.44) 
–0.0201*** 
(–5.59) 
0.0015*** 
(5.41) 
0.3933*** 
(12.98) 
–8.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.01 
(p=0.308) 
45.08 
(p=0.118) 
251.80*** 
(p=0.000) 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.2446*** 
(11.40) 
–0.0362*** 
(–5.80) 
0.0027*** 
(5.68) 
0.3166*** 
(13.38) 
–7.19*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.96 
(p=0.335) 
45.96 
(p=0.101) 
225.21*** 
(p=0.000) 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0385*** 
(11.54) 
–0.0040*** 
(–4.05) 
0.0003*** 
(3.29) 
0.4102*** 
(14.32) 
–8.40*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.46 
(p=0.142) 
43.79 
(p=0.146) 
281.40*** 
(p=0.000) 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0522*** 
(11.26) 
–0.0080*** 
(–6.12) 
0.0005*** 
(5.62) 
0.3934*** 
(14.57) 
–8.00*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.08 
(p=0.278) 
43.77 
(p=0.146) 
379.46*** 
(p=0.000) 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0509*** 
(2.44) 
–0.0231*** 
(–3.19) 
0.0015*** 
(2.74) 
0.3780*** 
(12.76) 
–9.15*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.28 
(p=0.199) 
46.98* 
(p=0.08) 
247.84*** 
(p=0.000) 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0094*** 
(3.15) 
–0.0032*** 
(–3.18) 
0.0002*** 
(3.14) 
0.4319*** 
(16.50) 
–9.12*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.78* 
(p=0.075) 
37.13 
(p=0.370) 
311.97*** 
(p=0.000) 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0121*** 
(3.29) 
–0.0042*** 
(–3.47) 
0.0003*** 
(3.59) 
0.4085*** 
(14.75) 
–8.23*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.68* 
(p=0.092) 
35.91 
(p=0.425) 
260.95*** 
(p=0.000) 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.1409*** 
(4.96) 
–0.0193** 
(–1.98) 
0.0017** 
(2.22) 
0.1032*** 
(4.36) 
–9.11*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.22 
(p=0.822) 
41.16 
(p=0.218) 
23.61*** 
(p=0.000) 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.3331*** 
(5.14) 
–0.0511** 
(–2.22) 
0.0040** 
(2.19) 
0.0932*** 
(3.84) 
–8.68*** 
(p=0.000) 
–0.90 
(p=0.364) 
33.15 
(p=0.557) 
18.61*** 
(p=0.000) 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0447*** 
(7.08) 
–0.0075*** 
(–3.56) 
0.0005*** 
(3.45) 
0.2344*** 
(8.61) 
–10.20*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.09 
(p= 0.928) 
43.56 
(p=0.151) 
90.71*** 
(p=0.000) 
Notes: 
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations of the period 1999–2008. The trend regressions are estimated by difference-GMM estimators using Stata 
11. The first year observation for each company is lost because the dynamic structure of the model. 
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b. Different corporate investment measures are used as the dependent variable (INV) in their respective trend regressions. The trend regression is specified as 
ititttit INVTTINV   13
2
210  
The instruments used for the regression include Constant, ∆T, ∆T2t and INVt-2….  
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, on the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Sargan overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test 
statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. Under the null hypothesis of instrument validity, the Sargan test has an asymptotic Chi-squared 
distribution. 
h. The Wald test tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
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Appendix 5.J: Coefficients of variation of the root mean square error based on 
difference-GMM estimation resultsa 
Investment measure RMSEb Absolute mean of INV CV(RMSE)c Rankd 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.3253 0.2772 1.1737 8 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.5964 0.4174 1.4290 11 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.2465 0.2129 1.1581 7 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.4132 0.3018 1.3690 10 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0682 0.0545 1.2518 9 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.2971 0.0064 46.2709 20 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.3555 0.0877 4.0535 16 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0804 0.0205 3.9309 15 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.1432 0.2329 0.6149 1 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2204 0.2642 0.8342 5 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.1482 0.2166 0.6842 2 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.2504 0.2585 0.9686 6 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0357 0.0514 0.6945 3 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0451 0.0587 0.7690 4 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.2186 0.0266 8.2144 19 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0333 0.0065 5.0905 18 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0403 0.0099 4.0894 17 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.3103 0.1024 3.0315 14 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.6848 0.2349 2.9156 13 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0631 0.0347 1.8197 12 
Note:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations of the period 1999–2008. The residuals are 
obtained by estimating the trend regressions specified as Equation 5.2 using difference-GMM estimators.  
b. The root mean square error, which is defined as the square root of the mean square error (see Equation 5.3). 
The coefficient of variation of the root mean square error, which is defined as the ratio of the root mean square 
error to the absolute mean of the observed values (see Equation 5.4). 
c. The corporate investment measures are ranked based on their respective coefficients of variation of the root 
mean square error, from lowest volatility to highest volatility around their respective trends. 
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Appendix 5.K: Fixed effect estimation results for the regressions of stock returns on 
unexpected earnings and unexpected corporate investmenta 
Investment measureb Constant UEPS UINV Hausman F-statistice Wald testf Rankg 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.3178***
c  
(8.40) d 
0.7489*** 
(8.08) 
0.0796* 
(1.93) 
13.54*** 
(p=0.001) 
23.41 
(p=0.000) 
3.7249 
(p=0.054) 
18 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.3176***  
(8.42) 
0.7558*** 
(8.18) 
0.0613*** 
(2.61) 
13.08*** 
(p=0.001) 
24.21 
(p=0.000) 
6.8121 
(p=0.009) 
14 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.3175***  
(8.44) 
0.7534***  
(8.14) 
0.1383**  
(2.57) 
19.09*** 
(p=0.000) 
23.42 
(p=0.000) 
6.6049 
(p=0.011) 
16 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.3174***  
(8.45) 
0.7563***  
(8.18) 
0.0809**  
(2.59) 
15.70*** 
(p=0.000) 
23.32 
(p=0.000) 
6.7081 
(p=0.010) 
15 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.3178***  
(8.39) 
0.7489***  
(8.12) 
0.1460  
(0.88) 
25.57*** 
(p=0.000) 
22.51 
(p=0.000) 
0.7744 
(p=0.379) 
20 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.3181***  
(8.46) 
0.7526***  
(8.16) 
0.1270***  
(3.21) 
59.91*** 
(p=0.000) 
24.65 
(p=0.000) 
10.3041 
(p=0.001) 
11 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.3179***  
(8.49) 
0.7603***  
(8.28) 
0.1396***  
(3.98) 
41.96*** 
(p=0.000) 
26.01 
(p=0.000) 
15.8404 
(p=0.000) 
5 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.3182***  
(8.45) 
0.7512***  
(8.20) 
0.4911***  
(3.38) 
30.85*** 
(p=0.000) 
24.73 
(p=0.000) 
11.4244 
(p=0.001) 
10 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.3180***  
(8.45) 
0.7545***  
(8.21) 
0.3140***  
(3.18) 
15.48*** 
(p=0.000) 
21.97 
(p=0.000) 
10.1124 
(p=0.001) 
12 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.3182***  
(8.52) 
0.7554***  
(8.19) 
0.2536***  
(4.42) 
14.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
24.41 
(p=0.000) 
19.5364 
(p=0.000) 
3 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.3176***  
(8.49) 
0.7565***  
(8.22) 
0.3955***  
(3.72) 
12.58*** 
(p=0.002) 
24.65 
(p=0.000) 
13.8384 
(p=0.000) 
8 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.3177***  
(8.51) 
0.7568***  
(8.26) 
0.2221***  
(3.86) 
11.54*** 
(p=0.003) 
25.16 
(p=0.000) 
14.8996 
(p=0.000) 
6 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.3177***  
(8.39) 
0.7524***  
(8.13) 
0.3557  
(0.99) 
11.11*** 
(p=0.004) 
21.93 
(p=0.000) 
0.9801 
(p=0.323) 
19 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.3198***  
(8.55) 
0.7481***  
(8.16) 
1.3857***  
(4.54) 
7.49*** 
(p=0.024) 
24.84 
(p=0.000) 
20.6116 
(p=0.000) 
2 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.3188***  
(8.55) 
0.7458***  
(8.20) 
0.2789***  
(4.83) 
6.53*** 
(p=0.038) 
24.25 
(p=0.000) 
23.3289 
(p=0.000) 
1 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.3180***  
(8.43) 
0.7495***  
(8.16) 
1.2760***  
(3.65) 
11.12*** 
(p=0.004) 
24.14 
(p=0.000) 
13.3225 
(p=0.000) 
9 
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Investment measureb Constant UEPS UINV Hausman F-statistice Wald testf Rankg 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.3187***  
(8.48) 
0.7489***  
(8.18) 
1.2075***  
(3.86) 
10.71*** 
(p=0.005) 
23.92 
(p=0.000) 
14.8996 
(p=0.000) 
7 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.3179***  
(8.43) 
0.7662***  
(8.20) 
0.0940***  
(2.74) 
19.95*** 
(p=0.000) 
21.82 
(p=0.000) 
7.5076 
(p=0.006) 
13 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.3178***  
(8.45) 
0.7511***  
(8.17) 
0.0393**  
(2.39) 
14.87*** 
(p=0.000) 
22.11 
(p=0.000) 
5.7121 
(p=0.017) 
17 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.3187***  
(8.49) 
0.7710***  
(8.33) 
0.7384***  
(4.11) 
11.24*** 
(p=0.004) 
23.03 
(p=0.000) 
16.8921 
(p=0.000) 
4 
Note:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations of the period 1999–2008. The model specified in 
Equation 5.5 is estimated by fixed effect estimators using Stata 11. 
b. Unexpected change in corporate investment measures are used as an explanatory variable in their respective 
regressions. The regression is specified as 
itititit eUINVUEPSMAR  210   
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables.  
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Hausman test is implemented to test for whether the individual effect is correlated with regressors. The test 
compares the coefficients obtained from both fixed effect and random effect estimators. Under the null 
hypothesis that individual effects are random, the fixed effect and random effect estimates should be similar 
because both are consistent. Under the alternative hypothesis, the fixed effect and random effect estimators 
diverge due to the inconsistence of random effects estimators, and thus the fixed effect estimator should be 
used. The test statistic asymptotically follows the Chi-squared distribution. 
f. We perform Wald test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on UINV is equal to zero. The test reports 
results using the F-statistic. The associated p-value is reported in parenthesis. 
g. The corporate investment measures are ranked based on their respective Wald test results, from the most 
informative to the lowest informative. 
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Appendix 5.L: System-GMM estimation results for the regressions of stock returns on unexpected earnings and alternative 
measure of unexpected corporate investmenta 
Investment measureb Constant UEPS UINV Test for AR(1)e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich Wald testi Rankj 
1. GINVt /Kt 0.0452***  
(2.50) 
0.7561***  
(6.91) 
0.0451  
(1.59) 
–11.90*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.56 
(p=0.118) 
54.52 
(p=0.641) 
21.10*** 
(p=0.000) 
2.53 
(p=0.112) 
17 
2. GINVt /Kt–1 0.0454***  
(2.51) 
0.7542***  
(6.76) 
0.0375***  
(2.76) 
–11.86*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.53 
(p=0.126) 
56.50 
(p=0.568) 
20.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
7.62*** 
(p=0.006) 
14 
3. GINVt /Krt 0.0465**  
(2.59) 
0.7598***  
(7.14) 
0.0850**  
(2.22) 
–11.92*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.47 
(p=0.141) 
51.14 
(p=0.756) 
22.71*** 
(p=0.000) 
4.93** 
(p=0.027) 
15 
4. GINVt /Krt–1 0.0422**  
(2.35) 
0.7725***  
(7.15) 
0.0710***  
(3.91) 
–11.92*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.42 
(p=0.155) 
47.48 
(p=0.859) 
22.62*** 
(p=0.000) 
15.29*** 
(p=0.000) 
8 
5. GINVt /TAt 0.0531***  
(2.88) 
0.7320***  
(6.60) 
0.0713  
(0.55) 
–11.85*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.71* 
(p=0.087) 
52.93 
(p=0.697) 
21.76*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.30 
(p=0.584) 
20 
6. NINVt /Kt 0.0456***  
(2.45) 
0.7208***  
(6.40) 
0.0544**  
(1.99) 
–11.93*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.66* 
(p=0.096) 
62.59 
(p=0.350) 
22.10*** 
(p=0.000) 
3.96** 
(p=0.047) 
16 
7. NINVt /Kt–1 0.0446***  
(2.46) 
0.7229***  
(6.43) 
0.0686***  
(3.46) 
–11.94*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.59 
(p=0.111) 
60.49 
(p=0.421) 
22.43*** 
(p=0.000) 
11.97*** 
(p=0.001) 
9 
8. NINVt /TAt–1 0.0463***  
(2.57) 
0.7270***  
(6.50) 
0.2807***  
(2.91) 
–11.89*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.63 
(p=0.103) 
50.93 
(p=0.763) 
22.68*** 
(p=0.000) 
8.47*** 
(p=0.004) 
13 
9. GCAPXt /Kt 0.0504***  
(2.68) 
0.6967***  
(6.48) 
0.2937***  
(4.12) 
–11.80*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.48 
(p=0.138) 
66.89 
(p=0.224) 
22.01*** 
(p=0.000) 
16.97*** 
(p=0.000) 
4 
10. GCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0400**  
(2.09) 
0.7242***  
(6.55) 
0.2044***  
(4.80) 
–11.99*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.45 
(p=0.147) 
70.32 
(p=0.148) 
24.01*** 
(p=0.000) 
23.04*** 
(p=0.000) 
1 
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Investment measureb Constant UEPS UINV Test for AR(1)e Test for AR(2)f Hansen testg F-statistich Wald testi Rankj 
11. GCAPXt /Krt 0.0363*  
(1.85) 
0.7002***  
(6.59) 
0.3186***  
(4.14) 
–11.83*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.56 
(p=0.118) 
72.22 
(p=0.115) 
23.78*** 
(p=0.000) 
17.14*** 
(p=0.000) 
3 
12. GCAPXt /Krt–1 0.0481**  
(2.46) 
0.7003***  
(6.80) 
0.1648***  
(4.01) 
–11.89*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.52 
(p=0.128) 
70.26 
(p=0.149) 
21.48*** 
(p=0.000) 
16.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
5 
13. GCAPXt /TAt 0.0547***  
(3.09) 
0.7411***  
(6.93) 
0.8594***  
(2.93) 
–11.88*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.56 
(p=0.118) 
54.70 
(p=0.634) 
21.60*** 
(p=0.000) 
8.58*** 
(p=0.004) 
12 
14. GCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0444**  
(2.41) 
0.7162***  
(6.82) 
1.1106***  
(4.57) 
–11.97*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.31 
(p=0.190) 
64.51 
(p=0.290) 
22.82*** 
(p=0.000) 
20.88*** 
(p=0.000) 
2 
15. NCAPXt /Kt–1 0.0327***  
(1.75) 
0.7098***  
(6.64) 
0.1604***  
(4.01) 
–11.80*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.60 
(p=0.109) 
66.32 
(p=0.239) 
23.35*** 
(p=0.000) 
16.08*** 
(p=0.000) 
6 
16. NCAPXt /TAt 0.0365**  
(2.05) 
0.7251***  
(6.90) 
0.9310***  
(3.23) 
–11.93*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.55 
(p=0.121) 
62.83 
(p=0.342) 
21.76*** 
(p=0.000) 
10.43*** 
(p=0.001) 
11 
17. NCAPXt /TAt–1 0.0393***  
(2.20) 
0.7203***  
(6.95) 
0.9200***  
(3.95) 
–11.93*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.47 
(p=0.141) 
60.06 
(p=0.437) 
22.26*** 
(p=0.000) 
15.60*** 
(p=0.000) 
7 
18. NSFAt /Kt 0.0336***  
(1.87) 
0.7375***  
(7.12) 
0.0331  
(1.16) 
–11.85*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.62 
(p=0.105) 
57.35 
(p=0.536) 
21.79*** 
(p=0.000) 
1.35 
(p=0.246) 
19 
19. NSFAt /Krt–1 0.0498***  
(2.62) 
0.6741***  
(6.28) 
0.0167  
(1.53) 
–11.83*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.74* 
(p=0.081) 
59.45 
(p=0.459) 
18.35*** 
(p=0.000) 
2.34 
(p=0.127) 
18 
20. NSFAt /TAt–1 0.0288***  
(1.53) 
0.7216***  
(6.67) 
0.5006***  
(3.44) 
–11.90*** 
(p=0.000) 
–1.43 
(p=0.152) 
68.60 
(p=0.1839) 
21.37*** 
(p=0.000) 
11.83*** 
(p=0.001) 
10 
Note:  
a. The sample contains 4,320 UK company-year observations for the period 1999–2008. The model specified in Equation 5.5 is estimated by two-step system-GMM 
estimators using Stata 11. 
 – 384 – 
b. The alternative measures of unexpected change in corporate investment are used as an explanatory variable in their respective regressions. The model is specified as 
itititit eUINVUEPSMAR  210   
We also control for time effects by adding a set of year dummy variables. The instruments used for the regression include Constant, Year dummies, UEPSt-1…, t-3, 
UINVt-1…, t-3, ∆Year dummies, ∆UEPSt and ∆UINVt. 
c. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level.  
d. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
e. The Arellona-Bond test tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated individual effects. 
Autocorrelation at order 1 is expected in first differences, because 1 ititit   should correlate with 211   ititit  , since they share the 1it  term. 
f. To check for AR(1) in levels, look for AR(2) in differences, in the idea that this will detect the relationship between the 1it  in it  and the 2it  in 2 it . 
Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus 
bad instruments. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one implies model 
misspecification. 
g. The Hansen overidentifying restrictions test tests for whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Under two-step robust GMM estimation, the Sargan 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, but the Hensen J-statistic, which is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is 
robust. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. However, the J-test has its own 
problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. 
h. F-statistic for the regression which tests the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept coefficient are jointly zero. 
i. We perform Wald test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on UINV is equal to zero. The test reports results using the F-statistic. The associated p-value is 
reported in parenthesis. 
j. The corporate investment measures are ranked based on their respective Wald test results from the highest informative to lowest informative. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis empirically investigates the interdependence of corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions in the presence of financial constraints, with reference to a large panel of 
UK-listed companies observed within the period from 1999 to 2008, in an attempt to improve 
our current knowledge of the simultaneity of the execution of corporate decisions. It also 
represents one of the first studies to explicitly and systematically examine the influence of 
uncertainty and managerial confidence on the set of jointly determined corporate decisions 
within a simultaneous equations system. The simultaneous equations framework explicitly 
allows uncertainty and managerial confidence to not only affect each of the corporate 
decisions directly on their own, but also indirectly through their effect on other decisions. 
Such analyses reveal new insights into the role played by companies’ fundamental uncertainty 
and by managers’ psychological bias in determining aspects of corporate behaviour. In 
addition, this thesis offers, for the first time, a comparison and evaluation of the alternative 
measures of corporate investment that are currently utilised in applied corporate finance 
studies. It, therefore, sheds some light and provides some guidance for measuring corporate 
investment behaviour.  
This chapter concludes the thesis by briefly recapping the research questions, 
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summarising the key findings, highlighting the main contributions, discussing the broad 
implications, acknowledging the limitations, as well as offering some promising ideas for 
further research. 
6.2 Key empirical findings and conclusions 
6.2.1 Simultaneous determination of corporate decisions 
The comprehensive review of existing literature shows that, although much effort has been 
devoted to investigating this key set of corporate decisions, corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions have typically been treated separately and examined in isolation rather 
than altogether, and hence there has been little analysis of the simultaneity among them. Prior 
research, however, has provided both reasons and evidence that corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions are likely to be interdependent upon one another and jointly 
determined by management. Several mechanisms through which the set of corporate decisions 
may be related to one another have been explored, such as the institutional approach, 
flow-of-funds approach, tax approach, agency approach, information approach, etc. An 
important implication is that corporate investment, financing and payout decisions are 
potentially linked in several important ways, thus should be better analysed within a 
simultaneous model framework. However, previous studies on the simultaneous 
determination of corporate decisions are not sufficiently comprehensive, in the sense that they 
neither provide enough insight into the theoretical mechanism through which the set of 
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corporate decisions are likely to be simultaneously determined, nor offer solid empirical 
evidence which can verify the potential interactions suggested by the theoretical arguments. 
Nonetheless, previous studies provide us with guidance in modelling corporate behaviours to 
avoid the danger of drawing spurious conclusions.  
To fill this gap in the existing literature, Chapter 3 investigates the interactions among 
corporate investment, financing and payout decisions in the presence of financial constraints, 
with reference to the UK-listed companies. The three main aspects of corporate behaviour are 
modelled within a simultaneous equations system where they are treated as endogenous. On 
the whole, our results suggest that corporate investment, financing and payout decisions are 
indeed inextricably linked and jointly determined by UK-listed companies, as implied by the 
information asymmetry-based flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour. It is found 
that capital investment and dividend payout, as competing uses of limited funds, are 
negatively interrelated, and both are positively interrelated to internally generated cash flow 
and the net amount of new debt issued. These results suggest that UK-listed companies are 
likely to be financially constrained not only by the availability of internal funds but also by 
the access to external finance, and therefore managers have to consider their financing and 
payout choices alongside with their investment decisions.  
Furthermore, we divide the entire sample into financially more constrained and less 
constrained subsamples and analyse them separately, in an attempt to gain deeper insights into 
the mechanisms through which the set of corporate decisions interrelated with one another. By 
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comparing the magnitude and significance of coefficients on the endogenous variables across 
the two subsamples results, we find that simultaneity among the three corporate decisions is 
more pronounced for financially more constrained companies, whist that for less constrained 
companies is relatively weak. Our empirical results indicate that the substantial economic 
interactions among the set of corporate decisions observed from UK-listed companies are 
likely to be attributable to financial constraints. 
6.2.2 Corporate decisions under uncertainty 
The review of literature also shows that uncertainty associated with a company’s future 
prospects seems to be a critical factor in determining corporate investment behaviour, as 
highlighted by the real options theory of investment. A broad consensus in existing empirical 
research is that the effect of uncertainty on investment is negative, although a number of 
studies also suggest that relationship between uncertainty and investment might be positive or 
non-linear. However, prior research has largely ignored the importance of uncertainty in 
financial decisions as well as the potential influence of uncertainty on investment through its 
effects on financing and payout choices. Given the fact that all corporate decisions are 
determined on the basis of uncertain information, the omission of relevant information in 
examining the effect of uncertainty on corporate investment is likely to generate misleading 
results and lead to inappropriate inferences. Therefore, it is more plausible to model corporate, 
financing and payout decisions simultaneously, and to investigate the effect of uncertainty on 
aspects of corporate behaviour within the simultaneous equations system. 
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In order to comprehensively investigate corporate behaviour under uncertainty, 
Chapter 3 offers the first systematic attempt to uncover the influences of uncertainty on 
aspects of corporate behaviour. By examining the effects of uncertainty on corporate decisions 
within the simultaneous equations system, this thesis offers new insight into the role 
uncertainty plays, not only as one of the key determinants of real investment decisions, but 
also as a key factor affecting corporate financial decisions which has been overlooked by the 
existing literature. We find that the effect of uncertainty on corporate investment is positive 
and significant, while that of uncertainty on dividend payouts is negative and also significant, 
suggesting that uncertainty stimulates investment in capital stock, not only on its own but also 
through its effect on dividend payout policy. Accordingly, companies facing greater 
uncertainty appear to invest more, and fund the increased investment by resorting to internal 
finance by cutting dividends rather than resorting to external finance by issuing new debts. 
In addition, we find that the effect of uncertainty is more significant for financially 
less constrained companies but insignificant for more constrained ones, suggesting that less 
constrained companies respond to uncertainty more aggressively than more constrained ones. 
Therefore, our results offer new insights that financial constraints not only intensify the 
simultaneity among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions, but also reduce 
managerial flexibility in adjusting those corporate decisions to respond to uncertainty. 
6.2.3 Corporate decisions and the state of confidence 
Recently, an emerging body of literature on behavioural corporate finance uncover that 
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managers’ psychological bias may have substantial impact on corporate decisions. In 
particular, managers’ upwards bias towards future company performance may generate 
overinvestment, underinvestment and pecking order financing behaviours through different 
channels. Prior research in this area mainly focuses either on the influences of investor 
sentiment (e.g. Polk and Sapienza, 2009), or on the impacts of managers’ personality traits on 
corporate behaviour (e.g. Malmendier et al., 2011; Hackbarth, 2008; and Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005). However, little research has been undertaken on the influences of the state of 
managerial confidence or economic sentiment at aggregate levels on aspects of corporate 
behaviour, despite it often being argued that this has some bearing on corporate 
decision-making processes. Although the theoretical framework in this emerging area has not 
been firmly established and the empirical evidence is still relatively rare, it is plausible to 
hypothesise that the less than fully rational manager approach to behavioural corporate 
finance has the potential to explain a wide range of patterns in corporate investment, financing 
and payout decisions. 
By relaxing the conventional assumption that managers are fully rational, Chapter 4 
offers the first attempt to investigate the impacts of managerial confidence and economic 
sentiment at aggregate levels on the jointly determined corporate investment, financing and 
payout decisions, using data from the panel of UK-listed companies observed within the 
period from 1999 to 2008. The relations between corporate decisions and the state of 
sentiment and confidence are examined within a simultaneous equations system which allows 
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for contemporaneous interdependence among the corporate decisions. The empirical results 
show that the state of confidence at aggregate levels, as proxied by the UK or EU managerial 
confidence indicators or economic sentiment indicators, has significantly positive effects on 
companies’ real investment and debt financing decisions. The positive effects remain 
statistically significant even after controlling for company idiosyncratic uncertainty and other 
fundamental variables. These findings show that managerial psychological bias plays an 
important role in the determination of corporate decisions, adding new evidence to the small 
but growing literature on behavioural corporate finance.  
In addition, the results presented in Chapter 4 also provide empirical evidence that 
managers’ psychological bias and companies’ fundamental uncertainty influence corporate 
decisions independently through different channels. Both managerial confidence and 
fundamental uncertainty have positive real effects on corporate investment decisions. 
However, managers consider different financial choices in response to the increased financing 
needs caused by different factors. To finance the increased investment spending caused by 
high managerial confidence and economic sentiment, companies tend to use external debt 
financing rather than cutting dividends paid to their shareholders. To financing the increased 
investment spending under a high level of uncertainty, companies prefer to resort to internal 
finance by cutting dividends rather than resorting to external finance by issuing new debts. 
Moreover, we find that companies in the services sector behave more aggressively compared 
to others when their managers are confident. Specifically, they invest in capital stock more 
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intensively, use debt financing more heavily, and cut dividends more decisively when the 
sentiment is high.  
6.2.4 Measurement of corporate investment behaviour 
The review of corporate finance literature also shows that the use of the corporate investment 
to capital stock ratio as a measure of corporate investment behaviour has been common 
practice in applied studies. Although the corporate investment ratios used in the existing 
literature are similarly specified and interpreted in the same way, they in fact vary both on the 
numerator and the denominator. At least twenty different constructions of corporate 
investment to capital stock ratio have been identified in the existing literature. However, no 
attempt has been made to provide a comparison among various corporate investment 
measures. One claim which has been implicitly made is that different measures of corporate 
investment behaviour will always yield the same, or at least qualitatively similar, results in 
empirical analyses. As a consequence, we know little about how differently these corporate 
investment measures perform in empirical analyses, and the extent to which the choice of 
corporate investment measures may influence the conclusions drawn from empirical analyses. 
Chapter 5, therefore, aims to fill this important gap in the literature by discriminating 
conceptually and evaluating empirical twenty different measures of corporate investment that 
are currently used in applied studies. The various corporate investment measures are first 
discriminated from an accounting perspective. Given the fact that different accounting 
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principles as well as different elements are involved in the construction of the alternative 
corporate investment measures, they are likely to carry different sets of information about a 
company’s investing activities. Information about a company’s future prospects contained in 
one corporate investment measure may not necessarily present in others, and vice versa. Due 
to a lack of understanding of the financial information provided by the relevant accounting 
items, corporate investment measures are potentially misused in empirical analyses. The 
conflicting conclusions drawn from the empirical literature on corporate investment, therefore, 
may also be attributable to the differences in measuring companies’ investment behaviour. 
With a balanced panel of UK-listed companies over the period 1999–2008, we 
empirically demonstrate that the alternative corporate investment measures are not uniformly 
positively correlated with one another. Significantly negative correlations are also observed 
among the alternatives, which appear surprising, since they are supposed to measure the 
investment behaviour of the same batch of companies over the same period of time. Therefore, 
there is no reason to expect the different measures of corporate investment ratio to yield 
equivalent results in empirical analyses. Accordingly, we posit that the conclusions drawn 
from empirical analyses are likely to be sensitive to the choice of corporate investment 
measures. This prediction is empirically verified by repeatedly estimating a simple Tobin’s Q 
model of investment, which indicates that the measurement of corporate investment behaviour 
does indeed matter in empirical analyses. 
To assess the empirical performance of the alternative corporate investment measures, 
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we carry out both trend analysis and information content analysis. The empirical results 
suggest that gross investment measures are systematically less noisy compared to the net 
investment measures, while cash based corporate investment measures are systematically 
more informative than their accrual based counterparts. Accordingly, we conclude that cash 
based gross corporate investment to capital stock ratios are the best performing measures of 
corporate investments behaviour among the alternatives, as they contain relatively less noise 
and greater value relevant information. Researchers in the area of corporate finance, therefore, 
are suggested to utilise cash based gross corporate investment measures for their future 
empirical analyses if they have to make mutually exclusive choices among the alternatives 
without any particular preference. 
6.3 Main contributions to the existing literature 
This thesis aims to fill the critical lacunae identified in the existing corporate finance literature, 
by investigating corporate investment, financing and payout decisions simultaneously, with 
reference to a large panel of UK-listed companies. Based on an implicit flow-of-funds 
framework for corporate behaviour, we develop a simultaneous equations system that 
explicitly accounts for the interdependence among the three corporate decisions, with each of 
the decisions being treated as endogenous. Furthermore, the simultaneous equations system is 
also used as a platform for undertaking empirical investigations into the influences of 
fundamental uncertainty and sentimental bias on the set of jointly determined corporate 
decisions. Conducting such a study makes a number of important contributions to the existing 
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literature, which we believe, would enhance our understanding of the complex corporate 
decision-making process in the real world.  
Specifically, the main contributions of this thesis are fivefold. First, unlike previous 
studies that focus only on one aspect of corporate behaviour, we treat corporate investment, 
financing and payout decisions endogenously, and model them simultaneously within a 
system as implied by an implicit flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour. By 
utilising recent econometric methods for simultaneity analysis, this research overcomes the 
shortcomings of single equation techniques currently adopted in the existing literature, and 
provides new insight into the interdependences among the corporate decisions in practice. The 
interactions among the corporate decisions are empirically verified in Chapter 3 and further 
confirmed in Chapter 4 based on the evidence obtained from UK-listed companies, 
contributing to the current knowledge of the complex interdependence of corporate behaviour 
under financial constraints. 
Second, we explicitly explore the possible channel through which the set of corporate 
decisions are interdependent upon one another, in order for us to fully facilitate the corporate 
decision-making process. By splitting the entire sample into two subsamples with financially 
more constrained and less constrained companies respectively, we find that the simultaneity 
among the three corporate decisions is more pronounced for financially more constrained 
companies, whist that for financially less constrained companies is relatively weak. This 
indicates that the substantial economic interactions among the set of corporate decisions 
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observed from UK-listed companies are likely to be caused by financial constraints. The 
findings offered in Chapter 3 are helpful in explaining the joint determination of corporate 
decisions in practice.  
Third, this thesis offers the first systematic attempt to uncover the influences of 
uncertainty on aspects of corporate behaviour. By examining the effects of uncertainty on 
corporate decisions within the simultaneous equations system, this thesis offers new insight 
into the role uncertainty plays, not only as one of the key determinants of real investment 
decisions, but also as a key factor affecting corporate financial decisions which has been 
overlooked by the existing literature. In addition, we find that financially less constrained 
companies tend to behave differently under uncertainty from financially more constrained 
ones. This thesis, therefore, extends the existing literature on corporate behaviour under 
uncertain circumstances. This is again achieved in Chapter 3. 
Fourth, this thesis represents one of the first studies to explicitly and systematically 
investigate the influences of the state of confidence at aggregate levels on the set of jointly 
determined corporate decisions. By relaxing the conventional assumption of broad rationality, 
the study highlights the importance of managers’ psychological bias, as proxied by managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment indicators, in the determination of the corporate decisions. 
The findings with regard to the influence of the state of confidence on aspects of corporate 
behaviour persist even after controlling for company-level uncertainty and other company 
fundamental characteristics, indicating that the state of confidence and the level of 
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fundamental uncertainty affect corporate behaviour independently through different channels. 
The research work presented in Chapter 4 adds empirical evidence to the small but growing 
strand of literature on behavioural corporate finance. 
Finally, the comprehensive review of literature shows that the use of corporate 
investment to capital stock ratio as a measure of corporate investment behaviour in empirical 
analyses has become a common practice. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has 
been no literature that provides a comparison among the various versions of corporate 
investment ratio which seem at first sight very similarly constructed. An attempt is made in 
this thesis to conceptually discriminate and statistically compare twenty alternative measures 
of corporate investment which have been identified in the existing literature. The evaluation 
results presented in Chapter 5 not only provide some guidance for measuring corporate 
investment behaviour in future empirical analyses, but also to some extent explain the 
inconsistent evidence and conflicting conclusions in the existing empirical literature on 
corporate investment. 
6.4 Practical implications of the findings 
The findings and conclusions presented in this thesis not only contribute to the existing 
academic literature, but also have broader practical implications, especially for corporate 
managers, public policy makers and investors.  
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6.4.1 Implications for corporate managers 
Since our investigation focuses particularly on the simultaneity as well as determinants of 
corporate investment, financing and payout decisions of UK-listed companies, we first 
consider the practical implications for corporate managers. 
First, the interactions among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions 
evidenced in this study have distinct implications for companies and their managements. In 
making key corporate decisions, managers must be aware of the inherent interactions which 
exist among them, in order to avoid undesirable side effects which may stem from a given 
decision. Thus, managers should consider the key corporate decisions simultaneously, or if the 
decisions are taken piece meal due consideration must be paid to the influence of the other 
factors. Particularly, in the presence of financial constraints, companies have to consider their 
fund-raising choices alongside their fund-spending decisions, in an attempt to prevent losses 
from underinvestment and at the same time to keep their overall cost of capital as low as 
possible, such that shareholders’ wealth can be maximized. 
Second, the empirical evidence on the relationship between investment and 
uncertainty uncovered in this study also has profound implications for corporate decision 
makers. Our results indicate that, in a competitive business environment, uncertainty 
associated with future prospects tends to increase not only the value of real option but also the 
advantage of pre-emption. In such a multi-player context, selectivity, value and timing of a 
company’s investments are likely to be influenced by the similar investment decisions made 
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by its peers. Managers therefore need to consider the strategic interactions among the peers in 
making corporate investment decisions. If there a strong and persistent advantage to be the 
first to invest, companies might be better off by investing earlier to pre-empt their rivals in 
spite of the uncertain outcomes. 
Third, it is found that managers are likely to be overconfident in making corporate 
decisions, and their upward psychological bias towards their companies’ future performance 
may result in distortions in corporate decisions. Although the less than fully rational 
managerial behaviour is fundamentally different from the rational moral hazard behaviour in 
the sense that managers believe that they are maximising their company’s value, managers’ 
upward psychological bias are likely to result in unintended overinvestment problems and 
simultaneously make their companies over indebted, which may damage shareholders’ wealth. 
These unintended distortions in corporate behaviour caused by managerial overconfidence 
cannot even be mitigated by using conventional incentives such as stock- or option-based 
compensation, as indicated in earlier work by Malmendier et al. (2011). Therefore, in order to 
better serve shareholders’ interests, innovative contracting practices and organizational 
designs are needed to constrain managers’ upward psychological bias. 
6.4.2 Implications for public policy makers  
Although this study focuses primarily on aspects of corporate behaviour, the empirical 
findings and conclusions drawn from this thesis may also have some implications for public 
policy makers.  
               Chapter 6: Conclusion  
– 400 – 
First, our empirical results suggest that the corporate investments of UK-listed 
companies are likely to be financially constrained not only by the insufficient availability of 
internal funds but also by the limited access to external funds. It is evident that financially less 
constrained companies are able to invest more efficiently by putting more weight on their real 
considerations in making corporate investment decisions, whereas the investments of 
financially more constrained companies are highly sensitive to their financial choices. 
Previous studies, such as Bond et al. (2003), indicate that, compared with the continental 
European financial system, the market-oriented financial system in the UK perform less well 
in channelling investment funds to companies with profitable investment opportunities 
because of the information asymmetry results from the arm’s-length relation between 
companies and suppliers of finance. Therefore, an important implication for public policy 
makers is that, by mitigating the degree of information asymmetry, which seems to be severe 
in the UK financial system, a more accommodative environment for business activities, in 
terms of corporate investment and financing, can be created. 
Second, it is found that managerial confidence and economic sentiment play a key role 
in the formation of companies’ expectations of future returns and risks, and thus in the 
determination of corporate decisions. High levels of confidence and sentiment encourage 
companies to take on more debt, which in turn enables them to invest more in capital assets. 
Therefore, the extent to which a policy stimulus contributes to an improvement in managerial 
confidence and economic sentiment is likely to be highly important. This implication is 
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particularly relevant for the public policy makers who are trying to stimulate corporate 
investment spending amid the on-going global financial crisis. In addition, certain level of 
uncertainty may also encourage companies to investment earlier in a competitive market 
environment, because the threat of being pre-empted may offset the value of the real option. 
Third, our simultaneous analyses show that corporate investment spending and 
dividend payout are competing uses of limited funds, and the negative relationship between 
the two variables may also have some implications for policy makers. It has long been argued 
that, in comparison to the classical system, the imputation tax system in the UK encourages 
companies to pay dividends rather than retain their profits (see, for example, Adedeje, 1998). 
Such a tax system therefore may exert a negative influence on corporate investment spending 
in the long run. Given this negative interaction between corporate investment and dividend 
payout decisions, government might be able to encourage corporate sector’s investment 
spending by adjusting its tax policy on dividends.  
6.4.3 Implications for investors 
In addition to the implications for corporate managers and public policy makers, the empirical 
evidence presented in this thesis also has implications for investors in general.  
The simultaneous analysis clearly shows that a company’s dividend decision is neither 
totally residual nor completely independent, but is taken with reference to its investment and 
financing decisions. In practice, investors seem to have strong preferences for high dividend 
payout ratios as they consider it as a sign that directors are alive to their shareholders. 
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However, investors may have not thought through the interactions that exist between dividend 
payout and corporate investment, and between dividend payout and debt financing. If fact, the 
size of dividend paid to shareholders directly affect both capital investment and debt financing 
decisions made by a company. If investors constantly put a high premium on dividend payers, 
companies might be forced either to forego relatively low net present value investment 
projects or to raise more external funds through a catering channel, resulting in either 
underinvestment losses or flotation costs. Therefore, an important implication for investors is 
that high levels of dividend payouts are not always in the best interest of shareholders. 
Shareholders should consider dividends paid by a company in the contest of the company’s 
investment opportunities and financing abilities.  
6.5 Limitations of the research 
It is worth noting that there are several limitations of the research reported in this thesis. First, 
the research relies mainly on the empirical research methodology, as illustrated by Figure 1.1, 
to test theoretical predictions. The findings and conclusions of this thesis are largely drawn 
from the accumulation of evidence collected from the dataset. Hence, the first main limitation 
of this thesis is that the validity of the conclusions may, to some extent, be sensitive to the 
selection of the sample, the measurement of variables, the specification of models, the choice 
of estimation techniques and the interpretation of results. Given the fact that a large amount of 
financial and accounting information is used to produce the empirical evidence, the results 
presented in this thesis may also be subject to the managerial manipulation of the reported 
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accounting data. 
Second, this thesis does not attempt to develop theoretical models and proofs on 
corporate finance issues. By using statistical hypothesis testing methods, we can only find 
empirical evidence to support or reject the theoretical predictions implied by the existing 
corporate finance theories, rather than prove them. Thus, theoretical issues in corporate 
finance are not explicitly addressed in this thesis.  
Third, although this thesis tries to systematically and simultaneously investigate the 
key corporate decisions within a framework as a whole, some important issues relating to 
corporate finance, such as corporate governance, initial public offering and seasoned equity 
offering, are not addressed here, owning to the lack of availability of relevant data. In 
particular, external equity financing is dropped from the flow-of-funds framework for 
simplicity, and thus the importance of financing through stock issuance is overlooked. 
Besides this, since the thesis is produced by combining four stand-alone research 
papers, presented in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, there is some limited amount of overlap among 
the chapters, in particular the duplication of literature review material. However, it is also 
necessary to review briefly the relevant previous studies in the empirical chapters to maintain 
their stand-alone status. We, therefore, allow for a limited amount of overlap among chapters, 
but the amount of overlap has been minimised where possible.  
Despite the above shortcomings, this research reveals new insights into the complex 
corporate decision-making processes. Some of the limitations of the research are expected to 
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be addressed in the future research. 
6.6 Promising ideas for further research 
Finally, a number of promising ideas for future research can be drawn from the existing 
literature reviewed and the empirical findings presented in this study. We conclude this thesis 
by proposing a number of promising research ideas for the further extensions of this study. 
This study investigates a key set of corporate decisions within a simultaneous 
equations system, as implied by the flow-of-funds framework. However, we do not consider 
external equity finance as a significant source of external finance, given the argument that it is 
rarely used after initial public offerings (see, for example, Cleary et al., 2007; and 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Following the “fairly standard assumption”, external equity 
financing thus has been dropped from the system for simplicity in this study. However, some 
other studies, such as Frank and Goyal (2003), claim that net equity issues on average exceed 
net debt issues in the US, and that net equity issues may track financing deficit more closely 
than do net debt issues. Therefore, further research may incorporate external equity financing 
into the simultaneous equations system, in order to explore the interactions between the 
external equity financing decision and other corporate decisions modelled in the system. 
Apart from the flow-of-funds framework for corporate behaviour, a number other 
approaches, such as tax approach and agency approach, may also be adopted to establish 
linkages among corporate investment, financing and payout decisions. These hypothesised 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but they may have very different implications for the 
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interactions among the set of corporate decisions. Further research may specify simultaneous 
equations systems for the set of corporate decisions in accordance with the alternative 
mechanisms, to further improve our understanding of the complex corporate decision-making 
process in the real world. 
Contrary to the broad consensus in the existing literature that uncertainty hampers 
corporate investment because of the increased value of the real “call option” to invest under 
uncertain circumstances (see, for example, Bloom et al., 2007 and Carruth et al., 2000), this 
study finds a significant but positive effect of uncertainty on the corporate investment of the 
UK-listed companies. This finding provides empirical support for the recent argument by 
Mason and Weeds (2010) that greater uncertainty can lead companies to take the advantage of 
pre-emption by investing earlier under a competitive business environment. However, the 
mechanism through which uncertainty stimulates corporate investment is not explicitly 
explored in this study, and thus needs to be addressed in future research. One possible solution 
is to classify the sample companies into monopolies and competitive companies according to 
their market structures (see, for example, Lensink and Murinde, 2006), and re-estimate the 
simultaneous equations system using subsamples. If Mason and Weeds’ (2010) argument 
holds, we expect the positive effect of uncertainty on investment to be more significant for a 
competitive company than for a monopolistic company. 
The construction of an appropriate proxy for uncertainty remains as the primary 
challenge faced by studies considering the effects of uncertainty on corporate behaviour. 
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Given the inability to underpin the specific source of uncertainty, this study derives general 
measures of uncertainty from stock market-based information. It is believed that, if the market 
is efficient, all of the information about a company’s asset fundamentals and growth 
opportunities will be properly transmitted into its share price. Thus, our measures of 
uncertainty are expected to capture the overall uncertainty associated with the changing 
aspects of a company’s environment. However, Carruth et al. (2000) argue that a test of the 
investment-uncertainty relationship should distinguish between the effects of industry-wide 
and company-specific shocks. The main concern is that irreversibility and strategic 
considerations act in opposite directions, thus the two effects may cancel each other out and 
lead to an inconclusive result. Therefore, another promising research idea is to decompose a 
company’s total uncertainty into its market, industry and company-specific components, and 
explore the effect of uncertainty at different levels on aspects of the corporate behaviour of 
UK-listed companies. 
Similarly, the principal challenge of incorporating the concepts of confidence into 
corporate behavioural modelling is to construct plausible measures of the hard-to-define idea 
(see Malmendier and Tate, 2005). In this study, we employ managerial confidence and 
economic sentiment indicators as proxies for the state of confidence at aggregate levels. 
However, recent literature in behavioural corporate finance has proposed a number of creative 
methods to proxy managerial confidence at company level. For example, Malmendier et al. 
(2011) and Malmendier and Tate (2005) exploit the overexposure of CEOs to the idiosyncratic 
               Chapter 6: Conclusion  
– 407 – 
risk of their companies, as reflected by their personal portfolio of their companies’ options 
and stockholdings, to measure managerial confidence in the US. Ben-David et al. (2007) 
measure overconfidence based on CFOs’ confidence intervals of their stock market 
predictions. Lin et al. (2005) construct managerial confidence measures for Taiwanese 
companies based on CEOs’ forecast errors in their companies’ future earnings. Unfortunately, 
such data that can be used to construct measures of managerial confidence at manager level is 
not readily available in the UK market. However, it is possible for further study to construct 
more direct measures of managerial confidence using survey instruments. Survey responses 
from corporate decision makers are expected to be better able to capture managerial confidence or 
overconfidence. 
It is clear that future research into corporate investment, financing and payout 
decisions is required, and much more remains to be done. With the development of theoretical 
frameworks and the accumulation of empirical evidence, our knowledge about aspects of 
corporate behaviour will be continually improved in the future.  
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